PROPOSITION XXVI.

These Attributes of Being formally add to the idea of Being either a negation or an extrinsic referribiity. Nevertheless, they manifest the real positive perfection of Being, not by way of addition, but as expressive of its essential nature.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition follows, as a Corollary, from the doctrine already established. However, the connection between the two is not so evident at first sight but that it requires and, therefore, shall receive, explicit evolution.

It has been shown, that the aforesaid Attributes make no real addition to Being; yet that, in themselves, they are expressions of reality, and moreover are said to inform and determine Being. Now, there are two ways of determining Being. In one way, it is determined by contraction of its periphery; and it is thus that this Transcendental is determined to the ten Categories, or Supreme Genera. But in such cases Being is, so to say, divided up, and is not convertible with each or any of its determinations, taken by itself. Thus, for instance, that all Substance is Being, is true; but not that all Being is Substance, for Accident is likewise Being. Now, it is obvious that such determinations of Being cannot be considered in any wise as Attributes; because one of the necessary conditions of an Attribute is, that it should be convertible with its Subject, or, as the Schoolmen say, dici ad convertentiam. For an Attribute in its nature accompanies its Subject wherever it goes, and is discoverable nowhere else. Therefore, the Attributes of Being must be as Transcendental as Being itself.

If, then, Being cannot be determined by its Attributes in this way of contraction; there must be some other mode of determination which shall not contract its extension. Yet the determination in question does not make any real, positive, intrinsic, addition to the entity of Being, as we have already seen; and, notwithstanding, it is not a mere logical determination, but is representative of a reality. But, if it cannot be a positive addition, it may be an addition by way of negation; and, if it cannot be an intrinsic, it may be an extrinsic, addition. This is the only conceivable way in which these Attributes can satisfy the various positions already established. Now, it is precisely after this manner that the aforesaid Attributes offer themselves to our contemplation. For Unity represents the negation of division in Being; while Truth represents its referribility or relation to the intellect; Goodness, its referribility or relation to the will.

There is, it need hardly be said, another way of determination and contraction, by the addition of something real which is not of the essence of the Subject; for example, when a rose is conceived or represented as red, and, generally, in the case of all Accidents. But any one can see, that such sort of determination satisfies hardly one of the conditions of an Attribute or Property.

The above exposition is scarcely more than a paraphrase of the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. As, however, a mere difference in the way of putting it may serve to illustrate an obscure problem; the passage of St. Thomas, to which allusion is here made, shall be given in full. It runs thus: -- 'In three ways something may add to another, over and above. First of all, in that it adds some reality, which is not of the essence of the thing to which the addition is made; as, for instance, White adds to Body, because the essence of Whiteness is not of the essence of Body. Another way in which one thing is said to add to another is, by mode of contraction and determination; as, for instance, Man adds to Animal something over and above; not in such sort, as that there should be in Man some other entity which is wholly foreign to the essence of Animal, (otherwise we should be compelled to admit, that not all that is Man, is Animal; but that Animal is only a part of Man), but Animal is contracted by Man; inasmuch as that which is determinately and actually contained in the nature of Man, is implicitly and, as it were, potentially contained in the nature of Animal. Thus, it appertains to the nature of Man that he should have a rational soul; and it appertains to the nature of Animal that it have a soul, without determining whether it be rational or not. Nevertheless, such determination, by reason of which Man is said to add something over and above to Animal, has a certain foundation in reality. Thirdly, something is said to add to another according to ordering of reason only; when, that is to say, something is explicitly contained in the idea of one, which is not explicitly contained in the idea (or definition) of the other. But that addition does not exist in the nature of things, but only in ordering of reason; whether the thing which is said to receive the addition be thereby contracted or not. For, -- to give an instance, -- Blind is a sort of addition made to Man, viz. the addition of Blindness. But Blindness is not anything in nature, but in ordering of reason only; forasmuch as Being,' (in its participial signification), 'includes privations. By this blindness Man is contracted; for it is not every man that is blind. But, when it is said that a Mole is blind, no contraction is made by the addition;' because all moles are blind.

