PROPOSITION LXXXVII.

There can be Ontological Falsity, properly so-called, neither in respect of the Divine, nor of the finite, (either speculative or practical), Intellect.

It will be of help to the declaration of this Thesis, if a few preliminary observations are here introduced touching the nature of finite Being. They are confined, for an evident reason, to finite Being; because the idea that Falsity, under whatever shape, could attach itself to Infinite Being, is patently absurd. If, therefore, there could be such a thing as Ontological Falsity; it would not be Transcendental, or convertible with Being. Finite Being implies two things, viz. Being and limit -- that which the thing is, and that which it is not. It is Being with defect of ulterior Being. Now, this defect may be either metaphysical or physical. A metaphysical defect is that which arises from the constitution of Being in a definite order of reality, implying a more distant or nearer approach to the Divine Nature, of which each created Being is an imperfect imitation. Thus, a stone, as compared with a plant, is deficient in reality; because it does not possess the vegetable life of the latter. The same holds good of a plant as compared with an animal, of an animal as compared with a man, and of a man as compared with an Angel. Such defect is necessary and essential to finite Being. But there can be also physical defects; which may be either, strictly speaking, physical, (as it is often called, natural), or moral. A strictly speaking physical defect consists in the absence of a perfection due to the nature of such Being. Examples of this sort of defect would be, a rotten apple, a pig with six legs, a man without arms and legs, or deaf, or dumb, and the like. A physical moral defect is the absence of a perfection due to the moral nature of the entity; as, a sinful thought, for instance, a sinful word or action. There might be added another kind, which is moral in its cause, and physical in effect; as is all punishment for sin, -- most especially, the final and irrevocable. Now, all these kinds of physical defect, (so called because they are absolute defects in the nature itself, and not merely relative limits), must be accidental. For a nature, in order to be defective, must be a nature; and must, consequently, be essentially constituted. If it were wanting to the essentials of its supposed nature; it would not belong to that nature, but to some other. It should be further remarked, that the intellect can formally and directly represent Being only; for Being alone is intelligible. But deficiency of Being is a negation, or not-Being, and can, therefore, become an object of thought indirectly only, i.e. in its connection with Being. In like manner, Falsity is a negation; and must, therefore, in any case, be a deficiency, or want (carentia), of something.

I. Premising thus much, let us now proceed to the proof. First of all, it must strike every one, that Ontological Falsity, assuming the phrase in its native sense, is a contradiction in terms. For how can Being be false? By the fact that it is Being, it is intelligible, and able to give a good account of itself to whatsoever intellect. Therefore, as is proved in the eighty-third Thesis, every Being, as such, is true. Nor is it in this sense that the subject requires discussion. Why, then, discuss it? Because, by the universal consent of mankind in every age, certain things have been, and are, pronounced false; and he would not deserve the name of a philosopher, who should make no count of so important a criterion of truth, which within its own proper sphere may safely be pronounced infallible. There must be a sense, therefore, in which such expressions as false gold, false diamonds, a false friend, false hair, and the like, can be understood as significative of a truth. Since, then, Falsity cannot be in finite Being, qua Being; can it be in Being, by reason of its defect of Being, in any of the ways mentioned above? St. Thomas remarks, -- 'The Truth of created things has itself nothing like Falsity in it; although every creature has something like Falsity in it, forasmuch as it is defective. But Truth is not the consequent of the creature by reason of its defectiveness, but in so far as, by conformation with the Divine Truth, it is free from defect.'^{1} It is worthy of remark, that St. Thomas does not affirm the existence of Falsity in finite Being; whenever he refers to the subject, he carefully uses the expression, 'something like Falsity.' In what way this is to be understood, will be shown presently. The question now is, whether any of these defects are really Falsity in Being? The answer, of which proof will now be given is, that,

