PROPOSITION C.
Every Being, as such, is good.
THIS PROPOSITION is thus briefly proved. Everything that is consonant with, and desirable for, its subject, (i.e. for itself), and is consonant with and desirable for another, is good. But every Being, as such, is consonant with, and desirable for itself, as well as for some other. Therefore, every Being, as such, is good.
The Minor Premiss will be declared and developed, taking each of its Members separately.
I. Every Being, as such, is consonant with, and desirable for, itself. As the reader will doubtless remember, it was shown in an earlier part of this Chapter, that what is good in itself satisfies the quasi-definition of Goodness, if considered after the manner of receiving and received. Now, if we conceive any whatsoever entity as passing from a state of pure objective potentiality to actuation; that first act, or actuation, (existence, in other words), is a good to it. All things that can be, may be said to have a natural inclination for Being; and those things which already possess it, rejoice in its possession. Wherefore, as St. Thomas says, 'Everything, so far as it is Being, is actual and, in a manner, perfect; because every act is a certain Perfection. But the perfect is essentially desirable and good.'{1} The same Doctor confirms this conclusion by another argument drawn from the fundamental identity between Goodness and end or final cause. 'Since the nature of Goodness,' he writes, 'consists in this, that one thing is capable of perfecting another as its end; everything that is of the nature of an end, is also of the nature of Goodness. Now, two things belong to the nature of an end; of which the first is, that it be desired, or wanted, by those things which are not as yet in possession of their end; and, secondly, that it be loved and, as it were, loveable by such as have attained their end. For it is the part of the same nature to tend towards its end and, to a certain extent, to rest in its possession; just as it is by the same nature that a stone is drawn towards the centre, and rests in the centre. But these two elements are discoverable in pure and simple Being. For those things which as yet have no share in Being, tend towards Being by a sort of natural Desire; while those things which have Being already, naturally love that Being of theirs, and preserve it with all their might. Therefore, Being itself has the nature of Goodness. Hence, as it is impossible that there should be an entity that has not Being; every entity is good, by the simple fact that it has Being.'{2} If the consideration is carried further to the subsequent accidental actuations of Being, the argument becomes clearer and more cogent. For the acts of each entity are so many fresh additions of perfection to it and, consequently, are good and desirable. The same may be said in the case of things material, concerning growth, increase of strength, and the like; in the case of spiritual Beings, concerning acts and habits, whether of intellect or will, such as science, fortitude, contemplation, temperance. Further, in composite entities it is plain that the substantial Form is a good to the Matter, as in like manner the Matter is a good to the Form; -- Part is a good to Part and to the Whole; Substance is a good to the Accidents, and the Accidents to the Substance. In these last instances, the Good is so really distinct from the subject which receives it, that the cases seem to be more naturally included under the second, than under the first, Member of the Minor. This would indeed be the true arrangement; if these entities were taken separately, instead of being considered as constituents of one and the same individual entity.
II. Every Being is consonant with, and consequently desirable for, some other. This is the second Member of the Minor, which remains to be declared. i. Its truth may be, first of all, developed on principles that are, more or less, priori. Every existing essence or nature has, by the fact of its existence and by reason also of all that goes to make up the complement of its existing Being, a perfection of its own, but a perfection limited and capable of indefinite accidental increase; and each nature has a natural inclination for such growth in perfection. Now, if the universe were a mass of independent entities; it would be difficult to understand how this natural inclination could be satisfied. Yet satisfied it must be somehow; for nature makes nothing in vain. We know, however, as a fact, that the universe is not so constituted. Metaphysics, Physics, and Ethics, conspire to show that it is a kosmos, -- a perfect order, composed of successive grades of Being, ascending in excellence and perfection towards the highest, yet for the most part insensibly melting into each other, -- a system of universal action and reaction, such as to allow of its being said, without hyperbole, that the displacement of a pebble affects the equilibrium of the whole, In the midst of such ever-spreading relation and correlation, every perfection is not only perfect to itself, but gives perfection, -- directly to some other, indirectly to the rest. It spreads, communicates, diffuses itself. Each entity does this in various ways. To one fellow-entity it serves as efficient cause, -- to another, it may be, as part of itself, -- to another, as a convenience or pleasure, -- to the whole, as contributing to its beauty and the complement of its perfection. Thus there is no Being whatsoever which cannot become in some way or other an object of the human will, as fitted for some end or purpose.
ii. This truth is further confirmed by an argument drawn from the well-known division of Being. For all Being is either Infinite or finite. There is no middle term. Now, finite Being is a partial, remote, similitudinal, participation of the Infinite. The latter, therefore, is an Infinite Good to the former, by virtue of this similitudinal participation. God is in effect Good to finite Being as Exemplar, Efficient, and Final Cause. On the other hand, finite Being is in its turn a good to the Infinite, as the copy is to the Pattern, as the representation to the Represented, as the effect to its Cause.
