In Catholic morals and asceticism it is laid down as a fundamental principle that the obligation to aim at the highest Good is universally binding. It is hardly possible for any misunderstanding to arise on the tenet that in our worldly actions it is never permissible to neglect or injure that which is supernaturally good. The conclusion that all our actions must be directed to the highest Good as their final end, follows from the words ex christianae sapientiae praeceptis of the Encyclical. The truth here expressed, though clear on the whole, may admit of more than one interpretation; it may be asked how every single human activity must be directed to the final aim. If we consult on this subject the masters of the Christian wisdom of life and the teachers of the Catholic School, we find that they for the most part base their explanation upon St. Paul's words: "Whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God."{1} God is the "highest Good," and to promote His glory is the highest and the final aim of all activity, of existence, and of created beings. Everything that is contrary to this aim, whether serious or insignificant, is sinful, and therefore forbidden. Everything that is positively in agreement with it, and is adapted to further it, is morally good. There is a particular virtue tending to promote God's glory in human life and society, and this is religion; but everything morally good participates in reaching this highest aim, and all that is bad involves dishonour to God. Conscience pronounces the rules of morality as a supreme law, absolutely binding, as an expression of the will of God, and of the wisdom that directs the universe.{2}
Love of God is the highest and most lively form in which the highest Good may be conceived; this love shows us not only the will and law of God and His supreme and exalted authority, but the living personal God Himself in the fulness of His properties, in such a way that the soul abandons itself wholly to Him, becomes united with Him, and lives for His sake. A Christian's supernatural love of God is based upon faith, which makes us realize God's perfections far better than reason can do, and reveals to us the possibility of coming into personal intercourse with our Creator as our Friend. In Holy Scripture we read that faith and love ought to influence the whole thought and action of a Christian. "The just man liveth by faith,"{3} which means, according to St. Thomas, by faith animated with love. The commandment of love declares that we are to love God "with all our strength" and to order all our free actions towards Him. By fulfilling this duty, a Christian imparts to his works the consecration that makes them meritorious for heaven.{4} In this connection the question how all our work, and how each individual action, ought to be referred to God becomes of much practical importance.
St. Thomas, who is followed by most theologians, says: "In order that God, or the love of God, should be the end of an action, it is not necessary that, in doing the action itself, a man should think of God or of love of God; but again it is not enough for him to possess God and to love Him only with an habitual intention (habitu), as in that case he would also direct to God acts constituting venial sin, and this is impossible," -- the intention to love remains even in one who sins venially, -- "but it is necessary for him to have thought previously of the end, viz., love of God, and for this reason to have directed his subsequent actions to that end, so that the lawfulness of this direction may continue in the subsequent actions. This is clearly shown in the example of an artist, who would be much hindered in his work if, whilst engaged upon it, he were always thinking of the rules of his art; the fact is, he first sketches the outline according to the rules of art, and then works along this outline, thus doing justice to art and observing its rules in his production."{5}
St. Thomas describes this connection between love of God and daily labour as "virtual," to distinguish it from actual and habitual intention, because from the first, actual direction of the work to God there remained not only a permanent condition, but a real force (virtus) is transmitted to the action, the force of moral attraction regarding the subordination or superordination of the aims, -- "as the force of a supreme aim extends to all the aims ordered with reference to it."{6} In another place St. Thomas illustrates his meaning by speaking of a pilgrim who proceeds to buy a horse to carry him on his pilgrimage, and during the transaction is, without thinking of it, influenced by his religious intention. He refers also to a physician who, whilst seeking medicinal herbs in the forest, is altogether absorbed with his task, and yet practically he does not lose sight of the end for which he practises medicine, viz., the cure of the sick.{7} St. Thomas applies these examples to the influence of the love of God. Its end is so high, and at the same time so naturally interwoven with the immediate ends of all action, that when the intention has once been directed to God, the force of the intention remains and affects all actions capable of being so directed, i.e., all morally good and not sinful acts. "Whoever possesses charity has directed himself and all that he has to God, to whom he clings as to his highest end. Hence whatever he does with reference to himself or his individual duties, he does in a meritorious fashion although he may not actually think of God. It is only when, by some irregularity in his action, he allows himself to be hindered that his work cannot be referred to God. This cannot, however, occur, unless the action is at least a venial sin." Hence the conclusion is deduced: "Every action of one who loves God is either meritorious or sinful; it cannot be indifferent."{8}
