PROPOSITION XCVI.

Transcendental Goodness does not exclusively consist in the real Perfection of Being.

It is the opinion of some, that Goodness is nothing more or less than the Perfection by which every Being exists in its own adequate entity. Hence, if it be simply and absolutely Being as substance is, it is in itself perfect and good absolutely; if it be Being of Being as Accident is, it is good and perfect in itself, proportionally to its diminished nature, by its own entity, and by that same entity it is good, relatively to that whose being it informs or perfects. Thus, the part of a composite is good in itself, by the same proper entity by which it is likewise good to the whole composite. Wherefore, the Goodness is the same. This hypothesis is rendered probable by the fact, that every other possible hypothesis would seem to have been eliminated in the preceding Thesis. Besides, it is supported by the authority of St. Thomas, who is continually identifying the Perfect with the Good.

In order to a due understanding of this interesting question, it is necessary to determine the exact nature of Perfection. Now, the Perfect bears two meanings. It may in the first place mean an entity so fully constituted, as to render it impossible to find a single one of its elements outside itself; or, in other words, an entity that is wanting in nothing. This is the first meaning which the Philosopher attaches to the word.^{1} But, in this sense, it is neither identified with Being nor with the Good; as is plain. For, a boy is a man and, as such, a Being, and ontologically good; yet he is not a perfect man. So, a tree in winter has its vegetative life, and is, consequently, an entity and good, but it is not perfeet; for there are many parts wanting to it, which the summer will disclose. But the Perfect, in another sense, stands for whatsoever Being that possesses everything which is necessary to its essential nature. Thus, a man is said to have a perfect body, when the latter has all the limbs and members which go to make up its normal structure; even though the limbs arc not well proportioned, and the features anything but pleasing. And, so understood, the Perfect is fundamentally identical with the Good. For the Perfection of a thing, according to this meaning of the word, is nothing more or less than the entity of a thing; and that entity enters essentially into the concept of its Goodness. And, in reality, very much the same may be said of the Perfect, taken in its first sense. For it simply represents Being, as possessed of the full entity requisite for the complement of its nature. It follows from these premisses, that there is an element of truth in the opinion which forms the subject of the present Thesis. Perfection does undoubtedly enter as an essential element into the concept of Goodness; nay more, there is nothing else real and objective, really distinct from Being or the Perfect, which is included in this concept. Nevertheless, it is contended, that Perfection does not adequately represent the idea of Goodness; so that Goodness does not exclusively consist in the real Perfection of Being.

THE PROPOSITION, THEN, IS PROVED by two arguments. For, if Goodness were identical with Perfection in such sense, that nothing were included in the concept of Goodness which is not included in the concept of Perfection; it would follow, that Goodness could not be an attribute of Being. The reason is, that Perfection, in the sense just explained, is synonymous with Being; consequently, Goodness would be synonymous with Being. But, if synonymous, how could it be even conceptually distinguished from Being as its attribute? Again it has been already shown that the same thing, remaining precisely the same in both cases, can be good for one, and not good, but bad, for another. But, if in the concept of Goodness nothing were included save the entity or Perfection of Being, this would be impossible. For, as a thing is its own Being or entity; so, it would be its own Goodness, which would be no more amissible than its essential entity.

{1} Teleion legetai en men ou mê estin exô ti labein, mêde en murion, . . . kai to kat aretên kai to tou eu mê echon huperbolên pros to genos, . . hotan kata to eidos tês oikeias aretês mêthen elleipôsin. Metaph. iv (al. v), c. 16. The Philosopher gives other significations subsequently in the same Chapter.