ARTICLE II.

Divisions or Determinations of GOODNESS.

PROPOSITION CII.

Goodness is either natural, moral, pleasurable, or useful.

PROLEGOMENON I.

The ancient division, universally adopted by the School, was tripartite, viz. honestum, delectabile, utile. But, apart from the difficulty of exhibiting the first in an English dress, -- the same authorities, who have handed down this division of the Good, acknowledge that the bonum honestum is capable of subdivision, forasmuch as it includes the naturally Good, (or, as they called it, bonum naturae), as well as the morally Good, (bonum per se decens). Now, since there would seem to be as great a distinction between the naturally Good and the morally Good as there is between the naturally Good and the pleasurably Good, and since the difficulty just mentioned had to be overcome; the bonum honestum has been eliminated, and its two species substituted in its place. The reason why the ancients combined them in one, is this; that they agree, as to a most important point, in the nature of their perfectiveness. For both are consonant with human nature in themselves, that is, by virtue simply of their own intrinsic perfection; as will be explained more fully in the declaration of the Thesis.

PROLEGOMENON II.

In this Article, Goodness is considered in its formal character as perfective, in other words, as good for another.

PROLEGOMENON III.

The above division primarily regards human Good, or that which is a Good to man; nevertheless it is capable of application to the Good generally. So says St. Thomas in the following passage: 'This division seems properly to belong to human Goodness' (i.e. to the Good in relation to man). 'Nevertheless, if we consider the nature of Goodness in its higher and wider signification, this division is found to be properly applicable to the Good, considered under the form of Goodness. For a thing is good, forasmuch as it is desirable, and term of the motion of desire; and we may consider this termination of the motion of desire by the light of the motion of a natural body. Now, the motion of a natural body is simply terminated at the last point; but is, after a manner, terminated at any intervening point, through which it passes to the last point which terminates its motion; and any point is called a term of motion, inasmuch as it terminates some part of the motion. Again: that which is called the ultimate term of motion, may be understood in two ways; either as the entity itself towards which the motion tends,' (and this is objective), 'such as, for instance, a certain spot, or some form; or as rest in the possession of that entity,' (and this is subjective). 'After the same way, then, in the motion of desire that which is desirable because it terminates the motion of desire partially as a means of tending towards something else, is called useful. That, again, which is desired as the ultimate end, entirely terminating the motion of desire, because it is something towards which the desire tends for its own sake, is called honestum; because that which is desired for its own sake, is called honestum. Lastly, that which terminates the motion of the appetite itself by way of rest in the possession of the object desired, is pleasurable.'^{1} This exposition of the Angelic Doctor introduces us to the PROOF OR DECLARATION OF THE PROPOSITION. The above division satisfies the three canons of true division, which are these. First, the sphere of each separate part must be less than the sphere of the whole. Secondly, the sphere of all the parts together must be equal to, i.e. neither more or less than the sphere of the whole. Thirdly, the spheres must not cross each other. Therefore, it is a true and exhaustive division. The Antecedent is made up of three Members, equivalent to the three canons; and the declaration of it will, therefore, assume a threefold shape.

