PROPOSITION CI.

There are three elements, or constituents, of finite Goodness, viz., Measure, Species, Order.

PROLEGOMENON.

When it is said in the Enunciation, that there are three elements of created Goodness, the expression must be understood metaphysically. We must not for one moment be deceived into the idea, that there are certain real parts which together constitute Goodness. For Goodness itself includes really nothing that, other than conceptually, is distinct from Being. It is simply Being itself with a conceptual connotation, as we have already seen. What is meant, is this; that, in the essence of finite Being, there are three notes or characteristics which formally constitute its perfection in itself, its consonance with other Being, and, consequently, its appetibility. As the Angelic Doctor observes, 'Measure, Species, and Order, are denominated good and entities, not as if they were themselves, so to say, subsisting; but, because, by virtue of these, other things are both entities and good. Wherefore, there is no need of their having some other things, by which they are good themselves. For, when it is said that they are good, it is not meant that they are formally good to things distinct from themselves; hut that, by virtue of them, certain things are formally good.'^{1}

SCHOLION.

The doctrine enunciated in this Proposition is derived from St. Augustine; who so explains those words of Holy Writ, 'Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight' (Wisdom xi. 21); understanding by number, Species, and by weight, Order.

As this Thesis is of a nature to require declaration rather than proof, and as the Angelic Doctor is the one from whom we have received the Augustinian idea in its present scientific form, it will be most convenient to open up the question with that Doctor's exposition. 'Everything,' he remarks, 'is denominated good, forasmuch as it is perfect, for thus it is desirable; and a thing is said to be perfect, in which there is nothing wanting proportioned to the measure of its perfection. Now, seeing that everything is what it is, by virtue of its form, and that the form presupposes certain things, while certain other things necessarily follow upon it; in order that a thing may be perfect and good, it must necessarily be in possession of its form, of the prerequisites, and of the consequents, of this latter. Now, form prerequires the determination or commensuration of its causes material or efficient. This is signified by Mode or Measure. . . . The form itself is signified by Species; for everything is specifically constituted by its form. The consequent of form is an inclination towards its end, or to activity, or to something of this kind. For everything, in so far as it is actual, acts and tends towards that which accords with its form. And this is what is meant by Weight or Order.'^{2} It is necessary to call the reader's attention to the fact, that St. Thomas is not here referring to the physical form of finite Beings, but to the metaphysical form or, in other words, the specific nature of each, which he regards as received in the individual. If this is not carefully realized, there is danger of failing to see, (as some have failed to see), the identity between the Angelic Doctor's teaching in this and in the following passage. Speaking, then, in another place of these three elements of goodness, St. Thomas says that 'the last, viz. Order, is that respect' (or connotation) 'which is expressed by the word Good; but the other two, viz. Species and Measure, are the causes of that respect' (connoted in the idea of Goodness). 'For Species belongs to the specific nature itself; and this nature, as having existence in any given individual, is received after a certain determined Mode or Measure; since everything that is in a thing, is in it after the measure of the recipient. Thus then, every Good, in that it is perfection by virtue of its specific nature and of its being, has Measure, Species, and Order; -- Species, by reason of its specific nature; Measure, by reason of its existence; Order, by virtue of its perfective character.'^{3} For the purpose of facilitating the apprehension of this somewhat abstruse doctrine, it may not be amiss to open ground with simple illustration.

Let us suppose that the construction of a Town-Hall has been undertaken. The first thing would necessarily be, to have the architectural plan, -- or say, a more or less general artistic idea. But the next question would be, with what material it should be constructed; whether (as in some countries) with wood, or with brick, or with stone, The nature of the ground, climate, civic customs, the position in the streets, and other similar matters, have to be considered; and the architect's general idea would require modification, in the working plan, conformably with these considerations. When the building has been erected, in proportion as the plan and the execution have been perfect, will it be a desirable Town-Hall for the citizens, i.e. a real good to them. Now, in this example, the architect's first idea represents the Species; the practical realization of the idea in the constructed edifice, would stand for its Measure; and the advantage of the Town-Hall for public meetings and similar purposes, would embody its Order. With the aid of this illustration, let us consider these three elements of Goodness separately.

