PROPOSITION LIII.

There is, in the Essences or Natures of Actual Entities, a real Formal Unity, which is conceptually, though not really, distinct from the Individual Unity of those Entities.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of the Proposition is thus proved. It is sufficiently obvious, from the essential nature of Unity, that there must be as many kinds of Unity as there are kinds of division. But it is equally plain, that there are, in all Entities, material or entitative, and formal or essential, division; which exist in actual Being, antecedently to, and independently of, any intellectual operation whatsoever. Therefore, there must also be in them a material and a formal Unity, independently of all intellectual operation, i.e. really.

The humor of this syllogism is approved by common sense, and is confirmed by the universal testimony of mankind, as expressed in the construction of all languages. For, in them all, are to be found common nouns which express a certain class or group of things, as distinguished from another class or group. Thus, dog, cat, horse, cow, pig, tree, shrub, plant, insect, reptile, are so many words which represent distinct groups; and common sense teaches us, that the nature of a dog is really divided off from the nature of a plant, for instance, or of a reptile. Moreover, we clearly perceive, under the same guidance, that the nature of a dog is really nearer to that of a reptile than to that of a plant; and nearer to that of a cat than to either of the other two. Yet, even between the two groups or kinds which are nearest akin, we recognize a substantial difference or division. No matter at present, whether the characteristic notes have been rightly estimated, or of what nature the division may be, as conceived by us; the fact remains incontestable, that common sense recognizes a substantial division between these groups of Being. When, however, it is necessary to divide numerically or individually; Language supplies us either with a proper name, or a demonstrative pronoun, or some other equivalent prefix. We call the dog Caesar; or we speak of it as this dog, to distinguish it from that; or we call it the dog, that one, viz, of which we have spoken before; or we describe it by its individual notes, e.g. a black and tan, with a white spot on its forehead. This is further confirmed by individual experience. For we recognize in Peter the essential unity of his manhood, equally with that individual unity by which he is himself and no other, numerically divided off from all others of his kind.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER asserts, that Formal Unity is conceptually distinct from Individual Unity in the same Entities.

This assertion admits of little doubt. For the Nature, or Essence, is conceived as something distinct from the individual or individuals to whom it is, as it were, communicated. But, so conceived, it has its own Formal Unity; although it has no Individual Unity. Therefore, the two Unities are at least conceptually distinguished from each other. A moderate analysis of thought will serve to show, that, in the two concepts of Man and of Julius Caesar, there is an objective unity in each respectively; yet, that the unity in the one is at least conceptually distinct from the unity of the other, even when we think Man in connection with Julius Caesar.

Furthermore: Individual Unity is not, of itself, a necessary attribute of the absolute Nature in finite Being; and finite Being is the exclusive object of the present inquiry. Consequently, something must be, at least conceptually, added, in order to determine a given Nature to the Individual; i.e. in other words, in order to invest it with Individual Unity. But Formal Unity is its own special attribute; and needs not, even conceptual, addition.

Lastly: it is impossible to conceive of an absolute Nature or Essence, without this Formal Unity; whereas, it is quite possible to conceive this same Nature without any Individual Unity. For men, as a fact, form such concepts, every day they live. Therefore, the two are conceptually distinct.

III. THE THIRD MEMBER affirms, that these two Unities are not really distinct.

PROLEGOMENON.

It is not intended here to enter into the vexed question, touching the Platonic ideas; for this is usually reserved for Ideology. Nor, indeed, is it of such necessity to offer an elaborate refutation of it in our day; seeing that the course of modern thought runs in a totally opposite direction. Perhaps it may not be inopportune to remind the student, that there has always existed a diversity of opinion as to the mind of Plato concerning these ideas. If he meant them to stand for the prototypal Ideas in the Divine Intelligence; his theory harmonizes with the doctrine that will appear in the sequel. If, as he has been more generally understood, he has willed to create a Universe of substantial Forms outside the Divine Mind, eternal, immutable, of which created Essences are a sort of shadow, Aristotle's objections are irrefragable; and the theory includes within itself so many contradictions, that, apart from its uselessness in Philosophical investigation, it is deservedly rejected as a wild and untenable conceit. The proof then, of this third assertion has been already given in preceding inquiries. For it has been shown, that, in real Being, the Specific or Essential Nature is not really distinct from the individual Subsistence. But, if this be true; since Unity follows Entity, Formal, cannot be really distinct from Individual, Unity.

