PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.

Falsity, properly so called, is limited to the judicial act of the finite intellect.

The proof of this Thesis is implicitly included in the doctrine which forms the subject-matter of the first Article of this Book. For Falsity is the contrary of Truth and affects, therefore, the same subject. If, then, Truth really and properly belongs to the intellect; Falsity will, likewise, be really and properly found in the intellect alone. Again as Conceptual Truth formally exists only in the judicial act; so, in like manner, Conceptual Falsity exists only in the judicial act. When applied to other concepts, the use of the word is metaphorical; as it is, when predicated of entities. This argument is strengthened by the consideration that, if Conceptual Truth cannot be formally predicated of simple Apprehension, a fortiori Conceptual Falsity cannot be so predicated. The reason is, because the representation of a simple Apprehension must be conformable to the object which is to be represented; seeing that the object actually represented is necessarily that which is to be represented. Therefore, it is always conform with, and never can be difform from, its object. But a renewed examination into the nature of the judicial act, will serve to bring out into clearer evidence the Truth which is enunciated in the present Proposition. In the case of a Judgment, the intellect conceptually connects, by affirmation or negation, a certain form with the entity which is the Subject of its cognition; uniting the two by affirmation, or separating them by negation. Furthermore, in the act of judging, it also virtually pronounces, that its judicial representation is in correspondence with the object of its thoughts. Now, it may be that the form, which by affirmation is united to the Subject, is really and objectively excluded from it; or that the form, which by negation is separated from the Subject, is really and objectively united to it. In both of these Judgments, therefore, the conceptual representation would be difform from the object which the intellect intends to represent. Thus, for instance, these Judgments, All animals are self-existent -- No man is free in his actions, -- are false. Besides, the intellect pronounces that its representation is conformed to the object of its thoughts. And herein consists the formal Falsity of the Judgment. Lastly, the universal consent of mankind confirms the truth of the Proposition. For, however extravagant a simple idea might be, no one would pronounce it false; but, if that idea be resolved by reflection into the form of a Judgment, at once it is accused of Falsity. Thus, for instance, if one were to exclaim, three-legged plants; there might be many discourteous epithets, but false would not be one of them. If, however, the same person were to affirm that some plants are three-legged; nobody would be surprised at hearing the assertion condemned as false.