PROPOSITION CVIII.

The Evil of sin is greater than that of Punishment.

This Proposition is proved by the following arguments. I. Whenever a form or quasi form so modifies its Subject as to give to that Subject simply and absolutely its own denomination, it is more intensely and efficaciously that which it is in its own nature, than when it gives to its Subject its own denomination in a sort of manner and with a modifying addition. Thus, for instance, if a man is simply spoken of as learned, his learning is understood to be of a higher and more perfect kind than that of the man who is spoken of as learned in Hebrew. In like manner, carbon exists more absolutely in a diamond than in carbonic oxide. Now, a man who is subject to the Evil of sin is said to be simply a bad man; but a man enduring punishment is never on that account called a bad man. If the term is used at all, it will be found in combination; in such expressions, for instance, as, he is badly off, he is bad in the head, he is in evil case, his days are evil. Therefore, the Evil of sin is greater than the Evil of punishment.

II. Good and Evil are absolutely predicated of act; while of potentiality they are predicated only after a fashion (secundum quid). Thus, a man is said to be a good musician, who has either composed or played well. Accordingly, the latter is somewhat expressively called a good performer; whereas, if he only had a supposed aptitude, he would never be called a good musician without the addition of some qualifying phrase, unless at least he had actually exhibited his knowledge in some other way. Now, there are universally, as we have said, two acts, viz. the first and the second, -- nature and operation; and the first is potential of the second. Therefore, Good and Evil are simply predicated of act, while of nature they are predicated with a qualifying addition. But sin is in operation; punishment, in nature. Therefore, Evil is absolutely predicated of sin; secondarily and with qualification, of punishment.

III. It is in the nature of Good to be an end, an object of desire. But an end is the perfection of an agent, inasmuch as he is in act. For it is the end which first moves an agent; and the actual possession of the end is his perfection. Consequently, an end and deflection from an end, (that is, Good and Evil), have priority of relation to an entity as active over that same entity as passive. Thus, a man would be justly designated a bad painter who, in the execution of his work, should have violated the rules of his art; but he would neither merit nor receive the same, if his hands were violently guided by another. Now, in sin the will of man is active; whereas in punishment it is passive. We do evil; we receive punishment. Therefore, the relation of Evil to sin has priority over its relation to punishment.

IV. Since God is essential Goodness; by how much anything is more alien from God, just in the same proportion does it become evil. But sin is far more alien from God than punishment; of which a sufficient proof is afforded by the fact, that God is Author of punishment, while He never can be Author of sin. The reason why He cannot be the Author of sin, is this. Sin is a deflection of the free-will of the creature from Himself; for God, as we learn in Ethics, is the Supreme End of all things and, in an especial manner, of rational Being. So is it essentially established in the very nature of things; and it could not, consequently, be otherwise. If God, therefore, could be the Author of sin, He would deny Himself, i.e. He would not be God. It follows, then, from these premisses, that sin is a greater Evil than punishment; even though that punishment should consist in the irrevocable loss of Him, and of beatitude in the possession of Him.

V. That Evil which the infinite Wisdom inflicts for the purpose of warding off or removing another Evil, must be a less Evil than that which it is intended to remove. But God inflicts punishment for the purpose of averting or remedying sin. Therefore, the former must be a less Evil than the latter.