PROPOSITION XVI.
Between actual Essence and its Existence there is no real distinction, but only a logical distinction founded on a reality.
I. THE FIRST PART of this Thesis is proved by the following arguments.
i. If there is to be a real distinction between actual Essence and its Existence; evidently, some other entity must be supposed superadded to actual or individual Essence, in order that it may be able really to exist in the nature of things. But this is unnecessary; and therefore superfluous.
The proof of the Minor will rest in considerable measure on a truth, to which attention has been already drawn in the proximate introduction to this Proposition. It is true that certain real entities or modes, really distinct from actual Essence, are required, in order that this or that kind of Essence may connaturally exist. Thus, Substance demands for its natural Existence in the order of creation a mode, distinct from its own Essence, by which it becomes its own master, so to say, and substantially incommunicable to another. So in like manner, Accident connaturally requires a mode really distinct from its own Essence, -- a union with, or rather inherence in, its Subject. So, imperfect or incomplete Substance, such as the human soul, postulates, as a condition of its natural existence, a real mode of union with its correlative. (But these conditions apply only to the existence of Essence in such and such kind, not to the existence of Essence, as such. On the contrary, they presuppose, at least in order of nature, the existence of Essence, as such; of which the clearest perhaps, and easiest instance, is that of the human soul. In fact, the presupposition is based on a philosophic necessity. For no thing cannot be made really incommunicable to another; nothing cannot actually inhere in a subject; nothing cannot be really united as a part with its correlative part. In all real composition the parts must exist prior, if not in order of time certainly in order of nature, to the composite itself. Therefore, none of these modes give existence to actual Essence as such; seeing that they presuppose it. But there are no other conceivable modes of Being besides these; and the arguments in favour of the opposite opinion are derived from the admitted necessity of these modes. Moreover, if there be any other need to be supplied, -- if there be any necessity, or advantage even, in some further mode, let it be stated. Surely, such a position should be supported by some probable reason or argument. Yet no such reason has as yet been given. So far, therefore, the assertion is justified, that such a real addition to actual or individual Essence in order that it may exist, is superfluous. But if superfluous, it is to be rejected; because, according to the philosophical axiom, Entities are not to be multiplied without a necessity.
ii. This distinct Entity of Existence is not only superfluous, but it is impossible. For it is impossible that a real form should be added without a proper formal effect. But there is no real formal effect which this supposed Entity of Existence could claim to itself. The Minor in this syllogism requires some explanation. It must be remembered, then, that it is not now a question of any mode extrinsically added to actual or individual Being, for its ornament or greater perfection. Many such modes are conceivable; and not only conceivable, but discoverable. The Mode or Entity which is now under discussion, is an Entity intrinsic to the actual Essence and added to it; so that it may exist in the order of natural things outside its proper causes. But here there is no room for it. The existence of Essence, as such, is provided for by its actuation; the existence of such and such an Essence is provided for by those modes of Suppositality, Inhesion, Union, &c., of which mention has been already made. Where is there a hiatus? What further effect is needed or even possible? Therefore it remains, that this supposed form would have no formal effect; which is absurd.
Heretofore, the arguments have dealt with the subject generally, and have been directed against a real distinction of any kind. Now, however, by way of confirmation, it will be well to consider the matter more specifically, by proving that any kind of real distinction is equally inadmissible. To this end it will be necessary to borrow from the doctrine of Distinctions, which is reserved for the next Book. There are two species of real distinction, -- real major distinction and real minor distinction. The former includes all those cases in which the terms of distinction are de potentia absoluta physically separable, such as are Substance and Substance, Substance and Accident. The latter comprises eases in which the terms of distinction are not in such wise separable, even de potentia absoluta; because it forms part of the essential nature of the inferior term, that it should inhere actually in the superior term. Such is the distinction which exists between Substance or Accident and its Mode. A clearer and more detailed explanation of these different kinds of distinction will be given in its proper place. At present it suffices to say, that between actual Essence and its Existence there can be neither real major nor real minor distinction. Wherefore;
iii. It is impossible that there should be real major distinction. The only supposable hypothesis is, that, between actual Essence and its existence, there might be such a real major distinction as is to be found between Substance and its Accident; for no one has ever dreamed, or will ever dream, of turning Existence into a Substance. Existence, therefore, in the hypothesis now under consideration, can only be regarded as an accidental Form, which gives to actuated individual Essence that last complement by which it exists in the natural order outside its proper causes. In such wise, actual Essence will be in a state of proximate capacity to exist; and this accidental form of Existence will be at once necessary and sufficient to reduce that mere capacity to act. But this is wholly inadmissible; for,
a. First of all, it supposes real composition between actual Essence and its Existence, -- to repeat a former argument. Therefore, the existence of actual Essence must be presupposed, and is independent of any supervening form. If the two were really distinct, they would together compose one composite, viz. This existing actual Entity; so that although, as regards the entire composite, Existence would hold the place of an intrinsic and formal Act; yet, if referred to its correlative component, viz, actual Essence, it could in no way constitute or compose it, for the reason that the one would be really contradistinguished from the other, as a simple Entity from a simple Entity.
b. It would follow, that all finite Being exists, not by its own Entity, but by the help of an Entity extraneous to it. Therefore, nothing would exist of itself and, as it were, by its own right; but in virtue of a created form, distinct from itself and superadded to it. But this is entirely repugnant to our intimate sense of things, -- nay, is scarcely conceivable.
c. It would further follow, that Existence would necessarily be an accident, not to finite Being only, as such, (for this is not only admissible but capable of demonstration); but to actual finite Being. And this is, indeed, hard to conceive. The Antecedent is plain; for, as soon as ever any Essence is actuated, there can be nothing wanting to that Essence or Entity in its essential notes; so that every after addition must be accidental.
d. In particular, if actual Essence be considered, (so far as the present question is concerned), as a mere subjective power or faculty receptive of Existence, but requiring a formal act of Existence in order to the actuation of that faculty; the difficulty remains unchanged. For that subjective power is either something real, or it is not. If the latter, the question is settled. There is only one Entity which is Existence and Essence, in accordance with the enunciation of the Thesis. If it be something real, it is; and if it is, so far as it is, it exists. Consequently, Existence cannot be the formal cause or act of its real Entity.
To this argument an ingenious answer has been given. For, it is said, a formal cause may be regarded under two different aspects. First of all, it may be considered in its relation to the whole composite which it constitutes; in which relation it is the intrinsic formal cause of the composite, but does not in any way constitute the Entity of the Subject which it informs. But it may also be regarded in its relation to that Subject; under which aspect it, as it informing it. Wherefore, it may be truly said, that the Form or were, extrinsically comforts or strengthens its Subject in Being, by Act is not only the formal cause of the whole composite, but also of the Matter or Subject. And the truth of this reply is confirmed and illustrated by the instance of Primary Matter. For, let it be informed by whatsoever Form; while the direct action of that Form principally intends the constitution of the composite, it is, nevertheless, undeniable that its action extends likewise to the Entity of the Matter which is subject to it; since it sustains the existence of primordial Matter, which cannot exist of itself but can only co-exist with some Form.
