PROPOSITION XXVII.

The universal Attributes of Being are three, Unity, Truth, Goodness; for it can be shown that this enumeration is adequate.

PROLEGOMENON.

As this Proposition will immediately recall us to the teaching of St. Thomas, which is exhaustive on the present subject; it will be useful, at the outset, to confront a difficulty which would, otherwise, have found a more fitting place among the objections at the end. This Doctor, in a passage which will be presently quoted, enumerates six Transcendentals; to wit, Being, Thing, Something, The One, The True, The Good. Making, therefore, abstraction of Being, five remain. How, then, can three be an adequate enumeration? Such is the difficulty.

It is obvious to remark, by way of reply, that St. Thomas is giving a catalogue of Transcendentals; since Being is itself included. It does not follow, therefore, that the rest, exclusive of Being, are Attributes. This animadversion is confirmed by the fact that, whenever St. Thomas is expressly treating of the Attributes of Being, he limits himself to the three mentioned in the enunciation of the Thesis. Nevertheless, there is a point which still wants clearing up; and it is this. Why has the Angelic Doctor included in his list, as distinct Transcendentals, Thing and Something? As will be seen from the passage when quoted, St. Thomas, following in the footsteps of Avicenna, makes a distinction between Being (Ens) and Thing (Res), identical with the distinction already mentioned between Being in its participial, and Being in its nominative, signification. The former he here reserves for Being, the latter he assigns to Thing: so that Being expresses something as existing; Thing, its quiddity, nature, or essence. Consequently, Thing is evidently not an Attribute. But what about Something? The question is in itself no more difficult of solution than the former, more especially in the English language. For Something is identical with Thing and Being. But the Latin word, Aliquid, introduces a fresh perplexity. For St. Thomas seems to derive Aliquid from Aliud quid, and explains it as that which is distinct from, other than, everything else. But even this use of the word will not enlarge the catalogue of Attributes; for it will then be included under Unity, not as its formal equivalent, but as its connotative, in a way which will be explained afterwards. The enunciation, therefore, of the Thesis remains undisturbed.

This Proposition is little more than a Corollary, inferred from the doctrine already established in the preceding Thesis. It may, however, be further confirmed by the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, who supplies us with the following elaborate proof. 'That which the intellect primarily conceives as best known, and into which it resolves all its other concepts, is Being. . . . Hence it must needs be, that all other concepts of the intellect should be taken for additions to Being. But nothing can be added to Being in the shape of a nature extraneous to it, in the way, e.g. that Difference is added to Genus, or Accident to its Subject; because every nature, of whatever kind, is Being. Accordingly, the Philosopher uses this as a proof, that Being cannot be a Genus. But some things are said to add to Being, inasmuch as they express some Mode of it, which is not contained in the simple name of Being. This takes place in two ways; in one way so, that the Mode expressed is a special modification of Being,' i.e. by contraction to the Ten supreme Genera, &c., as explained in the previous quotation. . . . 'In another way so, that the Mode expressed is the universal consequent of all Being. And this Mode can be understood in two ways; either as the consequent of all Being, considered absolutely as it is in itself, or as the consequent of every Being in its referribility to that which is other than itself. If it be taken in the first sense; its predication expresses a something in Being, either affirmatively or negatively. But you cannot discover any affirmative predication admissible in the case of Being as a whole, save its essence, according to which it is said to be. It is in this sense that the word Thing is applied to it; which differs from Being, in that Being is taken from the act of being, while the word Thing expresses the essence or quiddity of Being. On the other hand, negation which is the consequent of all Being, absolutely considered, is indivision; and this is expressed by the word One. For the One is no other than undivided Being. But, if the Mode of Being be taken in the other way, i.e. according to its referribility or respect to something else; this is possible in two ways. It may first be taken for division of one from another; and this is expressed by the word Aliquid; for Aliquid is as though aliud quid. Hence, just as Being is called One, because it is undivided it itself; so it is called Aliquid, because it is divided from others. Secondly' (it may be taken) 'for the proportion which one Being bears to another. This, however, is out of the question; unless something is apprehended as having a proportion of nature to all Being. And such is the soul, which in a manner is all things; according to the words in the third Book de Anima. Now, in the Soul there is the appetitive, and there is the cognitive, faculty. The word, Good, then, expresses the proportion of Being to the appetitive faculty; accordingly as it is said at the beginning of the Ethics, "The Good is that which all things desire." But the word, True, expresses the proportion of Being to the intellect. Now, every concept is perfected by an assimilation of him who conceives to the thing conceived: so that the aforesaid assimilation is the cause of cognition; just as sight, because it is disposed by the sensile Form (species sensibilis) of colour, perceives colour. Hence it is, that the first referribility of Being to the intellect consists in a proportionate correspondence of Being with the intellect. And this correspondence is called an adequation, an equalling, of Being and intellect. It is precisely this by which the Essence of the True is formally completed. Such, then, is the addition which the True makes to Being, viz, a conformity or adequation between the thing and the intellect; and on this conformity follows, as has been said, cognition of the thing. Thus, therefore, the entity of a thing precedes the formal mode of Truth; while cognition is an effect of Truth.'^{1}

