ARTICLE III.
Formal and Universal Unity.
Lemma.
As the purpose of the present work is to offer to the student the fundamental principles of the Scholastic Philosophy in an English dress; it will be necessary, at the outset of this Article, to borrow from Ideology certain important theorems bearing on the origin of ideas. It is true that they have no proper place here and, therefore, they are presented under the form of a Lemma; and, for the same reason, they will be simply stated, not proved, and stated with that brevity which is consistent with clearness. If it is permitted to the writer, in the good Providence of God, to complete his plan by adding to the Metaphysics the Psychology and Ideology of the School, these theorems will receive their due share of attention and discussion. They are simply introduced in this place; because, without some knowledge of them, it would have been difficult to understand the questions which now claim attention.
The human soul has a higher and a lower order of faculties. The latter belong to it as substantial Form of the body; the highest it possesses by virtue of its spiritual nature. The lower order of faculties are such as, the senses (not, remark, the organs of sense, which belong to the body), the feelings, passions, imagination. The higher order are exclusively two; viz. the intellect and the will. Among all these it will be now necessary to signalize two only, the senses and the intellect; for these are the two great means (the one material, the other formal), for the formation of ideas and, consequently, for the acquisition of truth. To begin with the senses: Material substances are their object, and these objects become present to the senses in the soul through the organs of sense. The objects, thus present, cause a Form of themselves, (not always a formally representative Form), in the sensible faculty, which excites sensation and is (to speak roughly), as a lens through which the object itself is perceived, but never the object of sensible perception. This form is called a sensible species, often also a phantasm. Now as these species or phantasms are produced by the action of the Accidents only of material Substance, and not by the Substance itself, (for material Substance does not energize save in and by its Accidents); it follows, that an act of sensible perception is representative only of the Accidents of Substance, not of the Substance itself. Hence it is, in every sense of the word, material in its representation, though itself the act of a spiritual nature. For this reason, it is only representative of singulars, and of existing singulars. With the intellect, however, it is wholly the reverse. Its proper objects are the Quiddities or Essences of things. For, since the Intellect is an immaterial faculty and 'everything that is received, is received according to the measure of that which receives;' it follows, that the intellect receives and, as a consequence, intues, material things immaterially, i.e. stripped of their individuating conditions. But, stripped of these, what remains of material Substance, save its Quiddity or Essence? Now, as an Essence is a potential Universal; it follows, that Universals are the proper object of the intellect.{1} So strictly is this true, that, according to the Angelic Doctor, the intellect could in no wise become cognizant of the Haecceity of material Substance, save that it has the power of turning round upon the sensible phantasmata which first waked it into energy.{2} Hence, the cognition of Universals is not a concept; but, originally at least, an intuition. It is not representative, but presentative. It is here that we touch upon one of the most fundamental errors in the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton; for he seems to deny the possibility of a universal concept that is not reflex.
There remains a question which is sure to be asked by the inquisitive student, and shall be answered here, though in the briefest form. If the intellect, in the beginning, is purely facultative, how do these material Entities become sufficiently present to it; since it abjures all connection with matter or material determinations? Bear in mind throughout, that the soul is entirely free from physical composition; and that all its faculties are faculties of one, simple, undivided, unpartitioned, Substance. The Scholastic answer is as follows. When the sensible species has been received in the soul, it is irradiated and, as it were, transformed by the acting intellect, which is like a Magnesian light, perpetually shining within its spiritual temple. By such irradiation of intellectual light, the sensible species becomes an intellectual species; by means of which, the possible or potential intellect is awakened from its previous state of indifference, (as having an object now present to it), and evolves into an act of cognition. The first or germinal form in this intellectual process is called, in Scholastic phrase, the impressed species (species impressa); the second or perfect form, -- the idea or concept, -- is denominated the expressed species (species expressa). There is the same distinction, and there are the same phrases to express it, in sensible perception.
It only remains to add, that 'the Forms of sensible or material things have a more perfect existence in the intellect, than they have in sensible things themselves. For they are more simple and of wider periphery; since, by means of the one intelligible form of man, the intellect embraces all men in its cognition.'{3} This is a truth worth realizing, more especially in the present age.