This answer, however, really leaves the difficulty untouched; however plausible it may at first sight appear. For there is in the case of existing Essence no composite constituted, and no formal cause required. This is precisely the point of contention, and must not be assumed, at all events, till a satisfactory solution has been given to previous difficulties. A Being is either merely possible in the objective power of God, or it is actually in existence. There is no middle term. Consequently, if Essence is actual, it is ipso facto existing; and stands in need of no formal cause to constitute it existent. Again: in composite Being the form is primarily for the sake of the whole composite; and is only necessary to the other component part, inasmuch as this latter cannot naturally exist outside of the composite. But actuated Essence already is; because it is in act. And it is here principally that the illustration from Primordial. Matter fails. For Primordial Matter is a pure power or subjective receptivity, so to speak; it excludes all independent and perfect Act of whatever kind. Actual Essence, on the contrary, is in essential act; though not essentially in act. Hence, Primordial Matter is wholly passive or receptive, -- all but nothing, -- being truncated and, if it may be allowed to coin a word borrowed from Latin usage, dimidiate. It cannot exist by itself, but only co-exist; whereas actual Essence is in act, and completely constituted in its own proper Entity, outside its causes.
iv. It is impossible that between actual Essence and its Existence there should intervene any real minor distinction; or, in other words, that Existence should be a real mode of actual Essence.
The arguments already brought forward to prove, that there cannot possibly be any real major distinction between the two, are equally valid as applied to the present question. For, like those more general arguments which preceded them, they all lead to the conclusion that actual Essence exists by virtue of its own actual entity. Besides, all the conceivable modes of Being have been passed in review; and no place, no function, has been discovered for this additional mode. Therefore, it is presumably superfluous.
Nevertheless these previous arguments admit of further confirmation. For there is an apparent self-contradiction in the hypothesis itself, as shall be shown. If there is a real distinction between the Subject and its supposed mode; that Subject, apart from its mode, must be an actual and real being, already constituted outside its causes; otherwise, there would be nothing but a logical distinction between them. Therefore, actual Essence, apart from its mode of existence, and prior to it, would be a real, existing entity. This being so, the ulterior supervening mode would constitute, together with this existing Essence, a third something which would be a composite of both; neither of whose parts would enter intrinsically into either the constitution or composition of the other. Whence it follows, that this modal existence could in no wise affect the actual entity of the Essence.
The position may be further confirmed by an argumentum ad hominem. For this modal distinction has been introduced to meet a supposed difficulty, which fact, it indefinitely increases. The supposed difficulty is this. It is an undeniable fact, that it is possible for finite Essence to exist or not to exist. Therefore, say some, it requires a determining mode, in order that it may be determined to existence. The true answer to the difficulty will be given, in considering the objections which have been made to this Proposition. Meanwhile, it must be owned that the introduction of this Modal Existence does not serve its purpose. For, as created or finite Essence is possible to be or not to be; so is Existence itself possible to be or not to be. If, therefore, a determining mode is for this reason requisite in the one case; it must, by parity of reason, be requisite in the other. Therefore, Existence will require its determining mode, whereby it, too, shall be determined to be. But what about this second mode? Is it not, likewise, possible that it should be or not be? A new mode therefore will be required; and so on, without end.
II. THE SECOND PART of this Proposition declares, that the distinction between actual Essence and its Existence is logical or conceptual, yet founded in reality.
The mere proof of this position is not difficult. For, on the one hand, if the distinction in question be not real, it must be logical; on the other hand, one's own consciousness, and the universal judgment of mankind, combine in assuring us that such a distinction is not a pure plaything of the intellect, but that there is something in it.
The difficulty begins, so soon as the inquiry turns upon the nature of the reality which serves for foundation of the conceptual distinction; and the difficulty must not be left unsolved. At the outset of this investigation, it must be borne in mind, that we are not in search of the proximate foundation, or of the foundation on which the intellect consciously builds its distinction in this or that order of cognition; but of that supreme reality which, in ultimate analysis, affords of itself sufficient reason for the distinction. It is with the greatest diffidence that the author enters upon the question; because it is his misfortune to have arrived at a solution of it which is opposed to the teaching of Suarez. The extrinsic evidence of such an Authority carries with it a more than ordinary weight; yet, after all, the point must be determined on its own merits, in accordance with the preponderance of motives, or of intrinsic evidence, on the one side or the other.
The arguments which that Author brings against the ensuing explanation will be examined in their order.
There is one point about which there can be no controversy; however the terms differ, by which it is explained. Merely possible Essence is distinguished from its after existence as not-Being from Being; and the distinction may be expressed by the formula, Thing is really distinct from No thing. Some may call this a logical distinction; others, real negative distinction. But, however they may differ in terminology; all are agreed upon the nature of the distinction as well as of its foundation.
But it is the distinction between actual Essence and its Existence, which is in dispute. Now, all actuated Essence is singular, individual. It will, therefore, facilitate a very abstract train of thought, if some individual example should be selected as a subject for metaphysical dissection. So, let us take Plato. He was and is (since the human soul is immortal) an existing being. But his integral existence, his entire composite Being, as visibly existent in the order of nature, has long ceased. Further, he was not in the Homeric times. Then he was merely possible. Then he could be, or he could not be. Consequently, his existence was not necessary but contingent. Again; in a certain sense, as we have just seen, he has ceased to be. If a brute animal were to be substituted in his place, its present non-existence would be unconditional. A dead lion, for instance, simply exists no longer. Thus there is a real foundation for affirming that the existence of Plato is conditioned, contingent, temporal, mutable. But his existence is himself. And what is he? A man. Is he so called, because he had hair of such a colour, a nose of such a form, such a height of stature, such intellectual gifts, such a history? No. He is a man, because he is a rational animal. Observe, that time with its conditions has passed; the is of Essence is in the present. But is not this too contingent, temporal, subject to change? No; because Plato is a man. But he might never have been created. True; but, whether created or no, if Plato is to be Plato, he must be a rational animal. That cannot change. Why? Because Plato is a man; and a man must be a rational animal. But might he not have been made a stone? Not so; for then he would not have been Plato, but something else. Yes, but Plato's Essence and Plato's Existence are one and the same thing. How, is it possible, then, to attribute to it properties so contrary? Because he is a finite and, therefore, wholly dependent being; and the term of that dependence, as connoting the free action of the Divine Will, that is to say, his existence in the order of Being, is the real foundation of the distinction. Without that foundation, the distinction would be a mere trick of the human intellect.
