PROPOSITION LXXIV.

Formal Conceptual Truth is not limited to the speculative, but belongs in like manner to the practical, intellect; in so far as this latter is understood to be the actual cognitiou of proposed moral action or artificial production.

This Proposition likewise is intended to meet a special difficulty. For, as preceding Theses must have made sufficiently evident, the objects or entities represented are the measures of Conceptual Truth, which consists in the conformity of the intellectual act with the reality conceived. Wherefore, Formal Conceptual Truth can undoubtedly be found in the speculative intellect, a denomination given to that faculty in so far as it occupies itself with speculative subjects. But it would seem as though the reverse must be said of the practical intellect, i.e. the intellect as conversant with Ethics or Art. For the end of Ethics is action, and the end of Art is production; yet both these are moulded according to the knowledge of him who is acting and producing. Consequently, in the case of Ethics and Art, it is not things that measure thought, but thought that measures things. Thus, for instance, a watchmaker constructs a watch according to the rules which he has in his own mind; and, if the watch is a true one, it is so, because it is in conformity with the idea of the watchmaker. Yet, on the other hand, the practical intellect must admit of Formal Conceptual Truth; because, by the common consent of mankind, Truth and Falsity are predicated of the moral, as well as of the aesthetic, syllogism. Then, again, if there can be no Conceptual Truth, There can be no Science -- but Ethics and Aesthetics are properly called Sciences. Lastly, the Divine Intellect, as will be seen, is the Measure of creation; yet, in God's knowledge of created things is to be found Formal Conceptual Truth in infinite perfection.

Such is the difficulty. That which follows is the solution; and will serve at the same time for a declaration of the Proposition.

There are two aspects under which ethical and artistic cognition may be regarded. For such a thought may be considered as a thought or Concept, and it may be also considered as a cause. Considered as a cause, it is the measure of entities; considered as a thought, it is measured, like all other thoughts, by a reality external to itself. This needs further explanation.

THE FIRST MEMBER will be willingly admitted. For, as the cause is author of the effect; this latter must depend, for its truth, on its conformity with the former. THE SECOND MEMBER requires some elucidation. The moral or aesthetic syllogism, considered as a mere Concept, deals with the natures or essences of things, not with their existence. Thus, e.g. Fraud is unlawful. But such an action is fraudulent. Therefore it is unlawful. Here is a moral syllogism, the Major of which, (as is generally the case), is a self-evident principle. Man's intellect did not make, and cannot unmake it. That such a given action is a fraud, depends wholly on its intrinsic nature; not on the conception of it by the intellect. Therefore, the syllogism is true, in so far as it is conformable to the objective nature of things. If I direct my individual action by its light; then it becomes a cause, and fashions the action. So it is in the aesthetic, or artistic, syllogism. Take the case of a watchmaker, who reasons with himself in this wise: 'If I am to have an hour-hand and a minute-hand; the wheel that conveys motion to the minute-hand and receives it from the wheel which gives motion to the hour-hand, is most conveniently arranged according to the proportion of 5 to 60. Therefore, the cogs in the former should be a multiple by 12 of the cogs in the latter.' The premisses are not a creation of his own brain; but depend on the laws of motion and the abstract relation of numbers. So, in painting, the artist must be guided in his conception by the laws of perspective, by those of light and shade, and by those of natural form and proportion. But all these laws are realities objective to the intellect, which, in proportion as its idea is conformed to them, attains to Conceptual Truth. That such separation between the ethical or aesthetic syllogism considered as a Concept and considered as a cause, is possible, may be easily proved by the logic of facts. For, if such separation did not take place in Ethics, there would be no crime; and if there were no such separation in Art, all Art critics would be artists.