Here, let a temporary break be made in the quotation, in order to leave room for the insertion of two remarks. St. Thomas is speaking of additions, as such. When, therefore, he mentions this third mode of addition, and most justly asserts that 'the thing added does not exist in the order of nature, but only by ordering of reason,' he is principally referring to it as an addition, though doubtless he also alludes to the formal and explicit concept. This last clause will be best explained by the second remark which it seems necessary to interpose. It may, at the first glance, strike one as strange, that St. Thomas should deny the reality of Blindness, and should assert that it is, on the contrary, a logical entity; for what can be more painfully real than Blindness? Yet, a little thought will suffice to evince the truth of his assertion. For what is Blindness, if not a privation of sight? But all privation is negative. It is the absence of something which ought to be present. Therefore, the formal and explicit concept of any privation is the concept of a Nothing. Fundamentally, however, it is most real.

And now to pursue the quotation: -- 'But it is impossible that a thing should add anything over and above to Universal Being in the first way, albeit addition may be made in that way to some particular being. For there is no entity in nature which is outside the Essence of Universal Being; although there may be something outside the essence of this particular being. In the second way, some things are found to add to Being; because Being is contracted by the ten Genera, each one of which adds something to Being; -- not any accident or any Difference which is outside the Essence of Being, but a determined manner of Being, which is founded in the very essence of the thing. But in no such way does the Good make any addition to Being; since the Good is, equally with Being, divided into the ten Genera' (or Categories). 'Wherefore it follows, as a necessary consequence, either that it should make no addition to Being; or that, if it adds, the addition should be in order of reason only. For, if anything real were added; it must needs be, that Being, by the form of The Good, should be contracted to some special Genus. But, since Being is that which primarily offers itself to the apprehension of the mind, as Avicenna remarks; it follows, either that all such denomination should be synonymous with Being, (which cannot be said of the Good, since it is not nugatory to say that a thing is good), or that it should add something in order of reason at least. Wherefore, since the Good does not contract Being; it must make some addition to Being, which is a purely conceptual addition. But a merely conceptual addition can be only of two kinds. For all absolute position, (or affirmation of a positive) 'signifies something existing in the order of things natural.' This last sentence needs explanation. The attribution of anything positive at once and absolute to the Subject, must be a real, and not a merely conceptual, attribution. Consequently, in the hypothesis that it is conceptual merely, if it is positive, it must be relative, not absolute; if it is absolute, it must be negative, not positive. Hence, an addition of reason is of two kinds only. To resume: -- 'After this manner, then, over and above Being which is the primary concept of the intellect, One adds that which is in order of reason only, viz, a negation; for the One stands, as it were, for undivided Being. But the True and the Good are predicated positively; wherefore, they can but add a relation, which is merely conceptual. Now, a relation, according to the Philosopher, is said to be a merely conceptual relation, when the independent Term in a non-mutual relation is said to be related to that to which it is referred; but the other way about,' i.e. when what is referred does depend on the other to which it is referred, it is not of reason only, but real, 'since the relation is itself a sort of dependence. This is plainly apparent in the instances of knowledge and the Knowable, Sense and the Sensible. For knowledge depends on the Knowable; but not the other way about. Hence, the relation by which Knowledge is referred to the Knowable, is real; while the relation by which the Knowable is referred to knowledge, is a relation of reason merely. For the Knowable is said to be referred, according to the Philosopher; not because itself is related, but because another thing is related to it. And this is the case with all other things which are in the position of measure and measured, or of perfective and perfectible. The True and the Good must needs, therefore, add to the concept of Being the relative idea of the Perfective. Now, in all being whatsoever, two things may be considered; to wit, the simple nature of the Form or Species, and the existence itself by which something else subsists under that Form or Species. And so, Being admits of perfection in two ways. First, according to its specific nature alone; and it is in this way that the intellect is perfected by Being, because it is perfected by the essential idea of Being. Yet, Being is not in the intellect in its own existent nature. And it is this manner of perfecting, which the True adds to Being. For the True is in the mind, as the Philosopher observes; and every being is said to be true, in so far as it is either conformed or conformable to the intellect. Wherefore, all who give a right definition of the True, include intellect in their definition of it. In another way, Being is capable of perfecting another, not only according to its specific essence or nature, but also according to the existence which it has in the real order of nature. In such way is the Good perfective for Good is in things, as the Philosopher remarks.'^{1}

From this elaborate exposition of the Angelic Doctor, which will be a frequent object of reference in future Chapters, it will be seen that he insists upon the position enunciated in the present Thesis. For be denies that the Attributes determine Being by contraction of any kind, whether it be Differential or Accidental; and concludes in consequence, that the addition is a logical one, or according to ordering of reason only. For any real additional determination would either contract it to a Genus, or contract it accidentally.

