PROPOSITION XV.

Actual Essence is constituted by a certain real entity which is really identical with that Essence and likewise with its Existence.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this position, which declares that actual Essence is constituted by a certain real entity, needs no proof by reason of its immediate evidence. For Essence is Being in its primary signification; and Being is that which has entity, or is constituted by its entity. Real or actual Essence, therefore, is constituted by real entity. Besides, actual Essence is essentially distinguished from merely possible Essence, in that it has a real entity of its own, which the latter has not.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER asserts, that this real entity by which its actual Essence is constituted, is really identical with that Essence; so that there is nothing like a real composition between the Essence and that entity by which it is constituted. This assertion is illustrated, -- for it is too plain to admit of proof, -- by a comparison between actual Essence and the same Essence in its former state of mere possibility. In this latter state it was Nothing; now it is Something real, and Something real by the sole virtue of its own entity. Its entity is all its Something. Therefore its entity is really itself, though considered by logical abstraction of the mind, or conceptionally, as the form by which it is constituted. Hence, Essence as actual differs really and immediately from itself as possible, by its entity and by nothing else.

Further: either actual Essence is really distinguished from its Existence, or it is not. But, under either hypothesis, it must be conceded, that actual Essence is identical with its own entity. For, in the latter hypothesis, there are no two real terms of composition; since there arc only two conceivable entities (esse), -- that of Essence and that of Existence, which are supposed to be really one. In the former hypothesis, actual Essence is really distinguished from actual Existence. Therefore, the entity of actual Essence is not really distinguished from that Essence, otherwise there must of necessity be a processus ad infinitum; since the question will recur as to the actuation of that entity itself by which the said actual Essence is constituted; and so on for ever. For it is plain that a so-called entity, unactuated itself, cannot become sufficient reason of actuation in another.

III. IN THE THIRD MEMBER of the proposition it is declared, that the entity by which actual Essence is constituted, is identical with the Existence of that Essence. So far, there could be no divergence of opinion. But the present point is the one which has been so warmly contested.

The first argument in favour of this position, is derived from the testimony of common sense. For, in the judgment of men in general, the possession of this real entity by anything, is supposed to afford sufficient grounds for the assertion, 'This Being or Essence is, i.e. exists.' Nay more: take any man of ordinary common sense, and endeavour to persuade him that his existence is one thing and his actual nature or manship another thing quite distinct from the former; he would either think that you were treating him as a fool, or he would have serious doubts about your sanity.

Again: That which alone distinguishes. actual from possible Being, is the fact that the former is in act or actuated; and that actuation is its own proper entity. But who does not see, that this actuality of Being outside its causes is enough to verify the enunciation, Such a Thing is?

Once more. Each one of the commonly received attributes of Existence concurs in this actuated entity; therefore, the principal intrinsic reason, on which those who maintain a real distinction between Essence and Existence rely, is deprived of all weight. For, they urge that, while Essence is necessary, eternal, immutable, Existence on the contrary is contingent, temporal, subject to change; and that, such being the case, it is necessary to admit a real distinction between the two, in order to justify this opposite predication. Whatever may be the true answer to this difficulty, (which will receive its solution later on in the chapter); it suffices to say now, that the institution of a real difference between Essence and Existence does not diminish the proposed difficulty, while it creates fresh ones far more serious. For the entity by which actual Being is constituted, (remember once more, that the present question concerns finite Being only), is contingent, not necessary, -- temporal, not eternal, -- mutable, not immutable. It is contingent, because before its creation, it was not and might never have been; while, now that it is, it may afterwards cease to be. It is temporal, for the same reasons; and, for the same reasons, subject to change. More than this, there is no conceivable condition, necessary to Existence of Being, which is not verified in the entity of actual Essence. But if so, what possible grounds are there for insisting on a real distinction between the two?

Lastly: What is finite Existence? Surely, it is no other than that being by which a thing really is in itself, and is formally and immediately constituted outside its causes. But this it is precisely, by which Essence becomes actual, and ceases to be merely possible. There is no imaginable intermediate between these two states. Essence passes from being merely possible, or (itself nothing) from being objectively in the Wisdom and Power of God, to a state of actuation, by a proper entity communicated and preconceived by the Creator as the First Efficient and Exemplar Cause.

The limits, however, of this discussion have not as yet been reached. For it may be admitted, that actual Being is de facto existing Being, in the sense that actuation of Essence postulates Existence as its natural and naturally inevitable term; and yet it is open to doubt, whether that completive term be identical with actuated Essence, or really distinguished from it as an accident or mode of the latter. It is one thing to say, that they are never apart and mutually postulate the one the other; it is another to assert, that there is no real distinction between them. One can scarcely see how the opinion of a real distinction can be reconciled with the third conclusion in the preceding Thesis. Yet the question cannot be left here; if only on account of the authority of those grave Doctors who have strenuously combated the doctrine developed in his Chapter.

To clear the way for the discussion upon which we are about to enter, it is to be observed (and it is a point of the greatest importance), that the question turns on the existence of finite Being, in the full extension of its Transcendental Universality. The object of investigation is, not the Existence of Substance or the Existence of Accident, but Existence as common to Substance and Accident, -- or, in other words, the Existence of Being. In proportion as Being becomes more contracted by cognate determinations, conditions of Existence begin to multiply. And those conditions may be really distinguishable from the conditioned Actual Being. Thus, for instance, Substance requires Suppositality as a natural condition of its existence; Spiritual Substance, Personality; Accident, a Subject of inhesion. Furthermore, these natural conditions (so to call them) are (as will be seen later on) really distinct from the Beings which are thus conditioned. But the question now under discussion treats of the Existence of Finite Being in general. There is no one who will not be ready to admit, that Existence is that by which a Thing becomes formally and intrinsically existing.

Consequently, it is undoubted that actual Essence, as such, includes in itself, formally and intrinsically, the Being of Existence. Nevertheless, it is at least conceivable that it may naturally require some further term, or mode, or union, in order to exist among the things of Nature. It is on this point that the controversy between the two Schools may be said to turn. For there are some who maintain that, although Essence by its own real Entity is true actual Being, yet it requires some other real and distinct actuality, in order that it may properly exist. This ulterior reality is, according to them, Existence. Against such theory, the following Proposition is directed.