Let the analysis now proceed with more scientific precision. Finite Being entirely and absolutely depends upon the Infinite. It depends, not only for its existence but for its existing quiddity or nature, on the Infinite. This truth receives illustration from the example of that which, most nearly of finite things, exhibits a like dependence, and has, consequently, been analogically called creation. The poem depends upon the poet; not only for its existence, but also in regard of its nature and quiddity, so to speak. But the existence of the finite depends upon the Infinite in a very different way from that in which the Essence, or Quiddity, of the finite depends upon the Infinite. The latter, even as actual Essence, does not depend upon the Free Will of the Creator, but on the necessary Idea of the Omniscient. Since God has willed to create the man Plato, He could not have made him other than a rational animal. He had no choice here; because the Quiddity does not depend on His Free Will. It does not depend on the Divine Free Will, because it is the realised imitability of the Divine Nature in a certain degree; and that degree of imitability is represented in the Divine Idea. But the Divine Nature, and the Divine Idea in the present instance, are absolutely immutable, even terminatively; therefore the quiddity of Plato is immutable, eternal, necessary, in its foundation. Nevertheless, God might have willed to make Plato that which we now call a plant. True; but then another Divine Idea, another grade in the imitability of the Divine Nature, another essence would be introduced, not that of Plato. And the question is about Plato's actual essence. If something else had been made in his place, that other essence would have been, in its turn, necessary, eternal, immutable; and for precisely the same reason. That actual essence, whatever it may be, corresponds to its Exemplar Idea; and, in its relation to that Prototype, it cannot be other than it is. God could not make the change; because that would be to deny Himself.
But, turning now to the existence of Plato outside his causes, (and such is the etymological meaning of the word Ex-sistentia), nothing can be plainer, -- assuming the fact of creation, -- than that Plato's existence was absolutely dependent on the Free Will of the Creator. He was not, then he was; he is, and is not; he might never have been. These are undeniable axiomatic truths. And why so? Because the Divine Idea of man does not represent, cannot represent, Existence as man's essential note; otherwise, he would be God, because his existence would be underived. But the existence of Plato is represented in the Exemplar Idea of God. True; because the Divine Idea, as practical Exemplar, presupposes a decree of the Divine Will to create Plato; but the Divine Idea, as such, antecedently to the Divine Decree which was altogether free, included in itself no such representation. Moreover, as included in the Exemplar Idea, it is not there by virtue of the mere Divine Reflection on the Divine Nature and Its imitability in such a given degree; but has claimed an entrance, because the decrees of the Divine Will are infinitely true, and the Intellect of God represents to Itself all truth. It is, if one may venture to use the phrase, an after-thought. But, then, this actual Essence of Plato is mutable, contingent, temporal. Yes; but because it is actual, existent, not because it is essence. This answer, however, suggests another difficulty. For, if the essence of Plato be considered apart from his existence, it relapses into the merely possible. Not so: for the merely possible includes negation of existence; whereas the essence of Plato, thus considered, only does not include it, that is, prescinds from it. In a word, actual Essence may be considered by the mind as actual reduplicatively; and then the formal representative is Existence. Or it may conceive actual Essence as essence reduplicatively; in which case the formal representation is Essence.
To sum up what has been said. The foundation for this logical distinction, between actual or individual Essence and its Existence, is to be found in the absolute dependence of finite Being on the Infinite; which gives rise to two distinct relations, as it were, of the former to the latter. The one is a relation to the Divine Idea, as a copy to its pattern; and this is hypothetically necessary and eternal. The other is a relation to the Divine Will as of an effect to its cause; and this is absolutely contingent and temporal. For this reason it is, that the same finite actual Essence may be considered by the abstracting intellect as to its actuality merely, and so is formed the concept of Existence; or, as a being constituted with such and such characteristic notes, and in this way is formed the concept of Essence. For the same reason, these two concepts admit of contrary predication; because of the diverse relations which they severally connote in one and the same object.
NOTE.
As the phraseology, expressly adopted in the foregoing, proofs, would lead the reader to suppose; Existence, properly so called, is really identified with the singular and individual. Whenever, therefore, it is predicated of a common nature, or of a collective concept, it is used in an analogical sense.
COROLLARY I.
Since Existence is identified with actual Essence, it is not always a simple, neither is it always a composite, entity; but of such kind as is the actual Essence with which it is identified. If, therefore, the Essence is simple and complete, the Existence will be simple and complete; if the Essence be simple and partial, the Existence will be simple and partial; if the Essence be composed of Matter and Form, in like manner, Existence will be composed of the partial existences of Form and Matter. And so on for the rest.
COROLLARY II.
It is impossible that Existence should be separated from its Essence; in such wise, that the latter could be destroyed and the former remain.
COROLLARY III.
It is impossible, de potentia absoluta, that created Essence should be preserved in the order of things, outside its causes, without having any existence.
COROLLARY IV.
It is impossible, de potentia absoluta, that Essence and its Existence should be separated so, that each should continue distinct from the other.
COROLLARY V.
It is impossible, de potentia absoluta, that any Essence should be preserved in existence by an existence extraneous and foreign to itself.
DIFFICULTIES.
