ARTICLE I.

Formal Conceptual Truth.

Conceptual Truth consists in a conformity between the representative concept and the object represented. Hence, it has been described as an equation, or adequation, between the two. But these terms must be rightly understood; otherwise, they may introduce confusion at the outset. They are intended to express a similitudinal equation, i.e. a correspondence between the representation in the mind and the object of cognition; so that there is a due proportional similarity between the two. They do not necessarily require an exhaustive representation of the object of thought; and most certainly do not suppose an entitative resemblance. In like manner, a photograph may be said to be adequate to the person or thing photographed; though it does not represent the colours, and though e.g. a plate of glass sensitized by a silver salt could bear no entitative resemblance to the flesh, blood, or bones of the person photographed.

Conceptual Truth is of two kinds, Formal and Material. Material Conceptual Truth consists in the simple conformity between the concept and its object; and excludes all cognizance by the intellect of the conformity. Thus informed, the intellect is true; but holds not the truth, because not knowing it. Formal Conceptual Truth consists in the same conformity between the concept and its object; but essentially includes the cognition of such conformity by the intellect. Wherefore, thus informed, the intellect not only is true, but holds or possesses the truth: and it is this which completes the conformity between the intellectual act and the object of thought. The nature of this important distinction will be made plain in the course of the following Propositions.

PROPOSITION LXIX.

Formal Conceptual Truth is to be found in the judicial act of the intellect; and in that alone.

PROLEGOMENON.

It is supposed, as a Lemma from pure Logic, that there are only two primary forms of human thought, to wit, the simple Apprehension and the Judgment. Under the former, are included simple ideas; under the latter, the mediate judgments of reason as well as the intuitive or immediate Judgments of the understanding. Thus, e.g. intellectual representations of a cow, a pleasant breeze, a rational animal, are simple Apprehensions; while, this cow is a shorthorn, the breeze is not pleasant, man is a rational animal, are Judgments. These latter are essentially enunciative either affirmatively or negatively, and consist of three components; the two Terms, which are respectively called the Subject and Predicate, and the Copula or Logical verb, -- is or is not. In this connection it may not be amiss to introduce Aldrich's description of a Judgment; for though it hardly satisfies the requirements of a scientific definition, it nevertheless brings out the most important and most difficult point in the question upon which we are now entering. Judgment, then, according to this author, is an act 'by which the mind not only perceives two objects' (for this is the act of simple Apprehension, not of Judgment), 'but, as it were seated on its tribunal, expressly pronounces within itself that they agree or disagree.' The formal act of Judgment, therefore, consists in this pronouncing either affirmatively or negatively, as the case may be. It is precisely this pronouncing of the mind in its judicial act, which constitutes the knot of the difficulty that awaits us.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of the present Proposition is proved by four arguments which go to prove the second Member also. Wherefore,

i. First of all, it is the common opinion of philosophers, including Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Suarez, that conceptual Truth formally exists in the judicial act, and in the judicial act alone. The declarations of St. Thomas touching this matter will be presented to the reader later on.

ii. Their opinion is supported by the verdict of common sense. For it is universally admitted by mankind that, when the mind has conceived a Judgment on any given matter, that Judgment must be either true or false. On tbis account, logicians teach that the quality of a Judgment, regarded materially, consists in its Truth or Falsity; regarded formally (i.e. as a pure Form of thought), in Composition or Division, -- otherwise, in affirmation or negation.

iii. The above argument is further confirmed by the Judgment which men commonly pronounce on spoken or written thought. For, whenever Truth or Falsity is attributed by them to anything said or written, the words are invariably in the form of a Proposition. In a similar manner, moral Truth is attributed to a man, only when his Statements or Propositions are in conformity with his thoughts. No one would dream of charging another with a lie, in virtue of any number of incongruous phrases or exclamations. Something must have been either affirmed or denied, in order to account for the accusation. But language is the mere symbol of thought; and, consequently, it is reasonable to argue from the symbol to the thing symbolized.

iv. The assertion is, moreover, proved from the definition of Formal Conceptual Truth. For this latter differs from Material Conceptual Truth, in that it not only supposes a conformity between the thought and its object; but likewise requires that the intellect should have cognition in some way or other of such conformity, or, in other words, that it should know the truth of its own representation. Now, in the judicial act, and in no other, the intellect does recognize such conformity; as will be explained at length in subsequent Theses. Therefore, Formal Conceptual Truth is to be found, (though neither necessarily nor invariably, yet solely), in the judicial act, or Judgment, of the mind.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER is proved by the same arguments. (For the sake of clearness, the enunciation of it may be thrown into this form: Formal Conceptual Truth cannot be discovered in simple Apprehension of whatever kind, provided that it is in all respects a mere simple Apprehension. This modifying clause is of no little importance; because there are some simple Apprehensions that either presuppose an antecedent Judgment, or virtually include the actual one.)

