PROPOSITION LXXIII.

In order that the intellect may be able to judge of the conformity between its own judicial Concept and the object represented, it is necessary that the two ideas which form the terms of the Judgment should be intentionally accepted by the mind as symbols respectively of a definite reality.

The climax of the difficulty, which besets this question of Formal Conceptual Truth, is now reached. It has been shown, in the preceding Thesis, that the intellect must judge concerning its object through the medium of its own Concepts. It is natural to inquire, (and it is all important that a satisfactory answer should be given to the inquiry), first, whether those Concepts must be, and secondly in what way they are, determined by the representation of a definite object? But this problem must not be confounded with that other, touching the bridge which connects the subjective with the objective, -- the Ego with the non-Ego, -- Thought with Being. The discussion of this latter belongs to the province of Ideology; and has no claims on the metaphysician. On the contrary, in the present investigation it is taken for granted that the sensile and intellectual faculties of the human soul, (provided that they, for their part, are in a normal condition, and that their proper object is duly present), are practically infallible in their operation, as the natural means for the acquisition of Truth. It is, moreover, supposed from Ideology that the human intellect intues the Essences or Quiddities of things as its proper object; so that the simple Apprehension of them is a perception rather than a conception; direct, not reflex.

To the former and easier of the two questions proposed, an answer is given in the enunciation of the present Thesis; which is thus declared. In order that the mind may be enabled to pronounce upon the conformity of its own Concept with the object of its Judgment, the elements of that judicial concept must have a fixed objective value, i.e. must represent a definite objective reality. But this postulates that the two ideas, which form the Terms of the Judgment, should be intentionally accepted by the mind, as symbols of a definite reality. Therefore, &c. -- The Major is plain; for if the Subject and Predicate have only a subjective value, and are not the determined symbols of a determined object; there can be neither similarity nor dissimilarity between the subjective Concept and the object to be represented, and, accordingly, no reasonable foundation of a Judgment. The Minor is equally clear; for, supposing the necessity of determining somehow the symbolical value of the Subject and Predicate, there can evidently be nothing else ultimately capable of so determining them, save the mind that conceives, and alone uses, them, as constituents of its own judicial act.

But the second question, touching the way in which these Concepts are determined by the intellect, is far more difficult. It is a problem peculiar to the present subject; though it arises in some measure out of the doctrine which will presently claim our attention, concerning simple Apprehensions. It will be shown in its place that simple Apprehensions can never be otherwise than true; and for this reason. The mind, in a simple Apprehension, neither itself defines, nor accepts from any other source a definition of, the object to be represented; so that the act determines its own object, and, consequently, that which the simple Apprehension de facto represents, is necessarily the proper object of its representation. On the other band, in the judicial act the object must be defined, before the intellectual composition is complete; because the mind compares the initial Concept with the object, and cognizes, as well as pronounces, the conformity between the two, in the act itself of judging. But how could it do this, unless the object were previously, at least in priority of nature, determined? Yet, how can it be determined? For until the judicial act is complete, and the Judgment pronounced, the only elements present to the mind are two simple Apprehensions. This is the gist of the difficulty.

It will be easier and clearer for the reader, if the solution is evolved by a process of analysis. Wherefore,

i. The material constituents of a Judgment are two simple Apprehensions, which respectively occupy the places of Subject and Predicate. Now, the first point to settle is, Are those simple Apprehensions determined in their representation? The answer is obvious, if it be only borne in mind, that these simple Apprehensions are not in course of making, but made; and have themselves become the object of subsequent thought. For, though the simple Apprehension is not determined to a definite object in its course of formation, or, as the Schoolmen say, in fieri; yet itself determines the object by the fact of representation, when formed, or, as the same Schoolmen say, in facto esse. Thus, to take an example, I may see a cut crystal, which may be an occasion to my intellect of recalling the simple Apprehension, diamond. It is true, that the circumstance of the cut crystal occasioning my thought, may become the occasion of my subsequently forming the false Judgment, This cut crystal is a diamond; but, while I simply apprehend, I think diamond, not cut crystal. It is plain that I have already formed the idea of diamond; and, once this simple Apprehension is formed, it has defined its own object by virtue of its representation. For it is the determinate intellectual expression of diamond. Since, therefore, the idea has been defined in its representation; the mind may use it as the recognized symbol of that entity.

