PROPOSITION LXI.

The real intrinsic principle of Specific Unity is the Nature of the entity in its ultimate essential perfection.

In the Specific concept, the Nature is represented as containing the notes by which it is similar to, as well as the notes by which it is dissimilar from, all other cognate collateral Natures. And these, together, contain virtually or implicitly all the notes of similarity and dissimilarity which such Nature exhibits through all the ascending grades of abstraction up to the highest and widest Universal; so that it represents the Nature, or Essence, of the objected entity in its ultimate perfection. It is, accordingly, eminently synthetical; for it collects together, as it were, the similar and dissimilar notes, so as to represent an entire whole, -- a perfected Essence. In other words, it synthesizes Genus and Difference; or, to speak metaphysically, the material and formal part. So then, the Generic and Specific Universal are both synthetical, but in an inverse order. Genus is logically synthetical, and sacrifices distinctness and adequacy of representation to a broader perfectness in the periphery of thought; while Species is metaphysically synthetical, and ignores conceptual periphery, in order to secure a perfect, adequate, representation of the reality.

OBJECTIONS TO THE ABOVE DOCTRINE.

It seems difficult to admit that Species, Genus, and Difference, represent, only under a different form, the same objective Nature and that, consequently, there is no real distinction between the three; for the following reasons.

I. Species is composed of Genus and Difference, or, as metaphysicians say, of its formal and material part. Therefore, there is a real metaphysical composition, because there is a metaphysical whole, composed of metaphysical, i.e. real, parts. Hence, it is not a merely logical composition. But, for real composition, it is not enough that there should be a virtual distinction only; there is need of a real distinction between the several components. Otherwise, there could be metaphysical composition in God. For it is certain that in Him is to be found virtual distinction; forasmuch as, by reason of His infinite Perfection, He contains eminently within Himself all the distinct and various attributes of Being, purified though they be in Him from all imperfection. But the infinite simplicity of God forbids the very thought of metaphysical composition; and the possibility of it is denied, with equal unanimity, by all Theologians and Philosophers of the School.

ANSWER. The composition between the material and formal part in any given Nature is not real, but conceptual; for, as it is justly contended in the objection, if the composition were real, it would assuredly require a real distinction in the parts. Yet, be it observed, the composition is not simply logical. It has been said advisedly that it is conceptual; that is, that there is a real difference in the objective concept, though the reality represented is the same, and the objective concepts, in the object represented, i.e. in the Nature, are the same. This remark may be made clearer by an illustration. There can be no doubt whatever but that an animal is one thing, and that an Intelligence is another, really distinct from the former. Yet, in man, that same reality which is animal is also rational; consequently, in him there is no real distinction between the two. So, nutritive life, sensitive life, intellectual life, are three really distinct entities, and are, accordingly, found actually and physically apart in the creation; yet, in the human soul there is no real distinction between them. Accordingly, it is truly said, not that there is a real distinction, -- because then there would be physical composition, -- but that there is a real foundation in the Natures or Essences themselves for such a distinction; in that they exhihit at once a similarity with, and a dissimilarity from, other natures, whence the human intellect conceives them, now as indeterminate or Generic, now as determinating or Differential. Thus the same entity is conceived, now under the form of a material part, now under the form of a formal part, -- so called by an extrinsic denomination derived from the inadequate concepts. And this is the reason why the composition is not physical, but metaphysical.

But then, as the objection urges, why cannot there be metaphysical composition in God, if the above explanation be true? It cannot be said that such composition is repugnant to the Divine Simplicity; because the human soul is simple, yet admits of metaphysical composition. Besides, a merely conceptual distinction of parts cannot interfere with entitative simplicity. And, indeed, so far, the argument is just and cogent. But there are two things that must not be forgotten. The one is, that the Divine simplicity is not univocal with the simplicity of even the most exalted creatures; it is sui generis. Moreover, the impossibility of there being metaphysical composition in God is not due only to His simplicity; but pre-eminently, to the boundlessness and supereminence of His Being. Hence it arises, that nothing can be predicated univocally of the Creator and His creature; and, consequently, that anything like a Genus or Difference is actually impossible. Hence likewise it arises, that it is a metaphysical contradiction, to conceive of His Nature as capable of multiplication; and, in consequence, anything like a Genus or Difference in God is conceptually impossible. Furthermore, owing to His surpassing simplicity as well as His Infinity and All-containingness, you will seek in vain for any common idea or Attribute of God, which is not essentially included in each and every special and incommunicable perfection; so that in Him Will is Mind, and Mind Will; and Mind and Will, are Life; and Life, Mind, Will, are one, simple, absolute, Being.

