PROPOSITION LXXX.

Transcendental or Ontological Truth imports the entity of Being; and, at the same time, connotes the conformity of such entity with intellect as rightly conceiving it, or its conformability with intellect as capable of rightly conceiving it.

The declaration of this Proposition will be more clearly understood, if we proceed by way of analysis. Now, the first question that confronts the inquirer is this; what is that which is really and intrinsically represented in the idea of Ontological Truth? The answer is a simple, and, after due consideration, an evident, one; and it is this. Transcendental Truth really and intrinsically is nothing more or less than the entity of Being. This principle, as it may be almost called, has been sufficiently confirmed, as touching the Transcendental attributes generally, in the first Chapter of this Book; but it will not be amiss to recur to it once more, under a somewhat different form. A passion or attribute of Being is convertible with Being; therefore, it cannot be a determination of Being, -- that is, it cannot contract the periphery of Being to a special Genus, as substance and accident, created and uncreated Being, do. These latter classify Being and divide it, by introducing into their express formal concept a reality which is only virtually and implicitly contained in Being, and is not discoverable in all Being; wherefore, they are not convertible with Being. Thus, Substance adds to the idea of Being, the reality of so subsisting in and of itself, as not to require any Subject of inhesion. But, for the very reason that it makes this addition, it is untrue to say that all Being is Substance. The two are not convertible. The mere addition, however, of itself does not afford a sufficient ground for the assertion of inconvertibility; because a specific property is undeniably convertible with the specific nature, yet, as undeniably, it adds a reality not included in the entity of that nature. Thus, visible is convertible with human nature; though it is not included in the Essence of the latter, and adds to it a reality of its own. It is, therefore, necessary to interpret the above canon by the Transcendentalism of Being; by virtue of which, every real addition to Being must be a contractive determination. On the one hand, such addition is simply a determination of Being, -- making no addition from without; because all real addition to Being must be Being, and, therefore, must be virtually included in the idea of Being. The only possible manner, therefore, of making any real addition is, to change the virtual into the explicit, and add it to the concept; and in this way, Being becomes as it were implicit, its Mode explicit. But, on the other hand, such determination must necessarily be contractive, and, consequently, not convertible with Being. The reason for this is, that in order to determine Being, there must be projected, in the concept, a reality which, together with other realities; was before virtually contained within the periphery of Being. But, to objectivize one reality of Being, that, by the force of its explicit position, excludes another, involves of necessity a contraction of Being to that particular reality. If, then, there be a concept whose periphery is coextensive with that of the concept of Being; it is impossible that the former should represent any other intrinsic reality than the simple entity of Being. But this it must represent; otherwise, it will represent nothing, and forfeits its claims to be a concept at all. Such is the principal point of difference between the opinion rejected in the last Thesis and the doctrine here established. In the former, the True is considered as separate from, and as a sort of independent addition to, Being; and is, accordingly, reduced to the level of a mere extrinsic denomination, -- the only thing it could possibly be, under such treatment. It is here contended, on the contrary, that the True, or, (if you prefer it), Ontological Truth, necessarily and intrinsically includes the entity of Being in its concept; so that it is not an addition, properly speaking, but a conceptual mode rather, -- or, as it is more truly called, an attribute of Being.