i. It is the all but universal opinion of philosophers, (including the three great names just mentioned), that such is the case.

ii. The common sense of mankind forbears from attributing truth to these incomplex concepts. It is often said, that such and such an idea is a queer one, is unreal, extravagant, nonsensical, or, that it is a brilliant, original idea; but it is not called true or false, unless, at least cryptically, it involves a Judgment.

iii. The same verdict is given as touching spoken or written thought. If any one, for instance, were to talk of blue grass, or of winged iron, the listeners might exclaim, 'What an outlandish idea!' but they would never accuse the speaker of falsehood. If, however, he should declare that, This grass is blue, or that, This bar of iron has not wings, they would denounce the former assertion as false, and would pronounce the latter to be true.

iv. In simple Apprehension the intellect does not cognize the truth of its own representation; but simply represents the object to be represented, which is no other than the object that is de facto represented. The reason is, that, in simple Apprehension, there is no intention of the intellect, determining itself to the representation of any other object than that which it actually represents. To illustrate this observation: a man may be prompted, on the occasion of the presence before his eyes of some aluminium ornament, to conceive the idea of gold; but, so long as he merely conceives the idea of gold, that metal is the true object of his thought. For his mind has not determined itself to the representation of any other object than the gold which he actually thinks. But, if he goes on to pass Judgment, and to pronounce, This ornament which I am looking at is gold; who does not see that the mind has determined itself to the representation of a definite object, and virtually asserts its representation to be a true one? It suffices for the present to put the facts in evidence, in order to make the distinction clear between the two intellectual acts, in their relation to Conceptual Truth; it will remain for us, in after Theses, to confront the difficult question as to the intimate reason of the distinction.

Here is the place to introduce the teaching of the Angelic Doctor concerning this subject; as it will lead us on the road to the solution of the difficulty last mentioned. St. Thomas offers two reasons why Formal Conceptual Truth is discoverable in the Judgment, but not in the simple Apprehension. The first he explains in the following passage: 'The Essence of' (Formal Conceptual) 'Truth consists in an equation between the entity' (or object) 'and the intellect. Now, equation does not exist between a thing and itself; for it is the equality of distinct things. Hence, the characteristic of Truth is first discoverable in the intellect, as soon as the intellect begins to have something of its own which the entity external to the soul has not, though having something corresponding to it; and so, between these two, we may look for the equation. Now the intellect, while conceiving Quiddities' (i.e. by simple Apprehensions) 'has only a resemblance or image of the entity external to the soul, like one of the senses in receiving the species or form of a sensile entity. But, as soon as it begins to form a Judgment about the thing apprehended, then the Judgment of the intellect, as such, is something proper to itself, and is not discoverable externally in the entity. When, then, there exists an equation between itself' (i.e. the judicial act of the intellect) 'and that which is externally in the entity, there is said to be a true Judgment.'^{1} The argument of St. Thomas is as follows: Conceptual Truth consists in an equation between the intellect and the object, as between the Representing and the Represented. But an equation is not consistent with identity; for equation may be defined to be the equality of distinct things. If therefore, there is to be an equation between the representing concept and the represented reality; there must be a difference between the conceptual representation, as representing, and the represented Reality. Now, in simple Apprehension there is no such distinction discoverable; for the intellectual expressed species, or concept, is a mere transcript of the original. In the order of representation, (which is the only order that comes into question in this matter), there is an identity between the Representation and the Represented. But, when the mind proceeds to a judicial act, it is quite the reverse. For the Judgment, as Judgment, finds no counterpart of itself in the reality represented. Suppose the Judgment to be true, there is no separation in the object, like to that which exists between the Subject and Predicate in the judicial concept; and the Copula, or logical verb, is altogether excluded from it. Hence, an equation is possible; because there is a distinction. This argument is subtle and ingenious; but its chief force resides in its virtual correspondence with the second reason given by St. Thomas.

