PROPOSITION LXX.

The conformity by which Formal Conceptual Truth is constituted, is not a conformity between the objective Concept and the entity which is the object of cognition.

It will be necessary here to remind the reader once more, that, in the case of real entities, the objective Concept is that reality in the object which is formally covered by the subjective Concept, or act of cognition. Now, according to Durandus and some others, Conceptual Truth does not consist in the conformity of the intellectual act with its object; but rather in the conformity of the objective Concept or, in other words, of that reality in the object, conceived by the intellect, with the object or entity itself. Besides the fact that this opinion is opposed to the common teaching of the Schools and to the authority of their most illustrious Doctors, (which, in the decision of intricate questions, is an argument of no small weight); there are five reasons of great cogency, why it should be rejected.

i. It is so plain as not to require any proof, that a Concept is not called true by denomination from the ontological Truth of the object, but from the conformity of the Concept itself with the object. Thus, when we say that such a statesman has formed a true Judgment of the state of affairs, we do not mean to assert that his Judgment is true, because the state of affairs is true, but because his Concept is conformable with the state of affairs or, in other words, because he represents things as they are. So, again, in the instance of sensile Judgments, -- v.g. The sun shines brightly, -- the Judgment is not said to be true, because the sun's shining brightly is conformable with the sun; but because the Concept represents the sun's shining as it really is.

ii. It is the same in language, as well as in all signs and images of things. For an expression or Proposition is said to be true, not because the Concept or object of the Concept is true in itself, but because the words are conformable to the Concept which they embody. In like manner, a statue of Napoleon is declared to be a true one, because it is a faithful representation of the person intended; not because the figure of Napoleon, as conceived, is conformable with himself. Hence the ordinary observation, that it is a true likeness. Yet Concepts are symbols of entities; as words are symbols of Concepts; and statues, of persons.

iii. No entity has an objective entity distinct from itself; so that there is no foundation for such a comparison. The reality which is called the objective Concept, is identical with the reality which is the object; and is called objective Concept by a merely extrinsic denomination, derived from the subjective Concept. In other words, it receives this name, because under such a form, (really its own, or rather itself), the intellect chooses to represent it. Thus, the anatomist represents man to himself as a skelelon; and the skeleton is, therefore, in his case the objective Concept.

But the skeleton and the man are not two distinct entities; so that the truth of the anatomist's Judgment should consist in the conformity of the man's skeleton with himself. His Judgment is true, in so far as it duly represents the human skeleton, which is nothing else than man partially considered. Again: The only difference between the entity and the objective Concept, is to be found in an extrinsic denomination, as has been already stated; and that denomination is received from the intellectual act, or cognition of the mind. Hence, a comparison of the two and a correspondence of the latter with the former, really resolve themselves into a comparison between the Concept and the entity, and a correspondence of the one with the other; which coincides with the common opinion.

iv. If it be true that Formal Conceptual Truth essentially consists in a correspondence between the entity and its objective Concept; it follows that, wherever Conceptual Truth is confessedly present, there must likewise be found this correspondence between the material and formal object. But, as a fact, there are many Judgments in which such correspondence is simply impossible; for the reason that there is no entity other than the objective Concept. Thus, in the knowledge of things contingently future, (such as the life and actions of Antichrist, for instance), there is nothing but the objective Concept which is present to the intellect. There is no corresponding actual reality. So, likewise, in the Judgment that a Chimera is a fabulous being, there is confessedly Conceptual Truth; yet there is no entity which is apart from, and comparable with, the objective Concept.

v. Not only is it generally understood, that all truth is primarily in the intellect; but, in particular, nothing can be clearer than that Conceptual Truth is subjective, because it is truth subsisting in the Concept, as the name sufficiently declares. But the opinion which is combated in this Proposition makes it objective; and thereby identifies it, more or less, with ontological Truth. To this it may be said, that the comparison is instituted by the judicial intellect. But this is nothing to the purpose. For the act of comparison is a sine qua non, if you please; but, in the hypothesis now under consideration, it does not enter into the formal constitution of Conceptual Truth, which consists in a certain correspondence or equation. If, then, that correspondence is between the cognized entity and itself, under the form according to which it has been conceived; the said Truth is not in the Concept, but in the entity or object.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. The first objection against the present Thesis may be thus stated. The requisite conformity, which is now under discussion, cannot be a conformnity between the formal or subjective Concept and the object. For such a conformity must be either entitative or intentional; in other words, either between the respective natures of the two, or a representative conformity. But it is impossible to maintain the former hypothesis; because, in a great number of Judgments, the object is material in its nature, while the Concept is spiritual. If the second hypothesis should be adopted; then it will follow, that the correspondence must be such only as is discoverable between the objective Concept and the entity that is object of cognition. For the Concept can only be compared representatively with its object, by virtue of its actual representation; and the actual representation, qua representation in the passive sense of the word, is the objective Concept. This is plain; for the act itself of judging cannot be one of the terms of comparison, since there is so far no similarity. It must be, therefore, in that which is represented by the act.

