PROPOSITION XXIX.

Unity in its formal acceptation is not a pure negation, but includes Entity as the Subject of such negation.

PROLEGOMENON.

In the case of Properties, truly so called, and of Accidental Attributes, there are three acceptations of the word, which are distinguishable from each other, viz., the formal, the material, and the adequate. To speak logically; in all accidental denomination there is the denominative Form, the Subject denominated, and the entire denomination as representative of the Subject actually modified by the Form. Thus, in White Man, Whiteness is the denominating Form, Man is the Subject denominated, and White Man is the adequate denomination. In like manner, the Transcendental Attributes may be considered in their formal acceptation, i.e. as exclusively representing that so-called addition which they make to Being; or they may be taken materially for the Subject of their Attribution; or they may be assumed as adequately representing the Subject as informed, so to say, by its Attribute. Now, there can be no question that these Attributes include Being in their material, and in their adequate, signification. The only subject of dispute is, whether they include Being in their formal acceptation.

I. The present Proposition shall, first of all, be proved by an analysis of accidental Forms in their several kinds. For the sake of clearness, it will be as well to anticipate the argument, whose premisses the present analysis is intended to confirm. Negative Attributes properly so called, as distinguished from all other Attributes, necessarily include the Subject in their formal signification. But Unity is a negative Attribute, properly so called. Therefore, it necessarily includes Being in its formal signification. And now, for the promised analysis. In the case of essential Properties, i.e. of Accidents (using the word generically) which flow from the Essence, there is a reality, represented formally by the Property, which makes a real addition to the Essence of the Subject. In like manner Accidents, specifically so called, are a reality in themselves, apart from their Subject; though they have an essential referribility to it. Even Modes, which essentially postulate actual inhesion in their Subject, have, notwithstanding, a reality of their own, which makes a real addition to the Subject, or Subjects, of modification. Thus, a sitting position is something real, and a real addition to Caius; although his sitting position cannot de potentia absoluta be separated from himself. In all these cases, therefore, there is no doubt but that the Accident not only can, but must, exclude the Subject in its formal signification. Now let us look to privative Forms. They are directly negative, and so far forth logical; but indirectly they are real, that is, if they are themselves real bona fide privatives. Consequently, their Form consists of a double element, as it were; for it is partly logical, partly real. It expresses the want of a certain real something which is due to the Subject and which, if present, would form a real addition to it. Hence, because of this reality indirectly represented, Privatives in their formal signification can stand alone, and do not necessarily include their Subject. But what of pure negatives'? Plainly enough, they can make no real addition, -- not even an addition of reason, to the subject of which they are predicated. For instance, A is nothing, or John is not James, or a point is not motion; what possible addition can such negations make to their respective Subjects? And what reality, or Form conceived as a reality, could they represent; unless their Subject were included in their formal signification? Yes, it may be objected, this is all very true of pure Negatives, but there are Negatives which are negations of negations; and these surely represent a reality which may stand alone, without inclusion of the Subject in their formal acceptation. Thus, Immortal, Immutable, Simple, (which last is really a Negation, -- the negation of composition), can stand alone, and represent something real, which is a conceivable addition to their Subject, in their formal signification. But Indivision is the negation of a negation; for Division is a negation. Therefore, Indivision represents a real perfection and, in consequence, needs not the inclusion of its Subject formally. Without determining for the present, whether Indivision is, or is not, the negation of a negation; let it be supposed, for the sake of argument, that it is. If so; then it is an absolute, intrinsic, real, perfection. But it has been already shown, that this is an impossibility in the case of Being. Either, therefore, it is a pure negation, or it is no Attribute of Being. Again, if it represents a real perfection under the form of a double Negative, it is Being and, consequently, by the very fact, the Subject must enter into its formal signification.

II. Unity is something real. This may surely be taken for granted; since its truth is accepted by the common sense of mankind. But it could not be something real, if in its formal acceptation it included nothing but a negation. The very expression, real Unity, would be in such case an anomaly and a contradiction.