I. One element of Goodness is Species, or the Specific Nature. It naturally comes first in the consideration of the present subject; because it is the principal and central element. For Measure is its prerequisite; Order, its consequent. The specific nature is the source of unity in entities, -- not of individual unity which is the foundation of variety and distinction, but of that essential unity which groups, and reduces into order, and is parent, of all Science. Indeed, it may be said that it is the root of individual unity; for in simple Being it, so to speak, constitutes this unity, as St. Thomas teaches; and what would composite substance become but an accidental and chaotic collection, if there were no specific nature to bind together in one the various parts? Take a man, by way of example; and begin by examination of his body. Apart from his individual characteristics, the body of James is, plainly enough, constructed after a definite type. There are a great number of points, wherein it is of precisely the same cast as the bodies of other men. There is a similar organic structure, similar distribution of vital organs, the same number of limbs and members, a similar proportion between them. Such is the essential nature of the human body. But what would be the good to us, or even to itself, of a body as this without life? There would be eyes without sight, ears without hearing, hands without touch, legs without motion, lungs without breath, a heart without circulation of blood. That which gives real unity of person and of action to this material structure is, the soul of James. Take now the soul of James. It too has its individual characteristics; but these can be dismissed for the moment. That soul, like the body, has been created on a certain type. In many respects, it is like all other human souls. It has sensitive faculties, vegetative and animal life; and it is gifted with the two characteristic faculties of intellect and will. All these it is, or has, in its own simple substance; but the sensitive faculties it cannot naturally use, save in and through the body. Therefore, it essentially requires its partner for the complement of its natural perfection; consequently, in itself it is an incomplete substance. In these and similar respects, we have all been formed in one mould. Well, these essential notes which principally constitute James in soul and body, which constitute him a man and not a brute or a plant, make up together his specific nature, or Species. Whatever he receives additional as James, (i.e. as this individual), is illuminated, perfected, made reasonable, beautiful, by this Species. Hence the origin of the Latin word, Speciosus, fair of form; which suggests that human beauty is derived from the Species, or specific nature. And, if it were not so, the ideal beauty of man, such as is in some measure represented by the Apollo Belvidere, would be a simple anomaly; for if there were no typal man, or specific unity, there could be no common measure of perfection. To resume the exordial illustration; if there were no common type in art of a Town-Hall, (as specifically distinct from other buildings, such as churches, galleries, theatres, shops, private dwellings, and the like), the former would be undistinguishable from the latter; and to require a plan, in the severe sense of the term, would be simply ridiculous. Or, to pursue the illustration, if there were no general types of Greek, Byzantine, Italian, Gothic, architecture and of the various species of each; building would become, what it was in the last and in the earlier part of the present century, an unsightly heaping together of incongruities. Style connotes Species. Thus, then, perfection and, consequently, Goodness, is principally founded in the specific nature of Being.

II. Another element of Goodness is Measure or Mode. That which is received, (to quote an axiom of the Schools), is received according to the Measure of the receiver. Thus, water, poured into a glass, accommodates itself to the Measure of the glass in which it is received. So, external material objects are received in the human intellect; not in their own material Measure, but intellectually according to the Mode of the faculty that receives them. The same may be said of the same objects, as intentionally received into one or other of the senses. Similarly, the architectural idea of our Town-Hall is, as it were, received into the existing structure according to the Measure of its material, standing-ground, environments, and the like. Now, in the composite entities of nature, there are two things requisite, antecedently to their production; -- matter out of which they are formed, and an efficient cause. By efficient cause is here meant a secondary efficient cause; not the First Cause. Both these regard formally and immediately the existence of the thing; just as bricks and masons are formally connected with the existence of the building. And, in this way, matter is not here considered in general, (for as such it enters into the specific nature), but this matter which is prerequired to the evolution of this form; and, therefore, to the existence of the individual entity, -- that which the Doctors of the School intended by their materia signata. It is evident, then, that the specific nature, in the case of composite entities, is measured or modified by the prejacent matter, out of which it is evolved as an existing reality. If the preparation of the matter for the evolution of the form be incomplete or defective, the specific nature will be measured and determined in its actuation by such incompleteness or defect. Hence the origin of monsters. But the modification of the specific nature does not depend on the matter alone or principally; but on the second prerequisite, viz. the efficient cause. No effect can go beyond its cause; and the specific nature, as received in the individual and existing, is the effect of the efficient cause that produces it. Thus, the idea of a picture may be perfect; yet, when carried out into execution and produced on the canvas, it may be terribly defective, owing to a want of practical skill in the painter. So, in the things of nature, a similar modification will be generated in the effect, by defect in the efficient cause. This is the reason why there are hereditary taints. As yet, in both cases, defect or incompleteness alone has been considered as a cause of modification; but the remark equally applies to excellence and completeness in the preparation or organization of matter, and in the efficiency of the productive cause. A statue would come better out of Parian, marble than out of plaster of Paris. The importance of efficiency in the cause is evinced by the value attached to the genealogy of animals; as of horses, for instance, and bulls. It is thus, then. that the specific nature becomes modified in each individual, and assumes distinctive notes, by which an endless variety is produced in the same Species. Unity in plurality, or variety, is a property, to say the least, of beauty and perfection. Species gives the unity; Measure, the plurality. And, as this variety is an element in the perfection of the entity itself and of its Goodness for itself; so is it likewise an element in its perfectiveness or Goodness for another. It is true that those modifications and varieties are incidental; but then, it must be remembered, it is only through and by its accidents, that one nature acts upon another. No one would be inclined to disown the respective, yet utterly distinct, merits of a greyhound and a bull-dog; yet here the specific nature is most probably the same, and the modifications are accidental. The same may be said of the difference between Mocha and other kinds of coffee, and of the difference between a crab-apple and a Ribston-pippin. In ascending upwards to man, these individual varieties become more pronounced; because the bodily modifications are brought out in stronger relief by modifications of the soul. Hence, countless varieties of expression in the countenance, of tones of voice, of walk, of gesture, of action; -- to say nothing of those individual notes which are entirely bodily or entirely spiritual. These two elements, therefore, together constitute the perfection, or intrinsic Goodness, of finite Being; and they are causes of the last element which remains to be considered.