As the present Article is devoted to the consideration of Formal and Universal Unity; it will be necessary to begin by stating what these two Unities respectively mean, what are the principal points of difference between them, and, lastly, why they are grouped together under one Article.
I. To commence with their meaning. From what has gone before it is plain, that, according to the teaching of tbc Angelic Doctor, (which has been assumed not without reason as typical of the Scholastic Philosophy), Matter with its Accidents may be considered as the principle of Individuation in the case of material Substances; while the substantial Form gives to each its specific or essential Nature. The Matter, then, on this hypothesis, will give to material Substance its individual Unity, while the Form will give to it its specific Unity. What wonder, therefore, if individual Unity should be called material, Unity; while specific, or essential, should receive the name of formal, Unity? Thus the nature of this latter is clearly discerned; for Formal Unity is nothing more nor less than Unity of Essence, which is logically represented by Species. That such Unity, as distinct from individual Unity, is recognised by the common sense of mankind, needs no other proof than the testimony of all languages, ancient as well as modern. For instance; this particular animal is called Carlo. But he is also called a dog, in common with an indefinite number of other animals to whom the same name of dog is applied. The one name is individual; the other is specific, and is applicable to all possible Beings, (as it is actually applied to all existing Beings), in which the same essential or specific characteristics are to be found. Each noun, viz. Carlo and dog, is in the singular, and is, therefore, representative of some sort of Unity; while the one is evidently a different Unity from the other. Individual Unity is a proper object of sensible perception; essential or formal Unity, of either intellectual intuition or cognition. Formal Unity abstracts from Individuation, as is plain from what has been already said; and, in fact, if any one conceives or speaks of dog, or a dog indefinitely, there is no element of Individuation either in the idea or in its expression. Dog in reality may be one, or it may be many; but it conceptually includes neither Unity nor Plurality. It is a specific Form which abstracts from all relation to concrete subsistence. But the specific Form, for this very reason, is potentially Universal, i.e. it is in such a state of indifference to individuation, while as a material Form it is so essentially communicable, that the intellect can conceive it as capable of possible extension, or as actually extended, to an indefinite number of subsisting Entities. If the intellect thus conceives it in its possible or actual relation to such Entities, it becomes a formal Universal. Universal Unity is, therefore, formal Unity conceived under this possible or actual relation. It follows from the foregoing explanation, that both these Unities may be called Universals, as indeed they often are; because both abstract from individuation. But formal Unity is what Logicians call an absolute; while Universal Unity, properly so called, is relative Universal, to which alone the laws of logical distribution formally apply. The former is, therefore, a Metaphysical; the latter, a Logical, Whole. It may be noticed in passing, that this distinction affords a clue to the discovery of a fundamental error in Sir William Hamilton's system of Logic, in so far as it diverges from the beaten track; and renders that original part of it (e.g. the quantification of the predicate and, more particularly, the multiplication of syllogistic modes), a work of supererogation.
These remarks serve as an introduction to the teaching of St. Thomas touching the aforesaid Unities. 'Universal,' he remarks in a certain place, 'has two meanings. First, it means the nature simply to which the Intellect attributes a formal concept,' (i.e. of universality), 'by reason of something which it has discovered in that nature. In this sense, Universals which express the nature of things, are predicated essentially. For Animal is expressive of the substantial Essence of that of which it is predicated; and Man, in like manner. Now, in this sense there is no Unity in many. On the contrary, the Essence predicated is always multiplied, with the multiplication of the subjects; for as many men as there are, so many animals are there. Universal means, in the second place, the same nature, considered under the formal concept of universality which is attributed to it. And so understood, on account of the uniformity of the representation to be found in the formal concept, which is caused by the separation of the object from material conditions and every sort of diversity, there is a Unity in many. For, in such wise, men are one Man and one Animal. There is nothing, then, really common to many; for whatever really exists, is a Singular communicable to one alone. But that which is common, is a creation of the intellect.'{4} There is another passage, a little further on in the same work, wherein St. Thomas developes his meaning at greater length. 'It must be understood, then,' he remarks, 'that, in a nature of itself, (setting on one side the formal concept of universality), there is sometimes a unity, independently of that which the intellect creates, and sometimes there is not.' (The Angelic Doctor is here referring to formal Unity.) 