I. The above division satisfies the first canon, which requires that the sphere of each separate part should be less than the sphere of the whole. Here it will be necessary to premise an observation, which will be of great service in the application of each one of these rules. There is, what may be called, a material, and there is a formal, subject of division. These rules are applicable to the latter; not to the former, save by accident. Thus, the solar spectrum exhibits the seven prismatic colours from one ray of white light; it does not follow that the division of the prismatic colours into seven is false, because they are all contained, so to speak, in one ray. Hence, St. Thomas remarks, 'the same thing, so far as the subject is concerned, is honestum and useful and pleasurable; but these three differ conceptually. For a thing is called honestum, because it has a certain excellence worthy of honour, by reason of its spiritual beauty. It. is called pleasurable, because it gives rest to desire; useful, because it is referred to some other.'^{2} Wherefore, 'OF the same entity may be at once naturally, morally, pleasurably, and usefully, good to the same man, yet these four kinds of Good be essentially distinct; for the division does not fall on the subject, but on the attribute. Now, no one of these divisions includes the rest; no one of them separately can include all Good. This will he clearly seen by instituting an examination into the nature of each kind. The naturally and the morally Good agree in this, that the entity, so denominated, is desirable by man for its own sake; so that the appetite tends towards the acquisition of it, as a simple end in and for itself. But they differ in many important respects. For the naturally Good is that which on its own account is desirable by man in relation to his vital action, of whatever kind that vital action may be. It is, for this reason, called a Good of nature, understanding by nature the principle of vital tendency howsoever exhibited, and putting out of consideration the unity of that principle, consequent upon the reduction to order of its complex constituents. Thus, food is a natural Good; because it is consonant with, and necessary to, vegetative and animal life in man. For a similar reason, health is a natural Good; and, in like manner, well-disposed organs of sense, bodily strength, and life itself. So, knowledge is a natural Good to the intellectual faculty; so are sound faculties, and intellectual habits. To these, perhaps, might be added a competency, the esteem of others, the normal term of life. Now, it is plain that natural Good is not limited to man; but must extend itself to every living entity. For every finite Being is perfectible; and naturally seeks its own perfection outside itself. Wherefore, since nature makes nothing in vain; there must he, and is, some external entity, by conjunction with which each Being is naturally perfected. Therefore, that an external entity is desirable to such finite Being for its own sake, is in itself consonant with the nature of that Being; consequently, a natural Good. Hence it may be said that, of the three kinds of Goodness, the natural Good comes nearest, in its essence and in the extent of its periphery, to Transcendental Goodness. Moral Goodness, or the morally Good, is that which is on its own account desirable by man in relation to his moral nature. Nature is now no longer considered as the mere principle of vital tendency, assumed, as it were, indiscriminately; but as that same principle reduced to a harmonious whole. Butler has shown us, in his sermons on this subject, that human nature, strictly so called, is a commonwealth of faculties and of tendencies, in which there are subordination and supreme rule. Of this commonwealth reason is the queen; free-will, the chief executive. To these two faculties all the other faculties and tendencies, by the constitution of man's nature, are subordinated; wherefore, that will be a moral Good to man, which is in itself consonant with right reason and, therefore, fitting object of desire to the will, or spiritual appetite, as directed by the reason. This moral Good may be considered under three distinct forms. For the acts of virtue are in themselves formally good, whether of the intellect as supplying the intention, or (and that principally) of the will, freely choosing that which is consonant with right reason. Then, virtuous habits are paramountly good in the moral order; not only because they facilitate the action of the will and give to it a stability in the pursuit of what is right, but because they are formed by a repetition of ordered and becoming acts in the same direction. Lastly, virtuous acts and habits presuppose a moral Goodness in the formal object. For a right action does not constitute, it presupposes, the Goodness in the object; wherefore, St. Thomas calls this last the primordial^{3} in moral Goodness. From What has been said it is manifest, that moral Goodness is only possible to spiritual Beings; since they alone have reason and will.

Moral Goodness is, therefore, essentially distinct from mere natural Goodness; which is made patent by three of its primary characteristics. For, first of all, its periphery is narrowly limited; seeing that of the whole visible creation it connotes man alone, whereas natural Goodness includes, in its connotation, every real finite Being. Secondly, it is formally desirable by the will of man only; whereas the merely natural Good is formally desirable by every vital appetite, and, when it is desirable by the will, it ceases to be merely natural, and becomes moral, Good. Lastly, in the case of man himself, the two kinds of Good are quite distinct; so much so, that they are often in antagonism. Life is the highest of natural Goods; yet circumstances arise, -- as for instance when the salvation of our own country is at stake, or the open profession of our faith is a plain duty, -- in which the preservation of life would be undeniably a moral evil. Knowledge is a conspicuous natural Good; yet if it should defile the imagination, or stimulate the passions, or engender a spirit of insubordination to constituted authority or of discontent with one's state in life, or should make a man conceited, presumptuous, it would not be, to such an one, a moral Good. So, a competency is a natural Good; but, if it has been gained by dishonest tricks in trade, by miserly thrift at home, by an habitual disregard for the just claims of the poor, it is a moral evil of no ordinary magnitude.

