PROPOSITION XCVII.
In the formal idea of Transcendental Goodness is included, besides the Perfection of Being, its consonance with other Being; that is, the Good adds to Being a connotation of some other entity which has a natural inclination and capacity for, or actual conjunction with it.
PROLEGOMENON.
Before undertaking the proof of this Proposition, a fitting occasion presents itself for explaining a not unimportant point, included in the Scholastic doctrine touching the two respective Transcendentals, which will greatly assist the reader in understanding the Enunciation of the present Thesis. By respective Transcendentals are intended Truth and Goodness, which essentially include in their concept a connotation of something outside themselves, in contradistinction to Unity which is absolute; as has been sufficiently declared in the first Chapter. It is to be observed, then, with regard to these two Transcendentals, that the term, (as it were), which they primarily connote, is the human soul; because of the universality of its tendencies, as contrasted with all other finite beings. For the Infinite Being is the Measure, rather than the Term, of both. The human mind is capable of Truth under whatsoever form, and the human will has a natural appetite for the Good of whatsoever kind. Now, as regards Truth, the connoted term must necessarily be an intellectual Being. Hence, all entities that are not intellectual are necessarily excluded from its connotation, respect, or relation. But it is not the same with Goodness; for all things seek after the Good, as the Philosopher remarks. The highest and noblest kind of appetition is, of course, that of will; because it is free and directed by intellectual cognition. But, according to their capacity, there is in animals likewise an appetite, or natural inclination, for that which is a Good to them. Obviously, they have a sensile inclination for sensile goods Beyond this, however, there is a natural tendency towards their own Perfection, and towards the end for which they were created; not thought out or willed, but fostered by an order imposed upon them from without. This is shared by every created thing in every order of Being; and may be a natural inclination, as it is in animal and, after a manner, in vegetable life, In the inferior ranks of existence it may, perhaps, be more clearly expressed as a natural capacity. Furthermore, there are certain capacities for Good, which are never mere capacities; because the Perfectible and Perfective are always in actual conjunction. Thus, the substantial Form of purely material substances is, evidently enough, a Good to, because it perfects, the Matter; yet Matter cannot exist without a Form, and such a Form cannot exist save in Matter. This is the reason why, in the Enunciation of the Proposition, the connoted entity is declared to have either a natural inclination and capacity for, or actual conjunction with, it; though, strictly speaking, natural inclination in its generic signification would serve for all three, provided that We eliminate the idea of mere tendency, as exclusive of consecution. There is a division of the Good, to which allusion has been already made, that will further illustrate the point in hand. There is that which is good in itself; and there is that which is good for another. The former does not, at first sight, seem to include that extrinsic respect which is said to form an essential element in the concept of Goodness. Hence, Suarez simply identifies it with perfection or Being; and would, consequently, exclude it from the category of Transcendental Goodness. Yet, he elsewhere implies the distinction which will now be made, by way of answer to the difficulty. A difficulty confessedly there is; for one does not see why a thing should with reason be called Good, yet, why its Goodness should be distinct from Transcendental Goodness, that is, should be no Goodness at all. If the term means nothing else than Being or the Perfection of Being; why call it Goodness? Now, the essential entity or integral complement of any finite Being may be regarded in either of two ways. It may either be considered as identical with the Being, as it really and objectively is; and then, the concept exclusively expresses the Perfection of Being. Or it may be considered as a participation, as something bestowed upon the Being, -- a concept founded on its contingency and dependence upon an efficient cause. Then, the essence or integral complement assumes the form of a perfection by which such Being is perfected, and the connotation of a virtual other is included; consequently, it may in strict phrase be denominated Good. It is in this sense that existence is good for things existing; and a man is said to have a good memory or a good head. In such cases, the Perfective and the Perfectible are, as is plain, only conceptually distinguished from each other.