'For a nature, after subtracting the formal concept of Universality, e.g. the nature of Animal, may be regarded in a threefold light. First of all, it may be considered absolutely and as it is in itself; and, conceived in this way, nothing is consonant with it, save that which enters into its definition; (to take an instance, an animated sensitive body enters into the definition of Animal); for anything else, from the present point of view, would be attributed to it falsely, as, for instance, that it is white, or musical, or anything like that. Secondly, this same nature may be considered as received in some one individual of its own kind; and, even yet, there will remain to it the essential Form which absolutely enters into the definition; for the animal, which is Socrates, is an animated, sensitive, substance. But, if it he received in several individuals, necessarily the nature itself at once and its definition will be multiplied. For Socrates and Plato are two animals and two animated, sensitive, substances. Wherefore, though, in the nature of Animal, there is neither unity nor plurality, as regards the natural capacity it has for being received in several inferiors, seeing that it can be equally received in one or in more than one; there is, nevertheless, in the nature itself, taken absolutely, (i.e. not considered as existing in its subjects), a sort of unity, since, (as is plain), it has one definition and its own proper name. Thirdly, this nature may be considered, as it is in the human mind. And, since everything that is in the mind, is abstracted from every sort of material division and diversity; there is attributed to such nature, by reason of the uniformity which it exhibits relatively to all things, a universal Form, which is one in many.' (The Angelic Doctor commences here to treat of Universal Unity.) 'Hence, under this point of view, such a nature is not multiplied in its inferiors. On the contrary, many men are one man and one animal, by participation in the same Genus and Species; for it is in this wise, that such natures are unified under the forms of Genus and Species. Therefore, there is in these natures a twofold unity; one, that is, in the absolute nature itself, and this nature belongs to each one of the Supposits. Such Unity, however, does not pass down from the nature itself to its Supposits. For instance, it is of the absolute nature of Animal to be an animated, sensitive, substance, as has been said. Nevertheless, this does not express its absolute nature entirely, but only in part. For it is in its own absolute nature, that it admits of being subjected to the formal concept of Universality; because it is only in an absolute nature that this is possible, and it is possible in every absolute' (abstract) 'nature. If we take in, then, the whole of its nature absolutely, and define it to be an animated, sensitive, nature, naturally capable of being submitted to the formal concept of Universality; neither unity nor plurality of any sort enters into the concept, because either the one or the other may befall it. But this nature has another unity, conferred upon it by the intellect, in which all the Supposits' (or Substances) 'unite together. Hence the Unity' (Universal), 'created by the intellect in such nature, is based on the Unity to be found in the Entity itself that is subjected to this' (conceptual) 'Unity.'{5}
II. These two passages of St. Thomas suggest the second question that has been proposed, and, in great measure, contain the answer to it. The question has regard to the principal points of difference between formal and universal Unity. All Unity essentially includes indivision in the Entity that is one and, consequently, as has been already seen, division from every other that is included under the same determination of Unity. Accordingly, Entities individually one are individually undivided in themselves, and divided off from every other individual Entity. Formal Entities are formally undivided in themselves, and divided off from all other formal Entities. Universal conceptual Entities are conceptually undivided in themselves, and divided off from all other universal conceptual Entities. So far, they all agree. But, besides these two constituents, Individual Unity also essentially includes incommunicability of nature to another; and, by this, it is primarily distinguished from both Formal and Universal Unity. For these two essentially include communicability, though in very different ways. This leads us to seven points of difference between the two.
i. Formal Unity denotes indivision of Essence or Nature, with an aptitude for communicating itself either to one or to more than one. Thus, human nature may be in one man, or it may be in fifty men. Hence, Formal Unity is indifferent as to its singularity or multiplication, while at the same time preserving its natural communicability. On the contrary, Universal Unity is not indifferent as to the determination of its communicability; for it is not capable of communicating itself to one, but only to many. Who would not at once perceive the absurdity of the proposition Man (i.e. all men) is Thomas? Hence,
ii. Formal Unity may be singular; Universal Unity, never. God is formally one; but it is a contradiction in terms to affirm that He is universally one. So, to take another instance, the sun is formally one; and it is potentially universal (which God is not), for there is nothing repugnant in the idea of a multiplication of suns. Indeed, according to recent astronomical observations, it would seem as though it were of one type with other stars.