Pleasurable Goodness is essentially distinct from the two preceding kinds. This will be seen by an examination into its nature, which shall now be prosecuted under the guidance of the Angelic Doctor. To all natural motion there are two terms, or ends; one objective to the thing that is moved, the other subjective. For a body in motion arrives at a certain point which is the end of its motion; and that point is its terminus, or objective term. But, observe, it stops. That stopping is its own; it has nothing to do with the terminal point of motion. It is the body's rest, which is purely subjective to it. And, if the body were conscious, it would little matter to it, desiring rest, at what point it stopped; so long as it could remain quietly there. Now, desire, or appetite, is the motion of a faculty towards its object which is consonant with such faculty and, therefore, its Good. When it has obtained possession of that object, the motion of desire ceases; for the faculty has, as it were, reached its terminal point in the possession of its Good. That possession produces a quiet, a sense of satisfaction, in the faculty so actuated; and this quiet is what is meant by pleasure. Hence, in the motion of desire there are two terms; viz. the object of the appetite, or the Good aimed at, and repose in possession of the object. From the description thus given it will be seen, that pleasure or delectation must accompany the actuation of every faculty, at least in sentient natures. For, when a faculty is in complete act, it is so far in possession of its object, and rests; whereas, before that, it was subject to the motion of tendency, from the moment that it was first awakened from its facultative indifference by the object coming within view. The subjoined clause, at least in sentient natures, must not be passed over without notice. For, though inanimate things, and those which have a vegetable life only, rest in the object possessed; yet, they have no pleasure or delectation, save metaphorically. For it is a necessary condition of pleasure, that it should be accompanied by some sort of apprehension, i.e. that there should be consciousness of the rest in possession of the coveted Good; and, in proportion as that apprehension is of a higher order, so will the pleasure, caeteris paribus, be more intense. But, to resume: -- it is plain that delectation of one kind or other accompanies every vital act. Yet, it is not every delectation that is of such a nature as to allure man to pursue it for its own sake. Hence, when it is a question of pleasurable Good, by pleasurable is understood that which affords sensile pleasure, or a feeling of repose in the senses. But here, to avoid all difficulties, we must not misunderstand the word, quiet. It does not exclude all motion; but only the motion of tendency. A billiard ball may rest on a certain spot of the table, and yet revolve with great speed, -- the result, not unfrequently, of a screw stroke. The ball in such case rests, and does not rest. It rests in its acquisition of that spot; but it does not rest within the sphere of its own entity. So, sensible pleasure is not the rest of sleep, but the repose of wakeful activity. Again, as sensile possession is not simple, instantaneous, and indivisible, the sensile Good may be more and more possessed; so that there may be partial possession in every part of the motion, as in the case of the motion of natural bodies. Wherefore, there may be partial delectation, accumulating in proportion as the faculty nears the full acquisition of its object. Now, accordingly as this sense of satisfaction or repose is more active and vivid, it becomes more attractive; and this is one reason why, as a rule, the young are more subject to the influences of sensual pleasure than those who are advanced in life. When this vital rest or satisfaction, arising from the union of any one of the senses with its object, is intense; the human will is prone to pursue the object, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the mere sensual satisfaction; and that which causes the satisfaction is called a pleasurable Good. In such cases, the acquisition of the sensile entity, in and for itself, is not the object of desire; but the repose and satisfaction which the object brings with it, and that alone. To take an instance: -- a drunkard does not continue his potations, because the liquor he is taking allays the natural appetite of thirst; but he takes it, because it causes a pleasing rest of the nerves for the time being, or an animal hilarity, or a relief from bitter memories. Nor is it the liquor for itself that he desires, for sometimes it is positively nauseous, as in the instance of absinthe or laudanum; and, in most cases, confirmed drunkards are not particular as to what they take, so long as the desired effect is produced. So, -- to take a more agreeable example, -- people will go to the seaside, some at least, not for the sake of health only or principally, but because the presence of the sea is an intense pleasure to them. The sight of its broad expanse, the heavings of its bosom, the sunlight bespangling it with countless jewels, the cloud-shadows that make floating islands on its green waters, the dying murmur of its tide upon the shore, produce a sensile pleasure, not unmixed with higher delectation. We seek the sea in such case, not for the mere sight or hearing of it, but for the wondrous sense of calm which it causes in the soul. That the sphere of the pleasurable Good is less than that of the Good generally, needs no proof; for there are many real Goods which are not pleasurable. Medicine is undeniably a Good to those who are sick; but no one will be inclined to maintain that it is for the most part delectable. So, the extraction of a tooth is often a great Good; but there is very little sensile repose in the operation. Thus, then, the pleasurable Good satisfies the first Canon.

