PROPOSITION XXVIII.

Transcendental Unity is a negation after the manner of a privation.

It has been already shown that an Attribute of Being can make no real, positive, intrinsic, addition to its Subject. Either, therefore, it adds absolutely, and then by way of negation; or it adds positively, and then by way of referribility to something other than the being of which it is predicated. But Unity includes no referribility to something extrinsic to itself; and in this precisely it is distinguished from its fellow Transcendental Attributes. Therefore, if an Attribute at all, it must add to Being by way of negation. And this is precisely what St. Thomas teaches. For he says, 'The One does not carry along with it any idea of perfectionating another' (which is respective), 'but merely that of indivision, which appertains to everything whatsoever by reason of its essence.'^{1} Accordingly he adds in another place, 'Wherefore, it is evident that The One, which is convertible with Being, posits indeed Being itself; but adds nothing, over and above, save a negation of division.'^{2} So far is sufficiently plain. But the student may find a difficulty in that modifying clause of the Proposition, 'after the manner of a privation.' Why is it not a mere negation? What is the reason which compels one to consider such negation, as it were, under the form of a privation? And, if it be after the manner of a privation, why is it not a real bona fide privation? These are the questions which naturally confront us at the outset. The answer to these problems depends for the most part upon an accurate and distinct notion of the difference between a pure negation and a privation. Now, a pure negation is Nothing. It is true that the negation of a negation is a position, according to the old adage, that Two negatives make an affirmative. But then it cannot be called a pure negation. Besides, it remains to be seen, whether Transcendental Unity be the negation of a negation or not. But even if it should be, the difficulty is the same. For the simple negation of a negation may represent a perfection, but not an Attribute; unless it ceases to be a simple negation, that is, unless it includes something directly positive to which it is referred. Moreover, a real position in the case of an Attribute of Being, is a contradiction to the doctrine already established, that no Attribute of Being can add anything positive and real to its subject. But what is a privation? It includes two significates, to wit, an absent Form, and a present Subject of such Form. Thus Blindness, as a privative, includes the Form of seeing, which is absent, and the Subject of that Form, -- let it be, by way of illustration, a man. Furthermore, if it be a real privation, two other elements must enter into the concept. First of all, the absent Form must he a real perfection; secondly, that Form must be due to the Subject which is deprived of it. It is by virtue of this latter element, that Privation is distinguished from mere Wanting or being without. Thus, Blindness is a privation to a man; it is a simple being without to a stone. Why? Because a stone has no right to eyesight.

Hence, it is easy to deduce, that Transcendental Unity is not a real privation. For the negation which it adds is no absence of a real Form. There is no absence of anything real; but the absence of self-division. Then again, self-division is not due to Being; on the contrary, it is essentially excluded. Lastly, in real privation, the superinduction of the missing Form would not only remove privation, but would add a positive perfection to the Subject. But self-division, i.e. division within itself, would be so far from adding by its presence to the perfection of Being, that it would utterly destroy it. Therefore, it is plain that Transcendental Unity cannot be a real privation. Why not, then, a simple negation? Why should it be described as a negation after the manner of a privation?

The reason is, that 'The One,' as St. Thomas puts it in the passage last quoted, 'posits Being itself.' Therefore it is consignificative of two things, absence of division, and the Subject from which division is absent. This is why the negation is after the manner of a privation. But, as such consignification is a capital element in the nature of this, as of the other two, Attributes of Being, it merits closer consideration. Wherefore,

{1} 'Unum non importat rationem perfectionis, sed indivisionis tantum, quae unicuique rei competit secundum suam essentiam.' 1ae vi, 3, ad Im.

{2} 'Patet ergo quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, ponit quidem ipsum ens, sed nihil superaddit nisi negationem divisionis.' De Potentia, Ibidem. v. fi.