PROPOSITION LXVIII.

Conceptual Distinction implies an imperfection in our intellectual apprehension; but it neither supposes nor exhibits that which is untrue.

THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition is sufficiently clear. For, though it is true that there is a real foundation for the Distinction in the object; yet the Distinction is itself made by different concepts of the mind which, only in a partial manner, abstractedly, imperfectly, and often confusedly or indistinctly, represent the object. Wherefore, the Divine Intelligence coins no such Distinctions Itself; though It knows the Distinctions which can be made by our mind, and knows likewise most perfectly what is the real foundation, in the object, of such Distinctions.

THE SECOND MEMBER is thus proved. The mind, first of all, forms these distinct concepts, and then predicates the distinction so obtained, of the object. But, in neither of these two acts, does it suppose or exhibit that which is false. These, however, are the only acts possible; so that it may be concluded absolutely that, in making these Distinctions, the human mind neither supposes nor exhibits that which is false. It is manifest that it cannot do so in the mere simple Apprehensions themselves; because, as we know from Ideology, it is impossible that there should be any untruth implied or contained in simple ideas. But neither is there any implied or expressed untruth in the subsequent Judgments; because, in such Judgments, the intellect neither supposes nor predicates a real Distinction in the object itself; but it only affirms that the object considered, by an inadequate concept, exclusively as such a reality, (which it actually is), is distinct from itself considered, by an inadequate concept, exclusively as such another reality, (which it likewise actually is). Thus, for instance, when it is affirmed that the Divine Justice is distinct from the Divine Mercy, no one intends thereby to assert that there are two distinct Realities in God, to wit, His Mercy and His Justice; but that God conceived as merciful, is not the same as God conceived under His Attribute of Justice. Accordingly, it is quite true to say that the same infinite Being, incomprehensibly One and Simple, saves the good and punishes the wicked; but it would be theologically erroneous to say, that the Mercy of God punishes the wicked, or that the Justice of God saves the good. Yet it would be most true to say, that the Divine Nature, which we conceive as Justice, is the same Divine Nature which we conceive as Mercy. When, then, the intellect predicates any such Distinction of its object, it does not intend to do so absolutely, but only as represented by its own distinct concepts, which, though imperfect and inadequate, are, nevertheless, true as far as they go; since the Conceptual Distinction has a real foundation in the object so represented. But, in predicating a Distinction after this manner, it is obvious that the intellect neither supposes nor represents that which is false.

NOTE I.

By what signs can it be discerned whether a given Distinction is a Conceptual Distinction or not? Two canons are given, the one positive, the other negative.

i. Whenever there is a Distinction in the objective concepts, and there is no sign whatsoever of real Distinction, either greater or less, it may be taken for granted that it is a Conceptual Distinction. Such is the negative canon.

ii. Whenever it certainly appears that the two realities, represented by two distinct concepts, are really so united and conjoined as to be actually and individually inseparable, as well mutually as not mutually, as well supernaturally as naturally, and as well in their existence as in their real union with each other; it is a very strong and all but certain reason for judging, that they are only conceptually distinguished. Such is the positive canon.

NOTE II.

It is necessary to subjoin a brief declaration concerning the nature of Identity and Difference; since they are considered by the Philosopher in the fifth book of his Metaphysics. Identity includes in its concept a double element; accordingly as it is regarded formally for what it is, or fundamentally, viz, as supposing a foundation in the entity itself for the formal idea. Formally considered, it expresses a logical relation, -- the relation, namely, of a thing with itself. If considered fundamentally, it hardly differs from Unity. The only discoverable difference is this; that, while Unity expresses indivision in Being, Identity expresses the indivision of Being from itself, or from that with which it is said to be identical. The opposite of Identity is Difference. But it is worthy of careful notice, that there is no such necessary opposition between the two; unless the Identity and Difference are predicated within the same sphere of thought. For, as the two are common to logical as well as to real entities, and to collections of entities as well as to individual entities, one with another; Identity in the real object does not exclude Difference in the concepts representative of that object. Hence the principle, or, more properly speaking, the axiom of Identity, Those things which are identical with one and the same third, are identical with one another, labours under the defect of a possible equivocation. For it is undoubtedly true, nay, axiomatic, that Those things which are at once really and conceptually identical with one and the same third, are really and conceptually identical with one another. But it is by no means true, that Those things which are. really identical with one and the same third, are conceptually identical with one another; nor, again, is it true, that Those things which are conceptually identical with one and the same third, are really identical with each other. Hence the axiom of Identity must be equally barren of fruit, whether in Logic or Metaphysics; and can hardly, therefore, be elevated to the rank of a Principle. This animadversion touches on a fundamental error ia Sir W. Hamilton's Logic. He has substituted this axiom of Identity for the Dictum de omni; and, thereby, has made Logic more intricate, at the expense of its fecundity.

RECAPITULATION.

DISTINCTION may be considered either materially or formally. It is considered materially, when the material part is alone taken into account, i.e. the entity or entities forming the subject of Distinction. It is considered formally, when the formal part alone is taken into account, that is to say, the absence or negation of identity between one thing and another, i.e. the distinction itself.

i. Distinction, regarded materially, is either real or logical, accordingly as the entities, conceived as distinct, are real or logical.

ii. Distinction materially real, regarded formally, is also either real or logical; accordingly as the real Subject of Distinction is really and truly several entities, independently of our mode of conceiving, or improperly and denominatively, and dependent on the mode of conceiving.

iii. Real formal Distinction is of two kinds; the Greater, which may be subdivided into Substantial and Accidental; the Less or Modal:

iv. Logical formal Distinction is likewise of two kinds, purely logical or mental; and conceptual, viz, with a real foundation. The former is called by the School rationis ratiocinantis; the latter, rationis ratiocinatae.

v. Conceptual formal Distinction is again of two kinds. For it is either based on the perfection of the entity, which is conceived as many, (and is called by some virtual); or it is based on the imperfection, wholly or in part, of the entity so conceived.

vi. Materially logical Distinction, considered formally, is, like materially real Distinction, either real or logical. Thus, the Distinction between a Generic Universal and its contracting Difference, as also the Distinction between the former and the Specific Universal under it, are both materially logical. But, if you regard them formally, in the instance first named the Distinction is analogically real; since, in the way that a Generic Universal is constituted as a logical entity, it is also constituted distinct from its Difference, in so far as it too is a logical entity. But in the second instance, it is a logical Distinction; because, in the way that any Universal is constituted as a logical entity, it is constituted as one with its included Species; and not as two, of which one is a Generic, the other a Specific, entity.