PROPOSITION LXXXIX.

Simple Apprehensions are said to be false, either by analogy of attribution of the first class, or because they virtually include or presuppose a Judgment.

This Proposition consists of three Members, each of which shall be declared separately.

I. It is first of all stated, that simple Apprehension may be analogically denominated false according to analogy of attribution of the first class; that is, the Falsity will be inherent in the Judgment, but the simple Apprehension is called false by an extrinsic denomination, forasmuch as it is causative of a false cognition. This will be best explained by an illustration. Let us suppose a man looking out, through a dense morning mist, on a more or less distant object. The sensile representation in his internal sense is, accordingly, very imperfect and confused; so that it excites in his mind the simple Apprehension of an ox. So far forth, there is no real Falsity in the intellect; because the simple Apprehension truly represents its only defined object, which is an ox. But there is a vital connection between the simple Apprehension and the sensile perception, which are both in the same soul; in that the latter has, in fact, given occasion to the former. Hence, the mind is predisposed to attribute the simple Apprehension to the object of sensile perception, and so, to pronounce judicially that the object which I see through the mist is an ox; whereas, in reality, it is a man. Here there is real, positive Falsity, or conceptual difformity from the object. As, then, healthy is attributed to medicine, not by reason of any health intrinsic in itself, but because it is provocative of health in the animal body; so, a simple Apprehension is said to he false, not because there is any Falsity intrinsic in the act itself, but because it inclines the mind to form a false Judgment.

II. It is in the second place asserted, that simple Apprehensions are said to be false, because they virtually include a Judgment. To take an instance: We will suppose a man ill versed in Zoology, who speaks of an oyster as a Crustacean, because it is covered all over with shell; or introduces it among the Articulata, because it has a beard, a breathing organ. He neither pronounces Judgment nor expresses a Proposition, as we will assume; but simply treats this bivalve molluse in thought and speech as a Crustacean, or as one of the Articulata. But, in so doing, his thought either virtually includes the judgment that oysters are Crustacean, that they belong to the great division of the Articulata; or it presupposes the Judgment already formed. So, again, if any one should conceive of the American cudweed, that it is an immortal plant; the idea would be denounced as false, because it implicitly involves the Judgment, that a plant can be immortal.

III. Lastly, it is asserted that simple Apprehensions may be called false, forasmuch as they presuppose a Judgment. To recur to an illustration given in the earliest pages of this work, -- we will suppose that a man, owing to some temporary defect in his organ of sight, has been convinced, and formed a settled Judgment, that the grass in Hampton Court is blue. Whenever the occasion presents itself, he speaks of that peculiar blue grass in Hampton Court. There is nothing false in the simple idea itself; but it is false, by virtue of a previous Judgment. So, if a man has already formed a fixed Judgment in his own mind, that all animals are immortal; he conceives a donkey as an immortal irrational animal. If the more common opinion among philosophers be true, (about which there is no question in the present inquiry); such a definition is self-contradictory, and will not endure as a term of thought. But the definition, considered as a mere simple Apprehension, would only be false; because it presupposes the Judgment, that irrational animals are immortal.

And so much suffices for the declaration of the Proposition.

NOTE I.

Before proceeding to determine, in what sense Falsity may be attributed to sensile perception or to finite Being; it will conduce to a more complete understanding of Conceptual Falsity, if we supplement the doctrine already established by the addition of certain explanatory notes. And, first of all, it should be understood that Conceptual Truth and Falsity are said to be contraries, only in relation to the same object; according to the fullest meaning of identity, as it is understood in the laws of logical contradiction. For the same Judgment may be now true, now false, concerning the same object; if the object changes in any such way as to affect the representation of the mind. Thus, the same Judgment, The Prince of Wales is ill, is true at one time, false at another. So, again, it may be at once true and false to say that, Descartes was a great philosopher. For he was undoubtedly great as a mathematician; but it is open at least to doubt, whether he was great as a metaphysician.

NOTE II.

Conceptual Falsity, like Conceptual Truth, denotes no real absolute or relative form in the judicial act nor any conceptual relation, properly so called; but adds, over and above the entity of the concept, a connotation of the object, as difform from the representation of it in the mind.

NOTE III.

