PROPOSITION LII.
Although St. Thomas seems to admit with Suarez that Accidents, as physically constituted in their Subjects, are individual by their own actual Entity; yet he equally maintains that, considered metaphysically the Subject is the genetic, conservative, and material principle of the Being of Accidental Forms and, consequently, of their Individuation.
I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition is clearly taught by St. Thomas, under five different points of view.
i. He insists upon the fact that, in spite of the transcendental relation of Accident to Substance and of the essential dependence of the former on the latter, Accident has a distinct entity of its own; so that, for instance, the quantity in a geranium and the qualities of red, green, and the like, are real entities, entirely distinct from the substantial entity of the plant. Hence, speaking of the Category of Relation, and contrasting finite Relations with those Divine Relations by which the Three Persons are, as it were, constituted in God, he says, 'In us Relations have a dependent existence; because their existence is one thing, and the existence of the Substance is another. Accordingly, they have their own proper mode of Existence, proportioned to their own proper nature; and such is the case with all the other Accidents. For, inasmuch as all Accidents are certain Forms superadded to Substance, and caused by the essential constitutives of Substance; it must needs be, that their Existence should be something added to the Existence of Substance, and should depend on it.'{1} It may, perhaps, be questioned, whether the esse of the Angelic Doctor should not be translated in the above passage, wherever it occurs, actual entity; but, as St. Thomas usually distinguishes esse from ens, as we distinguish Existence from Essence, -- as it harmonizes more completely with his whole doctrine on the subject of Accidents, -- and as the word has been hitherto rendered Existence, it has seemed better to preserve the rendering, even at the cost of seemingly weakening the cogency of the quotation. The bearing of the above passage on other points of his teaching, will appear later on in the declaration of the second Member. It only remains to draw the conclusion. If Accidents have their own Existence, distinct from that of the substantial Subject which they immediately or mediately inform, and an independent Existence proportioned to their nature, -- independent, i.e. intrinsically, though extrinsically dependent, -- and if Existence is the actual Entity of a thing; it follows that, as Accident has its own actual Entity, it must have its own Individuation distinct from the Individuation of its Subject, seeing that the Entity of Being is its Unity.
ii. St. Thomas emphatically declares that the Subject, which is inserted in the definition of Accident, is no part of the latter's Essence; wherefore, as he says, God de potentia absoluta could create the Accident without its Subject. In connection with the subject which he is professedly discussing, he illustrates his assertion by the examples of Density and Rarity, which give rise to a special difficulty. For, according to a definition which he seems to admit, in the passage here alluded to, Density is 'a great deal of matter under small dimensions;' so that it is at first sight difficult to understand, how Density or Rarity can exist without the Subject, i.e. Matter. But, as St. Thomas appositely remarks, this definition of Density is not its essential definition. For it is rather a property, consequent on such disposition of Matter under such dimensions. Matter is in itself indivisible, and wholly throughout, wherever it is. Quantity gives to it its divisibility and partial distribution in space; and, upon the fulness of Matter determined by smallness of quantitative dimension, follows Density as a resultant Entity. These are the words of the Angelic Doctor: 'Just as the Subject, which is inserted in the definition of the other Accidents, forms no part of the Essence of the Accident; so, in like manner, Matter, which is inserted in the definition of Rarity and Density, is no part of their Essence. For Density is not Matter existing under small dimensions; but is a certain Property which follows from such a disposition of the Matter. Hence, God can produce such a Property, even though there be no Matter.'{2} But if the Subject is altogether foreign to the Essence of its Accidents, it cannot be the intrinsic constitutive principle of their Individuation. Wherefore, it follows, as a consequence, that Accidents are individuated by their own actual Entity.
iii. Moreover, the Angelic Doctor, in discussing the Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation, with special reference to the condition of the Accidents or Species after they have been deprived of the Substances of bread and wine which they had previously informed, declares that they remain in that individual existence which they had acquired in those Substances, antecedently to the consecration.{3} But, if they have acquired an Haecceity of their own, and preserve that Haecceity after the desition of their natural Subject; it is obvious that their Subject cannot possibly be the intrinsic constitutive principle of their Individuation.
