PROPOSITION LIV.

Universal Unity, as such, is not real; nor has it any existence in real actual Entities, antecedently to the operation of human thought.

PROLEGOMENON I.

It follows, as a Corollary, from the proofs and accompanying explanations which have been given in the preceding Thesis, that those natures which are conceived and denominated Universals are real, and really exist in the entities themselves. If it were not so, it would be a bad look-out for Science. For Science is based on definitions, and perfected by demonstrations; but both definitions and demonstrations are only of Universals. If Universals were, therefore, as some extreme Nominalists have maintained, nothing but chimeras of the brain, destitute of all foundation in reality; Science, of whatever kind, would resolve itself into a mere logical fiction. For even the imperfect Science, (if Science it can be called), which is generated by pure Induction, must go with the rest; since all Induction ends in a putative Universal. Moreover, all Universals are the logical clothing of an Essence; and an Essence is eminently real. Individual determinations are for the most part purely phenomenal, so far as they reveal themselves to human perception, and are the formal object of sensation; while the nature, which human thought robes in its garment of Universality, is the proper object of the intellect. Nay, the IJniversality itself is an imperfect, yet pregnant, symbol which the human mind has used, for expressing, in its own way, the order of the one Whole.

PROLEGOMENON II.

It is also here supposed and, indeed, follows, as another Corollary, from all which has preceded, that these Entities, or Natures, which are conceived and denominated Universals, are not really distinct from the individual Beings in which alone they are to be found. The absurdity of supposing really subsistent Universals, existing on their own account, is too manifest to find acceptance with the intellects of this eminently practical age. For, -- not to urge the patent fact that everything which really is, is singular, -- the supposition in question is involved in manifold self-contradictions. We will imagine, for a moment, that Man exists, -- a Being really distinct from all individual men. What would be the result? He would ipso facto cease to be a Universal. But why? Because it is of the essential nature of a Universal, that it should be one in many. But this universal Man would not be in one, much less in many; because, according to the hypothesis, he is really distinct from each and all. Yet it is a contradiction in terms to affirm at once, that he is really distinct from, yet intrinsically included in, each and all of the same individuals. Again: if Man is an entity really distinct from William and Henry; it could not possibly enter into the essential constitution of either. Consequently, neither of them would be men. Lastly, (for the sake of more effectually exposing the absurdity of such a theory), suppose that these subsistent Universals could enter into the intrinsic constitution of the individuals grouped under them respectively; into what a Chinese ivory ball each individual would be transformed, circle within circle, yet each independent of the other! Take the case of William again: There would be in him subsistent Substance, subsistent Body, subsistent Life, subsistent Animality, each independent of the other, -- to say nothing of the generic and specific Accidents, which there is no just reason for excluding. And all these are thus gathered together, without either purpose to serve or functions to exercise. It is surely not necessary to discuss, at greater length, so wild and baseless a theory.

PROLEGOMENON III.

Assuming, therefore, as indubitable,, that the entities, which are conceived as Universals, are really identical with the Singulars, or individual Beings, to which they owe their origin; there still remains a question that awaits solution. For though, as has been seen, the specific, is really identical with the individual, nature in each existing Being; yet, the nature is in itself real in such sort, that there is in each individual a real Formal Unity, though not really distinct from Individual Unity. In like manner the question may arise, whether the Nature, which is denominated Universal, has a Unity, by reason of which it has received the name of a Universal, sufficient to justify us in saying, that not only the Universal Nature, but the Universality itself, is in entities, antecedently to all action of the Intellect. To give an answer to this question, is the purport of the present Proposition.

PROOF OF THE PROPOSITION.

There are only two real Unities discoverable, or intelligible, in Being; to wit, Numerical or Individual, and Formal. But neither of these is sufficient to establish Universal Unity. Therefore, Universal Unity is not real, and has no existence, antecedently to human thought.

The Major of this syllogism is sufficiently evident. For, as has been before remarked, Unity is indivision, or absence of division. Consequently, there will be so many, and only so many, real Unities in Being, as their real kinds of division. But entities are only really divided or distinguished from each other, either numerically or specifically. If there be any other real distinction, let it be produced.

The Minor plainly follows from the doctrine, established in the preceding pages of this Article. Singular Unity cannot be the real constitutive of Universal Unity; for the two are diametrically opposed to each other. Neither can Formal Unity be the adequate constitutive; for it may be in one, and, if it be in many, the Unity is multiplied with the multiplication of Supposits. But Universal Unity cannot be in one, and is itself essentially one in many. This second Member, however, in proof of the Minor requires, because of its intrinsic importance, further enucleation. Wherefore,