C. THE CAUSE OF EVIL.

PROPOSITION CVIII.

Every Evil has a cause of some sort, which is in itself good.

I. IN THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition it is declared, that every Evil has a cause of some sort. The proof is as follows. Every Being, as such, is good; according to the doctrine established in a previous Article. Therefore, no Being is in itself evil. Consequently, it cannot of itself be evil; and must become such by the action of some cause. Nothing can be evil of itself; because a thing is evil, forasmuch as it fails of acquiring or retaining its due perfection. Now, nothing fails of acquiring or retaining its due perfection, save by virtue of some cause, either acting upon it in a direction contrary to its own natural inclination or, at least, hindering it in its self-evolution. Thus, for instance, an apple, still united to its parent tree, becomes rotten. It has deflected from its normal perfection. Whence has this arisen? If the rottenness be inside, it has arisen from some maggot or other insect, or from groups of fungi in the form of mould, or from some other similar cause. In like manner, if the rottenness be external, it has arisen from the lesion of the outer skin, which has exposed the pulp to the corrupting influences of the common air. Let it be here observed, however, that although the examples have been taken from efficient causes, because these are the most apt for purposes of illustration; yet, the causes of Evil must by no means be limited to this category. Thus, to resume the former example, the apple may become bad from some debility or disease in the tree itself. Of what kind such causes may be, will be decided in subsequent Theses.

II. IN THE SECOND MEMBER of this Proposition it is maintained, that the cause of Evil is in itself good. The truth of this assertion is proved in more ways than one. For, i. Nothing can in any true sense become a cause, unless it is itself something; since, in order to energize, it is necessary first of all to be. But if it is something, it is Being; and as Being, it is good. It has been already shewn that every Evil has a cause. But that cause must be either good or evil. If evil, the question returns; for the reason, that every Evil has a cause. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to admit an infinite regress, which is justly rejected by all sane philosophers, it will be necessary to recur, in ultimate analysis, to some Good which is cause of the Evil. iii. Assuming, as true, that which will be proved in the following Thesis, viz, that whatever is the cause of Evil, causes it by accident; the following argument is built upon such assumption. Every accidental causation is reducible to causation that is direct and intentional. But the causation of Evil is only accidental; therefore it follows, that whatsoever is directly and intentionally caused, is good. If the effect, however, be good, the cause must be good; because every effect is assimilated to its cause. Consequently, Good must be the cause of Evil, at least by reduction; because accidental causation can be reduced to direct and intentional, whose cause is necessarily good. iv. Nothing acts, which is not itself actual. But, if a thing is actual, it is so by virtue of some definite form or perfection. Wherefore, everything that acts, acts inasmuch as it is perfect, i.e. inasmuch as it is good.

COROLLARY.

Hence it follows that anything like a supreme principle of Evil, such as was imagined by the Manicheans, is philosophically impossible.