II. No finite Being can be false by reason of any metaphysical or physical defect, to which it is obnoxious. If an entity could become, strictly speaking, false by reason of either metaphysical or physical defect; then such defect must render finite Being incapable of conformity with, i.e. essentially difform from, any whatsoever intellect that cognizes or is capable of cognizing it. But, on the contrary, finite Being, as such, i.e. as existing with defect, is actually conformed to the Divine Mind, by relation to which its Truth is primarily and absolutely constituted; and is either actually conformed, or is at least conformable, to finite intelligence. Therefore, it cannot become false by reason of any such defect. The two members of the Minor shall be proved separately.

i. Finite Being, as existing with defect, is actually conformed to the Divine Mind. Take we, first of all, the metaphysical defect in finite Being, i.e. Being as existing with defect of ulterior reality, or of higher forms of entity. It is plain that it is conformed to the Divine Practical Intellect; for the Will of God created that Being in such a constituted order, -- in that exact degree of the imitability of the Divine Nature; and, by so ordaining, appointed those limits of the particular entity, which are its metaphysical defect. When, for instance, He established the vegetative order, He not only had the positive pattern Idea of the entity of each plant, grass, tree, and the rest; but that Idea indirectly excluded all notes of animal or rational life. It not only represented Being but, indirectly, defect of Being; by virtue of those prescribed limits which defined the essence of the creature. A fortiori is the same object actually conformed to the Divine Speculative Intellect, which perfectly represents each creature in minutest detail. Very much the same may be said of finite Being, as physically defective. For, though these defects are mainly, if not entirely, due to the operation of secondary causes; yet, since these causes would be impotent by themselves and, consequently, require the co-operation of the First Cause, and since every smallest physical phenomenon and physical change are directed by the Divine Providence, and are subject to the laws imposed on nature by His Supreme Will; He had -- and must have had -- the Exemplar Idea of that individual entity, and that Idea must have represented those physical defects which are peculiar to such entity. Thus, the Exemplar Idea of a man born without arms or legs, represented him as composed of a body in which those members were wanting. Not that God so created him immediately; but He foresaw the effect arising from the operation of natural laws and the defective action of secondary causes, (with which He has bound Himself, as an ordinary rule, to co-operate); and foreseeing, conceived the entity according to its individual constitution. Here we come across traces of something that bears a distant resemblance to Falsity; inasmuch as a Being, thus naturally defective, is difform from what it may be permitted to call the generic or typal Idea in the Divine Mind. But real Falsity there is not; neither can there be. For, in the given instance, that individual man was not created after the pattern of the so-called generic Idea, but after that individual Prototype to which he is exactly conformed. Far less can finite Being, affected with physical defect, he ever difform from the speculative Divine Intellect, Which perfectly represents to Itself every creature, exactly as it is constituted in its individual notes. Lastly, finite Being, existing with moral defect, is actually conformed to the Divine Intelligence. Here there can be no question as to the practical Intellect of God; for it were horrible sacrilege to suppose that, in any possible sense, He could be the Author of sin, though, as will be seen in Natural Theology, He co-operates towards the production of the entity of the act. But His speculative Intellect conceives that Being with his moral deficiency. He knows him not only to be a man, but to be a sinful man, guilty of such and such sins in definite number and gravity. Therefore, in sum, there is no finite Being whatsoever, which is not actually conformed to the Divine Intelligence.