iv. St. Thomas teaches, that Quantity does not depend on sensible Matter for its essential Nature, but for its Existence or actuation. 'Dimensive Quantity,' he remarks, 'does not depend in its own proper nature on sensible Matter, although it depends on it for its Existence. Hence, 'whether as Predicate or Subject, it assumes the form of a Substance as well as of an Accident. Accordingly, we say that a line is a Quantity as well as quantitative, and a magnitude as well as great.'{4} But, if Quantity, in its own proper nature, does not depend on Matter; it clearly cannot depend upon it for its Individuation. This argument, if it be taken physically, (which is how the question is treated at present), applies with yet greater cogency to the other Accidents. For, as St. Thomas observes, Quantity comes much nearer to the first Subject; because it directly affects Matter and disposes it for the reception of its Substantial and, subsequently, of its Qualitative Forms .{5} As a fact, the qualitative Forms immediately inhere in Quantity; just as Quantity immediately inheres in the material Substance and, according to the more probable opinion, in the Matter of such Substance. Consequently, Qualities have less imperfection of Being than Quantity; because this latter, relatively to the former, is in a state of subjective receptivity or potentiality, while the Qualities are its Forms or Acts. As, therefore, everything is what it is by its Act, it follows that there is more of distinctive Entity, (proportionally to the nature of Being), in the informing Act than in the informed Subject. If, then, Quantity has its own distinctive Essence and its own distinctive Individuation, a fortiori will the informing Qualities have the one and the other.
But, further, there is no need of any deduction, in order to prove that St. Thomas supposed Quantity to have an Haecceity of its own; for he asserts as much in so many words. 'If, therefore, Quantity,' he says, 'should actually exist apart from Matter, it would have its own Individuation. For it would have, of itself, its own division by which Matter is divided; and so, one part would differ from another part, not in Species, but numerically.'{6} The same, therefore, can be safely asserted of the other Accidents, for the reason already given.
v. Lastly, St. Thomas asserts that Qualitative, as well as Quantitative, Accidents have their own proper Essence and their own proper Existence.{7} But the Haecceity of a thing is in reality its own actual Entity; therefore, these Accidents are individuated by their own proper Entity.
II. IN THE SECOND MEMBER of this Proposition St. Thomas is said to maintain, that 'metaphysically speaking, the Subject is the genetic, conservative, and material principle of the Being of Accidental Forms and, consequently, of their Individuation.' It is hardly necessary to remind the student, that a principle of such complexion cannot be intrinsic.
St. Thomas bases his doctrine touching this matter on two principles generally admitted in the School, of which one regards Accident as Accident, the other regards Accident as Form. It is proposed, therefore, to consider the question under each of these aspects separately.
i. Considering Accident as Accident, it will be found that, in several ways, Accident essentially includes a causal dependence on its Subject.
a. First of all, it includes such dependence in its own essential Entity, formally considered; by which it is primarily distinguished from Substance. For Substance is absolutely, without addition, Being; whereas Accident is said to be Being of Being, because it has in its own Nature a transcendental relation to Substance. But, if its actual Entity is essentially dependent on another; evidently, its Individuation so far forth depends on that other. Wherefore St. Thomas observes, 'Substance is individuated of itself; but accidents are individuated by their Subject, which is Substance. For we speak of this Whiteness, because it is in this Subject.'{8} So, in another place, he assigns the reason; and illustrates his position by a reference to Grammar. 'Substance,' he remarks, 'as it has Being of itself, so has it, of itself, unity or multitude. Hence, a noun substantive is taken to be singular or plural, according to the concept expressed by the noun. But, since Accidents have their Being in the Subject; so, from this Subject they receive unity or multitude. Wherefore, in adjectives, the singularity and plurality are regulated by the Supposits,'{9} or nouns with which they accord.
