PROPOSITION LXXIX.

Transcendental Truth is not a mere extrinsic denomination.

It is to be observed at the outset, that Ontological Truth, as supremely applicable to God, must be eliminated from the discussion; for it would be absurd, and something more, to maintain that God is true by a mere extrinsic denomination. Nor do the advocates of the opinion rejected in this Thesis contend for one moment, that their theory is applicable to Truth in God. It may be observed, however, in passing, that such an admission tells strongly against the theory as a whole; since all perfections are predicated analogically of God and of finite Being, according to analogy of attribution of the second class. But analogy of this kind demands, that the Form predicated should be one and the same in all the analogates; although in the secondary analogates the Form is dependent, whereas in the principal analogate it is absolute. The opinion, then, thus limited, amounts to this; that created things are called true by an extrinsic denomination, derived either from the Divine Truth, of which they are symbols and imitations, or from the Truth of the finite speculative intellect, of which they either are, or are capable of being, the cause.

THE PROPOSITION is thus briefly declared. i. It is universally admitted, that Truth is one of the Transcendental attributes of Being; so nearly equivalent to what, in a specific nature, is called a Property, that it occasionally goes by that name. Consequently, it must be intrinsic and essentially connected with Being; in such wise, that the two are simply convertible. Furthermore, as it may he said to be analogically a property; it must, at least in idea, add something intrinsic, which is not formally included in the essential idea of Being. Now, if Ontological Truth were merely an extrinsic denomination, all these requisites would be wanting; and Truth could not, in consequence, be a Transcendental attribute or passion of Being. For a mere extrinsic denomination is extrinsic and accidental in its very nature, more particularly if it is a relative denomination. Moreover, if the extrinsic denomination were abstracted, what would remain intrinsically? Nothing but Being. How then could the supposed attribute add anything intrinsic which is not formally included in the essential idea of Being? ii. If this opinion were true, there would be no reason why Ontological Truth should not be equally predicable of logical, as of real, entities; -- a hypothesis which, nevertheless, is universally rejected. For logical entities, such as Genus, Species, Syllogism, and other Second Intentions, would be as capable of receiving this extrinsic denomination from the intellect truly conceiving them as man, tree, gold, or other finite realities. iii. It would follow from the opinion in question, that the perfection of Ontological Truth would not depend on the perfection of Being. Thus, a stone would have the same Ontological Truth as a man, a man the same as an angel; for the truth of the intellectual concept, from which the extrinsic denomination is supposed to be derived, is equal in all these cases, whether they are considered in relation to the Divine, or in relation to the finite, intellect.