iii. The Truth of the present Proposition receives additional confirmation from induction of facts. For, in the first place, every Accident is good to the Substance which it can or does inform. So, in material substances, the Form is a good to the Matter, the Matter to the Form, and the Union to both. So, the Whole is a good to its Parts; its Parts to the Whole; which occasions the remark of the Angelic Doctor, touching material things, that 'Each Part naturally loves the common Good of the Whole, more than its own particular Good. This is plainly shown by its action; for each Part is principally inclined to that action which conduces to the common advantage of the Whole.'{3} Again: it is equally plain that integral composite substances are a good to some one or other of the creatures that surround them. Some are good, as supplying necessaries of life, -- some, as objects of art and profitable labour, -- some, for the pleasure they afford, -- some, for their beauty, -- some, for their usefulness -- all, in one way or another, as symbols of that which is higher and nobler than themselves. Man is a good to man in numberless ways so evident as to spare one the necessity of pausing over them. Pure spiritual Forms are a good to each other and a good to man, by a variety of service. Lastly and principally, God is the supreme, infinite, necessary, unalienable, Good to each and all of His creatures.
Therefore, to conclude: -- There is no Being of whatsoever kind which, in so far as its Being, is not good.
DIFFICULTIES.
I. The first objection that occurs, concerns the nature of mathematical entities. For it must be admitted that they are real entities; otherwise, if they were mere logical entities, they could not embody necessary truths objective to the intellect, and could find no place within the sphere of Philosophy properly so-called. Further, they could provide us with no necessary and eternal laws, to which material things are naturally subject. But, as a fact, they do supply us with such laws; and nothing can be naturally more certain than mathematical deduction. Moreover, the Philosopher claims a place for mathematics, higher than is attainable by any physical discipline, in the commonwealth of sciences; mathematical entities, therefore, are undoubtedly real. But Aristotle denies that they have anything to do with Goodness. Therefore, there are some real entities which are not good.
ANSWER. To reply in brief: -- mathematical entities are good like all other entities; but they are abstractively, so to say, (i.e. as mathematical entities), neither good nor bad. This needs explaining. The subject-matter of mathematics is quantity continuous and discrete. Now, quantity itself is good, like every other Being; -- good to substance which it informs, good to the other accidents which it immediately sustains. Without it, no extension in space; without it, no local separation; without it, no sensile phenomena. It is quantity that introduces material substance to our sensile perception. But quantity, as it really exists in the nature of things, is not, cannot be, the subject-matter of mathematics. It needs purifying by process of intellectual abstraction. Hence, the mathematical science is said, by the School, to be conversant with intelligible matter, -- with matter, as cognizable by us through its primary accident, -- with intelligible matter, because it has become subject of intellectual abstraction. But, in this process of abstraction, all that is causative of motion or inclination in others, is eliminated; consequently, all that partakes of the nature of a final cause, in other words, its Goodness. Nor is it true, that the Philosopher denies to mathematical entities the attribute of Goodness. What he does say is, that 'the mathematical sciences make no account of the good or bad in entities';{4} and this remark is in exact correspondence with the explanation just given. The answer of St. Thomas to the difficulty is the same. He says: 'Those things which come under the observation of a mathematician are good, according to the existence which they have in nature. For the Being of a line or of a discrete quantity is of itself good. But they are not considered by the mathematician according to their simple Being, but only according to their specific nature. For he considers them in the abstract; and abstracts are not real, but conceptual in their formation. . . . Wherefore, the idea of Goodness does not attach to a line or discrete quantity, when considered mathematically; although the line and discrete quantity are (in themselves) good.'{5} And the reason why the idea of Goodness does not attach to them when mathematically treated, is, that 'they abstract from motion and from matter' (i.e. sensible matter); 'and, in this way, they abstract from the idea of a final cause, which has a motive nature;'{6} for which reason, the end, or final cause, of an action is commonly called the motive.
II. It would seem, at first sight, as though primordial matter could not be good; yet, it is evidently, in some way or other, Being. And the reason why it would seem as though it could not be good, is this. All that is really good must exist or, at least, must be formally and proximately capable of existence. But primordial matter neither exists nor can exist by itself. Therefore, it cannot be truly denominated good.