The next question which awaits us in the present analysis, is this: What is the addition made to the idea of Being, when it is conceived as true? For, though it is evident from what has just been said, that Being is essentially included in Ontological Truth; yet, in the concept of the latter, there must be something added to the concept of Being. Otherwise, the two would be conceptually identical; in which case it would be absurd to maintain, that Ontological Truth is an attribute of Being. Suppose, we answer: The intelligibility of Being. Such a solution would be right as far as it goes; but still, it is only half the solution. Notwithstanding, we may profitably use it as a stepping-stone. What, therefore, do we precisely mean, when we pronounce a thing intelligible? The imagination is apt to deceive us, by surrounding the object, so denominated, with a sort of halo of light. But, when the idea is submitted to the touchstone of pure reason, it is found to resolve itself into two elements; viz. the entity itself, and an aptitude. Now the entity itself forms no part of the conceptual addition, as is obvious; it may therefore be dismissed. The addition must be in the aforesaid aptitude; there only can be found a clue to the difficulty. What, then, is this aptitude? The word will help us. For the Intelligible evidently has relation to the Intellect. But of what kind? The Intelligible is that which has an aptitude for being conceived by the intellect. Thus, then, the foregoing analysis has conducted us to this point; first of all, that Ontological Truth adds to the entity of Being, which it conceptually includes, a respect of some kind or other to the intellect. Furthermore, that respect is understood to be that of an object conceivable, to the intellect as capable of conceiving. But is this enough? In other words, does intelligibility cover the whole ground of Ontological Truth? Perhaps it may be said to do so fundamentally and by implication; but not formally or explicitly. There is no one who carefully thinks out the matter but will be free to own, that he means something more than intelligibility, when in his mind he pronounces an entity, v.g. gold, man, to be true. This is further confirmed by the meaning attached to conceptual Truth, from which the term Truth is originally derived. For there is found, as has been seen, the idea of conformity and, in a certain sense, of adequation. It may, therefore, well be supposed that Ontological Truth will be differentiated by a similar idea. Then, again, in conceptual Truth the other term of correspondence is extrinsic to the true concept; it is natural to infer, accordingly, that, in Ontological Truth likewise, the other term of correspondence will be extrinsic. But, from what has been already established by analysis, that extrinsic term can be no other than the intellect. So, then, Ontological Truth will be the entity of Being, as capable of exciting in the intellect a concept of itself conformable to, or corresponding with, that which it really is. But, as in conceptual Truth this correspondence or conformity denoted no real predicamental relation; so neither does it in Ontological Truth. Hence it is described, in the Enunciation of the present Proposition, as a connotation. Lastly, to the Ontological Truth of a thing it is not necessary that the concept of it should be actually formed, or the intellect existing; hence, are added the words 'conformability with intellect capable of rightly conceiving it.' For fear of mistakes, however, let it be added, that, though the actuality of concept and existence of the intellect are not required to the essential idea of Ontological Truth; yet, they may be otherwise required, and as a fact exist. This will be explained in the sequel.

There are three observations which may be usefully added to the above analysis, by way of an appendix. The first is, that, by examination of the respective Propositions, there will be found to exist a perfect parallelism between conceptual and Ontological Truth, not only as to the points already enumerated in the preceding paragraph, but likewise as to the exclusion of those absolute and relative perfections, of that pure negation, and of that merely extrinsic denomination, which have formed the subjectmatter of discussion in the two preceding Theses. The next observation is, that, from the doctrine here established, it may be seen how, while anything like a real or even conceptual predicamental relation cannot be admitted either in conceptual or Ontological Truth, nevertheless, the concomitant conformity or conformability approaches much nearer to the nature of a relative, than of an absolute, perfection; so that, in a loose sort of a way, it may be, as it has sometimes been, called a relation. But, as such, it partakes more of the character of a Transcendental, than of a predicamental, relation. Lastly, it is to be observed that, according to the theory here defended, it may be clearly seen, both how Truth can be a passion or attribute of Being, and also how the perfection of Ontological Truth is proportioned to the perfection of Being. The first is due to the fact, that Transcendental Truth includes in its concept a respective perfection which is not formally included in the simple concept of Being; the second is evident, because Truth essentially includes in its concept the entity of Being also, and, proportionally to the grade of Being, will be its intelligibility and its natural capability of causing a more or less perfect idea of itself in the intellect. Just as it is said, that matter is scarcely intelligihle, because of its imperfect entity.

