Brucker adds to these accusations of Hobbes three others, which I now propose to examine.

The first is, that the Scholastic Doctors were 'wont to dispute, with extremest stretching of the brain, about questions . . . commendable neither by reason of their utility nor of their certitude.' To this complaint may be added, because of its affinity, that of Mr. Lewes, who inveighs against 'the futility of the questions discussed.' I own to a perplexity, which has somewhat exercised me, touching this latter accusation. Mr. Lewes has informed us that he tried, but was unable, to continue his reading of the Scholastics; and, accordingly, he pushed them aside. I do not understand, therefore, how it was possible for him, save in the spirit of vaticination, to form a general judgment as to the nature of the questions discussed in these quickly discarded Folios. However, I will take his opinion for what it is worth. I will accept it as the unmotived echo of modern opinion. It shall cease to be his, and will be treated as a popular prejudice.

What is to be said to the charge? I can only speak to the extent of my reading. Neither occasion nor time has offered itself for studying the other Scholastic Doctors, as I have studied St. Thomas and Suarez. Nevertheless, I have repeatedly consuIted the former; so that I have been able to arrive at a more or less definite judgment touching the general tenor of the questions which they ventilate. The first thing that one naturally asks is; What does Brucker understand by utility? He surely cannot wish to limit metaphysical investigation to such matters as conduce to the comforts and conveniences of life. He cannot mean that nothing which does not help to light our streets, or to facilitate locomotion, or to substitute machinery for manual labour, or to transmit our messages, or to furnish our rooms, and the like, is worthy of thought or study. Indeed, I do not understand the reasons why Brucker has chosen to test science by the standard of utility at all. I had thought that Truth, wheresoever it may be found, is eligible for its own sake, -- that it is the adequate object of the noblest faculty of the human soul, -- and that the perfect beatitude of man formally consists in its inamissible possession. I have been taught by the greatest Philosopher of antiquity, that a life contemplative of Truth is man's highest state; and that the practical life is rightly regarded in the mere light of a necessary preparation for the former. Experience and observation have conspired to assure me, that there is in man, as it were instinctively, an insatiable hunger after Truth, which is temporarily cheated out of its appointed satisfaction by the necessity of living and of social and civic obligations; but is destined to receive the fulfilment of its desires at the last. To measure Truth, therefore, by its utility, as the word is ordinarily understood, is tantamount to turning means into an end and the end into means. It savours, moreover, of that miserable doctrine which, making no account of the acquisition of Truth, deems such acquisition valuable only for the excitement of the search and the exercise of the faculties that it presupposes. I cannot, then, bring myself to believe that such could have been Brucker's meaning. I prefer to suppose that his utility is intended to bear a cognate meaning to the futility of Mr. Lewes; and that he is accusing the Scholastic Doctors of dealing with questions which have little or nothing to do with Truth, -- a battling about mere words, -- unmeaning subtleties.

Taking the accusation in this light; what counterplea can be urged in defence? I should be very loth to maintain, that no one of the Doctors of the School has been ever tempted, by an oversubtlety of mind, to enter upon the discussion of questions that seem to be of comparatively little importance. I have encountered some such discussions myself; occasionally, (if I may be permitted to say so), even in the writings of Suarez. This is only saying that the philosophers of the School are men; and that they sometimes pushed their love of clearness and precision beyond the due proportions of science. But what I most emphatically deny, is this; that such is the general characteristic of the questions which they propose for discussion. As a fact, the main subjects of discussion are the common property of all. If one consults Suarez or Fonseca, for instance, it will be found that, in the treatment of by far the greater number of questions, either the authority of the School in globo is invoked, or the names of celebrated Doctors are introduced on one side or the other, -- often, on both sides. Hence we gather, that the particular subject-matter has been submitted to general treatment. Indeed, it could scarcely be otherwise; since the works of Aristotle were the text-book of Philosophy. Although, then, it may happen, -- nay, has happened, -- that a stray question may here and there occur in the writings of a particular Doctor, which has been started by himself and is, perhaps exclusively, his own property; nevertheless, these are exceptions to the rule, and it is unjust to frame a general indictment on the strength of a peculiar exception. As to St. Thomas, I may say that I have been occupied in the study of his Works for many years; yet I have never as yet come across a single question in his voluminous writings, that did not amply repay the labour of mastering it and the time expended upon it. Nevertheless, the labour often is not light, and the time is by no means short. The reader will have the opportunity of testing the truth of these assertions in the course of the present Work; for one of the objects I have had in view has been, to make him familiar with the writings of the Angelic Doctor.