b. But Accident depends likewise genetically on its Subject; because it is evolved out of that Subject. For, in the generation of Accidents, there must exist in the Substance already constituted, (which is their Subject), a receptivity, of which the Accidental Form is the Act. The Accident, therefore, actuates its Subject, and depends for its Existence on the potentiality out of which it is educed. Moreover, it follows, as an Act, from, or rather is caused by, the essential constitutives of its substantial Subject. Thus, to take an instance, the blush upon a man's face arises from some feeling in the soul, acting upon the heart, and producing an accelerated circulation of the blood. The emotive or lower faculties of the soul, and the body normally organized, are essential constituents of the man out of whom this redness is evolved, and who is receptive of this Accident. Further; these essential constituents are joint causes of the supervening affection. So, again, in laughter, there are required, as combining causes, an intellect capable of appreciating the ludicrous, and a peculiar muscular arrangement whose action produces those sounds which go by the name of laughter. But these two elements evidently belong to the soul and body, respectively, which are the essential constitutives of man. Now, in these cases, (and the same may be said of Accidents in general), it is pervious to common sense, that the blush and the laughter are elicited or evolved out of the man; that the man was in a prior state of receptivity in their regard, i.e. that he was equally capable of blushing and laughing, as of not blushing and of not laughing. Lastly, it is plain that the feeling (say, of modesty) and the accelerated action of the heart are, together, causes of the blush; and that an intellectual appreciation of the pun together with the spasmodic action of the muscles are joint causes of the laughter.
Whereby it may be perceived, that the generic relation of the Subject to its Accident is threefold; viz, that of a pure receptivity to its Act or, in other words, the relation of a material cause; secondly, that of a necessary, determining, condition; and, finally, that of an efficient cause. It is, however, to be noted, that the last-named relation is not verified in the instance of all accidents. For some of them are, as it were, forced on their Subject by the action of an external cause, as, e.g. the Form of heat in water. From this threefold relationship it may be clearly seen, that Accident has no absolute Existence and, consequently, no absolute Unity and that its Existence and Unity genetically depend on the Subject in which it eventually inheres.
But this is precisely the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. Speaking of Accident, he observes that 'it has neither absolute Existence nor absolute Unity; but its Existence and its Unity depend on that in which it inheres.'{10} Then, again, in another place: 'Actuality is found in the Subject of an accidental Form, before it is in the accidental Form itself. Hence, the actuality of the accidental Form is caused by the actuality of the Subject; so that the Subject, as potential, is susceptive of the accidental Form; as actual, it is productive of the same.'{11} And once more: 'Shape and all other Accidents follow upon Substance, as their cause. Wherefore, the Subject holds, with regard to its Accidents, the relation not only of a passive potentiality, but also of an active potentiality,'{12} i.e. of an efficient cause.
Not only is the Subject genetically necessary to, and determinative of, the Accident, but it is equally necessary, in the natural order, for the conservation of its Accident; for dependence is of the essence of Accident. Accordingly, St. Thomas assures us, that 'in case of all Accidents, universally speaking, the Subject is in some way or other their cause; forasmuch as Accidents are sustained in the actual Entity of the Subject.'{13}
Now, if the actual Entity of Accident is, in these various ways, dependent on the Subject which it informs, -- if it is the actuation of that Subject, and is evolved out of its potentiality, -- if, ordinarily speaking, in the case of Accidents generally, and universally in the case of connatural Accidents, the essential constituents of the Subject, either specific or individual, are their efficient cause, -- if, moreover, the Subject is, in the natural order, necessary to the conservation of its Accident, can anything be plainer than that the Individuation of the Accident must include a like dependence, and that it is determined by the Individuation of the Subject as by an extrinsic cause?