It now only remains to show, that the doctrine, established in these last three Propositions, is in exact accordance with the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. To begin with, then, -- St. Thomas in the two following passages explains how Ontological Truth is properly a passion, or attribute, of Being. 'The True,' he remarks, 'is a disposition of Being, not as if adding any nature' (real, absolute, or relative, perfection), 'nor as expressing any special' (i.e. contracting or determining) 'mode of Being; but as something that is to be found universally in Being, nevertheless not expressed by the word, Being.'^{1} Lest, however, it might be supposed that by the phrase 'to be found universally in Being,' he implied a real distinction, he adds in another place: 'It is not nugatory to speak of true Being; because there is something expressed by the word True, which is not expressed by the word Being; not that they really differ.'^{2} How, then, do they differ? This, too, he explains elsewhere: 'The True cannot, properly speaking, be a difference of Being; for Being has no difference. But Ontological Truth holds the position, relatively to Being, of a sort of Difference; just as Goodness also does, in that it expresses concerning Being something which is not expressed by the word Being. And, accordingly, so far the idea of Being is indeterminate as regards the idea of Truth; so that the idea of Truth is compared to the idea of Being, in some sort of a way, as a Difference' (stands affected) 'to its Genus.'^{3} Once more, he tells us what the nature of this addition is: 'Truth adds, over and above Essence, something conceptual, i.e. order' (or respect) 'to the cognition or scientific knowledge of some one.'^{4} Here let us pause for one moment, to recapitulate what S. Thomas establishes in these brief but pregnant passages. First of all, Truth is convertible with Being; and is not, by any real addition, a determination or 'special mode' of Being. Again: there is no real distinction between the two. But, thirdly, there is a conceptual distinction, sufficient to justify our considering Truth as an attribute of Being. Lastly, that addition in the idea of Truth which is not expressed in the idea of Being is, the order or habitude of Being to some intellectual cognition. It now follows to see in what, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, this order, respect, or habitude, of Being precisely consists. Here, too, he is equally plain. 'The word, Truth,' he proceeds to say, 'expresses the conformity of Being with Intelligence. Now, all cognition is completed by the assimilation of the thinker to the thing thought, so that the said assimilation is a cause of cognition; just as the sense of sight perceives colour, for the reason that it is disposed by the species' (or sensible impression) 'of colour. The primary habitude, then, of Being to intelligence is, that it should correspond with intelligence. And this correspondence is called an equation between the entity and the intellect. It is in this that the nature of Truth is formally perfected. This, then, is what Truth adds over and above Being, viz, a conformity or equation between the entity and the intellect; and upon this conformity follows the cognition of the entity.'^{5} This is sufficiently plain. St. Thomas maintains, in accordance with the doctrine enunciated in the present Proposition, that this habitude of Being to intellect is a habitude of correspondence, or conformity. But there is one point still remaining, upon which St. Thomas has not revealed his mind in the passages hitherto cited. Is this conformity a mere extrinsic denomination? Here, (it must be owned), there is, at first sight, a difficulty; for there is a passage in which the Angelic Doctor has been understood by some to answer the question in the affirmative so clearly, as to justify them in ranking him among the fautors of this opinion. An examination, however, of his words, especially as interpreted by his general teaching on this subject, will sufficiently evince the injustice of such a judgment. 'Entities,' he observes, 'receive the denomination of true from the Truth which is in the Divine Intellect and in the human intellect, as food receives the denomination of healthy from the health which is in Animal, and not as from an inherent form; but' (they receive the same denomination) 'from the truth that is in themselves, (which is nothing else save the entity itself, as rendered equal to intellect or rendering intellect equal to itself), as from an inhering form; just as food receives the denomination of healthy from a quality of its own, by virtue of which it is called healthy.'^{6} This passage is worthy of careful examination; for it will be found not only to confirm to the letter the doctrine advanced in this Article, but its consideration will throw great additional light on the whole subject. St. Thomas is treating of the question, Whether there is one only Truth by which all things are true. In its solution in the body of the Article, he premises certain distinct meanings of the word, Truth. It is properly predicated of Intellect; improperly of Being. Again, in its proper signification, it is primarily predicated of the Divine, secondarily, of the human, Intellect. Hence three meanings; -- primary proper, secondary proper, and improper. This premised, he thus solves the question. If Truth be taken in the first sense, all things are true by one, i.e. by the Divine, Truth; if in the second, there are many Truths of many true entities in different minds; if in the last, there are many Truths of many true things, but of one thing there is only one Truth. Then follows the passage which has been quoted above. It is evident that, by the proper signification, St. Thomas understands conceptual; by the improper, Transcendental, Truth. In each case there are two terms; because in each case there is a correlation. We may call these terms, respectively, for the sake of clearness, the Subject and the Term. Now, these two change places, accordingly as Truth is assumed, in its proper or in its improper, signification. In conceptual Truth, the intellect is the Subject, and Being the Term; in Ontological Truth, on the contrary, Being is the Subject, and intellect is, as it were, the Term. Let us for the moment confine our attention to the former. Conceptual Truth is in the intellect as in its Subject; and the intellect is said to be true, inasmuch as its conceptual representation is conformable to its object or Term of thought. If, then, Being is considered, in its relation to conceptual Truth, as objective Term of this latter; it is true, because it causes Truth in the intellect whose concept it measures. Regarded from this point of view, it is like food, when it is called healthy because of its aptitude for causing health in the animal body. The denomination is extrinsic; and Truth is predicated of Being according to analogy of attribution of the first class. Now, turn we to the latter signification of the word. Ontological Truth is in Being, as in its Subject. What is its nature, according to the Angelic Doctor in this passage? It bears resemblance to an inherent form. Is it, then, really an inherent form? No. Why? Because it is the entity of Being itself with a conceptual addition. But why, then, say, that it bears resemblance to an inherent form? To show that it is not a mere extrinsic denomination; but is the entity itself with an extrinsic connotation, having intellect for the term. In like manner, the form of health in food, considered as inherent in the food, is no mere extrinsic denomination; but denotes the nature of the food itself, connoting at the same time a conformity with the animal body. Thus it is made plain that, in this passage, St. Thomas admirably confirms the several Propositions enunciated in this Article. It may, however, be well to add that, when the Angelic Doctor declares here, as elsewhere in many places, that Truth is properly predicated of Intellect, improperly of Being, and when he also says that intellect has prior claim to the possession of Truth, Being only posterior, he is generally understood to be speaking of its conceptual origin and nominal derivation, rather than of itself in its absolute nature; though even in this latter sense, his assertions can be fully vindicated. One more point remains to be settled. Does St. Thomas teach that Ontological Truth essentially includes the entity of Being in its formal concept? The preceding passage can hardly be said to leave the matter doubtful. However, to set the question at rest, the following quotation shall close the present discussion. 'The Truth of things existing includes, in its formal nature, the entity of those things; and adds, over and above, a respect of adequation with the human and Divine Intellect.'^{7}

