PROPOSITION LI.

Although St. Thomas maintains that, in purely immaterial Forms, any multiplication of individuals in a Species is naturally impossible, being moved thereto by reasons of no little weight; yet he equally admits that there is, in their case as in that of other substances, a real distinction between the Haecceity and the specific nature.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition asserts that St. Thomas maintains, not without reason, the impossibility, according to the established natural order, of any multiplication of individuals in the Species of spiritual Substances. The following declaration will suffice to substantiate the assertion.

Let us begin with a brief analysis of the whole question, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor. The specific nature of a Substance is determined by its Form although, in its totality, it includes every element that contributes to the substantial Composite. Now, substantial Forms are of two kinds, viz, complete and incomplete. Complete Forms are perfect in themselves; and are, in their nature, free from all need of union with something else, necessary to integrate them substantially. Incomplete Forms are imperfect Substances, and, consequently, require union with something else in order to be substantially perfect. In the instance, therefore, of these latter, the perfect Substance is constituted by the union of the two, not by the Form alone; and in that union each part gives and takes. But all material Forms are incomplete. It follows, then, that all material Forms, as such, are communicable to something else. Hence, they are not individual, but common. They are not individual, because they are communicable; and incommunicahility is the foundation of Haecceity. As a fact, antecedently to their union with their supplement, they are absolutely indifferent to this or that. That something else, to which these Forms are communicable and which is required for the constitution in their case of a complete Substance, is Matter. When, then, any one of them is communicated to Matter, it is ipso facto individuated; because it is now determined to one, and is no longer communicable to any other. Hence the origin of its Haecceity. But the same specific Form, metaphysically considered, may be communicated to many distinct portions of Matter, and, in consequence, receive as many distinct individuations as there are distinct portions of Matter in which it is received. Yet, in all these, its nature remains one and the same. Hence it follows, that, in the instance of material Substance, individuals may be multiplied indefinitely in one and the same Species. Neither can it be said that Matter is in the same case; because it is primordially one, and is capable of communicating itself to an indefinite number of Forms. For it is in no way capable of communicating to, hut only of becoming Subject to the communicability of, others; for the reason that it is a pure receptivity. And this is what St. Thomas means, when he insists upon the fact that Matter is the first Subject. Its commonness is nothing else but its imperfection; and it receives individuation inchoately, not by any active communication of itself, but by a passive attraction which it receives for the impending Form.

And now to turn to complete immaterial Forms. These have in themselves no communicability; because it is not in their nature to require union with anything else than themselves, in order to the completion of their substantiality. Hence their name of separated Forms. In this case, moreover, the substantial Form is everything; consequently, it is the specific nature simply and absolutely. But that specific nature is, as has been seen, incommunicable. Therefore, it only needs actuation to become individual, even physically speaking. Neither is it communicable to more than one individual; not because the nature could not be multiplied de potentia absoluta, but because such a Form is not naturally communicative of itself, since it stands alone and one, in virtue of its own absolute completeness. To say, however, that it does not in its own nature require communication for its individual completeness, is one thing; and to say that it cannot be communicated to something else, (which may cause a multiplication of individuals in it), even by the Omnipotent Will of God, is quite another thing. The one amounts at most to a physical impossibility; the other, to a metaphysical. One may be fully justified in asserting that, looking to the Essences of things, there appears to be no sufficient reason for the multiplication of individuals in a purely spiritual species, and that, therefore, it may be concluded that there is no such thing in fact; and yet shrink from maintaining, especially on a subject so little open to human cognition, that it is absolutely impossible, even for God, to create such a multiplication. St. Thomas holds to the former, as will be seen; but he as pronouncedly rejects the other. He shall now speak for himself. 'Because the Essences of composite entities are received in determinate Matter, or are multiplied according to the division of the latter; it comes to pass, that certain things are specifically the same and numerically distinct. But, since the Essence of simple entities is not received in Matter, in their case there cannot be such multiplication. Wherefore, it is not to be expected that we should find more than one individual of the same Species in such Substances; but as many as are the individuals, so many are the Species, as Avicenna expressly declares.'^{1} 'Matter is the principle of Individuation in material things only because it is not capable of being shared by several things; and it cannot be so shared, for the reason that it is the first Subject existing in no other thing. . . . Separated' (i.e. purely immaterial) 'substances, then, are individual and singular. They are not, however, individuated by Matter; but their individuation is due to the simple fact that they have no natural tendency to be in any other and, consequently, to be shared by many. Hence it follows that, if any particular Form is naturally subject to participation by another, so as to become the act of some sort of Matter; it can be at once individuated and multiplied in view of the Matter.'^{2} 'But they argue with marvellous simplicity in endeavouring to show that God could not make many intellects of one and the same Species, imagining that it involves a contradiction. For, granting that multiplication is not of the nature of an intellectual Being, it does not follow that the multiplication of an intellectual Form would involve a contradiction. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from not having in itself the cause of some' (effect), 'and yet having it from some other cause.'^{3}