I. THE FIRST MEMBER of the Proposition declares, that in the essential idea of Goodness is included a consonance of the Good with other Being, that is, a connotation of some other entity which has a natural inclination, capacity for, or actual conjunction with it. The truth of the assertion follows, as a simple Corollary, from the two preceding Theses. For, if Goodness consists neither in a real absolute Perfection distinct from Being, nor in a real or even conceptual predicamental relation, and yet does not exclusively consist in the real Perfection of Being; there is nothing else conceivable, save the said connotation. Again, if it he true that Goodness, like Truth, is essentially respective, not absolute, and that, nevertheless, it is neither a real nor a conceptual relation properly so called, it must be connotative; for there is nothing else left. But Truth is connotative of Intellect; therefore, Goodness, of Desire. The Angelic Doctor explains his mind upon this point very clearly; and it is the more necessary to put his own declaration before the reader, because his opinion has been misunderstood. 'A word,' he remarks, 'may express a respect in two ways. One way is, when the word is instituted to express the respect itself; as, for instance, father, or son, or paternity' (in the abstract). 'On the other hand, some words are said to convey the idea of a respect, because they express a certain kind of entity which is accompanied by a respect; although the word has not been instituted to express the respect itself. Thus, the word, science, has been instituted to express a certain quality which is followed by respect, hut not to express the respect itself.' Here, for some perhaps, there is need of a little explanation. Science, in its subjective sense, or scientific knowledge, is a spiritual quality informing the intellect; because it is an intellectual habit. This is what the word Science formally represents. But it gives birth to a relation; because knowledge connotes the knowable. St. Thomas proceeds: 'It is after this way, that the idea of Goodness implies a respect. Not that the word, Goodness, expresses the respect itself only; but that it expresses. that of which the respect is a consequent, together with the respect itself. Now, the respect which is expressed by the word Goodness, is a respect of perfectiveness .'{1}
There are three things observable in this passage. First of all, the Angelic Doctor carefully avoids the term, relation; though all his examples, save Goodness itself, are real relations. He, moreover, explicitly denies that Goodness is a predicamental relation, by excluding it from the first category; and, by not entirely including it even in his second, he implies that it is not a Transcendental relation in the strict sense. Secondly, he affirms that the concept of Goodness essentially includes two elements; viz, something absolute, and a respect which is consequent upon the former. That Absolute, as will be seen in the second Member, is perfect entity or Being; and the respect is a connotation. Therefore, in his judgment, Goodness, on the one hand, is not an absolute perfection really distinct from Being; and, on the other hand, does not exclusively consist in the real perfection of Being, because it includes a connotation. Lastly, he tells us that this connotation, or respect, is the perfectiveness of Being for, obviously, that which is perfective must be perfective of something. But it should be noticed, that this respect comes out of itself, so to say, and is formally rooted in the perfectness of the Good. It does not come to it, in any form, from without. It is its own nature looking out, as it were, for a term; not the term looking out for it. This last observation will prove of some service in determining the question which forms the subject of the next Proposition.
There is one other argument confirmatory of this first Member. The doctrine here maintained satisfactorily accounts for the fact, that the same entity, remaining identically the same, is at once good for one and bad for another. For, though every Being is good; nevertheless, it is not good for every Being. Every Being is perfective of something, but not of everything. Hence, its perfectivity postulates that precisely which is perfectible by it; in which consists the connotation. Of one entity it is perfective and, therefore, good; of another entity it is not perfective and, therefore, evil. But, then, this latter does not enter into the connotation.
II. THE SECOND MEMBER of the Proposition asserts, that the formal idea of Goodness includes the Perfection of Being. The Perfection of Being, then, or the entity itself, is the absolute something which the Angelic Doctor represents as expressed by the word Goodness. It is plain that such is the mind of St. Thomas, from the fact that he has in his writings identified the Good with the Perfect so often, as to have given occasion to the misconception, that he held Goodness to consist exclusively in the Perfection of Being. However, in order to remove all doubt, he shall speak for himself. 'Goodness and Being,' he says, 'are really the same, but differ conceptually; as will appear from the following. For the nature of Goodness' (practically and posteriori) 'consists in this, that an entity is desirable. Wherefore, the Philosopher says, that the Good is that which all things desire. Now, it is plain that a thing is desirable according to its perfection; for all things desire their own perfection. But a thing is perfect, in proportion as it is actual. Hence it is plain, that a thing is good forasmuch as it is Being.'{2} Again, he thus puts the same idea under a somewhat different form: 'That, by virtue of which everything is said to be good, is its own excellence. For a thing's own proper excellence it is, that causes it to have goodness, and makes its operation to be good. But excellence is a certain perfection. For we then call a thing perfect, when it attains its proper excellence. Therefore, a thing is good because it is perfect, which is the reason why everything desires its own perfection as its proper good.'{3} From these two passages it is just to conclude that, according to the Angelic Doctor, (excluding for the present the question of desirableness), an entity is good, forasmuch as it is excellent; that it is excellent, forasmuch as it is perfect; that it is perfect, forasmuch as it is actual; and that it is actual, forasmuch as it is Being. Hence, in another place, he remarks that 'it is of the nature of the Good that it does not differ really from Being; and therefore, wherever we find the Good and Being, they are the same really.'{4} It follows, therefore, that, according to St. Thomas, all the reality in the concept of Goodness is Being, or essential Perfection.
