ARTICLE III.

Ontological Truth.

We have now arrived at the main subject of this Chapter; to elucidate which, has been the sole reason for the introduction of the preceding discussions touching the nature and constitutives of conceptual Truth. That there is such a thing as Ontological or Transcendental Truth, cannot admit of serious doubt; since its existence is attested by the universal consent of mankind. In every language, ancient as well as modern, what is more habitual than the recurrence of such expressions as a true man, true gold, a true friend, true virtue, true genius, true steel, true rosewood, and others of a like kind? Nor can it be said that such modes of speech are a mere redundancy; for a man is conscious to himself that when he makes use of the phrase, true gold, for instance, he means something more by it than by the simple term gold. Consequently, as there is Truth in concepts, so is there a Truth in things or Beings; which, on this account, is called Ontological Truth. It is likewise called Transcendental, because it is limited to no particular category of Being, but permeates and transcends all the Categories, and is, wherever Being is; or, to speak more accurately, is really identical with Being. Ontological, admits of the same declaration as conceptual, Truth; for wherever Truth is to be found, and whatever its definite nature, it always denotes an equation or correspondence; and, in the case of Transcendental, as of conceptual, Truth, that equation or correspondence is between intellect and Being. But there is this difference between the two; that in the latter, it is the correspondence of the intellect with Being as its object, whereas in the former it is the actual or aptitudinal correspondence of Being with intellect. So far, all is clear; but all is not plain. For it is in the effort to determine the nature of this conformity or conformability, that the difficulties begin; and difficulties, too, as one is compelled to own, of no ordinary character. In order to meet and solve these difficulties, a series of Propositions will be set before the reader wherein, first of all, it will be stated what Transcendental Truth is not, spite of the opinion of some Doctors to the contrary; then, it will be determined in what it formally consists; after this, its Transcendental character will be vindicated; and, finally, it will be traced to its primal source.

PROPOSITION LXXVIII.

Ontological Truth does not import either any real absolute property of Being, conceptually distinguishable from it; or any real predicamental relation; or any, strictly speaking, conceptual relation of a like kind; or a simple negation.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition is to the effect, that Ontological Truth is not a real absolute property or perfection of Being, from which it is conceptually distinguishable. Besides the arguments adduced in the twenty-fourth and twenty-sixth Theses, -- by which it was proved generally, that Being, as such, cannot have any positive attributes really distinguishable from itself, and that, consequently, the Transcendental attributes add to the idea of Being either a negation or an extrinsic referribility, (arguments which it would be of advantage for the reader to review); -- there are others which apply more particularly to Ontological Truth. For (i.) the universally admitted description of this Transcendental attribute supplies a very strong argument in favour of the present position. Ontological Truth essentially denotes a conformity, correspondence, or equation. This is of its very nature. But conformity, correspondence, equation, are evidently relative terms. Consequently, if Being could admit of a perfection distinguishable from itself, Truth would be a relative, not an absolute, perfection. For Ontological Truth, over and above the idea of Being, adds nothing but an actual or aptitudinal commensuration, or conformity, with intellect. (ii.) Then again; this absolute perfection must either be something or nothing. If nothing, it is no perfection; if something, it is Being. How can it, therefore, be distinguishable, even conceptually, from Being? (iii.) Lastly, there is no conceivable foundation for any distinction. Evidently, it cannot be a real distinction, either greater or modal; for the last argument evinces that this is impossible. But neither can there be a conceptual distinction between Transcendental Truth and Being. For, if there can be, it follows, that the two terms are conceptually distinct; so that the idea of the one does not necessarily enter into the idea of the other. But, as a fact, it is precisely the reverse. For proof, let the two terms be considered separately. It will not be doubted, that all Being in itself is intelligible, i.e. is naturally capable of provoking a corresponding representation of itself in the intellect that contemplates it. But it is precisely this which constitutes Ontological Truth. Therefore, Truth is essentially included in Being. Now take the other term, Truth. Truth is either something or nothing; -- to put it more clearly in the concrete, the True is either something or nothing. If it is something, it is Being; if it is nothing, it is a manifest contradiction to call it an absolute perfection. Wherefore, Being is essentially included in Truth.