III. The third element of Goodness is Order. The visible creation is not a fortuitous aggregation of independent entities. It is an interwoven chain; and each link is supported by its neighbours, and gives strength, beauty, continuity, to the whole. For each finite Being is finitely perfect; and its finite perfection is a thing of growth and time. It seeks, therefore, outside itself for that which will aid in the increase of its own perfection. To this end, there is implanted in its nature an appetite, or desire, for such external Good; and, consequently, that external Good becomes the end or object of the desire, and prompts it to activity. In man, it becomes, by virtue of his intellect, the intention of his action. And thus we are confronted, spite of ourselves and by the logic of facts, with that doctrine of' final causes, which it has pleased certain modern 'philosophers' to visit with contempt and invective. It is, in reality, final causes which give to all created things the unity of a whole. But, since it is the intrinsic perfection of an entity which makes it to be perfective of another, and since the intrinsic perfection of each individual entity consists in its specific nature and its individual modification, it follows that Measure and Species are the causes of Order. Thus, as the Angelic Doctor puts it in a passage already quoted, Species, Measure, Order, are the three constituents of Goodness; and of these, Species represents the essential nature; Measure, existence, or the individual modifications; Order, the perfectiveness of the Good, which isthe formal characteristic of Goodness.

{1} 'Modus, species, et ordo, eo modo dicuntur. bona sicut et entia, non quia ipsa sint quasi subsistentia, sed quia eis alia sunt et entia et bona. Unde non oportet quod ipsa habeant aliqua alia quibus sint bona. Non enim sic dicuntur bona, quasi formaliter aliis sint bona, sed quia ipsis formaliter aliqua sunt bona.' 1ae v, 5, ad 2m.

{2} 'Unumquodque dicitur bonum, in quantum est perfectum; sic enim est appetibile. . . . Perfectum autem dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque sit id quod est per suam formam, forma autem praesupponit quaedam, et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur; ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est quod formam habeat, et ea quae praeexiguntur, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam. Praeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio, sive commensuratio principiorum seu materialium seu efficientium ipsam. Et hoc significatur per modum. . . . Ipsa autem forma significatur per speciem; quia per formam unumquodque in specie constituitur. . . . Ad formam autem consequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut ad actionem, aut ad aliquid hujusmodi. Quia unumquodque, in quantum est actu, agit et tendit in id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc pertinet ad pondus et ordinem.' 1ae v, 5, o.

{3} 'Ultimum, scil. ordo, est respectus quem nomen boni importat; sed alia duo, species scil. et modus, causant illum respectum. Species enim pertinet ad ipsam rationem speciei, quae quidem, secundum quod in aliquo esse habet, recipitur per aliquem modum determinatum; cum omne quod est in aliquo, sit in eo per modum recipientis. Ita igitur unumquodque bonum, in quantum est perfectivum secundum rationem speciei et esse simul, habet modum, speciem, et ordinem; speciem quidem, quantum ad ipsam rationem; modum, quantum ad esse; ordinem, quantum ad ipsam habitudinem perfectivi.' De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 6, c. in fi.