PROPOSITION XCVIII.

The Desirable is fundamentally the same as the Good, but it formally differs from this latter in two respects. For it is posterior to, and consequent upon, Goodness; and it is, moreover, a merely extrinsic denomination derived from the Desire, of which it is aptitudinally the object.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition is sufficiently obvious. For, (as St. Thomas has remarked in a passage already quoted), since every entity naturally desires its own Perfection, it desires that which is perfecting, as complement of itself. But that which is perfecting must itself be perfect and, therefore, good; so that it is true to say, that Goodness is perfective Perfection. Furthermore, Goodness differs from Perfection, in that it connotes another entity, with whose natural inclination the Good and Perfect is consonant. This fundamental identity between the Desirable and the Good has been so repeatedly. and so emphatically insisted on by the Angelic Doctor, that his declarations seem at first sight to imperil the subsequent conclusions of this Thesis. He says, for instance, that 'the nature of the Good consists in this, that a thing is desirable;' again, that 'the Good adds nothing, over and above Being, except only the idea of the Desirable;' and he is frequently repeating, as though he deemed it a sort of definition, that well-known saying of Aristotle, 'all things seek after the Good.' This might naturally lead to the supposition, that the Desirable entered formally into the concept of Goodness. Nevertheless, it is here maintained, that the Desirable formally differs from the Good in two respects. This twofold difference awaits us in the subsequent Members.

II. IN THE SECOND MEMBER it is asserted, that the Desirable and the Good formally differ, in that the former is posterior to, and consequent upon the latter. At first sight, it might seem, -- independently of the declarations of the Angelic Doctor quoted above, (which will be discussed in their place), and for intrinsic reasons, that the Good and the Desirable are formally identical. For it has been seen, that both the Good and the True are respective; and that, consequently, they both agree in this, viz, in their connoting something external to themselves. As, then, the True connotes the Intellect; so, the Good connotes Will, or Desire, with which it is concordant. But what is this, if it is not to be desirable? Nevertheless, it must be said, that the Desirable is not formally contained in the concept of Goodness. A thing is not good, because it is desirable; on the contrary, this other causal is true, -- that a thing is desirable, because it is good. The appetibility does not constitute Goodness; but Goodness constitutes appetibility. Hence, the latter is consequent upon the former. Again: Appetibility borrows its concept from the effect, which is posterior to the cause. The Perfectiveness of entity is the cause, or reason, why it is desirable on the part of the appetite or inclination. Therefore, Desirableness is posterior to Goodness. Now, Perfectiveness is connotative; for the Perfective connotes the Perfectible. But the idea of the Perfective is formally taken from that which is intrinsic to the Good, viz, its Perfection whereas the idea of the Desirable is borrowed from that which is extrinsic to the Good, viz. the will or inclination of something else. Perfectiveness, therefore, enters into the formal concept of Goodness; but not Appetibility. As touching, then, the authority of the Angelic Doctor, it suffices to say; that he is speaking, in the passage alleged, of the material, not of the formal, concept of Goodness. It is quite true that the Good is the Desirable; though it may not be true, that Goodness contains the Desirable in its formal concept. Thus, what is visible is lucid, i.e. informed with light; but lucidness is not included in the formal concept of the visible. Nor is this fathering upon St. Thomas a meaning foreign to his own intention. For, in commenting upon that famous axiom in the Ethics of Aristotle, which teaches that 'All things desire the Good,' the Angelic Doctor speaks in this wise 'Primary entities cannot be made intelligible by anything prior to them, but are made intelligible by certain things that are posterior; as causes are explained by their proper effects. Since, then, Goodness is properly the motive cause of the Desire; Goodness is described by means of the motion of Desire, as a motive power is wont to be made manifest by motion. Wherefore, Aristotle says, that the philosophers have rightly declared the Good to be that which all things desire.'^{1} Add to this, that the same Doctor so frequently insists on the essential inclusion of the Perfective in the concept of Goodness.

III. THE THIRD MEMnER, which declares that the Desirable is a merely extrinsic denomination derived from the Desire of which Good is aptitudinally the object, needs no proof; since it has been sufficiently confirmed, during the course of the arguments adduced in favour of the preceding Member.

COROLLARY.

It follows from what has been said, that the Good fundamentally includes within itself the idea of a final cause. For a final cause constitutes the motive of action, or that for the sake of which things act or operate, consciously or unconsciously. But things operate immediately for their own Perfection and, consequently, for the sake of the Perfective; for the possession of the Perfective assists towards the complement of their proper Perfection. Accordingly, St. Thomas tells us that, 'since Good is desirable, it assumes the character of a final cause.'^{2} It cannot, therefore, afford matter for surprise, that the Philosopher, at the outset of his Ethics, should practically so identify the Good with Ends or Final Causes as to use the terms indifferently. And it is in this light, that the Good is so often described as self-diffusive. For, as the end of operation, it allures the Desire of entities, external to itself, to the possession of itself; not (be it observed) by any activity as of an efficient cause, but as that for the sake of which the Desire is set in motion. This is pronounced by the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. In one place he remarks, 'the Good is said to be self-diffusive, after the same manner as a final cause is said to move.'^{3} And again, 'The Good is said to be diffusive, after the manner of a final cause; like as the final cause is said to move the efficient.'^{4} It follows, that the Good and a final cause are convertible; and, in such sort, that whatever is simply and absolutely Good, is simply and absolutely a final cause, and that which is a Good after a manner, is a final cause after a manner. Thus, a useful Good is only good after a manner, because it is perfective and desirable, only as the means for attaining another Good; consequently, it is an end, or a final cause, after a manner. It is an end, because the will or Desire is to a certain extent satisfied in the possession of it. It is only an end after a sort, because the Desire goes on to the acquisition of another Good by means of it.

{1} 'Prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed notificantur per posteriora, sicut causae per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus, describitur bonum per motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum. Et ideo dicit, quod philosophi bene enunciaverunt bonum esse id quod omnia appetunt.' Comment. in Ethic. Nic. L. I, Lect. i-a, ad l.

{2} 'Bonum autem, cum habeat rationem appetibilis, importat habitudinem causae finalis.' 1ae v, 3, ad 1m.

{1} 'Bonum dicitur diffusivum sui esse eo modo quo finis dicitur movere.' 1ae v, 4, ad 2m.

{2} 'Bonum dicitur diffusivum per modum finis, secundum quod dicitur quod finis movet efficientem.' i, d. xxxiv, Q. 2, ad 4m. r