ii. But the difficulty is not yet solved. For the simple Apprehension in facto esse, though it defines its objective, by the formal or subjective Concept, does not necessarily determine itself to the representation ot an external reality. It is a mere, (one might also say, passive), impression; a figure projected on the sheet, and the mind may have slipped in one of its own slides. Thus, blue grass, is a simple Apprehension, and the object is defined; yet that object has no existence outside the intellect. But, to the presence of Formal Conceptual Truth in real Judgments (which are the only ones now under consideration) it is required, that the Concept should be determined to the expression of a definite reality external to itself. And such determination is made in the judicial act. For the intellect, in judging, selects a simple Apprehension as its intentional symbol of a definite reality, and constitutes it the Subject of its Judgment. Before proceeding further, it will be well to confirm this assertion by the evidence of examples. Let us commence with vocal Judgments, or Enunciations; because in them it often happens, that the intention of the mind is made manifest by signs and gestures. Take the following, accompanied (as one may fairly suppose) by either the pointing of the finger or the grasp of the object; -- This is a Latin Grammar. Here the Subject is, This thing; and the accompanying action makes known the intention of the speaker to pronounce judgment on that definite reality, which, as all the listeners understand, he is pointing out to them. So, again, one man may say to another, at the same time perhaps turning his eyes in the direction of the lawn, This grass is very coarse. Now, in that case, the word grass is used as the conventional symbol of a determined reality by the intention of the speaker, and is accepted as such by his companion. The addition of the pronoun, this, serves to particularize the object in the minds of both. Thus the object is determined by the Subject of the Judgment. In like manner, when a man thinks within himself that God is infinitely merciful, the Subject, God, stands in his own mind for the symbol of The Supreme Being; and, if he were to express the Judgment in words, it would be so accepted by all that heard him. The Subject, therefore, is constituted, by the intention of the intellect, the symbol of a determined reality. In like manner, the Predicate is intentionally accepted as the symbol of a definite objective form or attribute; and the mind in its act of Judgment, through the medium of its two simple Concepts, predicates or affirms the attribute of the reality which is its defined object. This is, almost to the letter, the explanation of the Angelic Doctor, as is plainly gathered from the second passage quoted in the preceding Proposition. The intellect he says 'in every Proposition, or enunciated Judgment, applies a certain form symbolized by the Predicate to a certain entity symbolized by the Subject, or it separates the former from the latter,' i.e. in the case of negative Judgments. To take an instance: The sea-anemone is an animal. No one can doubt but that here the intellect has for its definite object a certain living entity, which is symbolized by the Concept and name of sea-anemone, -- a symbol, moreover, universally recognized. Again, nobody doubts that the word and Concept animal symbolizes, by common consent, a definite existing external form or attribute. In its act of Judgment, then, the mind applies the attribute, animal, to the determinate entity, sea-anemone, by means of its two simple Apprehensions which respectively symbolize each. Precisely the same may be said of negative Judgments; the only difference between which and affirmative Judgments consists in this, that, in the case of the former, the mind in its judicial act pronounces the separation of the attribute from the reality. But such difference is wholly irrelevant to the present issue.

iii. So far, the nature of the express Judgment has been made manifest. It is clearly a pronounced application of the Attribute to the reality which is object of cognition. But what about the virtual Judgment, by which is essentially constituted the Formal Conceptual Truth of the act? The answer has already been implicitly provided. For, as a fact, the immediate composition is between the Subject and the Predicate, which are two Concepts. The composition itself is purely logical, and is symbolized by the logical Copula. It is only through these, as symbols, that the Judgment is pronounced on the external object. Therefore, the latter necessarily includes within itself a virtual Judgment as to the conformity of the judicial Concept with the represented reality. Finally, it is effected by that vital self-consciousness of the intellect, -- that spontaneous return upon itself which enables it to eye its own immanent action as representative of the objective reality.