iii. A third difference between the two, (and a crucial one it is), arises out of the fact that Formal Unity, as St. Thomas has remarked, is multiplied, with the multiplication of the Subsistences which receive it; whereas Universal Unity is one in all. Hence, Formal Unity ceases, as soon as it is received in more than one Supposit. This is the meaning of those words of the Angelic Doctor at the commencement of the last quotation, 'In a nature itself, setting on one side the formal concept of Universality, there is sometimes a unity, independently of that which the intellect creates,' i.e. when the Form or Essence is considered either as absolutely free from individual determinations or as communicated to a singular Supposit, 'and sometimes there is not,' i. e. when that same Form is considered as communicated to more Subsistences than one. And, in fact, since Formal Unity is the unity of a real specific nature; it is plain that, whenever that nature is really multiplied, the unity must be destroyed. Thus James and William are two rational animals; not one. But in Universal Unity it is precisely the reverse. For the Species, Man, and the Genus, Animal, are one in all men.
iv. Hence flows a fourth mark of difference between the two. Universal Unity, of its very nature, includes a transcendental relation to inferiors which are conceived to be included under it. Wherefore, it is essentially distributive, as Logicians say. For it is a Unity conceived as existing in many. But Formal Unity does not include any such transcendental relation. To take an instance of each: 'Human Nature is partly spiritual, partly corporeal,' is an example of Formal Unity, and includes no relation to inferiors; for it would be equally true, if never a man had been created. On the other hand, 'Every man is mortal,' is an example of Universal Unity; for of man, considered as a common Form existing in all men, it is predicated that he is mortal. The sign of distribution has been prefixed, in order to make the illustration clearer.
v. Another difference between the two is to be found in this; that Formal Unity, when existing in many, ceases of course, (as has been remarked before), to be Unity, and is the division of many with aptitudinal indivision. For though, in the individual determinations and differences, it is many; yet, by abstraction from these individual determinations and differences, it is capable of becoming one. But Universal Unity is, in many, the conceptual indivision of many, together with aptitudinal division. For though, in itself one Species or Genus; yet, by abstracting from the second Intention or Form of Universality, it ipso facto resolves itself into an indefinite number of distinct existing or possible Entities.
vi. From the preceding differences, is gathered another point of difference. Formal Unity is pre-eminently real; for it is the Unity of Essence. But Universal Unity is of itself entirely logical or conceptual, and has no place outside the objective representation of the intellect.
vii. Lastly, Formal Unity is not directly opposed to Individual Unity; whereas Universal Unity is its formal antithesis. For Individual Unity is indivision in the singular, division in the many; whereas Universal Unity essentially includes division in the singular, indivision in the many.
III. The last question finds an easy answer, in the explanations already given. Formal and Universal Unity are discussed together in the same Article, because of their intimate relationship. They are both included in one and the same formal object. Hence St. Thomas declares, in the second quotation, 'There is in these natures a twofold Unity.' In short, Universal Unity is nothing but the Formal, or Essential, Nature which has been subjected to the purely conceptual form of Universality. Hence, every essential Form, as St. Thomas remarks in the same passage, can be transformed by the intellect into a Universal; and nothing save an essential Form can be so transformed. For it should not be forgotten, that Accidents have their own essential nature, no less than Substances. Formal Unity, therefore, is the foundation of Universal Unity; since an absolute nature includes in its essential definition, St. Thomas notes in the same place, an aptitude for being subjected to the form of Universality. Wherefore, it is obvious that it is the same object which, as real, is invested with Formal; as conceptually informed, is invested with Universal, Unity. To the Metaphysician, then, whose object is Essence, these two are virtually the same; and, indeed, he only considers Universal Unity, which is a logical Entity, inasmuch as it is founded in, and in so far forth as it is illustrative of, Formal Unity. Moreover, it follows, as a sort of Corollary, that the constitutive principles and the elements of both, so far as they are real, are identical. It is at once, therefore, more convenient and more philosophical, to consider these two Unities together; the more so, because Universal Unity, in and of itself, is not a proper object of the Metaphysical Science. These questions answered; the doctrine touching these two Unities will be established, in the Propositions that follow.
{1} Vide D. Thomam, Opusc. XLIX (aliter XLV), De sensu respectu singularium et intellectu respectu universalium.