But here it is necessary to interpose a caution. When it is said that Truth is essentially included in Being, it is not meant that in the concept of Being is essentially included the concept of Truth; etherwise, to speak of true Being would be a mere verbal redundancy. All that is maintained is, that it is of the nature of Being that it should form, or be capable of forming, an equation with thought. Yet this does not hinder but that, by process of mental abstraction, Being may be simply conceived as Being, without taking into account, or representing, its referribility to intellect. This is sufficient to justify us in placing Truth among the Transcendental attributes of Being; but it excludes all pretext for considering Truth as a real absolute property. The distinction between the two is stated with his accustomed clearness and simplicity by St. Thomas. 'When it is said,' he remarks, 'that Being cannot be apprehended without the form of the True, this assertion may be understood in two ways. First, it may be understood to mean that Being is not apprehended, unless the form of the True follows upon the apprehension of Being; and, in this sense, it is correct. But it may, again, bear this other meaning, viz, that Being could not be apprehended, without including an apprehension of the True; and in this sense it is false. The True, however, cannot be apprehended without including an apprehension of Being; because Being enters into the nature of the True. It is just as though we should compare the Intelligible with Being. For Being cannot be conceived, if Being is not conceivable; but notwithstanding, Being can be conceived, without conceiving its conceivability. In like manner, Being conceived is true; but the concept of Being does not include the concept of the True.'^{1} Thus, Being can be conceived, without including the concept of Truth; but Truth cannot be conceived, without including necessarily in itself the concept of Being. Therefore, there is no sufficient foundation for a conceptual distinction; because, if either of the two terms essentially includes the other in its formal concept, that of itself is enough to exclude the possibility of conceptual distinction.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of the Proposition declares, that Ontological Truth does not import any real relation or any, strictly speaking, conceptual relation of a like kind. It will be necessary to premise a few words of explanation touching the phraseology and latitude of this Member of the Thesis. The expression, conceptual relation of a like kind, is intended to mean a conceptual relation which is conceived under the form of a predicamental relation, to the exclusion of that which bears a resemblance to Transcendental relation. The words, strictly speaking, have been added to set aside as irrelevant any relation which is a mere figment of the mind, and is destitute of any shadow of a foundation in the object. As touching the latitude of the Enunciation, it embraces under its negation real at once, and conceptual, relation. The two species of relation have been taken together, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition; since some of the arguments that follow, apply equally to both.

i. The first argument is based upon the perfection of the Divine Nature. For it cannot be denied that God is ontologically true. Nay more, it will be shown later on, that He is not only Ontological Truth in infinite Perfection, but that He is the measure of all Ontological Truth in created Being. But it is impossible that there should be predicamental relation, either real or conceptual, in God. The reason is, because all predicamental relation connotes dependence on the part of the related term; but there can be no such dependence, real or conceptual, in God. If, then, Ontological Truth can exist, and principally exist, in the instance of a Being in Whom relation is inconceivable; it is obvious that it cannot be constituted by any such relation, either real or conceptual.

ii. But neither is it possible that Transcendental Truth, in created. Being, should be constituted by a real predicamental, relation. For such relation, from the nature of the case, would either have the Divine Prototypal Ideas or the finite intellect for its correlative term. But in neither case could the supposed relation constitute Transcendental Truth. In proof of the Minor, let us first of all consider, whether any relation of finite Being to the Exemplar Ideas in God can constitute its Truth. If it were so, the only relation possible would be a relation either of similarity or of the measured to its measure. But it can be neither the one nor the other. It cannot be a relation of similarity; for this is founded in formal unity, or in agreement of formal notes. Thus, Henry is like William; because there is, in both, a mutual agreement of the formal notes which are considered to constitute human nature. But it is obviously impossible that there could be any formal unity between the Divine Ideas and created Being. The nearest to it that there can be, is an intentional similarity, such as subsists between a representation and the object represented; but this does not suffice to constitute a relation of similitude. Neither, again, can it be a relation between the measured and its measure, that constitutes the Truth of the creature; because it would be vain to seek for any such distinct relation of finite Being to the Divine Ideas. The reason is, that the Divine prototypal Ideas only affect created Being, by constituting tbe Divine Will (to speak according to the analogy of finite action) in proximate preparation for, or (as the Schoolmen would say) in Its first act of, creating. For the pattern Idea, or exemplar Cause, only affects the production; forasmuch as It guides the efficient Cause in the specification of the work designed. Consequently, there is only one relation, viz. that subsisting between cause and effect, which accompanies the constitution of created Being. Nor let it be said, that the efficient Cause determines the existence of created Being; while the exemplar determines its specification. For, in the one act of creation, are determined indivisibly the existence at once and specification of the creature. To take an instance; -- a horse, by the fact that it exists, exists as a horse. There is no room for real distinction. As this is a somewhat subtle doctrine and difficult to seize, it may be well to illustrate it from art. When a sculptor proposes to himself to execute a piece of sculpture, say, the Laocoon, he must first form the conception in his head as a type or pattern of that which he intends to produce; and this idea determines his will to the production of such a group. But, in the execution of the work, the conception only acts as a direction to the will in producing the Laocoon rather than another subject. It has no immediate influx into the work itself; and, by the same act of volition by which the sculpture exists, it exists as Laocoon. Consequently, it is all really one relation, not two; the relation, viz, of the effect to its efficient cause. Hence, there is no room for this distinct relation between the measured and its measure, which is by some supposed to constitute Ontological Truth. It is true that, after the full constitution of Being, it may be compared with its prototype as its measure; but this presupposes already the Transcendental Truth of that Being. It is one thing to be the occasion of a resultant relation; quite another thing to be formally constituted by such relation. The last argument is further confirmed from the nature of a predicamental relation. For, in it, the foundation has a priority of nature over the relation itself. But, in the present case, the foundation is the true entity of the creature; wherefore, the true entity of the creature is prior, in order of nature to the relation, and cannot be constituted by it. In other words, the creature is presupposed as constituted in its true specific nature, before the relation can arise. Therefore, it is presupposed as intelligible in such constituted order of Being; and, consequently, it is presupposed as true. The whole of this argument applies with equal force to the supposition of a conceptual relation. It may safely, then, be concluded, that Transcendental Truth, in finite Being, is not constituted by any relation of such Being to the Prototypal Ideas in God. But may it be constituted by relation of some sort to the finite intellect? This is the second and only remaining hypothesis. Yet this is, if such were possible, more destitute of foundation than the former. For such relation must be a relation either of actual, or of aptitudinal, conformity with the finite intellect. But, in the first place, whether it be considered as actual or aptitudinal conformity, such relation necessarily presupposes Being, as really and truly constituted in its specific nature; for this latter is the measure of the former. Then, as to aptitudinal conformity (or the capacity of Being to correspond with the finite intellect that shall truly cognize it) in particular, it is to be observed that there is here, strictly speaking, no relation. The only addition which is thereby made to Being considered as intelligible, is an aptitude for receiving to itself a certain extrinsic denomination, in which a Being would be represented as the term or subject-matter of possible cognition. Therefore, the Ontological Truth of finite Being cannot be constituted by any relation to the created intellect, either real or conceptual. Hence we conclude, that it cannot be constituted by any predicamental relation either real or of reason, to any intellect, Infinite or finite.