Again: albeit the intellect can consider the Essence or Nature, absolutely as it is in itself, by abstraction from the individuals in which it is found; yet such Essence has no real actual Being, save in the Individual. Hence, Aristotle declares in his Categories, that 'if first substances' (i.e. individuals) 'did not exist, it would be impossible for any of the others' (second substances, or Genera and Species) 'to exist.'^{1} Therefore, a nature has no real Entity, apart from the Individual, and, as a consequence, no real Unity; and no Unity, really distinct from the singular Unity of each individual.

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE THIRD MEMBER.

I. A Nature or Essence can be defined. Thus, the Nature in William and Robert has, as a fact, its proper definition. Therefore, it must have a Unity of some sort or other; for nothing can be defined that is not one. But this Unity is no mere creation of the Intellect; because, as common sense teaches and as is admitted by general consent, the Nature is real, and its definition is not a mere logical fiction. Therefore, the Unity, which is its transcendental Attribute, is real too and, consequently, really distinct from Individual Unity, which it in a manner excludes; since indifference is incompatible with determination.

ANSWER. Definition is an intellectual act, and presupposes a Unity, at least equivalent to its own nature. Absolutely, therefore, eonceptual Unity is sufficient for definition; otherwise, there could be no definition of Second Intentions, which are purely logical. But this does not solve, though it serves towards solving, the difficulty. The reason why it does not solve the objection is, because the object is confessedly real, and the Unity therefore real. But, even so, it is sufficient that the foundation should be real and the Unity fundamentally real; for then, though the Entity may be formally Logical or Conceptual and the Unity, in consequence, formally Conceptual, the foundation itself is real and, consequently, the definition no mere creation of the Intellect. In other words, the object itself is real; but the mode of representing it may be purely logical. A number of individuals have certain notes in common; that is to say, there are points in which they are precisely similar to each other. This gives rise to a common notion. But the community or commonness itself is not in the notes. It is an act of the Intellect which collects them into one. The definition represents those notes, which are similar in each individual; and, so far, is real. But that it represents them as formally one nature, is purely its own handywork. Therefore, the representation is real and the definition real, because they have a real corresponding objective concept; and to such extent the unity is real. Yet neither tbe nature itself, so represented and defined, nor the Unity of such Nature, is really distinct from the Individual Entity and Individual Unity in which alone it is discoverable.

II. The second objection is as follows. Unity consists in indivision; wherever, therefore, indivision is discoverable, Unity is there. But human nature, -- to take an example, -- has of itself formal indivision; therefore, of itself, it has formal Unity, which is, in consequence, really distinct from the individual Unity of the Subsistence, or Supposit, in which it is found. Now, that human nature of itself has this formal indivision, is obvious. For, if it had not of itself formal indivision, of itself it would have formal division; since indivision is nothing else than absence or privation of division. Yet, if of itself it admitted or included formal division, it would have it always and everywhere. But, as a fact, this is not the case; for, whenever it is considered absolutely apart from the Subsistences to which it is communicated, it does not include formal division.

ANSWER. It will be necessary to distinguish the word, indivision. For indivision may be predicated of its subject, as either positively or negatively pertaining to it. Positive indivision in a Being excludes the possibility of division in that Being; for it is a real attribute of Being, under the form of a privation. But negative indivision consists in an indifference to indivision or division, and, consequently, to Unity or Multiplication; being compatible with either. Thus, the absence of rationality negatively belongs to animal; because, as animal merely, it is neither rational nor irrational, but is indifferent to either, and nevertheless capable of either. But the same absence of rationality belongs positively to a brute; hence, it is incapable of the contrary. So, in like manner, it may be negatively said of a superficies, considered merely as it is in its own nature, that it is neither white nor black; because it is indifferent to either. But this does not hinder its becoming white or black, by subsequent determination. To answer the difficulty, therefore, in form. The Major must be distinguished. Unity consists in indivision; so that, if the indivision be a positive attribute, the Unity will be positive and real, -- granted; so that, if the indivision is merely negative, (consisting in an indifference to division or indivision), the Unity will be positive, actual, real, denied. Wherefore, in like manner, in answer to the proof of the Minor. 'If it of itself admitted formal division' positively, 'it would have it always and everywhere' -- granted: 'If it of itself admitted formal division' negatively, 'it would have it always and everywhere,' -- denied; because it may be afterwards positively determined to one.

But the difficulty is further urged. It would appear as though a Nature were not only negatively, but positively, undivided in its formal Essence. For Formal division is Essential division, and man, (to take an instance), cannot be essentially divided; although it is possible that he should be materially divided into many Supposits, or Subsistences.

