The second complaint which Brucker makes against the teaching of the Scholastic Doctors is, that it carried on 'its countless philosophical skirmishes with the help of worthless mental abstractions.' Now, I must begin by protesting, first of all, against what I will call the preamble to this indictment. From Brucker's method of expression, his readers would be led to imagine, that the Scholastic, or Peripatetic, Philosophy is substantially polemic. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. Let any man of honest purpose take up one of the great Works of the Angelic Doctor, (and I would leave him perfectly free to make his choice); and he will not be long in discovering, that the said 'skirmishes' are not the rule, but a very rare exception. It is just possible that Brucker may have been misled by the form which St. Thomas has adopted in the composition of by far the greater number of his Theological and philosophical writings; and as the reader might possibly fall into the same error, if it should happen that he has yet to make acquaintance with these writings, I will add a few words of explanation touching this point, taking the Summa, (the last and most finished of the works of the Angelic Doctor); as my illustration. This compendium of Theology is divided into four principal Parts; viz. the first Part, -- the first half of the second Part, -- the second half of the second Part, -- and the third Part. As it would be foreign to the subject-matter of these Volumes, to which the present Preface is an introduction, that I should enter into an explanation of this division; I will say no more than this, that the aforesaid division is theologically clear, and will commend itself to the mind of those who make a study of the contents. Each Part is composed of a number of Questions, each one of which treats of a particular truth. The disposition and process of these Questions are based on logical and scientific principles. As a given truth ramifies into a certain number of sub-truths, each Question of St. Thomas is made up of a certain number of Articles, in which these sub-truths are discussed and determined. Let me take an example. In the eleventh Question of the first Part, St. Thomas treats of the Unity of God. There are four problems to which this Question gives birth. First of all, What is Unity? Does it add anything to Being? Then secondly, since God is so One as to exclude from His essential Nature any multiplication of Itself, it occurs to inquire, Are One and Many opposites, i. e. opposed to each other? Thirdly, Is God one? Fourthly, Is God pre-eminently and especially one? These four problems are respectively discussed in the four Articles of which the said Question is composed. All the Articles are constructed on one uniform plan. As Heading, the problem is proposed. Then follow, (under numbers 1, 2, 3, &c.) objections which either have been or may be urged against the true resolution. After these have been stated, there follows an argument in favour of the true resolution. Next comes what is called the body of the Article, (corpus articuli), in which the true resolution of the problem is given. Finally, an answer is made to each of the difficulties in order. I will take the third Article of the above Question, by way of illustration; setting it before the reader in an abbreviated form. The problem is, Whether God is one?

'1. It would seem that God is not one. For it is said in 1 Cor. viii. 5, For there be gods many, and lords many.

'2. One, which is the principle of Number, cannot be predicated of God, since no quantity can be predicated of God. In like manner, neither can one which is convertible with Being be predicated of God ; because it signifies privation, which is an imperfection.

'On the other hand, it is said in Deuter. vi. 4, Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord.

'I answer, that the unity of God is demonstrated by three arguments. First of all, it is proved from His simplicity: secondly, from the infinity of His Perfection: thirdly, from the unity of the world.' (I have purposely omitted the demonstrations themselves; since they are not necessary to the illustration of the form.)

'In answer to the first, therefore, it must be said, that there are many gods in the erroneous opinion of certain persons who worshipped many gods. Hence, the Apostle subjoins in the same place, Yet to us there is but one God.

'In answer to the second it must be said, that one, as the principle of Number, is not predicated of God, but of those things only which have material Being. But one, as convertible with Being, is predicated of God. For though there is no privation in God; nevertheless, according to the measure of our apprehension He is not known by us save by mode of privation and remotion. In this way, there is nothing to prevent certain privatives in expression to be predicated of God, -- as, for instance, that He is incorporeal, infinite. In like manner it is said of God, that He is one.'

I have chosen this particular Article because of its comparative brevity; but, however long others may be, they are all constructed on precisely the same plan. In the most important work of St. Thomas after the Summa, -- his Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, there is a slight addition made to the form. The Commentaries on the four Books of the Sentences are composed of Questions and the Questions of Articles, as in the instance of the Summa. But it occasionally happens, owing to the concise compendiousness of the Sentences, that the problem which heads a given Article virtually contains two or three distinct, though cognate, questions; in which case, the Article is subdivided into two or three little questions, (quaestiunculae), as they are called. These little questions are, each of them, constructed on the same principle as an Article. There is one other work of St. Thomas, which is very frequently quoted; and, at first sight; the method of arrangement seems altogether different from the rest. I allude to his Summa against the Gentiles; which is divided into Books, and each Book subdivided into Chapters. But the difference is more apparent than real. For it will be found, on examination, that objections are stated and answered in scientific form, whenever the occasion requires.