Setting on one side, then, the three Transcendentals, Being, Thing, Something, as virtually identical and as not belonging to the Category of Attributes or Passions; the three remain, which are enumerated in the enunciation of the present Thesis. The argument by which St. Thomas proves that there are these attributes of Being, and these only, shall be resumed in brief. Because Being is Transcendental, outside of which it is impossible that there should be any reality, (for every real thing, be its nature what it may, is Being); there can be no determination of Being, which shall add anything that is extraneous to it. Furthermore, as an Attribute does not determine Being by contraction, it cannot add to the concept of Being a differential evolution of its nature, which shall reduce and, implicitly at least, divide it into Genera; for an Attribute or Property is mutually convertible with its Subject. Consequently, it remains that, if either of these Attributes modify Being absolutely, i.e. considered as it is in itself; it must be by way of negation. Such is Unity, which is the negation of division. If any of these Attributes modify Being positively, it must be respective. For it cannot be absolute; otherwise, Being would be capable of real addition to itself. But if these Modes are respective, they require a term equivalent to themselves, i.e. as far-reaching as Being; because this respect is a sort of relative, and requires the possibility at least of its correlative. Every Being has this referribility; and such referribility requires, accordingly, something to which all Being may be referrible. This (since God is omitted, and that for obvious reasons, from the question) can only be the human soul; or, if God and pure Intelligences are to be included, Spirit. The reason is, because all that is not Spirit is limited in its energies and powers to a definite order of Being; all Being, therefore, is not referrible to it. But the soul of man, by its innate faculties and energy, can extend itself to all things; which causes the Philosopher to declare, that 'the soul after a manner becomes all things.' This it does by its two spiritual faculties, Reason and Will. If Being, then, is regarded in its referribility to the intellectual faculty, it is called True; if in its referribility to the appetitive faculty, it is called Good. But these are the only possible ways in which Being can be modified, by way of an Attribute. Therefore, Unity, Truth, Goodness, (and these three only), are Attributes of Being.

SUMMARY.