ii. If Accident is considered as a Form, it partakes of the nature of all material Forms. Now, considering these Forms metaphysically, i.e. as they are in their essential nature, they are Acts or Actuations of their Subject. In other words, they are the Subject actually being what antecedently it was capable of being, but was not. Hence, they should be considered as determinations of the Subject rather than as Beings, so to say, on their own account. To put it in St. Thomas' own words: 'Forms are, properly speaking, Being, not because they are, but because by means of them something is. So, in like manner, a Form is said to be produced, not because itself is produced, but because something is produced by it, i.e. in that the Subject is reduced from potentiality to act.' Accordingly, further on, he says; 'A quality has no existence, save that which it has in the Subject.'{14} And, in another place, he draws the consonant conclusion, that 'Accidents are not individuated by Primordial Matter, but by their own proper Subject, which is actual Being; just as substantial Forms are individuated by their Subject, which is Primordial Matter.'{15} He even applies this doctrine to the human soul. For the soul of a man, though, by reason of its spiritual nature, it is not a purely material Form, is, nevertheless, created to inform this body. Hence it may be regarded under a twofold aspect, viz, as a material Form, and as an incomplete yet spiritual Substance. Because it is a material Form, it may be said to owe its Individuation to the body which it actuates. Because it is a spiritual Substance, it does not receive its individuation from the body, nor with natural dependence on the body; so that it preserves its Individuation, after the severance of union by death. Wherefore, in answer to an objection that, after death, the human soul would cease to be individual, if the body is its only principle of Individuation, the Angelic Doctor makes the following reply: 'There is in the soul no principle of Individuation And I assert that it receives its Individuation by reason of the body. . . . But, although the Individuation of souls depends on the body as regards their commencement, it is not the same as regards their ending; in such sort that, when the bodies cease to be, the in any other corporeal quality to exist without Quantity?' and the following is his solution of it. 'In order to see whether it is possible for God to cause Whiteness to exist apart from Quantity, it should be understood that, in Whiteness and every other corporeal Quality whatsoever, two things are to be considered; to wit, the nature itself of Whiteness by which it receives its specific character, and its Individuation by which it is this perceptible Whiteness, distinct from any other perceptible Whiteness. The nature, then, of Whiteness might be made by miracle to exist without any Quantity; but such Whiteness would not be like this perceptible Whiteness, but would be a sort of intelligible Form, like the separated Forms invented by Plato. But that this perceptible Whiteness should be individuated without Quantity, is impossible; albeit it is possible for Quantity to be iridividuated without Substance. For Quantity is not individuated only by its Subject, as other Accidents; but, likewise, by its position in space. For this latter belongs to the nature of dimensive Quantity, which is Quantity having position. Accordingly, it is possible to imagine two separate lines of the same Species, numerically distinct by virtue of their diversity of place. Otherwise, a line would not be divisible, by the very nature of its Genus; for a line is only divided into lines. But to imagine several Whitenesses of the same Species without a Subject, is impossible. Thus it is plain, that Whiteness is only individuated by its Subject; and, on this account, it could not be' (sensibly) 'individual, unless it were in some Subject, -- to say the least, in Quantity.'{16}
This doctrine of the Angelic Doctor does not appear to find favour in the eyes of Suarez; the student, then, will decide the question for himself according to its own intrinsic merits. Thus much perhaps may be said, that the modern theory of light seems rather to square with the theory of St. Thomas than with that of his opponents. Take, for instance, a green leaf. It is impossible to understand how the varied undulations of ether could be restricted to a definite wave length, how the transmitted or absorbed light could be lost, how the dispersed light which makes the objects around visible could be thus dispersed and, consequently, how the sensation of green should be produced in the soul by the medium of the organ of sight and its optic nerve, if the Quality that produces these effects and inheres in the Quantity of the leaf were disembodied, so to say, and deprived of its local extension.
SUMMARY.
It will be well to recapitulate the conclusions which have been evolved in the course of this long Article.