The intrinsic reasons have been already mentioned in the first Chapter, where it was shown that Being essentially enters into the formal concept of all the three Transcendentals; since, if they do not include Being, they include nothing, and nothing can hardly be an Attribute of Being. But there are, besides, certain arguments derived from the peculiar nature of Goodness. One is borrowed from the common judgment of mankind, as confirmed by the universal teaching of philosophers. For all seem to be agreed, that the Good and the Perfect, if not altogether identical, are yet so closely allied that the latter is always included in the former. But everything is perfect, either by its own essential Being, or by its full complement of Being. Then, again, the Good is divided into that which is good in itself and that which is good for another. Now, as to that which is good in itself, there can be no doubt but that it must include the entity of the thing which is denominated good; and it, therefore, remains to show that the same must be the case in that which is good for another. What, then, is the nature of that which is good for another? It is that which is perfective of another in such wise, that the supposed other has, or may have, a natural desire or inclination for it. But, how can nothingness be perfective; or how can an entity have a natural inclination towards nothingness?
DIFFICULTIES.
I. St. Thomas, in the following passage, makes a distinction between Being and Goodness, which seems to be subversive of the doctrine here maintained. These are his words: 'Since Being expresses the true actuality of Being, and act refers exclusively to potentiality; a thing is simply and absolutely denominated Being, according to its primary distinction from the purely potential. Now, this is the substantial existence of the thing. Hence, by its substantial existence a thing is denominated Being absolutely; but, by superadded actuation, it is said to be Being after a manner. As, for instance, to be white, signifies Being after a manner. For the being white does not remove simple or absolute potentiality; since it accrues to an entity already actually existing. But Goodness expresses perfectness, which is the object of desire; and, consequently, expresses ultimate completeness. Hence, that which is completely perfect, is said to be good simply and absolutely; but that which has not the ultimate perfection due to it, although it may have a sort of perfection by reason of its being actual, is, nevertheless, not called perfect absolutely, but after a certain manner. So then, a thing, in regard of its first substantial act, is said to be Being absolutely and good after a manner, i.e. forasmuch as it is Being; as regards its ultimate act, on the contrary, it is said to be Being after a manner, and absolutely good.'{5} Thus, then, according to St. Thomas, Being and Goodness so far differ from each other, that they are, relatively to the same entity, in exactly inverse ratio. How is it possible, therefore, that they should be really identical, and that Being should be essentially included in the idea of Goodness?
ANSWER. i. Unless it is to be supposed that the Angelic Doctor was guilty of a serious self-contradiction in one and the same Article, there must be a way of explaining this passage in accordance with the doctrine here established. For not only does he professedly undertake to show, in the body of the Article, that Being and the Good are really identical; but, at the commencement of the very answer from which the above quotation has been made, he observes that 'the Good and Being are really the same, and only differ conceptually.'
ii. It is to be remarked, that the passage in question forms part of the solution of a difficulty. The Angelic Doctor was anxious to save Boetius, who had said in his Book on the Weeks, 'I perceive in entities, that their Goodness is one thing; their Being, another.'
iii. St. Thomas declares that this difference is discoverable, not in any want of real identity, but in the conceptual distinction between the two. But, as has been shown, he places that conceptual distinction in a certain connotation, included in Goodness, and not included in the concept of Being.
iv. The preceding remark affords a clue to the true interpretation of the passage. In the idea of Being is formally and principally contained the idea of existence, which is the primal actuation of an entity. Every subsequent actuation by informing accidents is not simply Being, which already is, prior, at least in order of nature, to the supervening information; it can only, therefore, be such Being, that is, not simply Being, but Being under such and such determinations. Yet, on the other hand, if Goodness is formally considered as perfective of something other than itself, though it is true that, in its first substantial act of being or existing, it is good in a way, good to itself, good for others, because so far perfect; yet it is not wholly perfect, not wholly or simply good and perfective, till it has reached its last act of development. An animal does not feel a drawing towards food principally, because of the mere existence of that food; but because of the nutritive qualities, the flavour, and so forth, which belong to it in its state of perfection.
v. Nevertheless, on close examination, it appears that really the ratio between the two is preserved. For, if those ulterior acts of an entity are considered separately and in themselves, they are simply and absolutely Being. It is only when considered as adjuncts of Being already constituted, that they may be said to be Being after a manner. Further, if regarded in the same light, they are so many distinct goods and so many distinct perfects; it is only in their synthesis, that they constitute the more good, the more perfect and, consequently, the more perfective, the more desirable. But, in like manner, the synthesis of beings makes more Being; nevertheless, it does not constitute Being simply and absolutely, (which is one indivisible act), but Being after such a sort, determined in such a way.