Wherefore, the Angelic Doctor in another place explains the reason for the difference between the two intellectual acts, in regard of Conceptual Truth, after this wise: 'When a simple Apprehension is expressed or conceived, the Apprehension of itself forms neither an equation nor an inequality with the object. For equation and default of equation are expressions that denote comparison. But a simple Apprehension of itself involves no comparison with, or definite application to, the object. Hence, of itself it can neither be called true nor false. This can only be predicated of Judgment, in which the comparison of the simple Concept with the object is defined by means of Composition and Division' (i.e. Affirmation and Negation).^{2} This, then, in other words, is the argument of St. Thomas. Equation necessarily includes in its idea a comparison between the two terms of equation. If, then, Formal Conceptual Truth is an equation between the Concept and its object; it necessarily supposes a comparison made between the representing Concept and the represented object. Now, in a mere simple Apprehension such comparison is impossible. For the object is not defined, save by the perfected Concept; and there is no after act of the intellect, by which the comparison may be made. But, in a Judgment, the object is intentionally determined in the act of judging, before the completion of the act; and the formal act of affirming or denying, virtually includes the comparison of the complex Concept with its previously determined object. How the object is defined, and how this comparison is virtually included in the judicial act, will occupy us later.

DIFFICULTY.

There is only one objection of any value, that has been brought against the truth of the foregoing Proposition. If Formal Conceptual Truth, it is urged, can only be found in Composition and Division, or, in other words, in a judicial act of the intellect, it would seem to follow that Formal Truth has no place in the Divine Intelligence. For, in God, His Wisdom and Knowledge is one most simple Idea, one infinite Act of simple Apprehension, (so to say), or rather of simple Comprehension, which Act is His Being, Himself. But it is a contradiction in terms, to deny to the infinitely Perfect the most perfect form of Conceptual Truth; the more so, that such an opinion would suppose Him to be unconscious of His own Infallibility.

THE ANSWER. Though it is true that Composition and Division are not FORMALLY in the Divine Intelligence, because they connote imperfection; yet they are eminently there. That is to say, all that the finite intellect can do by its judicial acts, all the perfection that it acquires by them, are contained within the Divine Intuition in a superabundance of excess; as will be seen at length in the last Book, on Natural Theology. And, in that one infinite and infinitely perfect Intuition, He sees all complex truths in His own sea of Essence as Mirror and Substance of all Truth. Hence, the Angel of the Schools remarks 'Although there is neither Composition nor Division in the Intellect of God; nevertheless, by His own simple Intelligence He judges of all things and knows all complex truths. And so, in His Intellect there is Truth.'^{3}

It is now proposed to examine into the nature of Formal Conceptual Truth, not only as a contribution towards the solution of a perplexed problem, but as auxiliary to the establishment of the more probable doctrine concerning ontological, or Transcendental, Truth. In a series of Propositions will be established, in what that conformity consists which characterizes Conceptual Truth, -- how the intellect is conscious of the conformity, -- what is prerequired in order that this consciousness may be possible, -- and, lastly, the kinds of Judgment in which such Truth may be found.

{1} 'Sicut verum per prius invenitur in intellectu quam in rebus; ita etiam per prius invenitur in actu intellectus componentis et dividentis quam in actu intellectus quidditates rerum formantis. Veri enim ratio consistit in adaequatione rei et intellectus. Idem autem non adaequatur sibi ipsi, sed aequalitas diversorum est. Unde ibi primo invenitur ratio veritatis in intellectu, ubi primo intellectus incipit aliquid proprium habere quod res extra animam non habet, sed aliquid ei correspondens, inter quae adaequatio attendi potest. Intellectus autem, formans quidditates, non habet nisi similitudinem rei existentis extra animam, sicut et sensus in quantum accipit speciem rei sensibilis. Sed quando incipit judicare de re apprehensa, tunc ipsum judicium intellectus est quoddam proprium ei, quod non invenitur extra in re. Sed quando adaequatur ei quod est extra in re, dicitur judicium verum esse.'

{2} 'Cum aliquid incomplexum vel dicitur vel intelligitur, ipsum quidem incomplexum, quantum est de se, non est rei aequatum nec rei inaequale; cum aequalitas et inaequalitas secundum comparationem dicantur. Incomplexum autem, quantum est de se, non continet aliquam comparationem vel applicationem ad rem. Unde de se nec verum nec falsum dici potest; sed tantum complexum, in quo designatur comparatio incomplexi ad rem per notam compositionis aut divisionis.' c. Gent. L. I, c. 59, 2o.

{3} 'Licet in intellectu divino non sit compositio et divisio, tamen secundum suam simplicem intelligentiam judicat de omnibus, et cognoscit omnia complexa. Et sic in intellectu ejus est veritas.' 1ae xvi, 5, ad 1m.