There now remains the useful Good. When an entity is not an object of desire or will, either for its own sake or because of the sensile gratification which it affords; it may, for all that, become an object of desire. But how? In what element of its nature is that congruity with the desire discoverable, which can justify it in claiming the title of a Good? The answer is, that it may become an object of desire and exhibit the nature of a Good, inasmuch as it is the necessary, or most commodious, or certainly a commodious, means of obtaining another Good which we desire for its own sake. Thus, let it be supposed, for the sake of illustration, that a man desires to divide a piece of wood. It matters little or nothing to the aptness of the illustration, whether the severing of the wood be itself a merely useful Good or, as it might possibly be, a moral Good. So, let it be taken for the latter. The carpenter knows that the saw would be the fittest instrument for the purpose; therefore, without any special predilection for the saw over the axe, adze, gimlet, chisel, screw-driver, or plane, he chooses the saw, because it is the best instrument for effecting his purpose. His desire is for the saw, therefore, not because of any special and independent congruity of the saw with any vital action of his own; but because it is the most commodious instrument for attaining the end which is the ultimate object of his will. So, a man may have an intense aversion to railway-travelling, and yet may be frequently found in a train; because it is his only means of arriving at a place which he must visit, and of afterwards returning home. It needs no proof, that the Useful does not include every kind of Good within its category; therefore it too, as one of the dividing members, satisfies the first Canon.

II. The division here enunciated will also bear the test of the second Canon, which prescribes that the sphere of all the parts together must be equal to, that is, be neither more or less than, the space of the whole. If these four kinds of Good do not make up the sum of Good, then there must be certain Goods which are included under no one of these divisions; in which case, let them be produced. Till this has been done, it is fair to conclude that this anciently accepted division is exhaustive. However, the adequacy of the division admits, in a certain way, of positive declaration. For, between that which is congruous and good in itself and that which is not congruous and good in itself but only for the sake of something else, there is no middle term. Consequently, the division between the Useful and the three other kinds which are congruous and good in themselves, is immediate. Now, that which is good and perfective in itself may be so either objectively to the term it connotes (i.e. the perfective entity), or else subjectively. Here, again, it is vain to look for a middle term. But, if it is the former, it is called honestum Good; if the latter, pleasurable Good. Lastly, the honestum Good may connote either the nature of Being as principle of operation or human nature as the principle of moral action; and, here again, there would appear to be no middle term. But the former is called the naturally Good; the latter, the morally Good.

III. This division satisfies the third Canon, which requires that the spheres of the parts should not cross each other. It is very important that this logical Canon should be accurately understood. It does not then, forbid that, among the members of a division, there should be enumerated a part which is constituted by the composition of two other parts already enumerated, provided that the said composition results in the genesis of a new entity distinct from its two parts, according to that formality which is the direct object of division. What it does forbid is, that the same entity under the same formal consideration should be enumerated twice. These observations will be best understood by an example or two. Physicists tell us that there are really only three primitive colours, red, green, and blue; and that the other prismatic colours result from the combination of these three. Yellow, (so they say), is produced by the direct mixture of prismatic green and red; and so on, for the rest. Yet, for all that, the division of the colours into red, orange, yellow, green, blue, violet, indigo, and the half-ghostly lavender, would not offend against this last Canon; because the mixture or combination produces a colour entitatively distinct from both of its two constituents. But now, on the other hand, if animal were divided into man, the brute, and the quadruped, the division would sin against this third Canon; because quadruped is included under the brute, and hence the sphere of the one crosses the sphere of the other. In fact, it will be found on investigation to violate the second Canon. For let man be a; the brute, b; the quadruped, q; and let x represent animal. The equation would then be, according to the second rule of division, x = a + b + q. Now, the brute is divisible into quadruped and not quadruped; i.e. into q, and, say, y. Hence, substituting for b, q + y, the equation will be x = a + q + y + q = a + 2 q + y. But animal equals man, brute-quadruped, and brute-not-quadruped. Therefore, x = a + q + y. Therefore, a + q + y = x = a + 2 q + y. Therefore, q = 2q.