Haecceity is that mode of transcendental Unity, common to all existing things, by which an Entity is rendered incommunicable, as such, to any other, and becomes singularized. In finite Being, (which is here the exclusive subject of inquiry), it adds something real to the specific Nature, considered in the abstract; but is really, objectively, identical with the specific Nature, as it is actually in the individual. Nevertheless, there is a distinction of reason between the two, which has a real foundation. The principle of Individuation is twofold, accordingly as the question is considered physically or metaphysically. If the Being is regarded as physically constituted, and the question turns on the intrinsic constitutive principle of Individuation; then, in every case, the answer is one and the same. For, whether it be a spiritual or material Substance, a complete or incomplete Substance, an Accident, a substantial or accidental Mode; each Being is individually one by its own actual Entity. If the Being is regarded metaphysically, and the question turns on the genetic principle of Individuation in the Essences of things; then the answer will be different, according to the different nature of the entities. Spiritual Substance is individuated by its essential incommunicability. Of material Substance, Matter is individuated by dimensive quantity; the Form, by its proximately disposed Matter; Substantial Modes, by the Matter and Form, principally, however, by the latter. Accidents are individuated by their Subject; with the exception of Quantity, which is partially individuated by position in space. In all, save the first, the principle is extrinsic.
{1} 'In nobis relationes habent esse dependens, quia earum esse est aliud ab esse substantiae. Unde habent proprium modum essendi secundum propriam rationem; sicut et in aliis accidentibus contingit. Quia enim omnia accidentia sunt formae quaedam substantiae superadditae et a principiis substantiae causatae, oportet quod eorum esse L. iv, c. se sit superadditum supra esse substantiae et ab ipso dependens.' c. Gent. 14.
{2} 'Sicut subjectum, quod ponitur in definitione aliorum accidentium, non est de essentia accidentis; ita etiam materia, quae ponitur in definitione raritatis et densitatis, non est de essentia eorum. Non enim est densitas materia multa existens sub parvis dimensionibus, sed proprietas quaedam consequens ex hoc quod materia sic se habet. Unde talem proprietatem Deus potest facere, etiam si materia non esset.' In 4, d. xii, Q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, ad 6m.
{3} 'Hujusmodi accidentia acquisiorunt esse individuum in substantia panis et vini; qua conversa in corpus et sanguinem Christi, remanent virtute Divina accidentia in illo esse individuato quod prius habebant. Unde sunt singularia et sensibilia.' 3ae lxxvii, I, ad 3m.
{4} Quantitas dimensiva secundum suam rationem non dependet a materia sensibili, quamvis dependeat secundum suum esse. Ideo in praedicando et subjiciendo accipit modum substantiae et accidentis. Undo lineam dicimus et quantitatem et quantam, et magnitudinem et magnam.' In 4, d. xii, Q. i, a. I, q. 3, ad 2m.
{5} 'Prima accidentia consequentia substantiam sunt quantitas et qualitas. Et haec duo proportionantur duobus principiis essentialibus substantiae, scil. formae et materiae (unde magnum et parvum Plato posuit differentias materiae) sed qualitas ex parte formae. Et quia materia est subjectum primum quod non est in alio, forma autem est in alio, scil. materia; ideo magis appropinquat ad hoc quod est non esse in alio, quantitas quam qualitas, et per consequens quam alia accidentia.' Ibidem, ad 1m.
{6} 'Si ergo quantitas sine materia haberet esse actu, per se haberet individuationem; quia per se haberet divisionem illam, secundum quam dividitur materia. Et sic una pars differret ab alia, non specie sed numero.' In 4, d. xii, Q. I, a. I, q. 3, ad 3m.
{7} 'Cum ista accidentia habeant esse et essentias proprias, et eorum essentia non sit eorum esse, constat quod aliud est in eis esse et quod est.' Ibidem, ad 5m.
{8} 'Substantia enim individuatur per se ipsam; sed accidentia individuantur per subjectum, quod est substantia. Dicitur enim haec albedo, in quantnm est in hoc subjecto.' 1ae xxix, i, c.