No real addition can anyhow be made to Being; and a real additional determination must limit its extension and contract it into opposites. Wherefore, seeing that these Attributes are not mere nugatory concepts but expressive of a real perfection, and that they can make no real addition to the entity of Being, if either of them is intrinsic to Being, it must he expressive of a negation; if any of them are positive, they must have a sort of relation ab extra. For these are the only possible ways in which an Attribute of Being may represent a reality which is not included in the formal entity of Being, and yet make no real addition to it. Such is the case. For Unity is intrinsic and negative; Truth and Goodness are extrinsic in their connotation, and respective or referrible, because positive. But these Attributes, it should never be forgotten, are expressive of a real perfection in Being. In what way they are so, will be best understood by that separate consideration of each one, which is immediately to follow. It will only be necessary here to remark, in order to a distinct apprehension of the doctrine of St. Thomas, that the special perfection of Being, represented by the concepts of the True and the Good, is a respective perfection which is to be found in the capacity, possessed by every being whatsoever, of perfectionating another; but that respective perfection has its source, as will be seen, in the intrinsic excellence of Being.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of this Proposition, viz, that 'these attributes manifest the real positive perfection of Being, as expressive of the essential nature of Being,' is included in the declaration that has occupied the preceding pages. The fact is, that the human intellect is too narrow, in a sense, and too feeble, to embrace under one point of view the totality of its object; especially when that object is so far removed by abstraction from all sensile perception. It is therefore compelled to acquire science, by a careful demonstrative synthesis of partial and imperfect, (because not adequate or exhaustive), representations. In this way it first seizes on that which is the primitive and fundamental idea of its object, expressive of its Essence; and then proceeds to fill up its idea by a demonstrated composition of Attributes or Passions with that Essence or Subject. Nor can it, in the present instance, be objected, that a negation or extrinsic denomination cannot represent any real perfection in Being. For, first of all, it must be observed as to negations, that, though they are formally logical, they may be representatively most real; that is, the idea may be logical in its structure, owing to the difficulty under which the intellect labours in representing simple perfections. Yet the objective concept, which is neither more nor less than this simple perfection, is most real. It is plain, that the denial or negation of an imperfection is the virtual position of a perfection. Thus, for instance, seeing that mortality is an imperfection, the negation of mortality which is expressed by the word immortality is a real perfection; although, by reason of its simplicity, it is conceived under the logical form of a negation. Hence it is that, as the Fathers are wont to declare, our least imperfect concepts of the Divine Perfection are negations. Then, in the next place, for what regards extrinsic denominations, it must be remembered that the True and the Good are not mere extrinsic denominations. Indeed, it argues some looseness of speech to call them extrinsic denominations at all. True it is, that, in their case, the perfection of Being is made known to us by its capacity for perfectionating that which is considered as extraneous to such Being; but that capacity is itself an intrinsic perfection, though it connotes an extrinsic term. Furthermore; since it certainly is not a predicamental relation (as St. Thomas has explained in the passage last quoted), such capacity or referribility argues no dependence of any sort on its term; so that it remains as an intrinsic perfection of Being, whether that extrinsic term exist or not.

III. THE THIRD MEMBER of the Proposition, viz, that these attributes do not manifest the real positive perfection of Being 'by way of addition,' has been already sufficiently declared.