In a word, the members of division, taken together, are in excess of the divided whole. Now, it may easily be, that one and the same entity should offer itself as at once honestly, naturally, pleasurably, and usefully, good; but then, as a natural Good, it is desirable by man under one form; as a moral Good, under another distinct form; and so on, for the other two. When considered or desired as a natural Good, precision is made, by mind and will, of its consonance with man's moral nature, of the pleasure which follows from its possession, and of the advantages accruing from it; and the same may proportionally be said of the others. In order to satisfy the requirements of this last Canon, it suffices to show, that the form, by which each kind is, as it were, constituted, is essentially distinct from the forms of the others. Now, in the discussion touching the first Canon, this has already been sufficiently shown in the instance of natural and moral Good; but there are particular difficulties as regards the other two, which demand more than a perfunctory notice. Wherefore, they will be reserved for discussion in the two following Theses.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. It has been stated, in the declaration with respect to the first Canon, that the natural Good comes nearest to the Transcendental in the extent of its periphery. But this seems to be explicitly contradicted by St. Thomas, who says that 'the Pleasurable is of wider periphery than the Useful and Honestum; because everything that is useful and honestum is in some way or other pleasurable; but it is not everything that is pleasurable which is called useful and honestum.'^{4}

ANSWER. St. Thomas is here, in accordance with the nature of his subject-matter, using honestum in its most restricted, and pleasurable in its most extended, signification. As to the former, he tells us in another Article of the same Question, that 'the Honestum is, properly speaking, the same as virtue.'^{5} Wherefore, he identifies it with the morally Good, to the exclusion of the naturally Good; as might be expected from the fact, that the Question alluded to, which is devoted to the discussion de honestate, finds a place in the purely ethical part of the Summa. On the other hand, that he uses pleasurable in its most extended sense, is clearly gathered from his own words. For everything that is virtuous and useful is not sensibly pleasurable. It is a virtuous thing to die for one's country, or silently and in patience to endure a calumnious accusation. So, it is often useful to take a dose of castor-oil. But who would be found to maintain that any one of these acts is a source of sensile delectation? But how, then, can the assertion of the Angelic Doctor be justified? In this wise. Every act, whether vital or free, is a perfection acquired by a certain faculty, whose previous action was a tendency or motion towards the act. The act constitutes the faculty in a state of rest. Hence, as has been already said, two terms, -- the objective and the subjective. The subjective term is the aforesaid repose from motion. Now, strictly speaking, (as St. Thomas teaches), 'for delectation two things are required, viz. the attainment of an agreeable Good, and consciousness of such attainment;'^{6} or, in other words, rest, and consciousness of rest. But the rest itself may be considered as, in a sort of way, delectable to entities which have no consciousness. In a wide, then, and analogical sense, everything which perfects another thing may be called pleasurable to this latter. Strictly speaking, however, consciousness of rest essentially enters into the concept of the Pleasurable. Wherever, therefore, there is rest and consciousness of rest in the attainment of a Good, the object is truly a pleasurable Good. But the object, the faculty attaining such object, and the resulting delectation, may be spiritual or sensile. Wherefore, delectation may be either spiritual or sensile. To which of the two is the term most strictly and properly applied? In order to be able to answer this question to the satisfaction of the reader, it will be necessary to interpose an observation. Since consciousness is a requisite element in delectation; that Good will especially claim the title of delectable, which, when possessed, produces in the possessing faculty a more noticeable rest. The reason is, because, in proportion as the rest is more noticeable, it is less likely to escape notice. Now, it is undeniable that, limiting the question to man's actual condition, the quiet of the senses in the attainment of a sensile Good is the most vivid and provocative of consciousness, as a general rule. Therefore, delectation, or pleasure, in the strictest sense, is predicated of the senses; and a delectable Good is in the same way a sensile Good. Having premised thus much, it is easy to deduce the following conclusions. First; if the pleasurable Good is to be understood, in its widest and analogical meaning, for the rest which accompanies every act; it is wider in its periphery than the naturally, or morally, or usefully, Good. But this is not the sense in which the word is used in the division which is now under examination; neither is it the meaning of St. Thomas, in the passage quoted by way of objection. Secondly; if the pleasurable Good is understood in its strict sense, as including rest and consciousness of rest, it is necessary to introduce a distinction. If it be question of the Good in its universal application to all real Being; then, the pleasurable, is of narrower periphery than the natural or the useful, Good. If it be question, on the other hand, of human Good only, (and such is the mind of the Angelic Doctor in the passage under consideration), then it is wider in its periphery than either natural, moral, or useful Goodness; for many things are pleasurable, which are naturally and morally evil, and further, are detrimental to our interests. Lastly; if the pleasurable Good is to be understood in its strictest sense as applicable exclusively to sensile Good, then it is narrower in its periphery than either the naturally, morally, or usefully Good. It is according to this last meaning, that the word is understood in the Thesis.