I. The first great objection which has been brought against the doctrine exposed in the preceding pages is, that it is opposed to the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, who constantly insists on the fact, that in finite being there is a real composition between natural Essence and its Existence, such as is known to exist between a subjective power, or faculty, and its Act. He presses the point, because, as he seems to say, in no other way can the singular simplicity of the Divine Nature be satisfactorily vindicated. Thus, for instance, in a place where he is engaged in proving that with God Essence and Existence are identical, he says, (as if distinguishing God, in this particular, from finite Being), 'It is necessary, therefore, that Existence should be compared to Essence which is other than itself as an act to its potentiality. But, since in God nothing is potential; it follows that in Him Essence could not be other than Existence. Wherefore His Essence is His Existence.'{1} Here, then, St. Thomas seems to admit, that Essence may be something really different from its Existence, and explicitly states (as though it were the solitary exception), that in God Essence and Existence are identical; thereby manifestly implying, that such is not the case in finite Being. Again, in a little treatise on the subject of Being (i.e. Existence) and Essence, (where he is, therefore, expressly mooting the question), he has the following remarks: -- 'Now there is found to be in substances a threefold manner of having Essence. For there is One, -- God, whose Essence is His Existence; and, for this reason, some Philosophers say that God has not Essence, because His Essence is no other than His Existence. . . . Essence is found in another way, in created intellectual substances, in whom their Existence is other than their Essence; although their Essence is immaterial.' (He is alluding to Angels.) 'Hence, their existence is not absolute, but received, and therefore limited and bounded according to the capacity of the recipient; but their nature or quiddity is absolute, as not having been received in any matter.'{2} In this passage, again, St. Thomas asserts that identity of Essence and Existence is peculiar to God, and that in the Angels, and a fortiori in material beings, they are really distinct. But the palmary passage, which has been relied on as being utterly subversive of the doctrine here maintained, is tbe following: -- 'But it must not be thought, although intellectual substances are neither corporeal nor composed of Matter and Form nor existing in Matter like material forms, that, for this reason, they equal the Divine Simplicity; for some sort of composition is found in them, because in them Existence and that which exists are not identical. . . . Existence, precisely as Existence, cannot be diverse, but it can be diversified by something besides simple Existence, just as the existence of a stone is other than the existence of a man; therefore, that which is self-subsisting (Existence) cannot but be one only. But it has been shown that God is His own subsisting Existence. No other Being, therefore, besides Himself can he its own Existence. It is therefore necessary, in every substance except Himself, that its substance or essence should be one thing, and its existence another.'{3} And yet more explicitly in the next chapter: -- 'Now, it is hence evident that, in created intellectual substances, there is a composition of Act and receptivity; for in what thing soever two (elements) are discovered, of which the one is the complement of the other, the proportion of one to the other is similar to the proportion between faculty and Act. But, in created intellectual substance, two elements are discovered, that is to say, the substance itself and its existence, which is not the substance itself, as has been shown. But Existence is the complement of existing substance; for everything is actual by the fact that it has existence. It remains, therefore, that in every one of the aforesaid substances there is a composition of Act and receptivity. Furthermore: That which is in anything by virtue of an efficient cause, must needs be its Act; for it is the part of an efficient cause to make something (to be) in act. But it has been shown above, that all other substances have existence from the First Efficient Cause; and it is because they receive existence from some one else, that these same substances are said to be created. Therefore, Existence in created substances is a kind of Act in them. That, however, which is informed by Act, is receptivity; for Act, as such, is the correlative of receptivity. In every created substance, therefore, there is receptivity and Act. Again: Everything which participates is compared to that of which it participates, as receptivity to Act; for by that which is participated the participant is made actual. But it has been shown above, that God alone is essentially Being, and that all other things participate in Existence. Therefore, all created substance is compared to its existence as a sort of receptivity to act.
'Lastly: The assimilation of anything to its efficient cause is produced by Act. For an efficient cause causes what is like itself in so far as it is actual; but the assimilation of every created substance to God is by its existence, as has been shown above. Therefore, Existence is compared to all created substances as their Act. Whence it remains, that in every created substance there is a composition of Act and receptivity.'{4}
In these places St. Thomas asserts, over and over again, that in all created or finite Being there is a real composition and, therefore, a real distinction between Essence or Substance and Existence; and that such distinction and composition is that of receptivity and Act. Further: the whole scope of his argument goes to show, that for this reason even pure Intelligences, forasmuch as they are finite and created, cannot equal the Divine Simplicity. And his words are so explicit occasionally, as to leave no reasonable doubt as to his meaning. Thus, for instance, in one of these passages he declares absolutely, without any modifying clause, that in finite Being 'Essence or Substance is one thing, Existence another.' Therefore, there is a real distinction between the two.
ANSWER. What is to be said to this difficulty? It is one, of course, which is based upon authority alone; but that authority is second to none. It would not do to have the Angelic Doctor as an adversary, if it can be possibly avoided; and, in the present instance, a careful consideration of his doctrine, as a whole, touching this particular point, will (as it is confidently believed) persuade the attentive reader that the teaching of St. Thomas, so far from impugning the position taken up in these pages, from first to last, confirms it to the letter. The answer, to be satisfactory, cannot be compendious. This is, perhaps, the less to be regretted; since the process of examination will not only illustrate the nature of the Scholastic system, but will also throw much additional light on the intricate subject now in hand. For the sake of clearness it shall be reduced under three principal heads. First of all, the general meaning of this great Doctor in the above quotations and in similar passages will be stated. In the second place, this meaning will be confirmed by a careful examination of the several places quoted. Lastly, it will be still further confirmed by incidental and collateral evidence.
1. First, then, as to the meaning and argument of St. Thomas generally. A careful examination and collation of his teaching in these and cognate passages lead to the conclusion, that he is in no wise directly referring to the nature of the distinction between actual finite Essence and its Existence; but is insisting upon the metaphysical distinction between finite possible Essence and the Existence which it is considered as receiving, or, in other words, its actuation. Consequently, the receptivity is analogical, derived from the ideal state of finite Essence in the Divine Idea, as receptive of actuation by the determination of the First Efficient Cause. There is, therefore, this striking difference between Infinite and finite Being: that while the latter is in objective possibility of existence, undetermined of itself to be or not to be, and receiving its determination from outside itself; the self-determined Existence of the Former is His very Essence, and therefore Both are unlimited and one. And, because finite Essence in its ideal state exists in a state of receptivity as regards real existence; its existence outside its causes is an Act, as it were, determining and completing that receptivity, so that it now is (and the name itself suggests the idea) actual Being. Accordingly, there is a sort of metaphysical composition between the undetermined Essence as receptive and the act of Existence as completorial, which you will in vain try to discover in the Divine Simplicity. Further: Where Existence is Essence it must be one, yet all embracing; for, like transcendental Being, it includes all reality and admits of no differentia. It is simply limitless Being, participially at once and nominatively. But, forasmuch as the Existence of finite Being is received, derived, caused from without by other than itself; it is not, cannot be, simple Existence (for that is proper to the self-Existing alone), but is enclosed within limits and differentiated. It is the existence of a stone, the existence of a man; not Existence pure and boundless. And thus, the very phrases suggest some sort of composition. Whatever judgment may be formed of this interpretation of the Angelic Doctor; at least, it cannot be accused of failing either to vindicate the singular Simplicity of the Divine Nature, or to establish a sufficient foundation for the contrary predication in respect of finite Essence and its Existence respectively.
2. Bearing the above explanation in mind, we will now pass on to a separate examination of the several passages already quoted; in order to see whether the interpretation proposed is consonant, or not, with the scope of St. Thomas and with his expressed declarations. The first passage, taken from the first part of the Summa, is contained in an article that discusses the problem, Whether in God Essence and Existence are the same thing. St. Thomas solves the problem affirmatively; and gives two reasons for his conclusion, in what is called the Body of the article. The first reason may be paraphrased thus: Whatever is to be found in any being, apart from its essence, is caused. But it may be caused in two ways. For the efficient cause may be, either the constituent principles of the essence from within, as risibility is caused by the rationality and animality of man combined; or it may be an external cause, as heat is caused in water by fire. If, then, the existence of a thing is other than its essence; that existence must be caused. But it cannot be caused intrinsically; because then that Essence would he self-caused, as being the cause of its own existence. Therefore, it must be caused by some external efficient cause. But in God this is absolutely impossible, for the simple reason that He is the First Efficient Cause. Consequently, in Him Essence and Existence is the same.