ANSWER. i. By a like process of reasoning it would follow, that primordial matter cannot be truly denominated Being; so that the Proposition would remain untouched. For that which neither exists nor is in proximate capacity of existence, is, so far forth, not Being.
ii. The same argument would go to prove that purely material forms are neither good nor Beings; for they cannot naturally exist, save in the matter which they inform. Wherefore, by the composition of two nothings would all material things be formed; and a composite nothingness would become a Good.
iii. The answers hitherto given are purely elenchtic; let us now examine the difficulty absolutely in itself. It is, first of all, sufficiently plain that primordial matter, considered by itself separately, is not nothing. For, according to the teaching of the School, it is a subjective potentiality; (as will be explained fully in the fifth Book). Now, a subjective potentiality, -- in other words, that which is in itself a potentiality and not a mere possible by virtue of the active potentiality of another, -- is something real and, consequently, capable of existence. It is true that, on account of its imperfection, it is only capable of conjoint and essentially dependent existence; but this does not prevent its being formally and proximately capable of co-existence. Hence, it is Being and good. That it is in such sort Being, is confirmed by the fact that it naturally desires its form, and its form naturally desires it. But that which naturally desires and is the natural object of desire, must be Being and must be good. Furthermore: though the existence of matter is essentially dependent on its form; yet it has its own proper and inseparable existence, as included in the existence of the composite whole. Hence it is concluded, that primordial matter is not simply and absolutely good, just as it is not simply and absolutely Being; but that, to adopt the words of the Angelic Doctor; 'as primordial matter is potential and not actual Being, so it is a potential and not actual Perfect, a potential and not actual Good.'{7} The same Doctor explains this solution of the present difficulty, at greater length and with greater clearness, in a passage which shall be quoted by way of conclusion to the answer. 'Every thing,' he remarks, 'that is potential of the Good, for the very reason that it is potential of the Good, has an orderly relation to the Good; because potentiality is nothing more or less than the being ordained for actuation. It is plain, then, that whatever is potential, for the very reason that it is potential, partakes of Goodness. Wherefore, every subject, so far as it is potential in regard of any whatsoever perfection, -- even primordial matter, -- for the simple reason that it is potential, partakes of Goodness. Primordial matter is not denominated Being, save potentially; and receives Being, simply by virtue of its form. But it has its potentiality from itself; and since potentiality partakes of the nature of Goodness, as we have said; it follows, that Goodness attaches to it in its own right.'{8}
{1} 'Omne ens, in quantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum; quia omnis actus perfectio quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis et boni.' 1ae, v, 3, o.
{2} 'Cum ratio boni in hoc consistat, quod aliquid sit perfectivum alterius per modum finis, omne id quod invenitur habere rationem finis, habet et rationem boni. Duo autem sunt de ratione finis; ut scil. sit appetitum vel desideratum ab his quae finem nondum attingunt, aut sit dilectum et quasi delectabile ab his quae finem participant; cum ejusdem rationis sit tendere in finem et in fine quodammodo quiescere; sicut per eamdem naturam lapis movetur ad medium, et quiescit in medio. Haec autem duo inveniuntur competere ipsi esse. Quae enim nondum esse participant, in esse quodam naturali appetitu tendunt. . . . Omnia autem quae jam esse habent, illud esse suum naturaliter amant, et ipsum tota virtuta conservant. . . . Ipsum igitur esse habet rationem boni. Unde sicut impossibile est quod sit aliquod ens quod non habeat esse; ita necesse est quod omne ens sit bonum ex hoc ipso quod esse habet.' De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 2, o.
{3} 'Unaquaeque pars naturaliter plus amat commune bonum totius quam particulare bonum proprium. Quod manifestatur ex opere. Quaelibet enim pars habet inclinationem principalem ad actionem communem utilitati totius.' 2-2ae xxvi, 3, c.
{4} Tas mathêmatikas outhena poieisthai logon peri agathôn kai kakôn. Metaph. ii. (al. iii) c. 2, in i.
{5} 'Ea de quibus mathematicus considerat, secundum esse quod habent in rebus, bona sunt. Ipsum enim esse lineae vel numeri bonum est; sed a mathematico non considerantur secundum suum esse, sed solum secundum rationem speciei. Considerat enim cum abstractione. Non enim sunt abstracta secundum esse, sed solum secundum rationem. . . . Et ideo ratio boni non competit lineae vel numero secundum hoc quod cadunt in consideratione mathematica, quamvis linea et numerus bona sint.' De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 2, ad 4m.
{6} Prout abstrahunt motu et a materia; et sic abstrahunt a ratione finis, qui habet rationem moventis.' 1ae v, 3, ad 4m.
{7} 'Sicut materia prima eat ens in potentia et non in actu; ita eat perfecta in potentia at non in actu, et bonn in potentia at non in actu.' De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 2, ad 3m.
{8} 'Omne quod est in potentia ad bonum, ex hoc ipso quod est in potentia ad bonum, habet ad bonum ordinem; cum esse in potentia nihil aliud sit quam ordinari in actum. Patet ergo quod id quod est in potentia, ex hoc ipso quod est in potentia, habet rationem boni. Omne ergo subjectum, in quantum est in potentia respectu cujuscumqne perfectionis, etiam materia prima, ex hoc ipso quod est in potentia, habet boni rationem. . . . Materia prima non dicitur ens nisi in potentia, et esse simpliciter habet per formam; sed potentiam habet per seipsam. Et cum potentia pertineat ad rationem boni, ut dictum est, sequitur quod bonum conveniat ei per seipsam.' De Ma. Q. I, a. 2, c. init.