iii. The above arguments are further confirmed by another argument a pari. As the being knowable imports no predicamental relation to knowledge, and as the thing visible imports no relation to vision; so actual or aptitudinal conformity with the intellect imports no predicamental relation to the intellect.

iv. In the hypothesis that there were no intellect in existence either Divine or human, (and the absurdity of the hypothesis does not interfere with the value of the argument), Being would still be intelligible and true; i.e. Being would have, by virtue of its own entity, a capacity for exciting in the intellect, (should there be one), a true representation of itself, with which cognition it would be conformable.

III. THE THIRD MEMBER of the present Proposition asserts, that Ontological Truth does not import a simple negation. The opinion here rejected owes its origin apparently to a use of the term, true, which is frequent in ordinary conversation, more particularly in connection with the practical concerns of life. To take an instance or two: True gold stands for not sham, not merely apparent, gold. In like manner, a true man is contradistinguished from a painted or a sculptured man, as being such, not by mere similitude of art; or, if the term be employed in a moral sense, it means one who is not a pretender or unreal. Now, it is worth remarking that, in these and similar modes of expression, there is contained, (over and above the mere negation that has been signalized), the concept of that particular perfection of Being which, according to St. Thomas and the School generally, constitutes the foundation of Ontological Truth. For true gold is gold which corresponds, or is capable of corresponding, with the intellect truly conceiving, or capable of truly conceiving it; and the same may be said of a true man. Further; if we look a little deeper into the meaning of the phrases just given, in accordance with the interpretation assigned them, the truth of this part of our Thesis will be confirmed. For what is it that is denied? What is the nature of the denial? It is a negation of a negation, which involves the position of a reality. Fictitious, merely apparent, unreal, are negations, and can have no substantive existence. Nor can the negative form of the interpretation given, affect the question; because it repeatedly happens, as there has been occasion to remark before, that simple perfections of the highest excellence are conceived by the human mind under the form of a negation of a negation. Such are Immortal, Impossible, Infinite, Incorporeal, and the like. This argument receives further confirmation from the fact, that Falsity (which is the contrary of Truth) is a negation, -- to wit, a negation of Truth; therefore it is not a negation of a negation, else it would denote something positive. Consequently, it is the negation of something positive; and that something positive is Truth. But the most unanswerable argument against the opinion now under discussion, is derived from the common sense of mankind. There is no sane man who supposes that, when he speaks of true Being, he adds nothing to Being save a mere negation.

{1} 'Cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo ita quod non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem entis; et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic intelligi, quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur ratio veri; et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi, nisi apprehendatur ratio entis; quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et est simile, sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile. Sed tamen potest intelligi ens ita quod non intelligatur ejus intelligibilitas. Et similiter ens intellectum est verum; non tamen intelligendo, intelligitur verum.' xvi, 3, ad 3.