Now, here it will be well to pause for one moment to inquire, whether St. Thomas could be intending to speak of actual finite Essence throughout the course of this argument. A little reflection will show that, if he had intended this, his argument would have been rendered nugatory. For what is its one foundation if not this, that everything in any being, save its essence, is caused? Therefore its essence is not caused. But who will venture to say, -- certainly not St. Thomas, -- that the actual essence of a finite being is not caused?
The second reason for his conclusion is contained in the passage from which the quotation, now under examination, has been taken. The argument is as follows: Existence is the actuality of every Form or Nature (i.e. Essence. See the prefatory remarks in the first Chapter of this Book). For goodness or human nature (humanitas) is not represented as actual, unless it is represented as existing. Consequently, Existence, compared with the Essence that is not identified with its existence, assumes the relation of an Act to its receptivity, which is evidently potential. But in God there can be no potentiality. Therefore, in Him Existence and Essence is one and the same.
Now, it is worthy of attentive consideration, that the Angelic Doctor, at the outset of this argument, identifies actuality of Essence with existence of Essence. Therefore, he does not seem to admit, if he is to be judged by his words, any real distinction between actual Being and existing Being; for, according to him, the actuation of Essence is its existence. But further; he could not, with such a preface, be comparing actual essence with existence, as a receptivity determined by its Act; because it would be in open contradiction with his previous statement. When, then, he declares that in God there is nothing potential, and that, therefore, His Existence is no other than His Essence; the argument must be thus rendered in harmony with the interpretation already proposed. From God every kind of possibility is excluded; consequently, all possibility of existence determinable to Act. He is pure Act, and (as metaphysical distinction between Essence and Existence necessarily supposes a potentiality, a receptivity, because a possibility), in God there can be no such distinction. As a consequence, in Him Existence and Essence is, even metaphysically, identical.
The second passage is taken from a short Treatise on Being and Essence, in which the former word is taken in its widest transcendental signification for that which has essence -- the concrete Subject, as it were, of which Essence is the abstract form. The entire Work, therefore, is dedicated to the consideration of Essence under its primary determinations. In the sixth Chapter, from which the passage in question has been borrowed, St. Thomas sums up the result of his examination, touching the modifications of Essence in Substance, and commences with the words in the quotation. 'Now,' he says, 'there is found to be in substances a threefold manner of having essence. For there is one, i.e. God, Whose Essence is His Existence; and for this reason some philosophers say that God has no Essence, because His Essence is no other than His Existence.' So far, the quotation goes in the objection; but mark the words which immediately follow: 'Whence it follows, that He is not included under any Genus; for everything that is under a Genus must have a Quiddity (or Essence) besides its Existence. For the Quiddity or Nature of a Genus or Species admits of no distinction, so far as the Nature itself is concerned, in those who belong to that Genus or Species; but Existence is in the different (Subjects) generally.'{5} As the force of this argument is not apparent on the surface, it may be useful to add a word or two by way of explanation. The essential notes of any whole are common, and therefore one in all the inferiors that are included under that Whole, whether it be a Genus or a Species. It is only when those constituents of Essence are regarded in existing species or individuals, that the Essence is either specifically or individually differentiated. Thus, animal is animal all the world over; it is only when this nature is regarded as existing, e.g. in a cow or a man, that it becomes distinguished by one or the other of the two Differences, Rational or Irrational. So man, as man, is one nature or Essence; it is only when Human nature is considered as existing in Plato, Socrates, and so on, that it becomes diversified by the addition of individual notes, such as size, features, complexion, character, talents, &c. Hence, Essence in itself is one; but it becomes divided off by Existence. If, therefore, Essence and Existence in any given case are identical, there is no possibility of differentiation; consequently, such Essence cannot be either generic or specific. It can, however, be individual; because the Essence is Existence, and all Existence is individual.
Now, who can fail to see that, in pursuing such a line of argument, St. Thomas could not have been referring to actual Essence? For, by the mere fact that the finite Essence actually is, outside its causes, it is ipso facto differentiated. Even if Existence be considered as a real completorial mode necessary, as they say, to give to actual Essence the power of persevering in existence; nevertheless, as soon as Essence is actuated, it is individualized, and therefore receives its differentiation. But, in this argument of St. Thomas, the existing individual is one term of distinction; generic or specific nature, the other.
The other portion of the extract from the same treatise is still more clear. For, speaking of Angelic substances, St. Thomas draws a contrast between their Essence and their Existence; in that the former is absolute and not received from the First Efficient Cause, whereas the latter is so received, and, consequently, limited to the capability of the Nature that receives it. But it is manifest that actual Essence is as much the result of the Efficient Cause as Existence; nay, according to the hypothesis of our adversaries, more so. For actuation of Essence would be the formal term of Causation; while Existence would follow as a supplemental mode.
And now, in the last place, for the two Chapters in the Angelic Doctor's Philosophical Summa against the Gentiles.
In the former, or fifty-second Chapter, he is occupied in proving that, although the Angels are immaterial subsisting Forms; yet, that their simplicity does not equal that of the Divine Nature, because in them Essence and Existence are not the same. And his first argument in proof of this last position is, that wherever Existence is the very Essence, it admits of no differentiation; because Existence in itself is always one and the same. Wherever, therefore, it is differentiated, the Essence is not the same as Existence, for the Difference is added; as in the examples adduced, -- the Existence of a stone, the Existence of a man. From this first argument it must be confessed that no conclusion can be drawn in favour of either opinion.
The second argument is minori ad majus, in this wise. There can be but One Whose Existence is self-subsistent, His own Essence. All others, therefore, receive their existence from without; consequently, in them Existence is other than Essence. The Antecedent is thus proved. Every common or generic nature, or Essence, if it were to subsist of itself, would be one only; for it could only be multiplied through its division by Differences which would constitute different Species. If this be the case in generic wholes; how much more must it be verified in the case of a Transcendental whole, which admits of no division, but only of contraction or determination. The whole force of this argument depends upon the assumption, that finite Existence is received from without, whereas Essence is not; and that, therefore, in the creature the one is different from the other. But, if St. Thomas meant actual Essence; there would be no difference in this respect, inasmuch as both would be received.
The fourth argument (for the third has no bearing on the present question) is derived from the relation of efficient causation to Being, and may be thus stated. No being which receives its existence from another is essentially its own existence; consequently, its Existence is other than its Essence. But all created or finite Being receives its existence from another. Therefore, &c. The Major is thus demonstrated. He, whose Essence and Existence are identical, cannot admit of anything which is accidental to Essence. But the receiving existence from another is accidental to Essence. Therefore, &c. The same inference which has been drawn from the second argument, applies with equal force to this fourth.