Of the doctrine concerning the Attributes or Passions of Being, this is the sum. Being cannot, from the very nature of the case, have real positive Attributes, distinct from itself. Nevertheless, it is equally true, that Being has some so-called Attributes which are not mere logical figments, but are really and truly predicated of it. These Attributes neither contract Being nor do they make any real addition to it; but they formally add either a negation or a referribility to something extrinsic. There are three such Attributes, and three only; to wit, Unity, Truth, Goodness. Unity adds a negation, viz., the negation of division. Truth and Goodness add a referribility; -- Truth, to the intellect, Goodness, to the will. These Attributes are ex parte rei identical with Being. But there is a distinction of reason between the latter and the former; inasmuch as these Attributes are not explicitly included in that which is conceived by the intellect as the quiddity or essence of Being, but are considered as certain Properties, so to speak, flowing from the nature of Being. It is, moreover, indubitable that these three Attributes of Unity, Truth, Goodness, are real, and real perfections of Being, though not really distinct from it; for the truth of the assertion is attested by common sense and the general verdict of mankind. By means of them the real perfection of Being is revealed to thought; as a consequence, their synthesis by demonstration with their Subject is productive of Science, properly so called. It remains to examine the nature, kinds, and perfection of each separately, following the natural order. For Unity, as an absolute Attribute, precedes Truth and Goodness, which are respective; and of these latter, the one which is referrible to the intellect claims precedence over the other which is referrible to the Will, since nothing is loved till it is first known. Hence St. Thomas: 'If, then, the True and the Good are to be considered as they are in themselves, in such manner the True is prior to the Good according to its nature, since it is perfective of something else according to the nature of its Form (or species); but the Good is not only perfective of something else after the nature of its Form, but according to its real entity. Thus the nature of the Good contains within itself more than the nature of the True, and in a manner is constituted by addition to it. Wherefore, the Good presupposes the True, but the True presupposes the One; since the nature of the True is perfected in the apprehension of the intellect, and a thing is intelligible, in so far forth as it is One, according to the Philosopher in the fourth Book of the Metaphysics. Hence, this is the order of these Transcendentals, if considered as they are in themselves. After Being comes Unity; then Truth; lastly, after Truth, Goodness.'^{2}

{1} 'Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens; ut Avicenna dicit in principio Metaphysicae suae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura, per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subjecto; quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens. Unde etiam probat Philosophus in 3. Metaph., quod ens non potest esse genus. Sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere supra ens, in quantum exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine ipsius entis non exprimitur. Quod dupliciter contingit: uno modo, ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis. . . . Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generaliter consequens omne ens; et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest; uno modo, secundum quod consequitur omne ens in se; alio modo, secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in ordine ad aliud. Si primo mode, hoc dicitur, quia exprimit in ente aliquid affirmative vel negative. Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit ancipi in omni ente, nisi essentia ejus, secundum quam esse dicitur. Et sic imponitur hoc nomen, res; quod in hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam in principio Metaph., quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatum sive essentiam entis. Negatio autem, quae est consequens omne ens absolute, est indivisio. Et hanc exprimit hoc nomen, unum; nihil enim est aliud unum quam ens indivisum. Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo mode, scil. secundum ordinis unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno mode secundum divisionem unius ab altero. Et hoc exprimit hoc nomen, aliquid; dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid. Unde sicut ens dicitur unum, in quantem est indivisum in se; ita dicitur aliquid, in quantum est ab aliis divisum. Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud. Et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente. Hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia, sicut dicitur in 3o de Anime. In anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen, bonum; ut in principio Ethic: dicitur, Bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen, verum. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam; ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis; sicut visus, per hoc quod disponitur per speciem coloris, cognoscit colorem. Prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est, ut ens intellectui correspondeat; quae quidem correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur. Et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit verum supra ens, scil. conformitatem, sive adaequationem, rei et intellectus; ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei. Sic ergo entitas rei praecedit rationem veritatis; sed cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus.' De Verit. Q. I, a. 1, o.

{2} 'Considerando ergo verum et bonum secundum se, sic verum est prius bono secundum rationem, cum sit perfectivum alicujus secundum rationem speciei; bonum autem non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed secundum esse quod habet in re; et ita plura includit in se ratio boni quam ratio veri, et se habet quodammodo per additionem ad illa; et sic bonum praesupponit verum, verum autem praesupponit unum, cum veri ratio ex apprehensione intellectus perficiatur. Unumquodque autem intelligibile est in quantum est unum. Qui enim non intelligit unum, nihil intelligit, ut dicit Philosophus in 4. Metaph. Unde istorum nominum transcendentium talis est ordo, si secundum se considerentur: quod post ens est unum, deinde verum, deinde post verum bonum.' De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 3, c.