PROPOSITION LXVII.

Conceptual Distinction is of two kinds.

Purely mental Distinction, or rationis ratiocinantis, does not concern the metaphysician. It suffices, therefore, to mention it, and so to pass it by. But Conceptual Distinction, which has a real foundation, is of great importance to metaphysical inquiry. It concerns us to know, more or less precisely, what that real foundation in the object is, upon which the Conceptual Distinction is founded; then, besides, how it comes to pass that the human intellect should require two or more concepts, in order to represent to itself one and the same reality, and how it is that the Distinction between these concepts can be other than false. The latter question will find an answer in the subsequent Proposition; the former, in this present one.

It is here declared, that Conceptual Distinction is of two kinds. Now, these two kinds are simply distinguished from each other, by virtue of an essential difference in their respective foundations; or, in other words, by an essential difference in the nature of the object represented. They shall be considered separately.

i. In one kind of Conceptual Distinction, the foundation exists in the perfection of the object. This perfection may present itself under a twofold aspect. For there may be, in the object, an eminent reality which is at least equivalent to, even if it does not surpass, several realities that are actually distinct in other Beings. By virtue of such equivalence, the mind is able to represent the object by different concepts, each one of which figures it under the form of one or other of those realities which it eminently includes in itself. Thus, the soul of man may be represented, now under the form of vegetative, now under the form of animal, life; because it virtually and eminently includes both. Moreover, those two realities are in themselves distinct; for, inasmuch as the vegetative exists alone in plants, while in animals it is only contained virtually in the higher form of animality, the two, as a fact, exist separately. So, again, in God the foundation for conceiving His Intelligence as distinct from His Ideas, His Will as distinct from His Intelligence, His Being as distinct from Both, is His own infinitely perfect Reality which in Its indivisible oneness is equivalent to, and infinitely exceeds, these several realities which in the creature are distinguished. After a somewhat different manner, Distinction is made between the Existence and Essential Nature of God; inasmuch as the Divine Being infinitely transcends, in its boundless Simplicity, all the reality which is represented by the Essence and Existence of His creatures. There is, however, a difference between this and the former examples; for the reason, that not even in the creature is there any real Distinction between Essence and Existence. But the foundation of such Distinction in God is His supereminent Perfection; whereas the foundation of the same distinction in the creature is, (as will appear presently), the imperfection of this latter. Thus the Conceptual Distinction between Essence and Existence, originating with the creature, (as all our thoughts do in their primary formation), is transferred to God.

There may be likewise in the object a perfection which enables it, though one, to produce widely different effects, or acts. In consequence of this, the mind under one concept can represent the object as capable of producing such or such acts exclusively; and, under another concept, such other acts or effects. Thus, the human intellect may he represented, now as an intuitive faculty, now as a ratiocinative. In a like manner, men are accustomed to distinguish between the Creative Power, the Mercy, the Avenging Justice of God, (though in Him there cannot be any such Distinction really); because His Essence is equivalent, and more than equivalent, to one simple Faculty, (as we conceive it), which is able to elicit all these diverse acts.

ii. In another kind of Conceptual Distinction, the foundation is to be discovered in the imperfection of the Object. For an imperfect Being is limited and, consequently, is wanting in ulterior reality; whence it arises, that either it admits of comparison with that higher reality which is wanting to it, or it requires de facto to be perfected by several distinct realities. This statement will be made clearer by illustration. It is certain, as has been seen, that there is no real Distinction between the actual Essence and the Existence of a creature, yet a Distinction is made; and, on the strength of such Distinction, contrary attributes are respectively predicated of the one and the other. Plainly enough, there is here a Conceptual Distinction, i.e. one that has a real foundation. The question, then, arises, What is that foundation? If one compares created being with God, there immediately appears a marked deficiency in the former. God is self-existing; while the creature owes its existence to another. Hence, its existence is contingent; whereas the Creator exists essentially. Further; though the Essence and Existence of the creature are equally dependent upon God; yet, considered separately, the two depend in a different manner upon Him. For the Essence, (which is, as it were, the type in which the Being is cast), depends on the Intellect of God; whereas its Actuation, or Existence, depends on His Freewill. By virtue of this comparison, the mind conceives a Distinction between the two. Now, to take an instance or two of the second sort of foundation derived from the imperfection of the creature: -- A Distinction is made between the vegetable, animal, and intellectual, life in the human soul; whereas it is impossible to make any such Distinction in an Angel, who is of a much higher nature. Why is this? It arises out of the composite quiddity of man, who is partly body, partly spirit; and, consequently, his soul is an incomplete substance, as being essentially the Form of the body. But the body needs a principle of growth and of sensitive perception. Hence, the human soul, because it is lowest among spiritual beings, postulates at least three classes of distinct acts, -- the nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual; whereas a pure spirit requires, and is capable of, the last only. So, again, Intuition, in the intellectual faculty, is conceived as distinguishable from Reason. Why is this? Because human intelligence is so weak and imperfect, that it cannot intue all truths; since there are many truths, latent to it, which it can only reach by the circuitous process of reasoning.

It will be observed, that once or twice the same example has been adduced in illustration of both these kinds of Conceptual Distinction; nor should this afford matter for surprise. For the same entity, considered under one relation, may become a subject of Distinction by virtue of its perfection; considered under another relation, by virtue of its imperfection. Thus, if man is compared with plants and brute animals, the Distinction of lives in his soul is based upon his perfection; if he is compared with Angels, on his imperfection.

NOTE I.

It is necessary to call attention to an error which is not uncommon. When the phrase, Logical Distinction, is employed, it is often imagined that the members of such Distinction must be Second Intentions, or logical entities. This is, however, so far from being true, that in Conceptual Distinction it is simply impossible; unless the Distinction is applied to such entities by an extrinsic denomination. Thus, there may be said to exist a Conceptual Distinction between Genus and its Species; but, in this case, the denomination is borrowed from the Natures which stand in such relation to each other. And, even in purely logical Distinction, the members may be First Intentions, although the Distinction itself exists only in the form.

NOTE II.

There are many varieties in Conceptual Distinction. Such are (a) that which exists between the determined and undetermined; as, e.g. between Substance and Being; (b) between whole and part, as between the Specific Nature and the Generic or Differential; (c) between corresponding parts, as between the material and formal part of an Essence; (d) between the including and included, as between Generic and Specific Natures; (e) between two realities, each mutually exclusive of the other, as e.g. between two Differences that divide the same Generic Nature.