{2} Opusc. XXIX (aliter XXV), De principio individuationis.
{3} 'Formae rerum sensibilium perfectius esse habent in intellectu quam in rebus sensibilibus; sunt enim simpliciores et ad plura se extendentes. Per unam enim formam hominis intelligibilem omnes homines intellectus cognoscit.' c. Gent. L. II, c. 50, 4.
{4} 'Universale enim dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo ipsa natura, cui intellectus propter aliquid in ea inventum intentionem attribuit. Et sic universalia quae rerum naturas significant, praedicantur in quid. Animal namque dicitur substantia illius de quo praedicatur, et similiter homo. Et isto modo non est unum in multis. Immo natura praedicatorum semper multiplicatur, multiplicatis subjectis; quod enim sunt homines, tot sunt animalia. Alio modo dicitur universale natura illa sub intentione universalitatis sibi attributa; et sic propter uniformitatem rationis inventam in intentione, quae fit propter remotionem a materialibus conditionibus et omni diversitate, est unum in multis: Sic enim homines sunt unus homo et unum animal. In re igitur nihil est commune multis; quia quicquid est in re, est singulare uni soli cornmunicabile; quod autem commune est, agitur per intellectum.' Opusc. XLII (aliter XXXIX), De natura Generis, c. 5, p. m.
{5} Unde sciendum est, quod aliquando est unitas a parte naturae subtractae intentioni universalis praeter istam quam facit intellectus, aliquando autem non, nature autem non.' (Nota ad calcem, 'fortasse redundant haec verba.') 'Natura enim quae est subtracta intentioni universalitatis, sicut natura animalis, tripliciter considerari potest. Uno modo absolute et secundum se; et sic, nihil sibi convenit, nisi quod est de intellecta ejus. Ut, puta, de intellectu animalis est corpus animatum sensibile; nihil enim aliud sibi attribui potest secundum hanc considerationem nisi falso, ut album, vel musicum, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Alio modo potest considerari haec natura prout est recepta in aliquo singulari sui generis. Et adhuc inerit sibi ratio quae de intellectu ejus est absolute. Animal enim, quod est Socrates, est substantia animata sensibilis. Sed ei recipiatur in pluribus, necessario et natura ipsa et intellectus suus multiplicabitur. Socrates enim et Plato snunt duo animalia et duae substantiae animatae sensibiles. Unde, licet in natura animalis non sit unitas vel pluralitas, secundum quod est nata recipi in pluribus inferioribus, cum possit in uno recipi et in pluribus; est tamen in ipsa natura absoluta accepta, secundum quod non est in inferioribus considerata, quaedam unitas; cum definitio ejus sit una, et nomen suum, ut patet. Tertio modo potest conciderari haec natura prout est in anima. Et quia omne quod est in anima est abstractum ab omni divisione et diversitate materiali, attribuitur isti naturae, ratione uniformitatis quam habet ad omnia, ratio universalis quod est unum in multis. Unde sic non multiplicatur haec natura in suis inferioribus; immo plures homines sunt unus homo et unum animal, participando genus et speciem; hoc enim modo convenit talibus naturis secundum rationem generis et speciei. In istis igitur est duplex unitas; una, scil. in natura absoluta; quae natura convenit singulis suppositis. Sed haec unitas non descendit ab ipsa natura ad sua supposita. Sicut de natura animalis absoluta est substantia animata sensibilis, ut dictum est. Sed hoc non dicit totam naturam ejus absolutam, sed aliquid ejus. In natura enim sua absoluta est, quod possit substerni intentioni universalitatis; quia solum natura absoluta hoc potest, et etiam omnis natura absoluta. Comprehendendo ergo totam naturam ejus absoluto, dicendo naturam animalis absolutam esse substantiam sensibilem aptam natam substerni intentioni universalitatic, non oct do intellectu ejus unitas aliqua, nec otiam pluralitas; quia utrumque potest sibi accidero. Alia est autem unitas naturae, quam habet ab intellectu, in quam omnia supposita conveniunt. Ideo unitas, quam facit intellectus in tali natura, fundatur super unitatem in re inventam, quae una est illa unitate.' Opusc. XLII (aliter XXXIX), De natura Generis, c 7.