PROPOSITION XCII.

There is an essential difference between the nature of Conceptual Truth and that of Conceptual Falsity, viz, that, in the former, the conformity of the cognition with its object is itself cognized by the intellect; whereas, in the latter, the difformity of the judicial representation from the object, is in nowise apprehended.

It has been already proved, that, in a Judgment of the mind which is formally true, there is always a virtual recognition of the conformity of the cognition with the object. It remains to explain why it is, (for the fact itself is beyond all doubt), that, in a false Judgment, the mind is ignorant of the difformity existing between its concept and the object conceived. A little consideration, however, will serve to make the matter clear. Formal Conceptual Truth differs from material, (which is shared by simple Apprehension), in this one point precisely; that, in the former, the intellect pronounces on the Truth of its own Concept, whereas in the latter it does not. Therefore, the form of Conceptual Truth, (that by which it is, as it were, essentially constituted), is to be found in the second implicit Judgment, which pronounces on the conformity of the intellectual Judgment with the object intentionally represented. But, where the form of Truth is to be found; there must we look for the quasi-form of its contrary, Falsity. Hence, Falsity would formally consist in the Judgment of the mind, that its concept is conformed with the object; whereas it is really difform from that object. Therefore, the mind cannot know the difformity. Otherwise, it would pronounce within itself as much; and the Judgment would, in consequence, be formally true.