PROPOSITION LXXII.

Formal Conceptual Truth differentially consists in a virtual or implicit Judgment, which the mind forms in the judicial act itself, as to the conformity between its own judicial representation and the object represented; or, in other words, in the explicit cognition by the intellect of the material truth of its own representation.

As the present Proposition is explanatory of the previous one, rather than any enunciation of a new principle, the declaration of it will be made clearer and more satisfactory by pursuing the method of analysis. Wherefore,

i. Formal, essentially differs from Material, Conceptual Truth, in that the mind knows the conformity of its own Concept with the object conceived in the former; whereas, in the latter, it does not know this conformity, but simply possesses it, In the one case, it pronounces on the truth of its own representation; in the other, it does not, In the one case, it is conscious of its own truth; in the other, it is not. This is the meaning of the word differentially, which appears in the Enunciation. The difference is most clearly defined by the Angelic Doctor in various places, of which two will be here presented to the reader, as guides in the prosecution of the present analysis. 'Truth,' he says, 'is in the intellect and in the senses; but not in the same way. For it is in the intellect as, so to speak, a consequent of the intellectual act, and as cognized hy the intellect. For it is a consequent of intellectual operation, accordingly as the intellect judges of a thing as it really is. Furthermore, it is cognized by the intellect; forasmuch as the intellect reflects upon its own act, not only as knowing' (or being conscious of) 'its own act, but as knowing its proportion to the object. But this cannot he known, unless the nature of the act be known; and this latter cannot be known, unless the nature of the active principle be known. But such is the intellect itself, of whose nature it is to admit of a conformity with entities. Hence, it is because the intellect is self-reflexive, that it cognizes' (conceptual) 'Truth. But Truth is in the senses simply as the consequent of their act, when the sensile judgment is in accordance with what the object really is. Yet, on the other hand, it is not in the senses as an object of sensile perception. For, although the senses form a true judgment of their object; they nevertheless do not cognize the truth according to which their judgment is true. For, albeit the senses are conscious that they perceive, they neither cognize their own nature, nor, as a consequence, the nature of their own acts, nor the proportion of these to their objects; and, therefore, they have no cognition of their truth.'^{1} This passage will be of service in the sequel. At present it will only be necessary to remark that, when St. Thomas speaks of the judgment of the senses, he is using the word analogically; in that the common sense, (i.e. the faculty by which the separate perceptions of each sense are reduced to a common unity), exhibits acts which, as he describes them elsewhere, bear a shadowy resemblance to intellectual Judgments. In the preceding quotation, the Angelic Doctor compares the judicial act of the intellect with sensitive perception only. In the one that follows, he likewise compares it with the intellectual act of simple Apprehension; and, in doing so, enters more explicitly into the reason why Conceptual Truth is not formally discoverable in the latter, but only in the Judgment. Here are his words 'Truth according to its primary signification, is in the intellect. Now, since every entity is true, in that it possesses the Form proper to its own nature; it is necessary that the intellect in act should be true, in so far as it has a likeness of the thing conceived, which is its Form when it is in act. And it is for this reason that Truth is defined to be a conformity between the intellect and its object. Hence, to know this conformity, is to know the Truth. But the senses in nowise know it. For, though sight has a likeness of the object seen; nevertheless, it does not know the relation of resemblance which subsists between the object seen and its own sensile perception. But the intellect is capable of cognizing its own conformity with the intelligible entity. It does not, however, apprehend this conformity in its simple Apprehension of the Essence. But, when it judges that the entity really corresponds with the form under which it apprehends such entity; then, for the first time, it cognizes and pronounces the Truth. And this it does by Composition and Division. For, in every Proposition, it applies a certain form symbolized by the Predicate to a certain entity symbolized by the Subject; or it separates the former from the latter. Wherefore, it may be justly concluded that the senses are true in respect of such and such an object, and that the intellect is true in its simple Apprehension of Essence; but not that either of them cognizes or pronounces the Truth. The like may he said of simple Terms. To sum up: Truth can exist in the senses or in the intellectual simple Apprehension of Essence, as in a certain true entity, but not as a something cognized by the cognizing, which is what Truth means. For the perfection of the intellect is Truth, as cognized. Consequently, properly speaking, Truth is in the judicial act of the intellect affirmative or negative; but neither in the senses nor in simple Apprehension.'^{2} From these two passages it is plain that, according to the mind of St. Thomas, Formal Conceptual Truth differs from Material, (as existing in simple Apprehension, and likewise analogically in the senses); in that the former essentially includes an intellectual cognition and expression of the conformity between the Concept and its object, which has no place in the latter.

