PROPOSITION CIII.

The pleasurably Good is essentially distinct from the naturally, morally, or usefully Good.

The truth of this Proposition is sufficiently obvious to common sense, and is abundantly confirmed by the experience of life; nevertheless, when considered philosophically, it is beset with peculiar difficulties. For that which is called the pleasurable Good, or the Pleasant, is either the object which causes delectation or the delectation itself. If the former, then it would seem to be identified with the usefully Good; if the latter, one does not see how it differs from the naturally Good. To explain: It is evident that the Pleasure is not in the object, but in the subject that is in possession of the object. Thus when a child eats a sweetmeat, the Pleasure of the taste is not in the sweetmeat, but in the child. Consequently, the object is sought after, not for its own sake, but for the sensile delectation which it affords. But, when an object is desired simply as a means for producing something else, it is a useful Good. If, however, it should be assumed, that the pleasurable Good is the Pleasure itself, then we are confronted with another difficulty. For, as has been already remarked, when delectation is said to be the rest or quiet of a faculty in the possession of a congenial Good, it must not be supposed that such quiet involves the absence of all motion. There is an end, it is true, to desire or the motion of tendency; but delectation is itself a vital act, though more properly called, perhaps, a passion, which, nevertheless, is itself a receiving act. Hence, St. Thomas decides that delectation is a passion; because 'the motion of the sensitive appetite is properly called a passion.'^{1} But this motion or act is a vital one; that is, it is natural to the sensitive life of the human soul. As a consequence, delectation would seem to be a natural Good. But, further, it does not seem to be possible that the pleasurable Good should primarily consist in the delectation itself. For the latter presupposes some Good, whose acquisition causes this vital quiet. Neither does the delectation cause the possessed object to be good; on the contrary, the object causes delectation, because it is good. If this be so, then, either the object is a natural Good, or it has some form of Goodness proper to itse1f; and the division, here proposed, is inadequate.

Such are the difficulties which environ this question; and now for their solution. First of all, then, an appeal must be made to the testimony of common sense. There is no one who doubts that there are pleasurable Goods; and that they are really distinguishable from moral, natural, or useful Goods. Thus, when a man drinks himself to death, it is plain that his potations are morally evil. It is equally plain that they are not a natural Good; since they cause a premature death. They cannot be called useful; for there is no other Good which they procure their victim. But it is quite certain that the drunkard experiences in them a pleasure of some sort or other; otherwise, he would not persevere in face of so many powerful motives to deter him. Moreover, such phrases as, a voluptuary, a man of pleasure, a man addicted to pleasures, and others of a like nature, (common to all languages), very clearly indicate the universal recognition of pleasure as an end or Good which some men practically pursue, instead of their natural or moral Good. Yet again; everybody understands that, in such cases, the object of pursuit falls into the background, so to speak; and becomes an object of desire, solely because of the delectation which its possession procures. But, on the other hand, nobody who pays even a slight attention to the matter, can hesitate to own, that it is the acquisition of that particular object which causes the pleasure. The object is not an external means for helping along the road to something else. Its simple possession, solely and absolutely, is a pleasure. The boy eats his tart; and the act of eating it, gives him the desired delectation. But, if a mason takes up his chisel, the grasp of the chisel causes him no delectation; though, when by means of it he has accurately worked out the moulding, that may cause him pleasure. So, a man takes medicine, and the operation is anything but pleasurable; yet he feels pleasure afterwards, on finding that his troublesome indigestion has disappeared. Therefore, common sense teaches, that the Pleasurable is quite distinct from the Useful. On the other hand, daily observation shows us that men who have given themselves over to the delights of a favourite passion, will sacrifice their health, fortune, character, prospects, nay their very souls, in the pursuit of such Pleasures. Wherefore, common sense likewise teaches, that the pleasurable, is really distinct from the moral or natural, Good.