ANSWER. This instantia serves to evince, indeed, that there is a Formal Unity in Beings; but, as intended to prove the common nature of this Unity and, consequently, a real distinction between Formal and Individual Unity, the argument labours under the defect of equivocation in more than one respect. For, when it is said that a Nature is of itself formally undivided, so that anything like formal division is a contradiction; this may mean that the Nature is in such wise formally one, that it is impossible for it to be further divisible by formal, or essential, Differences. If such be the meaning, it is manifestly false in regard of Generic Natures; for these have their own Formal Unity, and yet, are capable of formal division by Specific Differences. Again: though it is true of Specific Natures; yet, that does not tell in favour of the objection. For, though Specific Natures are not divisible by formal, they are divisible by individual, Differences; and these cause that the Specific Nature should have, in each individual, its Formal Unity, really distinct from that which it has in any other. Or the words may mean, that a Nature is in such sort undivided of itself as to forbid all division or multiplication of its Formal Unity. So understood, it is false again, even in regard of Specific Natures. For, although in the individuals there is no essential division or distinction; yet there is a real division or distinction of essences. Therefore, though individuals do not formally or essentially differ; notwithstanding, they have distinct Formal Unities, proper to each. How comes it to pass, then, that individuals are not distinguished from one another formally or essentially? Because it is not enough for such formal distinction, that the Subjects of distinction should have essences entitatively distinct from each other severally; but it is likewise necessary, that those Essences or Forms should exhibit a dissimilarity of notes, such as would forbid their inclusion under one objective concept or under one definition, and that, in consequence, they should not only differ existentially or really, but conceptually also.

III. Lastly it is objected, that human nature, for instance, is of itself and positively Being. Therefore, of itself and positively it has some sort of Unity. But such Unity is not material or numerical, as is plain; otherwise, it would be incapable of multiplication. Consequently, it must be Formal; because there is no middle Term. This argument is confirmed by an example. Human nature and the nature of a horse are in themselves, apart from all individual determinations, really and essentially two distinct entities. If so, then each of them is essentially one. For, where there is no Unity, there can be no Plurality; where there is no intrinsic indivision, there can be no division or separation from others.

ANSWER. A reply must be given to the present, similar to those already made to the previous, objections. The argument is doubtless a convincing proof that there is a real Formal Unity in each entity, pertaining to the Specific Nature; by virtue of which, that Nature formally differs, and is divided off, from every other Specific Nature. And thus much is maintained in the first Member of the present Proposition. But it does not avail to prove, that this Formal Unity is really distinct, in the Subject, from Individual Unity; so that it is really common to all the individuals that are included under it. Perhaps, it will not be profitless to justify and elucidate this solution by a fuller explanation. It is here maintained, then, that a Nature or Essence is not really common to many, but that, on the contrary, it is really identical with the individual Supposit, in every instance; so that there are really as many Natures as there are individuals. The Nature, however, is conceptually common to many; yet, conceptually only. Nevertheless, the concept is not a pure fiction of the intellect; because it is based on the similarity or equivalence of the essential notes in each. Precisely in the same manner, Formal Unity is not really, but only conceptually, common to many; and it is really divided into as many Formal Unities as there are individual Unities. Each of these Formal Unities is undivided in itself; but, taken in common, they are not in reality formally undivided, though they are so in the conceptual Unity of a common similarity, by reason of which they cannot properly be said to be formally distinct, but are Formal Unities individually distinct. Wherefore, the principle of real distinction between each individual essence and the Formal Unity of that essence, is not the Formal Nature but the individual Difference. Let this doctrine be illustrated by an example. William and Henry have each a soul, animating an organized body. In this they are precisely similar; and, accordingly, they are called men, and are said to participate in one common nature. There can be no doubt that this nature is real; yet it is equally plain, that the human nature in William is really distinct from the human nature in Henry, and that the nature in each is really identical with the individual Difference of each. For the soul of William is really this soul, with all its individual characteristics; and the soul of Henry is really that other soul, with all its individual characteristics. So, the body of William is really this individual body, with its special features, proportions, and the like; while the body of Henry is that other body, with its distinguishing marks. Nevertheless, it is equally true that Henry and William are equally distinguished from a horse; in that they each have a rational soul, animating a specifically organized body. But these essential constituents are only conceptually common to both, because entitatively they are distinct in each; and the real distinction arises from the fact, that William is individually other than Henry. Yet, the essential notes are considered as common to both, because of their similarity in each; which causes in the mind the concept of a specific identity. The similarity itself, however, is not conceptual; as is manifest to common sense. On the contrary, it is pre-eminently real.

{1} Mê ousôn oun tôn prôtôn ousiôn, adunaton tôn allôn ti enai. Categ. c. 5, in init.