ii. It further follows from the doctrine laid down in these passages, that Formal Conceptual Truth may be in every kind and form of Judgment; and that it must be there in every case, unless the Judgment should prove false. For St. Thomas attributes it to the judicial act of Composition and Division. Wherever, then, there is either Composition or Division, one or other of which occurs in every judicial act of the mind, as its essential Form; there must be cognized conformity or, in other words, Formal Truth, unless there should be a difformity of the Concept from its object.

iii. Therefore, Formal Conceptual Truth, and the judicial cognition of the conformity between the Concept and its object, by which the Formality of Conceptual Truth is constituted, are not limited to Judgments, which are, speaking according to the strictness of logical terminology, reflex. In the instance of these latter Judgments, there would be no difficulty; because, in them, the judicial cognition of the conformity between the Concept and its object, is expressly pronounced. Thus, for instance, -- That the earth moves round the sun and not the sun round the earth, is true, -- is, strictly speaking, a reflex Judgment; in which the conformity with the object is expressly predicated of the previous Judgment, assumed as subject. But Formal Conceptual Truth is to be found equally in the direct, as in the reflex, Judgment. Here it is, that we touch on the main difficulty of the present inquiry.

iv. In direct affirmative Judgments, (and that which is discoverable in them, may likewise be found, servatis servandis, in negative Judgments), the intellect pronounces expressly the conformity of a certain reality with the entity which is hic et nunc the object of its cognition. Thus, in the Judgment, -- a dog is a quadruped, -- a four-legged body is pronounced to be conformable with the animal known as a dog. The conformity is objective; and the Judgment refers to the object only. Yet there are no traces, at first sight, of any other Judgment in the act. Wait for a moment. Does the intellect judge of the dog and of its conformity with a four-legged body immediately? If so, the dog itself must be inside the thinker's brain, in company with a really distinct four-legged body; because equation presupposes real distinction. But this is plainly absurd. Those entities are respectively represented by two Concepts; and, therefore, the immediate comparison, and the subsequent immediate judgment of conformity, are concerned with the Concepts, not with the realities. But it may be further urged; allowing the truth of this conclusion, still Judgment is principally, and, so to say, intentionally pronounced on the object. Most true; nevertheless, through the medium of the Concepts. Consequently, the intellect, while formally pronouncing on the conformity of the object with the reality attributed to it; in and by the same judgment, virtually pronounces on the conformity of its complex Concept with the object thus judicially represented. For it only reaches the objective reality through its Concepts. To affirm, therefore, the objective, is necessarily to affirm the subjective, conformity; the more so, because, in numberless cases, the two realities conceived are really identical in the object. But, then, how is it that the intellect can form this virtual Judgment? St. Thomas supplies us with the answer. Consciousness is not enough; for the senses are conscious of their sensible perceptions, yet are unable to cognize the conformity of such perceptions with the sensible object which they represent. Accordingly, as he remarks, 'They form a true judgment (so called) of their object, but nevertheless they cannot cognize the truth according to which their judgment is true.' The intellect, however, has the power of self-introspection; hence, St. Thomas derives the word intellect from the root intra legere, -- as it were, a reading inside itself.^{3} This self-consciousness or self-introspection, of the intellect, is a necessary accompaniment of its own acts; and so, the mind, spontaneously reflecting on its own Judgments, cognizes, and virtually pronounces on, the conformity of its Concept with the object, in the act of composition or affirmation.

Hence, it follows, as a sort of Corollary, that all Judgments, even such as are in logical phrase direct, are in some way reflex. But there is this marked difference between these and logically reflex Judgments: that, in the former, the reflection is spontaneous and vital; in the latter, it is voluntary and accidental. The one is inseparable from all Judgments; the other constitutes the Difference of a particular class.