{1} 'Tripliciter potest aliquid super alterum addere. Uno modo quod addat aliquam rem, quae sit extra essentiam illius rei cui dicitur addi; sicut album addit super corpus, quia essentia albedinis est praeter essentiam corporis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid addi super alterum per modum contrahendi et determinandi; sicut homo addit aliquid super animal; non quidem ita quod sit in homine alia res quae sit penitus extra essentiam animalis (alias oporteret dicere, quod non totum quod est homo, esset animal, sed animal esset pars hominis); sed animal per hominem contrahitur, quia id quod determinate et actualiter continetur in ratioue hominis, implicite et quasi potentialiter continetur in ratione animalis; sicut est de rations hominis quod habeat animam rationalem, et de ratione animalis est quod habeat animam, non determinando ad rationalem vel non rationalem; ista tamen determinatio ratione cujus homo super animal addere dicitur, in aliqua re fundatur. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid addere super alterum secundum rationem tantum; quando scil. aliquid est de ratione unius quod non est de ratione alterius; quod tamen nihil est in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum; sive per illud contrahatur cui dicitur addi, sive non. Caecum enim addit aliquid supra hominem, scil. caecitatem, quae non est aliquod ens in natura, sed rationis tantum, secundum quod ens est comprehendens privationes; et per hoc homo contrahitur, non enim omnis homo caecus est; sed cum dicimus talpam caecam, non fit per hoc additum aliqua contractio.

'Non autem potest esse quod super ens universals aliquid addat aliquid primo modo; quamvis illo modo possit fieri aliqua additio super aliquod ens particulare; nulla enim res naturae est quae sit extra essentiam entis universalis, quamvis aliqua res sit extra essentiam hujus entis. Secundo autem modo inveniuntur aliqua addere super ens; quia ens contrahitur per decem genera, quorum unumquodque addit aliquid super ens; non aliquod accidens, vel aliquam differentiam quae sit extra essentiam entis, sed determinatum modum essendi, qui fundatur in ipsa essentia rei. Sic autem bonum non addit aliquid super ens; cum bonum dividatur aequaliter in decem genera, ut ens. Et ideo oportet quod vel nihil addat super ens, vel si addat, quod sit in ratione tantum; si enim adderetur aliquid reale, oporteret quod per rationem boni contra heretur ens ad aliquod speciale genus. Cum autem ens sit id quod primo cadit in conceptione mentis, ut dicit Avicenna; oportet quod omne illud nomen vel sit synonymum enti, quod de bono dici non potest, cum non nugatorie dicatur ens bonum; vel addat aliquid ad minus secundum rationem. Et sic oportet quod bonum, ex quo non contrahit ens, addat aliquid super ens, quod sit rationis tantum. Id autem quod est rationis tantum, non potest esse nisi duplex. Omnis enim positio absoluta aliquid in rerum natura existens significat.

'Sic ergo supra ens, quod est prima conceptio intellectus, unum addit id quod est rationia tantum, scil. negationem; dicitur enim unum quasi ens indivisum. Sed verum et bonum positive dicuntur. Unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum. Illa autem relatio secundum Philosophum dicitur esse rationis tantum, secundum quam dicitur referri id quod non dependet ad id ad quod refertur; sed e converse, cum ipsa relatio quaedam dependentia sit. Sicut patet in scientia et scibili, sensu et aenaibili. Scientia enim dependet a scibili, sed non e converso. Unde relatio qua scientia refertur ad scibile est realis; relatio vero qua scibile refertur ad scientiam, est rationis tantum; dicitur enim scibile referri, secundum Philosophum, non quia ipsum referatur, sed quia aliud refertur ad ipsum. Et ita est in omnibus aliis quae se babent ut mensura et mensuratum, vel perfectivum et perfectibile.

'Oportet igitur quod verum et bonum super intellectum entis addant respectum perfectivi. In quolibet autem ente est duo considerare; scil. ipsam rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid aliud subsistit in specie illa. Et sic aliquod ens potest esse perfectum dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum rationem speciei tantum: et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui perficitur per rationem entis. Nec tamen ens est in eo secundum esse naturale. Et ideo hunc modum perficiendi addit verum super ens. Verum enim est in mente, ut Philosophus dicit; et unumquodque ens in tantum dicitur verum, in quantum conformatum est vel conformabile intellectui. Et ideo omnes recte definientes verum, ponunt in ejus definitione intellectum. Alio modo ens est perfectivum alterius non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam se undum esse quod habet in rerum natura. Et per hunc modum est perfectivum bonum. Bonum enim in rebus est, ut Philosophus dicit.' De Veritate, Q. xxi, a. I, o.