The fifth argument is wholly inexplicable, if St. Thomas is supposed to treat of actual Essence. The substance (i.e. substantial essence) of a thing is Being in its own right, not by the causality of another. Hence, actual lucidity is no part of the essence of air, because it receives it from another. But the Existence of every finite or created Being is received from another; otherwise, it would not have been created. Therefore, in no created essence or substance is Essence the same as Existence.'{6}
The sixth argument is somewhat obscure by reason of its brevity; but it is of great weight in the present controversy. It will be well, therefore, to develope it into somewhat more explicit form. Every agent or efficient cause acts, in proportion as it is itself in act. Wherefore, it behoves that the First Efficient Cause should Himself be in act, i.e. actual after the most perfect manner. But that which is itself essentially pure Act, without admixture of potentiality of any sort, is more perfect than that which receives actuation. For this latter, plainly enough, receives its Act from the former. But this Act is Existence; wherefore, the First Efficient Cause must be Himself simple Existence. Thus, His Existence is His Essence. But, in the causes of all secondary efficient causes, the act of existing is received from the First Efficient Cause; and every such Form and Act is in receptivity, till it exists. Consequently, it is not pure Act; for the Essence is, before actuation, potential or receptive of Existence. In God, therefore, as the First Efficient Cause, and in God alone, Essence and Existence are the same.{7} Now, in this argument, actuation is identified with Existence; otherwise it is a patent paralogism. Consequently, when Forms and Acts are said to be in potentia; it cannot but be, that the Angelic Doctor means in potentia objectiva, i. e. in their state of objective possibility in the Divine Idea and fundamentally in the Divine Nature. For, what sort of an Act would that be, which would be actual and, at the same time, possible in relation to itself?
The last argument tells equally in favour of the interpretation advocated in these pages. It is as follows. That which belongs to anything by participation from another, is not its essence. But Existence belongs to all finite Being by participation from the Self-existent, as First Efficient Cause. Wherefore, in finite Being Existence is other than Essence.{8} Is then actual Essence in the creature no participation from the First Efficient Cause?
Turn we now to the succeeding, or fifty-third, Chapter. As the whole of it has been already given to the reader in an English dress, it may be more summarily treated. Therefore, in the first argument St. Thomas identifies actual with existent Essence in the words, 'everything is actual by the fact that it has existence.' Of the second the same may be said. For he argues that in created substance there is receptivity and Act, because the existence of created Being proceeds from the First Efficient Cause; and it is the office of an efficient cause to make a thing actual. Of the third argument, again, the same may be said; for the only difference between it and the preceding consists in a change of the Middle Term. In the preceding it was Efficient Causation; in this, Participation. Lastly, the fourth argument exhibits precisely the same features, its Middle Term being Assimilation. In each and all, therefore, the Angelic Doctor identifies actual with existing Essence; consequently, he could not have intended to contrast them together as receptivity and Act. Accordingly, he must be speaking of finite Essence in its state of objective possibility. But, if St. Thomas were speaking of this real negative distinction between possible Essence and its Existence; would he have spoken absolutely of their being in relation to each other as receptivity and Act, and of a composition arising out of their union, which excludes all finite Being from the possibility of equalling the Divine simplicity? Would he not have qualified his assertions? Would he not have expressly used some modifying phrases, by means of which he might direct our attention to the fact? This is precisely what he has done in every passage. Thus, in the passage of the Summa; 'comparetur . . . sicut actus ad potentiam;' in the short treatise on Being and Essence, 'non est in eis omnimoda simplicitas -- illud esse receptum est per modum actus . . . propter hoc a quibusdam hujusmodi substantiae dicuntur componi ex quo est et quod est;' in the fifty-second Chapter of the Philosophical Summa, 'Aliqua compositio -- per participationem quamdam;' and in the fifty-third Chapter, 'proportio unius ad alterum est sicut proportio potentiae ad actum, . . . ut quidam actus earum, -- comparatur substantia omnis creata ad suum esse sicut potentia ad actum -- ipsum esse comparatur ad omnes substantias creatas sicut actus earum.' Now, are not all these phrases, 'a sort of Act,' 'like an Act,' 'like the proportion between Act and receptivity,' and the rest, exactly what might have been expected, if the interpretation suggested in the present answer were true? If St. Thomas had intended to represent actual Essence as receptive of Existence, there would have been in such case undoubted real composition; because there would have been composition of two real components. Why, then, should he say, 'Accordingly, these intelligent substances are said by some to be composed of Existence and Essence (ex quo est et quod est)'? Moreover, St. Thomas never once asserts or implies anything like real or physical composition between the two; the whole of his phraseology tends in an opposite direction.
3. It is now time to confirm the interpretation which is here vindicated, by two cognate passages taken from other writings of the same Doctor. In his Questions de Potentia occur the following words: 'By the mere fact that Existence is attributed to Quiddity (or Essence), not Existence alone, but the Quiddity itself is said to be created; because, before it has existence, it is nothing, save perchance in the Intellect of the Creator, where it is not a creature but the Creative Essence.'{9} Now, in this place St. Thomas expressly denies any middle term between existing and merely possible Essence. If it does not exist, it is in itself nothing; and is, only in the Divine Idea. How can this be reconciled with any interpretation of his doctrine on this head, which supposes actual Essence outside its causes to be something really distinct from existing Essence?
The same doctrine is still more explicitly stated in another passage, which we only quote in confirmation, (whereas it might otherwise have justly claimed the first place), because the fragment is 'very corrupt'.{10} Nevertheless, the part of it here given is fortunately quite plain and clear. 'Since everything which has anything not from itself, is possible in respect of such particular Quiddity; seeing that finite beings have existence from another, they will be possibles in respect of that existence, as also in respect of Him from Whom they have it, in Whom is no like potentiality. Accordingly, in such Quiddity is found receptivity and Act; for the reason that the Quiddity (or Essence) is itself possible, and its Existence is a composition of receptivity and Act, (de quo est et quod est).'{11} If any reliance may be placed on this passage, there is no room for further doubt about the matter. For St. Thomas herein distinctly explains, that the receptivity, to which he attributes Existence as act, is merely possible Essence; since he calls it possible, and explicitly alludes to its internal as well as external possibility. So much for the objection based on the supposed authority of the Angelic Doctor.
II. THE SECOND DIFFICULTY is the first of a series of arguments which are based on purely intrinsic evidence. They are partly elenchtic, i.e. directed against the doctrine maintained in the present proposition, partly apologetic, i.e. offered in support of the contrary opinion.
The existence of finite Being must be contracted; otherwise, it would be without limit and, therefore, infinite. But Existence can only be contracted by its reception in some receptivity, or passive faculty, really distinct from itself. That receptibility can be no other than the actual Essence; because possible Essence in itself is not real and cannot, consequently, be really distinct. Therefore, there is a real distinction between actual Essence and its Existence.