{9} Substantia autem, sicut per se habet esse, ita per se habet unitatem vel multitudinem. Unde et singularitas vel pluralitas nominis substantivi attenditur secundum formam significatam per nomen. Accidentia autem, sicut esse habent in subjecto, ita ex subjecto suscipiunt unitatem vel multitudinem. Et ideo in adjectivis attenditur singularitas et pluralitas secundum supposita.' 1ae xxxix, 3, c.
{10} 'Adjectivum autem significat per modum accidentis, quod non habet esse absolutum nec unitatem, sed esse suum et unitas sua dependent ex eo cui inhaeret.' In I, d. ix, Q. I, a. 2, c.
{11} 'Sed e converso actualitas per prius invenitur in subjecto formae accidentalis quam in forma accidentali. Unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subjecti; ita quod subjectum, in quantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis; in quantum autem est in actu, est ejus productivum.' 1ae lxxvii, 6, c. Hence elsewhere St. Thomas says more clearly, 'Accidens naturale causatur ex principiis subjecti.' De Malo, Q. iv, a. 2, ad 9m.
{12} 'Quia figura et omnia alia accidentia consequuntur substantiam sicut causam. Et ideo subjectum se habet ad accidentia, non solum ut potentia passiva, sed etiam quodammodo ut potentia activa.' Opusc. LX (aliter LXIII), in Boet. de Trinit. Q. v, a. 4, ad 4m.
{13} 'Omnibus accidentibus, communiter loquendo, subjectum est causa quodammodo, in quantum scil. accidentia in esse subjecti sustentantur.' In i, d. xvii, Q. i, a. 2m. It would be well to consult this entire answer.
{14} 'Sicut esse non est formae, sed subjecti per formam, ita nec fieri, quod terminatur ad esse, est formae sed subjecti. Sicut enim forma ens dicitur, non quia ipsa sit, si proprie loquamur, sed quia aliquid ea est; ita et forma fieri dicitur, non quia ipsa fiat, sed quia ea aliquid fit, dum scil. subjectum reducitur de potentia in actum. . . . Non est aliquod esse qualitatis, nisi quod habet in subjecto.' De Virtt. in Communi, Q. I, a. II, c, init. Read the whole Corpus.
{15} 'Accidentia non individuantur per materiam primam, sed per subjectum proprium, quod est ens actu, individuantur, sicut et formae substantiales per materiam primam, quae est earum subjectum.' Opusc. XXIX (aliter XXV), de Principio Individuationis, in fl.
{16} 'Ut ergo videamus utrum fieri possit a Deo quod albedo sit sine quantitate, sciendum est, quod in albedine et qualibet alia qualitate corporali est duo considerare, scil. ipsam naturam albedinis per quam speciem sortitur, et individuationem ejus, secundum quod est haec albedo sensibilis ab alia albedine sensibili distincta. Posset ergo fieri miraculo, ut natura albedinis subsisteret absque omni quantitate; tamen illa albedo non esset sicut haec albedo sensibilis, sed esset quaedam forma intelligibilis ad modum formarum separatarum quas Plato posuit. Sed quod haec albedo sensibilis individuata esset sine quantitate, fieri non posset; quamvis fieri possit quod quantitas individuata sit sine substantia. Quia quantitas non individuatur solum ex subjecto, sicut alia accidentia, sed etiam ex situ, qui est de ratione ipsius quantitatis dimensivae, quae est quantitas positionem habens. Et ideo possibile est imaginari duas lineas separatas ejusdem speciei numero diversas secundum diversum situm. Alias linea non esset divisibilis ex ipsa ratione sui generis: non enim dividitur linea nisi in lineas. Plures autem albedines ejusdem speciei sine subjecto imaginari, est impossibile. Et sic patet quod albedo non individuatur nisi ex subjecto. Et propter hoc non posset esse individua, nisi esset in aliquo subjecto, ad minus in quantitate. Quol. vii, a. 10, o.