III. The preceding argument receives confirmation from the fact, accepted by all the Doctors of the different Schools, that Unity is not predicated univocally of real Being and of logical Being, but according to analogy of proportion. Now, this could not be, if Unity stood, according to its formal signification, for a mere negation; seeing that it is the formal significate which principally determines the signification of a word. For mere negation would indiscriminately and equally apply to logical, as to real, Being.

IV. Yet again; the Unity of Being is not an adjacent Form, as it were, (like Soft or Bed), which is outside the sphere of the Subject and informs it with some accidental perfection. On the contrary, it is the very Entity of Being in its own state of real Indivision. It has no meaning, no reality, save in that Being whose intrinsic perfection it represents under the conceptual form of a negation; but a negation which objectively is a phase of Being itself.

V. The truth of the present Proposition is confirmed by the authority of the Angelic Doctor. There is one passage where he is expounding the question, disputed from of old by the Philosophers, whether Transcendental and Numerical Unity are identical or not. He here takes occasion to insert the universally admitted doctrine concerning Transcendental Unity in the following words: -- 'One, which is convertible with Being, adds nothing positively to that to which it is adjoined; because a thing is not said to be one, because of any additional arrangement of it. Otherwise, there would be an infinite process; if that arrangement too, seeing that it is one, would be one by some other arrangement (or disposition). Wherefore, they say that One includes in its concept universal Being, and adds, over and above Being, the Form of a sort of privation or negation, that is, of indivision. Hence Being and One are convertible, as being really the same, and differing only in concept; forasmuch as One adds, over and above the idea of Being, a negation. Hence, if the form of The One be considered as regards that which it adds over and above Being, it expresses a negation only.'^{1} Suarez gives it as his opinion, that St. Thomas is speaking in this passage of One in its adequate acceptation; but, to say the least, the expression, 'One includes in its concept universal Being,' coupled with the fact that the whole passage treats of One as distinct from Being, seems to indicate, on the contrary, that he is taking Unity in its formal signification.

In a parallel passage, where the Angel of the Schools is dealing with identically the same question, he expresses himself in the same way; though Suarez, without sufficient reason, (if one may say so), asserts that, like the quotation just given, it 'plainly' treats of Being in its adequate acceptation. These are the words of St. Thomas: -- 'One which is convertible with Being,' (which expression, by force of the logical separation involved, would seem to imply that he is considering One as contradistinct from its Subject), 'makes no addition to Being save a negation of division. Not that it means indivision itself only,' (how could it, if the adequate sense were in question?), 'but the essence of Being with it' (the indivision), 'for One is the same as undivided Being.'^{2}

But there is a third passage, which helps to interpret the rest, and is admitted by Suarez himself as unquestionable. The subject is still the same; and St. Thomas takes occasion to remark, 'Since One is that which is undivided in itself and divided off from other things, and every created thing is distinguished from other things by its essence; the essence itself of created Being, regarded as undivided in itself and distinguishing from others, is its unity.'^{3} It is manifest, therefore, from these quotations that, in the judgment of St. Thomas, One which is convertible with Being, considered consequently as formally its Attribute, 'posits Being.'

DIFFICULTIES.

I. The doctrine indicated in this Proposition seems to be incompatible with the claim of Unity to be an Attribute of Being. For the formal acceptation of an Attribute is that which distinguishes it from its Subject. But that which distinguishes Unity from Being is Indivision. Therefore, Indivision alone can be included in the formal signification of Unity.

ANSWER. In answer it may be said, with Suarez, that Unity is distinguished from Being radically, as it were, by this negation of division, but that it is not formally so distinguished, but by Entity as undivided: so that Being formally stands for Entity as such; Unity, for Entity qua undivided. But this distinction requires elucidation. It is admitted, then, that Indivision, as expressed by Unity, is the foundation of the distinction between the Attribute and its Subject. But what is this Indivision objectively? It is Being in its own perfectness, -- not, be it remarked, a superadded perfectness, but a perfectness which is identical with itself. The difference between Being and its Attributes is conceptual, and consists in this, that Being is conceived as representative of that purely which is necessary to the position of Being as a reality in thought, -- that without which it would be impossible to think of it as Being; whereas Unity determines this concept by the superaddition of a characteristic, intimately imbibed in the nature of Being and objectively identical with it, yet not included in the first undetermined concept of its Essence. The foundation, therefore, of the difference is the added negation of division; while the formal signification of Unity necessarily includes Being, as an integral part of the objective concept.

