PROPOSITION LX.

The real intrinsic principle of Differential Unity, is the Essence of the individual, as embracing in itself a dissimilarity from Natures of another kind, and, consequently, as capable of differentiation.

This Proposition, like the preceding and the succeeding one, is a simple Corollary from the doctrine evolved in the fifty-eighth and antecedent Thesis in this Article. It has been shown that, as a Nature has notes similar to those of other natures; so has it likewise distinctive or dissimilar notes which hedge it in, so to say, within its own proper limits. The human intellect can direct its intention to the representation of the Nature under the form of these notes, to the exclusion (or rather non-inclusion), of all others whatsoever; and in such wise it generates a Differential concept. Of course, if the Nature is confusedly or inadequately represented by a more extended Generic concept, the corresponding Differential concept will also claim a wider periphery; while, on the contrary, when the Genus represents only those notes of similarity which relate to proximate and collateral Species, the corresponding Differential concept will represent those distinctive notes alone which distinguish the specific Nature in its ultimate perfection. Hence arises the difference between, and the constitution of, Generic and Specific Difference. From what has been said it will appear, that a Differential Universal is an analytical concept, at least functionally; since it serves to resolve, or divide, the common concept by distinctive notes of difference. Hence it exhibits the elements of differentiation, but, taken by itself, it does not differentiate; because it is the Differential. Consequently, it cannot represent the nature as differentiated; because, in the Differential concept, nothing is represented but the Differential Form. So true is this, that in another line of abstraction it may become a Genus, as representing notes similar to other Natures; just as Rational or Intellectual, which is the ultimate Difference by which man is distinguished from all other animals, becomes a Genus, if we compare man with the Angels. Hence it follows that the Differential Universal, even though it be Specific Difference, does not adequately represent the Specific Nature, but requires to be complemented by the Genus. In a sense, therefore, it may, like Genus, be said to represent the Nature as capable of ulterior determination; for the Generic Universal acts the part, in some sort, of a Difference.