PROPOSITION LXXI.

Formal Conceptual Truth consists in the conformity of the judicial concept of the intellect with the object of cognition.

Before proceeding to the direct proof of this Thesis, it will be necessary to explain the nature of the conformity required, which cannot be given better than in the following words of St. Thomas. 'Since Conceptual Truth,' he observes, 'is an equation between the intellect and its object, in that the intellect pronounces that to be which is, and that not to be which is not; Truth' (Conceptual) 'appertains to that, in the formal Concept, which the intellect pronounces, not to the mode or form of operation by which it pronounces it. For it is not necessary to Conceptual Truth, that the intellectual act itself should form an equation with the object; since the object is sometimes material, while the intellectual act is immaterial. But that which the intellect by its act pronounces and cognizes, must form an equation with the object, in such sort that this latter should really be as the intellect pronounces'^{1} (that it is). In this passage St. Thomas admonishes us, in what respects conformity between the Concept and the object is not to be expected, and in what way such conformity is imperatively demanded, in order to satisfy the requirements of Formal Conceptual Truth. In the first place, we must not expect a conformity between the nature of the act, and the nature of the object; in other words, between the entity of the act and the entity of the object. Again, he warns us not to anticipate a conformity between the form of the thought, or what logicians call the Second Intention, and the entity represented. For the form of a simple Apprehension is more conformable to the object than that of a Judgment, since one of the principal elements of the latter -- its formal constitutive, in fact, -- can have nothing even similitudinally corresponding with it in the objected entity. Moreover, the logical form of the Concept may be different, and yet the Conceptual Truth remain. For the Divine Idea is in infinite perfection conceptually true; nevertheless, It is not a Judgment, as St. Thomas points out. The conformity required, then, consists in an equation between the pronounced representation of the mind and the entity represented; which supposes, not only that the intellectual representation should be conformable to the object, but that the intellect should pronounce, -- adjudge it to be so, -- should 'pronounce that to be which is, and that not to be which is not,' -- the former by an affirmative, the latter by a negative, Judgment. But so to pronounce, argues consciousness of the conformity. It is manifest from the above commentary on this passage of the Angelic Doctor, (which is based on tbe words themselves, as interpreted by the context and the main drift of the Chapter), that they greatly err, who discover herein any countenance of the opinion which has been rejected in the preceding Proposition. If other proof were wanting, the expression of St. Thomas that 'Conceptual Truth appertains to that in the formal Concept, &c.' would be enough of itself to evince, that he is in no wise referring to the objective Concept.

THE PROOF of the present Thesis is easy; since it is contained in the simple application of the definition. For, if Formal Conceptual Truth consists in the conformity of the intellectual act with the object represented by that act, as well as in the mental consciousness, or rather cognition, of such conformity; and if, moreover, such cognition of the conformity of the Concept with its object, by which the truth of the intellectual act becomes itself an object of mental apprehension, is limited to the Judgment of the intellect: it follows, as a demonstrative consequence, that Formal Conceptual Truth consists in the conformity of the judicial act with the object of cognition. But the Antecedent has been in part established already, and will be further confirmed in Propositions that are yet to follow. Therefore, the Consequent is demonstrably true.

{1} 'Cum veritas intellectus sit adaequatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est, ad id in intellectu veritas pertinet quod intellectus dicit, non ad operationem qua id dicit. Non enim ad veritatem intellectus exigitur, ut ipsum intelligere rei adaequetur, cum res interdum sit materialis, intelligere vero immateriale. Sed illud quod intellectus intelligendo dicit et cognoscit, oportet esse rei aequatum, scil. ut ita in re sit, sicut intellectus dicit.'