I cannot help thinking, that prepossessions, such as those exhibited by Hobbes, Brucker, Lewes, and the rest, owe their origin to a defective acquaintance, often a total unacquaintance, with the special subjects of discussion and with the immediate bearing of these on truths of great moment. A problem, it may be, is set before them in its own naked simplicity; in all probability isolated from the weighty questions that depend on its solution. How is it possible for them to form a just appreciation of that which is involved in the Article or Chapter, over which they have only cursorily glanced? Even a professed student, until he shall have mastered the Scholastic Philosophy as a whole, is scarcely in a position to determine the measure of importance attributable to this or that Disputation. What hopes of success, then, can there be for those who turn over a few pages, here and there, of their author; and form a judgment on the strength of what little they imagine themselves to have picked up in the process? I can anticipate no other possible issue of such levity, than that their heads will become more muddled, and themselves further removed from an acquaintance with the Scholastic teaching than they were before. Neither do I think that the result of such butterfty-reading would be more propitious in other branches of knowledge. I will illustrate what I mean by an example. There is, perhaps, no part of the Philosophy of the School which has been so common a subject of amimadversion and scorn, as its doctrine about Modes. A superficial and opinionative thinker would be tempted to exclaim: In the interest of Truth, what can it matter whether there be a special class of Accidents that are absolutely incapable of being separated from their Subject, or not? Do not all these divisions and subdivisions savour rather of logical subtlety and of hairsplitting, than of solid and profitable knowledge? Such is the appearance that the dispute wears, so long as it is considered in itself, apart from its bearings. But now, let us apply it to a subject of vital consequence, -- the essential constitution of man. Every man is constituted of a soul and a body. But how is he constituted of these two elements? What is the nature of such constitution? For the formation of a man, is it enough that there should be a human soul and an inanimate body, side by side? Of course not, you will answer; the two must be united. -- Most true; and what is that union? Is it something, or nothing? -- You reply, Of course it is something; because, without it, the body and soul would not become a man. -- Well, then, Is it a Substance or an Accident ? -- It cannot be a Substance, will be the answer; because it cannot stand by itself. But it cannot be an Accident either; for then man would be a man by accident. Besides, I can conceive an Accident to be separable from its Subject. As a fact, in Mathematics I do so conceive of Quantity. But a union without any things to unite, is inconceivable. Therefore, it is neither Substance nor Accident. -- What is it, then? -- I cannot say. -- Suppose we call it a Mode. Surely, this is a truth not wholly unimportant in its way. At all events, it is a truth; and as such cannot be accounted a mere 'verbal dispute.' The remaining part of the first accusation which Brucker brings against the Scholastics is, that they ventilated questions that are not 'commendable by reason of their certitude.' I do not find that he makes any exception; much less that he treats the questions complained of as exceptional instances. Hence I am forced to conclude, that he makes this charge against what may be called the body of their teaching, -- and of their philosophical teaching in particular; because only as philosophers could they legitimately find a place in his History of Philosophy.

If this interpretation of his meaning be correct, I must meet the assertion with a categorical denial; and I confidently appeal, in justification, to the greater number of truths demonstrated in the present Volume, -- taken, as they are, for the most part, (as will appear), from the writings of the accused. I will presume, then, that Brucker intended his animadversion to apply only to certain, -- too frequent perhaps, but still, for all that, -- exceptional cases. Thus understood, his censure has greater show of reason. The mere fact, that there are questions which are points of controversy between rival Schools, and others concerning which Doctors of the same School have defended opposite opinions, is a proof, (if any were needed), that equal certainty does not attach to all the conclusions of the Scholastic Philosophy. But is this peculiar to that Philosophy? Has there ever existed a system of Philosophy, or even a science or discipline, whose teaching is equally evident throughout and, consequently, equally certain? Are there less numerous or less momentous points of difference now between modern, than there were formerly among the medieval, Schools? Surely, within the abstract sphere of Metaphysics there will ever arise problems which, for a time at least, fail of receiving a satisfactory solution, either because they have not as yet been sufficiently sifted by careful thought, or because the light of evidence seems to distribute itself in opposite directions. But, with regard to such questions, I recognize a wisdom of treatment in the School, which, if adopted in our own day, would signally contribute towards the restoration of scientific knowledge and the gradual diminution of baseless assumptions and pretentious theories. Consult Suarez, for instance, on one of these debated points. It will be found that the reasons for and against each of the different solutions are given with strict logical precision. When at last he offers his own, he supports it by the pure method of demonstration; while, at the same time, he examines and answers in form the arguments advanced in favour of the opinions which he rejects. You may not always agree with his conclusion; but you know where you are. The motives for each conclusion are plainly and tersely set before you. There is no declamation, -- no misleading rhetoric, -- no tirade against opposing Schools, -- no magisterial dicta resting solely on the teacher's own authority and unsupported by a particle of evidence. He submits his own decision to the same test as that which he applies to the conclusions of others, -- the simple test of reason. You perceive that all ideas and consideration of self give way before the paramount claims of Truth. Thus assisted and instructed, our task is made comparatively easy. We have only to weigh the arguments adduced, examine into the evidence of the premisses, as in turn we review each opinion; and then form an impartial judgment, to the best of our ability. Assuredly, if certainty is to be reached; such is the only safe road by which to attain it. It may be more pleasing to be presented with a medley of original views, even though they lack mutual consistency; or with startling paradoxes, tricked out in the colours of a vivid imagination and with all the ornaments of a brilliant style. The pages of the Scholastic Doctor may prove prosaic and tedious in comparison. But it must be borne in mind, that we do not come to Philosophy in order to be pleased or moved, as men betake themselves to a novel; for we are no true philosophers, -- that is, lovers of wisdom, -- unless we have a single desire of discovering Truth. And, if such be our intent, I confidently put the question, Whether the Scholastic method, as I have just described it, is not the surest means towards the attainment of this end?