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of the Proposition asserts, that St. Thomas admitted a real distinction, in purely immaterial Forms, between the specific nature, as such, and its Individuation or Haecceity.

The truth of this assertion follows, as a Corollary, from the words, of the Angelic Doctor, quoted last. For, if there be no metaphysical repugnance in the multiplication of individuals within any Species of spiritual substances, it is impossible that the Essence, or specific nature, and the Haecceity should be really identical; otherwise, God could not effect such a multiplication, because He cannot change the Essences of things.

But the question deserves further examination, not merely for the sake of vindicating more thoroughly the teaching of St. Thomas, but because of its own intrinsic interest and importance. Observe then, that, according to the more commonly received opinion, the intrinsic principle of Individuation in the case of every kind of Substance, incomplete as well as complete, material no less than spiritual, is the actual Entity of that Being. Therefore, in an integral material substance perfectly constituted as such, the Form is individual by its actual Entity, the Matter by its own actual Entity, and the substantial mode of union by its actual Entity. So far, as regards the Substance already constituted: but now, let that Substance be considered in the order of generation, -- in other words, while it is in the process of being evolved or produced. Its Matter essentially needs individuation, which it is conceived as receiving by the disposition of indeterminate dimensions. Save for this, Matter would preserve its primeval indifference, would be indivisible, undistinguishable, and could not become this Matter. Further: the Form, (which is the principal object of inquiry for the moment), in order to become individual, must be an actual Entity. But it cannot become an actual Entity, save in, and by, that individual Matter of which it is the Act. In itself, it is essentially common; for it is communicable to any and every portion of Matter possible within the periphery of that vast receptivity. When, however, it has become an actual Entity by actuating a definite portion of Matter, it is no longer communicable to another; for its activity is, so to say, exhausted. Therefore, the Matter is genetically the principle, albeit extrinsic, of the Haecceity of the Form. In like manner, the genetic principle of Individuation for the Mode of Union, are the Matter and Form. Lastly, these three partial Haecceities, combined, are the principle by which the whole substantial Composite is individuated. It is to be observed, then, that in each case there is a sort of communication; and the Haecceity is the result of a previous composition. But Matter, in order of generation, is the primary element; and corporal Matter (for corporeity is the first, necessary, distinguishing Form, as it were, of Matter), affords ample room for multiplication of individuals under the same Form, or under the same specific Nature.