ANSWER. The Antecedent, in which it is asserted that the required conformity cannot be any such as is supposed to exist between the concept and its object, is met with a simple negation. As to the proof of the Antecedent, the disjunctive Major is admitted; for it is true that such conformity must be either entitative or intentional. Furthermore, the first member of the Minor is granted for the reason given in the proof. There can be no doubt, that such correspondence or equation is impossible between the nature of the Concept and the nature of the entity; for, even where there may chance to be some such correspondence, it is quite accidental to the Truth of the Concept. But the second member of the Minor is denied. There may be a correspondence between the judicial act as representative and the entity as represented; and that intellectual representation is in no wise identical with the objective Concept. For the objective Concept is the entity itself, so far as it is covered by the intellectual act; and, accordingly, would not be the judgment as representative, but the object as represented. Of course, there can be no correspondence, till the completion of the Concept; for it is not to be found in judging but in the Judgment. Now, if we look at the completed act, we discover that it is representative of a determined object; and it will be well to examine that intention or representation, since it will conduce towards a clearer solution of the difficulty. In that representation there are three elements, viz. the definite object of representation, symbolized by the Subject; the form under which the object is conceived, symbolized by the Predicate; and the logical Verb, Is, or Is not, which is the essential Form of the conceptual representation. Of these the former two have a corresponding object in real Judgments, (which are the only ones contemplated in the present inquiry); the latter cannot possibly exist out of the intellectual act. The objective Concept, then, includes the entity, together with the form or mode under which it is represented. Thus in the Judgment, Man is an animal, man is represented under the form of animality. But now, take a contrary Judgment, Man is not an animal. The first is true; the second is false. But why? The only contrast between the two Judgments is in the Copula, or logical Verb; yet there is nothing corresponding to it in the object. But it may be urged in reply; The objective Concept, in the second instance, is Man deprived of animality. This is impossible; for there is no such form in the object, but just the reverse. In such case, there is no objective Concept, properly so called; the only objective Concept is a logical entity, which is purely subjective. Wherefore, the Conceptual Truth or Falsity depends solely on the Copula, which is exclusively logical; and if so, Conceptual Truth is in the subject, not in the object. In answer, then, to the objection, that the Concept, compared intentionally with its object, is neither more nor less than the objective Concept, it must be asserted that the case is precisely the reverse. For the entity receives the name of the objective Concept from the intellectual act which represents it; and this argues a certain priority of nature in the Concept, not to the entity or the reality of that entity which is represented, but to the objective Concept in its distinction from the entity. The judicial act is, in its nature, representative; and, when that logical representation exhibits the entity as it really is, then, and then only, is it conceptually true.

II. It is, again, urged in objection, against the present Proposition, that Truth is the object of the intellect and, in consequence, of its judicial act. Therefore the conformity, of which we are in search, must be in the object; not in the cognition. For, when the intellect forms a direct Judgment concerning the truth; it cannot be judging of the subjective conformity of its own act, but of the truth of the object itself.

ANSWER. Truth is not formally, but only fundamentally, the object of the intellect. On this point St. Thomas makes the apposite remark, that 'though conceptual Truth is caused in our intellects by the object, it is not necessary that the form of truth should be previously discoverable in the object; just as the form of health is not discoverable in the medicine, previously to its being in the animal. For it is the virtue of the medicine, not its healthiness, which causes health; since its agency is not univocal. And, in like manner, it is the being of the thing, not its truth, which causes Conceptual Truth. Wherefore, the Philosopher says, (in the Categories, e.g., that opinion and speech are true because of the existence of the thing, not because of its truth.'^{1} The object, therefore, of the mind, is the entity which it represents; and its aim is to acquire a definite and scientific knowledge of that object, in which is essentially included the conformity of the intellectual representation and, consequently, Conceptual Truth. But the mind does not contemplate the truth of the object, (which is nothing other than its intelligibility), but the object itself. How it is that the intellect, (even in a direct, as distinguished from a reflex, Judgment), can judge of the conformity of its act with the entity represented by that act, will be discussed in the sequel.

III. It is objected, in the last place, that, when the intellect reflects on its direct act, in order to gain a formal cognition of its truth; it does not compare the direct Judgment with the object, but the object, under the form by which it is apprehended, with itself in its absolute entity. But, if so, it is plain that Conceptual Truth consists, as Durandus maintains, in the conformity of the objective Concept with the entity that is the object of representation.

ANSWER. The assumption on which the argument rests, is wholly unfounded. In such reflex Judgments, the formal Concept is compared with the object.

{1} 'Licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis; sicut neque in medicina per prius invenitur ratio sanitatis quam in animali. Virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas ejus, causat sanitatem, cum non sit agens univocum' (that is, it does not produce health by healthiness, as fire produces fire). 'Et similiter esse rei, non veritas ejus, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde Philosophus dicit, quod opinio et oratio Vera est ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res vera est.' 1ae xvi, I, ad 3m. The quotation from Aristotle is more a summary of his teaching in the Chapter alluded to; the only words that exactly correspond, are these, Tô gar pragma einai mê einai, toutô kai ho logos pseudês einai legetai. The 'opinion' (doxa) is not mentioned here, but is borrowed from the preceding context.