To resume my consideration of Brucker's innuendo against the Scholastics, viz, that they indulged in 'countless philosophical skirmishes:' -- It would seem highly probable, (as I have before suggested), that this misconception has arisen from the form of the Articles, as I have just explained it. For the same form has been substantially maintained, as a rule, by the later Scholastic Doctors; although they have not retained the division into Questions and Articles in so many express terms. On the contrary, other names have been introduced. Suarez divides his Metaphysics into Disputations; while each Disputation is subdivided into Sections. I cannot help regarding this nomenclature as most infelicitous; since the word Disputation suggests the idea of a philosophical skirmish, and gives occasion to the erroneous idea which I am now considering. Nevertheless, touching the form itself, it will be found to be admirably adapted for implanting clear, distinct, scientific, cognitions of the subject under discussion. Not only is the solution of each problem established by rigid demonstration; but the student is invited to return to the truth, -- to go round about it, -- to weigh all the objections that may be urged against it; while, at the same time, he is provided with an answer to each objection in order and logical form. This is all done as simply and as tersely as possible; so as to encourage, while guiding, the thought of the reader. There is thus room, -- nay, a necessity, if the student would hope to master the subject, -- for sustained intellectual exertion.

In making the above observations, I have no intention of denying that there were points of controversy between rival Schools, even on questions of Philosophy; but I am quite sure that their number and importance have been greatly exaggerated. If we except the Nominalists, whose theories never took root in the Church's Schools, the rest of the Doctors had one common foundation of Philosophy, -- the teaching of Aristotle. Hence, touching all the principal metaphysical truths they would naturally agree; and differed only about subsidiary questions, more or less intimately connected with the former.

But Brucker goes on to say, that the Scholastics carried on these 'countless philosophical skirmishes by the help of worthless mental abstractions.' The whole force of this accusation consists in the supposed worthlessness of these mental abstractions; for mental abstractions of some sort or other you must have, if you aim at acquiring science properly so called. There is no science of the individual and contingent, but only of the necessary and universal; and, so far as human knowledge is concerned, the necessary and universal are only discoverable in mental abstractions, -- that is to say, in ideas which abstract from all material conditions. Neither are these ideas less real, because they are formally logical, -- or rather, logical in form; on the contrary, it is only by means of these concepts of the understanding, that we can hope to pierce through the sensile, contingent, temporary, and mount to the pure heaven of Truth. Even the physical disciplines are compelled to use universals of their own; otherwise, they could adopt no classification and evolve no order or constancy of law. Are, then, the mental abstractions, which the Scholastic Doctors have used in the service of Metaphysics, worthless or not? Brucker has given no instances in proof; but has contented himself with the bare assertion. I am, therefore, compelled to give the statement a categorical denial. Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur. For the same reason, I must treat in the same way the further accusation of Brucker, that the philosophers of the School dealt in 'axioms assumed;' as well as the decretorial asseverations of Mosheim, that there were 'defects in their manner of reasoning,' -- that 'they did not divide their subject with perspicuity and precision,' -- and, in particular, that 'the definitions' of St. Thomas 'are often vague, or obscure, and his plans or divisions frequently destitute of clearness and proportion.'

There remain now only two accusations that I have not noticed. Hobbes asserts that the School-men 'conversed in questions of matters incomprehensible;' and Mosheim denounces 'their extravagant and presumptuous desire of prying into matters that infinitely surpass the comprehension of short-sighted mortals.' It is impossible to say for certain, (for, as usual, no instances are given as guides to the meaning and right application of these censures), but I am forced to conclude, that these writers must be referring to the Theological problems of the Scholastic Doctors; for, if their indictment applies to the Philosophy of the School, it becomes simply absurd. Assuming, therefore, my conclusion to be just; I must be excused if I decline to enter upon a question, which will involve the admission into these pages of a discussion concerning the science of supernatural Theology.