II. It is said in the declaration made under the first Canon, -- and St. Thomas repeatedly makes a similar assertion, -- that the honestum Good, including both natural and moral, is distinguishable from the other two, in that it is desirable on its own account or, in other words, for its own sake. But this seems very like putting the cart before the horse. For a natural or moral Good is only desirable for its own sake, because of the intrinsic Goodness or perfection, of whatsoever sort it be, which such object possesses. The question, therefore, turns upon the distinctive nature of such intrinsic Goodness, not on its appetibility which, as has been already shown, is only a consequent of the former.

ANSWER. There is truth in the objection. But the memory of the reader should be recalled to a pregnant observation (already quoted) of the Angelic Doctor, which is to the effect, that primary elements and, consequently, primary ideas, are best explained by their effects or results. If, however, this objection should be still urged, and a declaration as to the intrinsic nature of this Goodness be demanded; the following is the answer. The naturally Good is that entity which, by virtue of its perfection, is of itself absolutely perfective of human nature, considered as the principle of all the vital operations of man; whereas the morally Good is that entity which, by virtue of its perfection, is of itself absolutely perfective of man's moral nature, i.e. considered as principle of free and responsible action. Some have said, that the morally Good is that which is agreeable to right reason. But, if this is to be understood formally, it is liable to precisely the same objection as the one now under discussion. For the object is not Good, because right reason pronounces it to be such; on the contrary, right reason pronounces it to be such, because the object is in itself consonant with man's moral nature. If understood fundamentally, it is true.

{1} 'Haec divisio proprie videtur esse boni humani. Si tamen altius et communius rationem boni consideremus, invenitur haec divisio proprie competere bono, secundum quod bonum est. Nam bonum est aliquid, in quantum est appetibile et terminus motus appetitus; cujus quidem motus terminatio considerari potest ex consideratione motus corporis naturalis. Terminatur autem motus corporis naturalis, simpliciter quidem ad ultimum, secundum quid autem, etiam ad medium per quod itur ad ultimum quod terminat motum. Et dicitur aliquid terminus motus, inquantum aliquam partem motus terminat. Id autem quod est ultimus terminus motus, potest accipi dupliciter; vel ipsa res in quam tenditur, utpote locus, vel forma; vel quies in re illa. Sic ergo in motu appetitus id quod est appetibile terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium per quod tenditur in aliud, vocatur utile. Id autem quod appetitur ut ultimum terminans totaliter motum appetitus, sicut quaedam res in quam per se appetitus tendit, vocatur honestum; quia honestum dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat motum appetitus, ut quies in re desiderata, est delectabile.' 1ae v, 6, o.

{2} 'Idem subjecto est honestum, et utile, et delectabile; sed ratione differunt. Nam honestum dicitur, secundum quod aliquid habet quandam excellentiam dignam honore propter spiritualem pulchritudinem; delectabile autem, in quantum quietat appetitum; utile autem, in quantum refertur ad aliud.' 2-2ae cxlv, 3, c.

{3} De Ma. Q. ii, a. 3, c.

{4} 'In plus tamen est delectabile quam utile et honestum; quia omne utile et honestum est aliqualiter (note the modifying adverb) delectabile, sed non convertitur.' 2-2ae cxlv, 3, c.

{5} 'Et ideo honestum, proprie loquendo, in idem refertur cum virtute.' 2-2ae I, C.

{6} 'Ad delectationem duo requiruntur; scil. consecutio boni convenientis, et cognitio hujusmodi adeptionis.' 1-2ae xxxii, I, C.