The word, intellect, may be used generically much in the same sense as mind; or it may be used specifically for the intuitive, as distinguished from the ratiocinative, faculty. Furthermore, intellect in this specific sense has its own proper object and an accidental object. Its own proper object are the essences of things; its accidental objects are sensible perceptions. These may be set aside, as having a more intimate connection with the next Proposition. The specific intellect, then, contemplating the Essences, or Natures, of things, can evolve into an act of simple intuition; or may further proceed to an intuitive Judgment. The Angelic Doctor asserts, that in either case, the intellectual act is necessarily true. These are his words: 'The quiddity of a thing is properly the object of the intellect. Wherefore, as the senses are always true in relation to their own proper sensible objects; so is the intellect, likewise, in its cognition of Essence, as Aristotle says in the third Book de Anima. But, nevertheless, accidentally it may chance to be false; that is to say, inasmuch as the intellect conjoins or separates' (by an affirmative or negative Judgment) 'falsely. This takes place in two ways; either by its attributing the definition of one thing to another, as if it should conceive, for instance, rational animal to be the definition of an ass; or, by joining together members in a definition, which do not admit of such conjunction; as, for instance, if it should conceive immortal irrational animal to be the definition of an ass. For this is false, Some irrational animals are immortal. Hence it is plain that a definition cannot be false, except as involving a false affirmation. . . . In like manner, the intellect is not in any way subject to deception as to first principles. Wherefore, it is evident that, if intellect is taken to mean that action whence it derives its name' (intus legere, which is equivalent to intuition) 'Falsity is not in the intellect.'^{1} From this passage it is gathered that, according to St. Thomas, the intuitive intellect is infallible in its simple intuition of the essences, or natures, of things. But, when that intuition is not simple, (forasmuch as it either presupposes, or virtually includes, a Judgment); there may be room for Falsity. One reason for the former is, that every simple Apprehension is true; and that such Truth is identical with the ontological Truth of the intellectual act. The other reason, and a far more pregnant one, is this; that essence is the true and proper object of the intellect. Whence it comes to pass, that not only that which is to be represented is that which is actually represented, but that what is actually represented is that which is to be represented; for the nature of the faculty in relation to its proper object supplies the determinating intention that is required for the formal conceptual Truth of the judicial act. The reason of the latter is, that, generally speaking, Falsity is always possible; when there is the presence, either express or implicit, of an intellectual Judgment. From the same passage it is further gathered, that not all intuitive Judgments admit of being false; for the intuition of first principles is infallible. St. Thomas gives the reason of this in another place, where he observes that 'the intellect is always right in the intuition of first principles, in relation to which it is not subject to deception, for the same reason that it is not subject to deception as to essence. For self-evident principles are such as are cognized immediately on the understanding of the terms; because the Predicate is included in the definition of the Subject.'^{2} The present is not the place to offer proof of the truth of these statements; they are here assumed as Lemmata from Ideology. It must not, however, be supposed that the task is at all formidable.

{1} 'Quidditas autem rei est proprie objectum intellectus. Unde, sicut sensus sensibilium propriorum semper est verus, ita et intellectus in cognoscendo quod quid est, ut dicitur in 3o de Anima. Sed tamen per accidens potest ibi falsitas accidere; in quantum, videlicet, intellectus falso componit et dividit. Quod contingit dupliciter, vel inquantum definitionem unius attribuit alteri, ut si animal rationale mortale conciperet quasi definitionem asini; vel inquantum conjungit partes definitionis ad invicem quae conjungi non possunt; ut si conciperet quasi definitionem asini animal irrationale immortale. Haec enim est falsa, aliquod animal irrationale est immortale. Et sic patet quod definitio non potest esse falsa, nisi inquantum implicat affirmationem falsam. Similiter nec in primis principiis ullo modo decipitur.' De Verit. Q. I, a. 12, c.

{2} 'Intellectus semper est rectus secundum quod intellectus est principiorum, circa quae non decipitur ex eadem causa qua non decipitur circa quod quid est. Nam principia per se nota sunt illa quae statim, intellectis terminis, cognoscuntur ex eo quod praedicatum ponitur in definitione subjecti.' 1ae xvii, 3, ad 2m.