vi. If this interpretation of the doctrine conveyed by St. Thomas in the above passage be the correct one, the charge which Suarez brings against the Angelic Doctor would seem to be unfounded, where he remarks that 'there seems to be an equivocation in these phrases, after a manner, and simply. For, when they are predicated of Being, they seem to be predicated of substance and accidents, compared separately; but, when they are predicated of the Good, they are predicated of the created substance, now taken apart by itself, now as informed by dispositions and powers connatural with it.'{6}
II. It cannot be denied, that there are certain privations and negations which men commonly pronounce good. Thus, for instance, people say that it is good for a warm bath not to be above 94 degrees Fahrenheit. So again, it is good not to do evil. Again, there are some cynics who maintain, that man's highest natural good consists in the entire absence of pain. Finally, it has been said on the highest authority, that it would have been good for a certain man, if he had never been born. But such kinds of Good do not include Being or Perfection; on the contrary, they exclude it. Hence it follows, that the concept of Goodness does not formally and essentially include Being or the perfection of entity.
ANSWER. The mere absence or privation of an evil can never be a good, really and properly speaking; but absence or privation of an evil may be a good in three ways. First, because the absence of an evil may include the position of a good. Thus, the absence of the overgreat heat in the bath includes, or supposes, that moderate heat which is a positive good. It is thus that negatives are often the most emphatic expression of a positive Perfection. Secondly, because the absence of evil presupposes a real entity which has caused, so to say, this absence of evil. Thus, it is good for a man not to commit evil. But why? Because it presupposes, in that man, a positive will not to commit evil; and that act of the will is a real entity and, consequently, is really good. Thirdly, a mere absence or privation may be called good, by a sort of analogy, or simply by way of metaphor; as in the instance of the words applied to Judas. But, in such cases, the privation is conceived under the form of a certain entity, and, so conceived, is conceived as a Good.
{1} 'Aliquod nomen potest respectum importare dupliciter. Uno modo sic, quod nomen imponatur ad significandum ipsum respectum, sicut hoc nomen, pater, vel filius, aut paternitas ipsa. Quaedam vero nomina dicuntur importare respectum, quia significant rem alicujus generis quam comitatur respectus, quamvis nomen non sit impositum ad ipsum respectum significandum. Sicut hoc nomen, scientia, est impositum ad significandum qualitatem quandam quam sequitur quidam respectus, non autem ad significandum respectum ipsum. Et per hunc modum ratio boni respectum implicat; non quia ipsum nomen boni significet ipsum respectum solum, sed quia significat id ad quod sequitur respectus cum respectu ipso. Respectus autem qui importatur nomine boni, est habitudo perfectivi.' De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 6, c.
{2} 'Bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum rationem tantum; quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit quod aliquid sit appetibile. Unde Philosophus (in 1 Ethic., in principio) dicit quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque est appetibile, secundum quod est perfectum. Nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. In tantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, in quantum est in actu. Unde manifestum est quod in tantum est aliquid bonum, in quantum est ens.' 1ae v, 1, c.
{3} 'Id quo unumquodque bonum dicitur, est propria virtus ejus. Propria namque virtus uniuscujusque est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus ejus bonum reddit. Virtus autem est perfectio quaedam. Tunc enim unumquodque perfectum dicimus, quando attingit propriam virtutem, ut patet in septimo Physicorum. Ex hoc igitur unumquodque bonum est; quod perfectum est. Et inde est quod unumquodque suam perfectionem appetit sicut proprium bonum.' c. Gentes, L. I, 0. 57.
{4} 'De ratione boni est quod non differat secundum rem ab ente; et ideo ubicunque invenitur bonum et ens, sunt idem secundum rem.' De Verit. Q. xxi, a. I, ad 5m.
{5} 'Licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem; quia tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum simpliciter. Nam, cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpiciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscujusque. Unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter; per actus autem superadditos dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid; sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid. Non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei jam praeexistenti in actu. Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile; et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam perfectionem quam debet hahere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem inquantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sic ergo secundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter, et bonum secundum quid, id est, in quantum est ens; secundum vero ultimum actum dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter.' 1ae v, I, ad 1m.
{6} 'Unde in illis vocibus, secundum quid, et simpliciter, videtur esse aequivocatio. Nam cum dicuntur de ente, videntur dici de substantia et accidente praecise comparatis; cum autem dicuntur de bono, dicuntur de substantia creata aut solitarie sumpta, aut ut affecta dispositionibus et facultatibus sibi connaturalibus.' Metaph. Disp. x, sect. 1, n. 16.