PROPOSITION XCI.

Finite entities are said to be false, according to analogy of attribution of the first class.

It has been made sufficiently clear, in the eighty-seventh Proposition, that there can be no such thing as real ontological Falsity, -- or, in other words, Falsity in Being. Yet there remains the fact, (which has not, as yet, been sufficiently cleared up), that men do commonly call things false; and it is impossible that such a mode of expression should have heen of universal occurrence, unless there were some real foundation for it. It is the object of the present Thesis to determine that foundation.

Now, it cannot be doubted, for reasons already given in the ahove-named Proposition, that no finite entity can be called false, owing to any difformity from the Divine, (whether practical or speculative), Intelligence. It has been also proved, that no entity has in itself an aptitudinal difformity from the human intellect; that is to say, there is no real entity whatsoever which has not a natural aptitude for exciting in our minds a cognition conformable with itself. The only remaining question, therefore, is, whether there are any entities actually difform from a general human cognition of them; and whether that difformity is in some sort traceable to themselves. In answer, it must be admitted that there are entities thus actually difform from the common judgment of men; and that the difformity is in some measure attributable to the entities themselves. This is the real foundation for the expressions to which allusion has been made. But how can this be? We will begin by giving the reason for it, in the words of the Angelic Doctor. 'In relation to the human intellect,' he observes, 'there is sometimes found to be an inequality between the entity and the intellect, which is in some measure caused by the entity itself. For an entity causes a knowledge of itself in the mind by means of its external phenomena; since human cognition originates from the senses. Hence Aristotle says, in his first hook De Anima, that accidents mainly contribute to our cognition of essence. Wherefore, when there appear in an entity sensile qualities that indicate a nature to which they do not really belong; that entity is said to be false. Accordingly, the Philosopher says, in his sixth book of the Metaphysics, that those entities are called false, which have a natural aptitude to appear either of a kind other than they are or of a nature different from their own as, for instance, false' (or sham) 'gold, in which there appear externally the colour and other congruous accidents of gold, while internally the nature of gold is not there.'^{1} In a parallel passage he puts it yet more clearly. 'Because,' he says, 'it is in our nature to judge of entities by their external phenomena, (since our cognition takes its beginning from the senses, which primarily and absolutely have for object external accidents); hence it arises that those entities which, in their sensile accidents, have a similarity to other entities, are called false in respect of these other entities. . . Accordingly, the Pseudo-Augustine says, in the Second Book of his Soliloquies, that 'we call things false, which we apprehend as verisimilitudes.'^{2} In these passages we have an exhaustive explanation of the reason, why some entities have a natural tendency to tempt the human mind into a false Judgment. In the actual order, and for such time as the soul is the substantial form of an actuated body, (in other words, for so long as the two are actually united), all cognition of nature or essence begins with, and to a great extent depends on, sensile perception. But sensile perception directly and formally represents only the sensile accidents. Hence, if it should so happen, (as it often does), that there is a close similarity, amounting at times to a virtual identity, between the accidents of two different substances; the intellect is naturally prone to mistake one substance for the other and, accordingly, to form a false Judgment. Instances of this kind are very common. Thus, for example, there are kinds of topaz, which are sensibly undistinguishable from quartz. The only discoverable difference is in the striation; which would not be likely to discover itself, save to the practised eye of a mineralogist. So, again, take an ordinary cotton-thread; and compare it with pyroxyline or gun-cotton. As they present themselves to the senses of sight and touch, they seem identical; and yet, there has been, in the case of pyroxyline, a chemical transformation which has probably made the cotton into a new substance. Take, once more, the instance of the mormolyce, or leaf-insect. Its outward accidents are so exactly like those of a leaf, that, unless it sensibly moves, it would all but inevitably be mistaken for a leaf. It is on this principle, that false eggs, (or what are called nest-eggs), are placed in the roosting-places of hens and ducks, in order to encourage them to lay; and that scarecrows are placed over fields newly sown.

It must not, however, be supposed, by reason of this actual difformity from a more or less general cognition of men's minds, that there is anything like real Falsity in the entities themselves. For, first of all, the primary and essential relation of Being is to the Divine Intellect, by which its truth is determined; and there neither is, nor can be, any difformity of finite Being from the Divine Intellect. Then, again, the actual difformity of certain finite Beings from the idea of many men, is not invincible; for it can be reformed by a closer and more scientific examination of the object. Oftentimes it is removed, by a simple comparison of the apparent with the true; otherwise, the former could never get the name of false. Lastly, it is not the essence of the thing that causes a false Judgment in the mind, but it is external phenomena only; and these are not of a nature to compel a false Judgment. So that the error arises in great measure from the defects of the human intellect; one, (which is natural to it), that it gains its knowledge of material entities from their external or sensile accidents; the other, (which is voluntary), that it is often overhasty in jumping to conclusions. Hence, St. Thomas wisely remarks that 'An entity is not in such wise the cause of Falsity in the mind, as to cause Falsity necessarily. For Truth and Falsity primarily exist in the Judgment of the mind. But the mind, so far as its Judgment about entities goes, is not passively acted on by entities; but rather acts of itself after a certain manner. Hence, an entity is not said to be false, because it always causes a false apprehension of itself; but because it has a natural aptitude to do so, by virtue of its sensible phenomena.'^{3}

From all that has been said, then, it is manifest, that Falsity is only analogously predicated of finite Being, and that the analogy is that of attribution of the first class. For the form (if so it may be called) of Falsity is only intrinsic in the human mind, which is the principal analogate; while it is attributed to the entity by extrinsic denomination, for the reason that it is to a certain extent the cause of Falsity in the principal analogate.

{1} 'Per comparationem ad intellectum humanum invenitur interdum inaequalitas rei ad intellectum quae quodammodo ex ipsa re causatur. Res enim notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa exterius apparent; quia cognitio nostra initium a sensu sumit, cujus per se objectum sunt sensibiles qualitates. Unde et in Io de Anima dicitur, quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est. Et ideo, quando in aliqua re apparent sensibiles qualitates demonstrantes naturam quae eis non subest, dicitur res esse falsa. Unde Philosophus dicit 6o Metaph. (5, com. 34, et lib 4, com. 37) quod illa dicuntur falsa quae nata sunt videri aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt; ut aurum falsum, in quo exterius apparet color auri et alia hujusmodi accidentia, cum tamen interius natura auri non subsit.' De Verit. Q. I, a. 10, c.

{2} 'Quia innatum est nobis, per ea quae exterius apparent, de rebus judicare, eo quod nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui primo et per se est exteriorum accidentium; ideo ea quae in exterioribus accidentibus habent similitudinem aliarum rerum, dicuntur esse falsa secundum illas res . . . et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus (in lib. 2 Soliloq. cap. 6 in fin) quod eas res esse falsas nominamus, quae verisimilia apprehendimus.' 1ae xvii, I, c. in fi.

{1} 'Nec tamen res est hoc modo causa falsitatis in anima, quod necessario falsitatem causet; quia veritas et falsitas praecipue in judicio animae existunt. Anima vero, inquantum de rebus judicat, non patitur a rebus, sed magis quodammodo agit. Unde res non dicitur falsa, quia semper de se falsam facit apprehensionem, sed quia nata est facere per ea quae de ipsa apparent.' De Verit. Q. I, a 10, C, v. fi.