ANSWER. It is not true that Existence can only be contracted by some receptivity really distinct from itself. For finite Existence has its determined bourn, partly in itself as being received Existence, partly in itself as actuated Essence. To explain: All finite Existence is from the Infinite as its Efficient Cause; from Him it is derived. Now, derivation connotes dependence; and dependence connotes superiority. But that which is superior, of itself gives a limit to its inferior. Moreover, as antecedently a mere Possible; finite Existence is subject to the will of the First Efficient Cause and, therefore, limited. But it is also limited under its aspect of actuated Essence. For, though each Essence or Quiddity, within its own proper periphery as a common nature, is only limited by Existence which individualizes it; yet, as a Quiddity, it is limited in the Divine Idea, since it is the realized imitability of the Divine Nature in a certain definite grade, and that grade limits it off from every other grade actual or possible. Thus, finite Existence can be limited without reception in any passivity distinct from itself; and the objection is, therefore, inconclusive.
III. THE THIRD DIFFICULTY attacks part of the proof which has been offered in support of the present Thesis. It has been asserted that, if Essence is actual, it must exist. On the contrary, there is nothing repugnant in the idea that Essence should be actual, and yet really distinguished from the Mode or Form of Existence by which it is made actual. Thus, antecedently to its information by such Mode or Form, it is actual in comparison with merely possible Essence, potential with regard to the act of existence.
ANSWER. This argument involves a contradiction in terms. For an actual Essence is Essence in act; and the first fundamental act of Essence is its Existence. If it be actual, outside its causes, it exists; if it is not outside its causes, it is not actual; and, in such case, it is merely possible. There can be no middle term; for Existence is indivisible, and in itself in actu exercito admits of no degrees. A thing either exists or it does not; if it does not, it is merely possible. Therefore, it is a contradiction in terms to say that a being is actual, and at the same time receptive of Existence.
IV. THE FOURTH DIFFICULTY pursues the preceding argument. A middle term is possible between existent Essence and merely possible Essence. For there is such a thing as subjective possibility, i.e. something real which is receptive of its perfection. Actual Essence, therefore, is an entity, and so, distinguished from merely possible Essence; yet it is receptive of that Mode or Form by which it exists. Precisely similar is the case of Primordial Matter; which is something, yet cannot exist, save under the actuation of some Form.
ANSWER. All subjective possibility presupposes the existence of that entity which possesses this receptivity of an ulterior Form. Therefore, it exists; and, consequently, of whatever other real perfecting mode it may be capable, certainly it is not capable of that which it possesses already, viz. Existence. Existence is the first act of Being; it cannot be really receptive, before itself is. If, therefore, an Essence possesses actual Existence; de facto it exists. It is an insult to common sense to affirm, that a being is outside its causes, its creation willed, itself distinguished from mere possibility; and, at the same time, to maintain that it requires some real Mode supervening in order that it may exist. Neither is the confirmation added from the example of Primordial Matter of any weight. For Primordial Matter is not integral Being, but half-Being. It neither has, nor can have, in itself integral Existence; but only in partnership. Hence, its actuation by some primitive Form is a necessary condition of its co-existence; for exist it cannot, in and of itself. Its separate existence, therefore, involves us in a Metaphysical contradiction. That which is peculiar to it by reason of its imperfection is, that its formal actuation is its Existence; because it cannot be, save in company. But no such peculiarity is to be found in those Essences which are conceived in the Divine Intellect, and only attend the Fiat of the Divine Will to become real, existing entities.
V. THE FIFTH DIFFICULTY. In order that Being may be truly said to exist, it is not enough that it should be constituted outside its causes as a passivity receptive of the act of existence; but it must be constituted outside its causes, as something actual and complete in the order of Being. Therefore, there can be a middle term between merely possible and existent Essence.
ANSWER. It is probable that the author of this argument must have meant by 'actual and complete in the order of Being,' actual and complete in the act of being or existing; because if he means that a receptive faculty, or an imperfect substance, cannot exist till the one and the other is actual and complete in its actuality, facts are against him. For, what is to be said of the sensitive, volitive, and intellectual faculties in a foetus? What of the human soul after death? It may not be useless to call attention to this distinction; as it serves to elucidate the solution of the difficulty. It is impossible, then, that actuation should be potential relatively to itself. But the first act of Essence is Existence; actual Essence, consequently, exists, and cannot be potential relatively to its non-Existence. But, even if it could, the difficulty would remain. For the question would arise, What is this faculty receptive of Existence? Is it something or nothing? If something, it is outside its causes; because it is really distinct from merely possible Essence, and actual. But if outside its causes, God has created it. Therefore, it is; for the Divine power cannot be terminated to nothing. But, if it is, it exists. All other supervening mode of Existence, therefore, would make a composite Existence other than the first and, as it were, accidental to it.
VI. THE SIXTH DIFFICULTY owes its origin to a misapprehension of the doctrine of St. Thomas. For it is objected that the doctrine maintained in this Chapter fails to vindicate the singular and incommunicable simplicity of the Divine Being; since, in the hypothesis that there is no real distinction between finite Essence and its Existence, the Angels would have the same simplicity of nature as God Himself.
ANSWER. In answer it is maintained, that a metaphysical composition, such as is enunciated in the present Proposition, suffices to vindicate the singular simplicity of the Divine nature. Nor can it be urged in reply, that a physical composition would be more effective for the purpose. For such a line of argument would carry its advocates further than they themselves would wish to go; seeing that composition out of material and physically distinct parts would draw a yet more effective line of demarcation between the Creator and His creature; and, consequently, all creation should be material. Moreover, so far is this objection from being true, that a purely metaphysical distinction seems especially fitted to illustrate the Divine simplicity at once and the Divine, wisdom. For, as in creation there is a continuous chain of Being, each one of whose links is an imitation of the Divine nature, proceeding upward from the remotest to the nearest and noblest, though still limited and imperfect, copy; so is it well that, as the chain reaches higher, the composition should grow less and less, till the creature reaches a simplicity which only stops short at the incommunicable simplicity of God, in Whom, as there is no physical, so neither is there even metaphysical, composition.
VII. THE SEVENTH AND LAST DIFFICULTY is one, not directed against the Thesis itself, but against the explanation given as to the real foundation on which the logical distinction between actual Essence and its Existence is said to rest. It is the objection of Suarez, alluded to in the proof for the second part.{12} This great philosopher argues that the Divine Ideas are not the foundation of finite Essences, but rather that the Essences are, so to speak, the foundation of the Divine Ideas; i.e. that those Essences are not such and such, because the Divine Idea so represents them, but the Divine Idea so represents them, because the Essences are such and such The Divine Ideas, therefore, cannot be the foundation of finite Essences as such.