It now remains to see, how this doctrine of common sense can be philosophically maintained; for of this we may be certain, that no true philosophy can ever run counter to common sense. Observe, then, in the first place, that a Good, or object possessed by any given faculty, may be considered in three different ways; viz, objectively, subjectively, and adequately (or both objectively and subjectively). This needs some further explanation. No appetitive faculty is moved to the acquisition of an object, unless that object is connatural with, and agreeable to it and, as a consequence, a natural Good. When the said faculty is in possession of that object, its tendency is satisfied and quieted; whence arises in the soul a sense of delectation. Now, it is possible for the mind to consider the object thus possessed apart from its actual possession, examining into its intrinsic conveniency with human nature. It is then regarded objectively. Again, it is possible to reflect upon the possession simply, and the resultant pleasure; in which case the object possessed is regarded subjectively. Or we may consider the object and its possession together; and so, it is adequately regarded. Hence it follows, that the same object, materially speaking, may be at once a moral or natural, and a pleasurable, Good. It is a moral or natural Good objectively; and it becomes a pleasurable good subjectively. Accordingly, St. Thomas remarks that the division of the Good, which forms the present subject of inquiry, 'is not according to real, but conceptual, opposition';^{2} i.e. it does not follow that a natural or moral, must necessarily be distinct in reality from a pleasurable, Good, but only that what may be the same Good, is regarded under two distinct and opposite forms. For the acquisition of a natural Good must cause Pleasure; and all Pleasure arises from the acquisition of a natural Good. Nevertheless, as the said distinction or opposition is not purely logical, but conceptual (i.e. founded in reality); it follows that there are two really distinct forms of Goodness, according as the object possessed is regarded objectively or subjectively. For there is the Goodness of the object itself as proportioned and agreeable to human nature; and there is the Goodness of the rest and satisfaction which result from the possession of the former. The latter, too, may be said in a certain sense to be natural; but it is natural subjectively as a passion, not in the same sense as the former is properly denominated a natural Good. Hence it may happen, as has been remarked before, that the two Goods are really distinct. Thus, stimulants are a natural evil to an apoplectic subject; yet they are to him, it may be, a pleasurable Good. Here, however, we light upon a fresh difficulty; for this last observation seems to be in open contradiction with what has been stated before, viz, that all pleasure or delectation arises from the acquisition of a natural Good. But the contradiction is only apparent. For the word natural is capable of two meanings. Human nature, like every other nature, may be considered either as a mere collection of parts or of separate constituents; or, as a composite whole. Each part of our complex nature is natural; and, consequently, every object that is consonant with, or fitted for, any faculty or sense, is truly a natural Good. But, if human nature is regarded as a whole, it is seen to consist not only of parts, but of ordered parts. There is an obvious correlation between them, and a subordination of each part to the whole. Thus considered, that object only can lay just claim to be a natural Good, which is agreeable to the whole physical nature. And thus it comes to pass, that an object may be a natural Good to a separate faculty, which is simply a natural evil to our physical nature, considered as a whole. For instance, a plunge in the sea during the heats of summer is a natural Good to a man's sense of touch; yet, it may be absolutely an evil, if he has a complaint of the heart. To such an extent is this the case, that, universally speaking, over-indulgence of one faculty tends to impair the others and vitiate the whole nature. Hence it comes to pass, that pleasure may arise from the acquisition, by a particular faculty, of a Good connatural with itself; which acquisition is, nevertheless, injurious to the whole nature. It is obvious, from what has been said, that no other object than that which is consonant with the entire nature, is a natural Good, absolutely and adequately; whereas, the object which is connatural with a special faculty, is called a natural Good in a secondary and partial sense, or, as the Schoolmen would express it, it is natural secundum quid. It is evident, then, that the pleasurable Good is essentially distinct from the natural or moral Good, and that, as the Angelic Doctor remarks, 'Those things are called properly pleasurable, which are only regarded as desirable, by reason of the delectation which they afford; since it sometimes happens that they are' (physically) 'injurious and morally unfitting .'^{3} Not that the pleasurable Good objectively and, so to speak, materially, need be really distinct from the natural Good; but, when the appetite seeks a natural Good for the mere gratification afforded by its possession, the natural Goodness is, as it were, accidental, and the object becomes, by virtue of the kind of desire which it has provoked, a pleasurable Good.

That the Delectable is essentially distinct from the Useful, hardly needs any declaration. For that which is merely useful has no conveniency in itself with human nature or any constituent of that nature; nor does its possession cause any sensible delectation. It is desired wholly and solely for the sake of something else external to it, and external to the subjective act of possession; whereas the Pleasurable is sought for on its own account, because of the gratification which its presence affords. But it may be objected, that sometimes the possession of the merely useful causes delectation of itself; as, for instance, when a long-lost instrument or tool has been at length found. But it will be seen, on closer examination, that such seeming exceptions only confirm what has been here advanced. For the pleasure, in these and like cases, does not arise from the mere possession of the tool; but from the cessation of trouble in the search, -- exemption from the necessity of buying another, -- or, because it chanced to be the gift of a friend, -- or, for some other similar motive, extraneous to the mere usefulness of the instrument as such.

{1} 'Motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur.' 1-2ae I, c.

{2} 'Haec divisio non est per oppositas res, sed per oppositas rationes.' 1ae v, 6, ad 2m.

{3} 'Dicuntur tamen illa proprie delectabilia, quae nullam habent aliam rationem appetibilitatis nisi delectationem, cum aliquando sint et noxia et inhonesta.' 1ae v, 6. ad 2m.