II. The second objection is as follows. Wherever there are realities whose Essences, even though they be partial or incomplete, are anywise really distinct, there there must be a real distinction. But the Essences, respectively represented by Genus and Difference, are really distinct; otherwise, the received doctrine concerning the Predicables must be abandoned. For, in the first place, the essence of Difference cannot be included in the essence of Genus, otherwise, both would ipso facto be Species. Then, again, if the essence of the Difference were included in the essence of the Genus; seeing that Genus is divided by two opposite Differences, the essence of Genus would be in direct opposition to itself. Furthermore, Difference contracts and actuates Genus; but there is nothing that contracts and actuates itself. Lastly, it is for this reason that the Judgment, Animality is rationality, is false, together with other like Judgments; for, if there were no real distinction between the Genus and Difference, they would be true.

ANSWER. For the verification of the established doctrine concerning the Predicables, and for the solution of all such difficulties, it is enough that there should be a conceptual distinction between the partial Essences represented respectively by Genus and Difference. In order to render this answer perfectly intelligible, it will be necessary to refer the student to the explanation, already given in an earlier part of this work, touching the nature of the objective concept, which is nothing, more or less, than that reality in the object, which is formally covered hy the subjective concept or idea itself. Now, this reality may be really identical in the object contemplated with another reality that constitutes a second objective concept; yet, if the two are considered absolutely as they are in themselves, neither enters into the essential constitution of the other. A sufficient proof whereof is, that, as a fact, each exists in other objects independent of the other. Thus, albeit in man animal and rational are one; yet in a horse there is animal without rational, and in an Angel rational without animal. Therefore, it suffices that the realities, absolutely considered in themselves, should be really distinct; though, in the object, the distinction is merely conceptual. For the Essence of the one is not included in the Essence of the other; though the two Essences are one, in the constitution of that complete Essence which is the object of cognition. This, too, is sufficient to justify us in considering Difference as the act and contraction of the potential Genus. For such act or contraction is not real, but conceptual; since, as has been declared, the composition is conceptual, and act and potentiality are of such kind as is the composition. As to the last difficulty, it will be plain, from what has been said, that these abstract terms simply represent the objective concepts or realities absolutely in themselves and apart from the object in which they are one; consequently, it must be false to affirm the identity of two realities which in themselves are really distinct, In the concrete, the Judgment would be true, if it were particular, not universal.

III. Genus and Difference, taken separately, must be really distinguished from Species; because they stand in the relation to it of a part to a Whole. For the Whole is really distinguished from each one of its component parts. Accordingly, man must be really distinguished from animal, otherwise, neither would a dog be distinguished from animal; and thus, man would not be distinguished from dog, because things which are identical with one and the same thing, are identical with one another. Furthermore, different entities cannot be entirely similar and dissimilar relatively to the same. But two Species are essentially dissimilar, yet are similar in Genus. Consequently, it cannot be, that Genus should be only conceptually distinguished from Species.

ANSWER. The solution is evident from preceding answers. Hence briefly; i. Genus and Difference do not stand in the relation to Species of real parts to a whole, but of conceptual parts only. ii. It is true that man is an animal and that dog is an animal; but it does not thence follow that man is dog; because they are not one and the same animal, but have merely a similarity to one another in animal Being. iii. The assertion, that entities cannot be entirely similar and dissimilar relatively to the same, is categorically denied, for reasons which have been already given.