II. Every Property or Attribute formally expresses that which it adds to its Subject, and that only. But Unity adds Indivision to Being, as St. Thomas repeatedly declares. Therefore, Unity in its formal acceptation expresses Indivision, and that only.

ANSWER. The assertion is true of Properties and Attributes strictly and truly so called; but it does not hold good in the case of the Transcendental Attributes of Being, for the reasons already alleged in the first Chapter of this Book.

III. If One expresses anything save simple negation, that anything must be either Being or something else. But the latter cannot even be imagined. For, if it is not negation, it must be positive. Now, it cannot be a conceptual positive. For, first of all, no one has ever dreamed of such a significate in Unity formally considered. Besides, this putative positive is either respective or absolute. But it cannot be respective; for Unity is absolute. Take the opposite alternative and suppose that it is a conceptual absolute positive. Let us be told in plain terms the precise nature of its objective concept; for as yet the task has been unattempted. If, then, One expresses anything positive, it must be real; and, therefore, Being. But, in this case, it would follow that Being and Unity are even conceptually one and the same, which is, to say the least, inconvenient. Besides, such a theory involves an infinite process. For that something positive, included in the formal signification of Unity, must be One; One, therefore, as inclusive of something positive and absolute, which, in turn, must be One; and so on, for ever. Again; it would follow that there is no difference between the formal and the adequate Acceptation of Unity. Lastly, it would follow, as a necessary consequence, that this Attribute of Being would formally include all the perfection of Being; so that an Attribute would be of, at least, equal perfection with its Subject.

ANSWER. The answer to this nucleus of objections is nearly the same as that which has already been given to the second difficulty. It is manifest from all which has been said in confirmation of the present Proposition, that it is Being which is included in the formal acceptation of its own Attribute. Nor is there in this any inconvenience, such as the first argument in the present difficulty assumes. For these Transcendentals are not real Attributes or Passions, but are represented conceptually after the fashion of Attributes. As a fact, they are determinations of Being, not by contraction, but by explicit evolution of Entity. The object is really the same in the concept of Being, as in the concept of One; but in the latter instance the concept is more complete, so to say, and determined. Neither is it true that, if the doctrine here maintamed be correct, there would be an infinite process; because Being and One are ex parte rei precisely the same as regards all that is positive, and only differ even conceptually in this, that One adds to the concept of Being a negation of division. Consequently, Being is one by its own Entity, and One is Being by its own Entity, and One is one, because it is Being. Lastly, it is willingly conceded that One includes not all the perfection in actu exercito of Being, but exhibits a further perfection which is not formally represented in the concept of Being; while, on the other hand, it is also true that in actu signato it does not attinge what is conceived to be the essential perfection of Being, as such. For it explicitly exhibits Being under the determining form of indivision.

{1} 'Dicunt ergo quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, nihil positive addit ad id cui adjungitur, eo quod res non dicitur esse una per aliquam dispositionem additam; quia sic esset abire in infinitum, si ista etiam dispositio, cum sit una, per aliquam aliam unitatem una esset. Unde dicunt, quod unum claudit in intellectu suo ens commune, et addit rationem privationis vel negationis cujusdam super ens, id est, indivisionis. Unde ens et unum convertuntur, sicut quae sunt idem re, et differunt per rationem tantum, secundum quod unum addit negationem super ens. Unde si consideretur ratio unius quantum ad id quod addit supra ens, non dicit nisi negationem. tantum.' In I Sentt. d. xxiv, Q 3, a. 3, c.

{2} 'Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, non addit supra ens nisi negationem divisionis. Non quod significet ipsam indivisionem tantum, sed substantiam ejus cum ipsa; est enim unum idem quod, ens indivisum.' De Potentia, Q. ix, a. 7, c.

{3} 'Cum enim unum sit quod est indivisum in se et divisum ab aliis, cum unumquod quo autem creatum per essentiam suam distinguatur ab aliis; ipsa essentia creati, secundum quod est indivisa in se et distinguens ab aliia, est unitas ejus.' In Sentt. d. xix, Q. 4, a. I, ad 2m