PROPOSITION CX.

The Good is cause of Evil only by accident.

THIS PROPOSITION is proved by the following arguments.

I. The formal term of causality cannot be nothing; for all real action terminates in something. But Evil, as such, is a privation; and a pure privation is in itself nothing.

II. Every effect, which has a direct and absolute cause, is intended by its cause either actually or interpretatively. For either the cause is itself rational, and then the intention is actual; or the cause is without reason itself but is ordered to its effect by a higher rational cause, and then, the intention may be called interpretative. Thus, one might say that the saw intends to cut wood; which would mean that it is intended by man for that purpose. If, then, an effect is accidental, it is only accidentally caused. Thus, for instance, a body of men are occupied in digging a railway-cutting; and they come across a heap of hidden money. It is plain that the action of spade and pickaxe is only an accidental cause of the discovery of the treasure. So, the compressed steam in the engine of a steamboat is intended to convey men and goods across the seas; it is accidental, if it blows a number of passengers into the air and causes loss of freight. But Evil, as such, cannot be intended; because it cannot become object of desire or will. For it is Good only that is desirable. Hence, whenever that which is evil is desired, it is always under the appearance of Good.

III. Every effect has a likeness to its cause. Consequently, Evil can only be the effect of the Good by accident.

IV. Between every direct cause and its effect there is a deterinmate order of relation. But a determinate order of relation is good; whereas, that which is evil transgresses determinate order, and cannot, therefore, be the direct effect of any cause.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. It seems repugnant that Good should be the cause of Evil, even though it be by accident. For, granting that the causation is by accident, still, for all that, the action of the cause has its real influx into the effect; just as, in the instance adduced, the digging turned up the treasure, although the discovery was accidental. But any real causal influx of the Good into Evil as its effect is contrary to the recognized principle, that contraries do not produce their contraries. Therefore, it is impossible that in any way, even accidentally, the Good should be the cause of Evil.

ANSWER. As St. Thomas observes in connection with this difficulty, an accidental cause may be understood in two ways; accordingly as the characteristic of accident attaches to the cause, or attaches to the effect, In the former case, the cause itself has a real and direct causal influence in the production of the effect; but, because the cause is united to some accidental addition, considered in conjunction with such addition it is called accidental. Thus, Sir Thomas Gresham built the first Royal Exchange in London. Queen Elizabeth had made him queen's merchant. It may, therefore, be truly said that the queen's merchant was the builder of the Exchange, but accidentally; because it was an accident that Sir Thomas Gresham held that office, In the latter case also, the cause really and directly produces its effect; but there is an accident attaching to that effect, which is not subject to the direct action of the cause. Thus, for instance, a man has built a hall which is afterwards converted into a Chapel. He is directly cause of the hall, accidental cause of the chapel. Now, it is in this second sense, that the Good is said to be accidental cause of Evil; wherefore, the former kind may be dismissed, and further examination be restricted to the latter. It is to be observed, then, that in the case of accidental causation the cause may, or may not, have a real causal influx into the accident which gives its name to this species of causation. Thus, in the instance of the treasure-trove, there was a real influx of the cause; while, in the example of the Chapel, there was no such influx. Now, as to the latter, there can be no difficulty; the objection only applies to those cases, where there is a real influx of the cause into the production of the accident. Touching these, therefore, it is to be said, that the cause does not directly and, as it were, immediately or intentionally energize in the production of the accident, but rather in that of the entity which is Subject of the accident. More particularly does this hold true, when the accident is a nothing, such as any privation must be; for real causality must be terminated by a real effect. Consequently, the cause produces an entity, i.e. a Good, in which there is a privation. Wherefore, producing the Good, it produces unintentionally, or by accident, the Evil; that is, it produces the Good with a defect. But the cause is so far from intending the defect, that the defect is, as the Pseudo-Areopagite quoted by St. Thomas^{1} remarks, quite out of the road of the cause's motion, i.e. the cause was in no wise set in motion by the prospect of such a result. But now, what is to be said to the difficulty, that no opposite produces its corresponding opposite? In the first place, phenomenally the principle in question is not universally true; for the coldness of the circumambient air often produces an increase of warmth in the human body. But it is really verified, even in such cases. For the vital warmth is not caused, but only occasioned, by the frosty air. The true answer is, that the rule holds good as regards direct and intentional, not as regards indirect and accidental, causation. And, in this latter case, there is no true opposition; for Good and Evil are not predicated of the same thing under the same respect. Thus, fire is good in itself, but evil to water; because the form of fire tends to the substantial corruption of the water. But the direct action of the fire is to communicate its form and produce steam; the consequent corruption of the water is, as it were, accidental and outside the intention. So, when it is said that man, as a Good, produces an evil action; the Good is predicated entitatively, the Evil is moral. If the action were considered entitatively, it must be pronounced good; and if the man were regarded morally, it must be owned that he is evil. And, in this way, Good is seen to produce Good, Evil is seen to produce Evil. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that Good and Evil are not, properly speaking, contraries, but opposites. For real contraries are, both, positive entities, as are white and black, sweet and bitter, rough and smooth; whereas Good and Evil stand in the relation to each other of perfection and its privation, i.e. of something and the nothingness of something. It is true that moral Good and Evil partake of the nature of opposites; but the reason of this is, as St. Thomas tells us,^{2} that moral Good and Evil are the object of the will; and the act of the will is specifically determined by the formal object. Now, the will must choose either a Good which is rightly ordered, or a Good which is inordinate and, therefore, relatively evil. Consequently, the act will be either good or evil; and if it is the one, it cannot be the other. The opposition is, therefore, to be found in the moral diversity of positive choice, as determined by the formal object. The privation is not in the act of the will; but in the object as willed.

II. According to a statement made in the exposition of the preceding Proposition, every accidental cause is reducible to an absolute and direct cause. If, therefore, Evil have an accidental cause; it follows that it must have an absolute and direct cause.

ANSWER. As the accidental cause is reducible to an absolute and direct cause; so, proportionally, an accidental effect is reducible to the absolute and direct effect. But the absolute and direct effect is the Good in which the privation, or Evil, is to be found. Therefore, there is no absolute cause of Evil.

III. Nature is directly and absolutely cause of all that is produced in the natural order. But there are certain Evils produced in the natural order; such as old age, and death. Therefore, the Good sometimes causes Evil directly and absolutely; and not by accident only.

ANSWER. As St. Thomas remarks,^{3} the partial corruption of old age and the entire corruption of death are said to be a natural change, not relatively to the particular nature of that entity which is the subject of such corruption, but in regard of nature in general, which causes generation and corruption, or rather, generation out of corruption; so that it primarily and absolutely intends generation, while it intends corruption only inasmuch as this latter is the necessary medium of the former. Wherefore, nature does not directly and absolutely cause corruption, but generation only.

{1} De Ma. Q. I, a. 3, ad 14m.

{2} De Ma. Q. I, a. I, ad 4m.

{3} Ibidem, Q. 1, a. 3, ad. 18m.