ii. Finite Being, as existing with defect, is either actually conformed or, at least, conformable to the human intellect. And, first of all, as to finite Being, considered as metaphysically deficient: -- It is plain enough, that all men who truly conceive this or that finite Being, conceive it with its essential limits. If they did not do so, definition, and consequently all science, would be impossible. For these necessarily presuppose difference of nature, that one thing is essentially not another thing; and this involves limitation. As a fact, when a man has formed a more or less clear notion of a stone, he not only understands that a stone is a material substance composed of such or such chemical elements; but he also knows that it has not the organization, assimilating power, self-evolution, of either vegetable or animal life. This argument may be confirmed a priori. For the conformability of Being with intellect is commensurate with its intelligibility. Now, that intelligibility is either infinite or finite. If it is infinite; then the Being is infinite, as infinitely intelligible. If it be finite, the conformity must be finite; otherwise, it would cease to be conformity. But, if the conformed concept of the intellect represents its object as finite, it ipso facto represents that object with metaphysical defect. In two ways, then, the conformability of finite Being, (considered as metaphysically deficient), with whatsoever human intellect, is already virtually proved from the foregoing arguments. For the second applies to conformability, at least equally with actual conformation. From the former the same conclusion is of easy deduction. For, if the object has so represented itself to the human mind that has contemplated it; it is a most unerring sign that it is capable of exciting the same adequate similitude of itself in every other human mind with which it might be confronted. Thus much for finite Being that is metaphysically deficient. Now, as touching entity physically or morally deficient. The two are grouped together, for the same argument applies to both; and in neither case can there be any question of human practical intelligence, that is, when the moral defect is in the object of cognition. Indeed, the same may be said of metaphysical defects. A like argument to that which has already served in the former instance, will apply here. The testimony of facts is a sufficient proof. For men have conceived throughout all time, and still conceive, or form an idea of v.g. a rotten apple, idiots, monsters; as again of thieves, liars, traitors, seditious. But these cognitions (for the Idea can become a Judgment) are representative -- those of Beings with a physical, these of Beings with a moral, defect. Therefore, such an object is not incapable of representation. Moreover, the mind is conscious, and pronounces, that its Judgment is true. Therefore, such object is actually conformed, and a fortiori conformable, to the human intellect; always supposing, of course, that it is in a normal condition. So much for the human speculative intellect. The practical intellect of man embraces two kinds of entities, -- to wit, his own moral acts, and productions of art. The question, as touching these latter, has been fully discussed under the second difficulty to the eighty-third Proposition. It remains, therefore, to see whether moral action can be really false; that is, difform from the practical intellect of him who elicits the act. And it would seem at first sight as though it could. For most men (i.e. all adults who are in their right mind) are capable of sinning. Now, it is necessary, in order to be capable of sinning, that the man should know the principles of justice and prudence against which he is offending, and should have, at least, an habitual or virtual knowledge of the difformity from those principles of the act which he contemplates doing. Therefore, his sinful act is difform from the directive Judgment of his mind. But then, in answer, it must be observed that, in the case of a sinful action, the will is not guided by these principles of right, but by an erroneous practical dictate of the reason, which really assumes the place of the prototypal idea. And to this erroneous dictate the action is conformed. Wherefore, the action is malicious; not false. It is true that, as in the productions of art, a work may be called false, because it is difform from the ideal of art; so, an inordinate moral act may receive the same appellation, forasmuch as it is difform from the ideal of right and law. But, in both cases, the term is applied, at the most, according to the analogy of proportion. In much the same way, an entity with a natural defect may be called false; because it does not correspond with the perfect type of its special nature. But, in all these cases, the expression is analogical; and does not convey the idea of real Falsity.

Such is the meaning of St. Thomas in the passage quoted above, where he declares that 'the creature has something like Falsity in it; so far as it is defective. But, that he agrees with the doctrine inculcated in this Thesis, will appear from the following unequivocal statement. 'There is truth,' he remarks, 'in all entities, because they are that which they are in the Supreme Truth Absolutely speaking, every entity is true, and no entity is false; but, in a certain sort of a way, some entities are called false, in relation to human thought.' These last words afford a clue to the meaning of those common expressions, which have in great measure given occasion to the present controversy. But of these more presently.

{1} 'Ipsa veritas creata non habet aliquid simile falso, quamvis creatura quaelibet aliquid simile falso habeat. Intantum enim simile aliquid falso creatura habet, inquantum deficiens est. Sed veritas non ex ea parte consequitur creaturam qua deficiens est, sed secundum quod a defectu recedit primae veritati conformata.' De Verit. Q. I, a. 4, ad 7m.