ANSWER. But in reply it must be observed, that possible Essence, or finite Essence as such, (abstraction made of its Actuality or Existence), depends on the Divine Idea formally, on the Divine Nature fundamentally. The Divine Idea, as such, does not determine the necessity and immutability of finite Essence; as neither is it determined by the finite Essence itself. It is here that Suarez would seem to have made an erroneous assumption, which is fatal to his argument. The Divine Idea is determined by the Divine Nature, Which eminently contains within itself that definite degree of Its own imitability ad extra, which is the real foundation of such possible Essence. Supposing, therefore, the Divine Decree for the creation of this Essence; the Divine Idea becomes the Prototype or Exemplar Idea, according to Whose measure it is created. The finite Essence, therefore, is such and such, because it is so represented in the Divine Idea; but that representation itself in the Divine Idea has for object the Divine Nature, as imitable in such a definite grade. This question, however, will recur in the following Chapter.
{1} 'Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo nihil sit potentiale, ut ostensum est supra Q. ii, a. 3, sequitur quod non sit aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse. Sua igitur essentia est suum esse.' 1ae, iii, 4, in c.
{2} Invenitur autem triplex modus habendi essentiam in substantiis. Aliquid enim est, sicut Deus, cujus essentia est ipsum suum esse; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet essentiam, quia essentia ejus non est aliud quam esse ejus. . . . Secundo modo invenitur essentia in substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in quibus est aliud esse quam essentia ipsarum, quamvis essentia sit sine materia; unde esse earum non est absolutum, sed receptum, et ideo limitatum et finitum ad capacitatem naturae recipientis. Sed natura vel quidditas earum est absoluta, non recepta in aliqua materia.' Opusc. XXX (aliter XXVI), c. 6, in init.
{3} 'Non est autem opinandum, quamvis substantiae intellectuales non sint corporeae, nec ex materia et forma compositae nec in materia existentes sicut formae materiales, quod propter hoc divinae simplicitati adaequentur. Invenitur enim in eis aliqua compositio, ex eo quod non est idem in eis esse et quod est. . . . Esse autem, in quantum est esse, non potest esse diversum; potest autem diversificari per aliquid quod est praeter esse, sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse hominis. Illud igitur quod est subsistens, non potest esse nisi unum tantum. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est suum esse subsistens. Nihil igitur aliud praeter ipsum potest esse suum esse; oportet igitur, in omni substantia quae est praeter ipsum, aliud esse ipsam substantiam et aliud esse ejus.' c. Gent. L. II, c. 52, in init.
{4} 'Ex hoc autem evidenter apparet quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis est compositio actus et potentiae. In quocumque enim inveniuntur aliqua duo, quorum unum est complementum alterius, proportlo unius ad alterum est sicut proportio potentiae ad actum; nihil enim completur nisi per proprium actum. In substantia autem intellectuali creata, inveniuntur duo, scil. substantia ipsa et esse ejus, quod non est ipsa substantia, ut ostensum est. Ipsum autem esse est complementum substantiae existentis; unumquodque enim actu est per hoc quod esse habet. Relinquitur igitur quod in qualibet praedictarum substantiarum, sit compositio actus et potentiae. Amplius. Quod inest alicui ab agente, oportet esse actum ejus; agentis enim est facere aliquid aetu. Ostensum est autem supra, quod omnes aliae substantiae habent esse a primo agente; et per hoc, ipsae substantiae creatae sunt, quod esse ab alio habent. Ipsum igitur esse inest substantiis creatis, ut quidam actus earum. Id autem cui actus, potentia est; nam actus, in quantum hujusmodi, ad potentiam refertur. In qualibet igitur substantia creata est potentia et actus.
'Item. Omne participans aliquid comparatur ad ipsum quod participatur, ut potentia ad actum; per id enim quod participatur, fit participans actuale. Ostensum est autem supra, quod solus Deus est essentialiter ens; omnia autem alia participant ipsum esse. Comparatur igitur substantia omnis creata ad suum esse, sicut potentia ad actum.
'Praeterea. Assimilatio alicujus ad causam agentem fit per actum; agens enim agit sibi simile, in quantum est actu. Assimilatio autem cujuslibet substantias creatae ad Deum est per ipsum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Ipsum igitur esse comparatur ad omnes substantias creatas, sicut actus earum. Ex quo relinquitur, quod in qualibet substantia creata, sit compositio actus et potentiae.' c. Gent. 1. II,
{5} 'Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere, quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quidditatem praeter esse suum; cum quidditas aut natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem naturae in illis quorum est genus vel species; sed esse est in diversis diversimode.' Opusc. XXX (aliter XXVI), c. 6.
{6} 'Amplius: Substantia uniuscujusque est ens per se et non per aliud; unde esse lucidum actu non est de substantia aeris, quia est ei per aliud. Sed cuilibet rei creatae suum esse est ei per aliud; alias non esset creatum. Nullius igitur substantiae creatae suum esse est sua substantia.' The meaning of the word substantia is determined by the problem proposed in the heading of the Chapter.
{7} 'Cum omne agens agat in quantum est actu, primo agenti, quod est perfectissimum, competit esse in actu perfectissimo modo. Tanto autem aliquid est perfectius in actu, quanto talis actus est in via generationis posterior, actus enim est tempore potentia posterior: in uno et eodem quod de potentia ad actum procedit. Perfectius est quoque in actu, quod est ipse actus quam quod est habens actum; hoc enim propter illud actus est. His ergo positis, constat ex supra ostensis quod Deus solus est primus agens. Sibi ergo soli competit esse in actu perfectissimo modo, ut scilicet, sit Ipse actus perfectissimus. Hoc autem est esse, ad quod generatio et omnis motus terminatur; omnis enim forma et actus est in potentia, antequam esse acquirat. Soli igitur Deo competit quod sit ipsum esse; sicut soli competit quod sit primum agens.'
{8} 'Amplius: Ipsum esse competit primo agenti secundum propriam naturam; esse enim Dei est ejus substantia, ut supra ostensum est. Quod autem competit alicui secundum propriam naturam suam, non convenit aliis nisi per modum participationis, sicut calor aliis corporibus ab igne. Ipsum igitur esse competit omnibus aliis a primo agente per participationem quamdam. Quod autem competit alicui per participationem, non est substantia ejus. Impossibile est igitur quod substantia alterius entis, praeter agens primum, sit ipsum esse.'
{9} 'Ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur; quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia.' De Potent. Q. iii, a. 5, ad 2m.
{10} Note of the Editor of the Roman edition, 1570.
{11} 'Quia omne quod habet aliquid non a se est possibile respectu illius hujusmodi quidditatis, cum habeant (sic) esse ab alio, erunt possibiles respectu illius esse et respectu ejus a quo habent, in quo nulla eadem potentia; et ita in tali quidditate invenitur antis, potentia et actus, secundum quod ipsa quidditas est possibilis, et est esse ejus compositio potentiae et actus, de quo est et quod est.' Opusc. LIV (aliter LXVII).
{12} Metaph. Disp. xxxi, § 6, n. 17.