Now let us turn our attention to spiritual Substances, -- those immaterial Forms which are entirely separated from Matter. They are, what they are, entirely in themselves. There is no indigence of another and, consequently, no natural tendency towards communication of themselves to other Beings, in order to the establishment of their perfect substantial Entity. Hence, if actual, they are ipso facto individual, because they are naturally incommunicable; and, moreover, they are individual by their own actual Entity. But, for the very same reason, there are no natural elements for the distinction of more than one individual in a given Species. Why? Because, in them, the Form is the entire Species. But the Form, as actual, is individual. Therefore, in the natural order, to multiply the Individual, is to multiply the Form; hut to multiply the Form, is to multiply the Species. As St. Thomas appositely puts it, a Spiritual Substance is one in number (una numero), but not one of a number (una de numero).^{4} If such be the case, how is it possible that there should be a real distinction between the Specific Nature and the Haecceity? In order to answer this question, let us recur to a truth, (already established in previous Theses), that everything is individuated by its own actual Entity. Now, in order that a thing may be actual, it must exist; really, if really actual; ideally, if ideally actual. But Existence is not included in the Essence of created Spiritual Forms; therefore, neither is the Actuation, nor, as a consequence, the Individuality. To this it may be objected, that such an explanation supposes Existence to be the principle of Individuation, which has been, nevertheless, rejected in a preceding Proposition. The answer is, that though Existence, according to the explanation given, is not the principle of Individuation but the actuation of the Entity; yet that Existence is really (or ex parte rei) identical with actuation. Should it be urged that this is a distinction without a difference; we reply, that the distinction involves a considerable difference. For incommunicability is not included in the Nature or Essence of an Angel; but only the completeness of the particular Substantial Form, which causes that it should stand in no need of partnership. But by its Existence, and proportionally by its ideal actuation, it becomes de facto incommunicable and, therefore, individual. Fortified by these preliminary statements, turn we now to the Angel of the Schools: 'As a Form, which is in a Subject or Matter, is individuated by its being in this Something; so, a separated Form is individuated, because it has no natural tendency to be in Anything. For, just as the being in This excludes the extensive generality of a Universal, which is predicated of many; so likewise does the incapacity for being in Anything. As, therefore, this Whiteness is not prevented from having under it many individuals, because it is Whiteness (which belongs to the nature of a Species), but because it is in This (which belongs to the nature of an Individual); so the nature of this Angel is not prevented from being in several, by reason of its being a Nature in such an order of Being, (which is of the nature of a Species), but because it is not in its nature to be in any Subject, (which is the essential characteristic of an Individual).'^{5} 'Whatsoever Entity admits of accidental addition which is no part of its essential Nature, in it the actual Entity and the Quiddity, in other words, the Supposit and the Nature, differ. For, under the meaning of the word Nature, is included that only which enters into the constitution of the Species; but Supposit not only retains whatever belongs to the constitution of the Species, but likewise includes other things which are accidental to the Species. Wherefore, Supposit is defined as a Whole; but Nature or Quiddity, as the formal part. Now, in God alone is no Accident discoverable which is added to this Essence, because His Existence is His Essence, as has been said; and, accordingly, in God Supposit and Nature are absolutely one and the same thing. But, in an Angel, they are not entirely one and the same; because there is something accidental added to him, outside of that which constitutes his specific Nature. For the Existence itself of an Angel is outside of his Essence or Nature; and certain other Accidents appertain to him which absolutely belong to the Supposit, but not to the Nature.'^{6} Once more: 'Because it' (i.e. the specific Nature of created immaterial Substances) 'is not its own Existence; there is something that is accidental to it, viz, its existence, and certain other things which are attributed to the Supposit, and not to the Nature. For this reason, the Supposit in their case is not entirely identical with the Nature.'^{7} What those 'certain other things' are which St. Thomas had in his mind, he has not stated. It is probable, however, that he refers to various spiritual accidents which belong to each of the Spiritual Forms individually; such, as these or those thoughts, volitions, successive presences. If he meant this, it must not be forgotten that these Accidents can in no wise serve towards the constitution of the Haecceity, but, as being its concomitants, are a characteristic note of its existence.

NOTE.

If the principle of Leibnitz be admitted, that it is impossible there should be two individuals who are only numerically distinguishable from each other; it seems difficult not to admit the teaching of St. Thomas touching the Individual Unity of each Angelic Species.