{1} 'Verum est dispositio entis, non quasi addens aliquam naturam, nec quasi exprimens aliquem specialem modum entis; sed aliquid quod generaliter invenitur in ente, quod tamen nomine entis non exprimitur.' De Verit. Q. I, a. 1, ad 4m.

{2} 'Ideo non est nugatio cum dicitur ens verum, qua aliquid exprimitur nomine veri quod non exprimitur nomine entis; non propter quod re differant.' De Verit. Q. I, a. 1 ad 1m contra.

{3} 'Verum, proprie loquendo, non potest esse differentia entis; ens enim non habet aliquam differentiam, . . . sed aliquod verum se habet ad ens per modum differentiae sicut et bonum; in quantum viz. exprimit aliquid circa ens quod nomine entis non exprimitur. Et secundum hoc intentio entis est indeterminata respectu intentionis veri. Et sic intentio veri comparatur ad intentionem entis quodammodo ut differentia ad genus.' Ibidem, Q. I, a. 10, ad 2m.

{4} 'Veritas addit supra essentiam secundum rationem, scil. ordinem ad cognitionem vel demonstrationem alicujus.' In I. d. xix, Q. 5, a. 1, c. in fi.

{5} 'Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen, verum. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam; ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis, sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur per speciem coloris, cognoscit colorem. Prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui correspondeat; quae quidem correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur. Et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit venum supra ens, scil. conformitatem sive adaequationem rei et intellectus; ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio nei.' De Verit. Q. i, a. i, c.

{6} 'Denominantur autem res verae a veritate quae est in intellectu divino vel in intellectu humano, sicut denominatur cibus sanus a sanitate quae est in animali, et non sicut a forma inherente; sed a veritate quae est in ipsa re (quae nihil est aliud quam entitas intellectui adaequata, vel intellectum sibi adaequans), sicut a forma inherente; sicut cibus denominatur sanus a qualitate sua, a qua sanus dicitur.' De Verit. Q. I, a. 4, C. in fi.

{7} 'Unde veritas rerum existentium includit in sui ratione entitatem earum, et superaddit habitudinem adaequationis ad intellectum humanum vel divinum.' De Verit. Q. I, a. 8, c. v. m.