There is one more important question, as regards Individual Unity, that awaits its solution. It is that which concerns the Individuation of Accidents. Here, too, a dissidence has been imagined to exist between the teaching of St. Thomas on the one hand, and. that of Suarez and other Post-Tridentine Doctors on the other. Doubtless, on certain comparatively minor points which enter into the discussion, they do differ, as will be seen; but, upon the fundamental point which bears on the intrinsic principle of Individuation, they have the appearance of being in disaccord only because, as in the former case of material Substances, it has escaped observation, that the respective combatants, (for such they are imagined to be), are regarding the same subject from two different points of view. St. Thomas is considering the Haecceity of Accidents metaphysically and in order of generation more particularly, which naturally sets him in quest of the extrinsic or genetic principle of Individuation; while Suarez considers the Accident as already physically constituted in its Subject, and, as naturally, searches for the intrinsic principle of its Individuation. With the hope that light will be thrown on an intricate but by no means unimportant problem, and with a confidence that the teaching of these two great Doctors with regard to it may he reconciled, the following Proposition is introduced.

{1} 'Essentiae rerum compositarum ex eo quod recipiuntur in materia designata vel multiplicantur secundum divisionem ejus, contingit quod aliqua sint idem specie et diversa numero. Sed, eum essentia simplicium non sit recepta in materia, non potest ibi esse talis multiplicatio; et ideo non oportet quod inveniantur plura individua unius speciei in illis substantiis: sed quotquot sunt individua, tot sunt species ut Avicenna dicit expresse.' Opusc. XXIX (aliter XXV), De Ente et Essentia, c. 5.

{2} Non enim materia est principium individuationis in rebus materialibus, nisi in quantum materia non est participabilis, a pluribus, cum sit primum subjectum non existens in alio. . . . Individuae ergo sunt substantiae separatae, et singulares; non autem individuantur ex materia, sed ex hoc ipso quod non sunt natae in alio esse, et per consequens nec participari a multis. Ex quo sequitur quod si aliqua forma nata est participari ab aliquo, ita quod sit actua alicujus materiae, illa potest individuari et multiplicari per comparationem ad materiam. . . .'

{3} 'Valde autem ruditer argumentatur ad ostendendum quod Deus facere non possit quod sint multi intellectus unius speciei, credentes hoc includere contradictionem. Nihil enim prohibet aliquid non habere in sua natura causam alicujus, quod tamen habet illud ex alia causa.' Opusc. XVI (aliter XV), De Unitate Intellectus, v.

{4} Opusc. XVI (aliter XV), De Unitate Intellectus, v. f.

{5} 'Sicut forma quae est in subjecto vel materia, individuatur per hoc quod est esse in hoc, ita forma separata individuatur per hoc quod non est nata in aliquo esse. Sicut enim esse in hoc excludit communitatem universalis quod praedicatur de multis; ita non posse esse in aliquo. Sicut ergo haec albedo non prohibetur habere sub se multa individua ex hoc quod est albedo, quod pertinet ad rationem speciei; sed ex hoc quod non est in hoc, quod pertinet ad rationem individui; ita natura hujus Angeli non prohibetur esse in multis ex hoc quod est natura in tali ordine rerum, quod pertinet ad rationem speciei; sed ex hoc quod non est nata recipi in aliquo subjecto, quod pertinet ad rationem individui.' Q. unica de spirit ualibus creaturis, a. 8, ad 4m.

{6} 'Cuicumque potest aliquid accidere quod non sit de ratione suae naturae, in eo differt res et quod quid est, sive suppositum et natura. Nam in significatione naturae includitur solum id quod est de ratione speciei; suppositum autem non solum habet haec quae ad rationem speciei pertinent; sed etiam alia quae si accident. Et ideo suppositum signatur per totem, natura autem sive quidditas, ut pars formalis. In solo autem Deo non invenitur aliquod accidens praeter ejus essentiam, quia suum esse est sua essentia, ut dictum est. Et ideo in Deo est omnino idem suppositum et natura. In Angelo autem non est omnino idem; quia aliquid accidit ei praeter id quod est de ratione suae speciei. Quia et ipsum esse Angeli est praeter ejus essentiam seu naturam; et alia quaedam ei accidunt quae omnino pertinent ad suppositum, non autem ad naturam.' Quol. II, a. 4, c.

{7} 'Quia non est suum esse, accidit si aliquid praeter rationem speciei, scil. ipsum esse, et alia quaedam quae attribuuntur supposito, et non naturae. Propter quod suppositum in eis non est omnino idem cum natura.' Ibid., ad 1m.