Eminent theologians point out, however, that as a matter of fact the influence of love cannot always be proved to go so far as to permeate and sanctify all good actions in this way; they maintam that no one acts in virtue of love of God unless he can say: "If I had not previously awakened an act of love, this good or permitted work would not have been performed"; only in such a case is love the root and motive power of the work. The pilgrim and physician of whom St. Thomas speaks could say this with reference to their aim, but is it possible for a Christian to say it of eating and drinking, of many things in his daily occupation, and even of many acts of natural virtue? Are not in all these things earthly aims, natural inclinations, and social duties often the real motives, so that the actions would have been performed even if the supernatural intention of love of God had not been present? Theologians who take this view are inclined to limit merit in actions and undertakings to such works in which there is actual direction of the intention to God in faith and love, this direction being really the efficient cause of the action, although perhaps in a latent, indirect manner.{9}
Most theologians, however, agree with St. Thomas and stoutly maintain that the expression "virtual" bears this wider meaning, and that in the case of a man who has dedicated himself and his whole life to the love of God, whatever moral acts he performs, in conformity with his conscience, are directed and supernaturally ennobled by this love. St. Paul, in speaking of eating and not eating, gives the same reason as St. Thomas: "For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself, for whether we live, we live unto the Lord, or whether we die, we die unto the Lord. Therefore, whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."{10} This higher sanctification of our whole conscious existence is not only mystical, resulting from infused grace, it is at the same time something really moral, induced by the impelling forces of our desires, although perhaps this connection of motives cannot be made so evident as the critics mentioned above would desire. The conclusion drawn, however, that all real influence of an end is wanting if the question whether the action would otherwise not have been performed must be answered in the negative, is erroneous. The important thing is not what might otherwise have happened, but what did actually happen; if a man at the time when he holds another view of life eats, drinks, and takes recreation, this would not prevent him from doing all these things after he had accepted the Christian standpoint, and had now the intention of doing them in the service of God. His will to aim at the highest end may be proven in an empirical way, if he has chosen his mode of life and its expression in the light of faith and love; for he really determined the character of his future life and actions at the time when he made his choice. This supernatural direction towards an aim easily spreads over his future individual actions, conjointly with the moral deliberation and resolution without which no conscientious man proceeds to the more important, at least, of his undertakings. If, as we have seen, all morality as such involves a reference to the absolute good, the lex aeterna, this moral deliberation and resolution unmistakably forms a natural link between the striving for the love of God and everyday life and work. In this way the independent existence of a Christian may form one great organism, in which all immediate and earthly aims and occupations are, through faith and love, directed towards a higher end. The direction of all action, including worldly occupations, to the highest Good, is accomplished primarily by a conscious and actual surrender and consecration of a man's whole self and work to God. A sinner does this when he is converted; a man who has always loved God does it when he rouses to activity the disposition or habit of love that he already possesses. It is accomplished again when religious and secular good works are proposed and carried out; such works owe their origin directly to this higher aim in life, which often causes the energy of the first resolution to be spread over an extended system of action and over long periods of time, while yielding whenever more concrete thoughts assert themselves. (Virtual influence in the narrower sense.) Just as the sun, even though its splendour may be hidden from us, is making itself felt everywhere in nature through its life-giving force; just as the power of electricity is put forth from the place where it is generated to all sorts of machinery and workshops, in the same way it often happens that one vigorous resolution sets a man's activity in motion in such a way that one wave urges another forward, one effort induces many smaller ones, so that work apparently worldly shares in a religious impulse, imparting higher life and moral unity to the most uninteresting and distracting occupation.
The more profound the penetration and piety of a Christian, the more constant and conscious is the ordering of all his daily actions to his moral end. This is facilitated, as I have already said, if he has the correct view of his calling being the personal life work assigned to him by God. If a man has chosen his employment with reference to God, and regards fidelity in the pursuit of it as direct service of God, the chief part of his life will naturally take the form of silent worship. Of course the obligation imposed by one's calling does as a rule not control so completely the course of one's life and work as is the case in the religious life, and it cannot be denied that many opportunities occur for free resolutions and undertakings that are accidental and spontaneous and not due to any religious motives. A merchant wishes to make a good bargain, a scholar desires to solve some real problem and thus increase his reputation, the artist seeks to produce some beautiful work of art, and an official seeks promotion. A strong feeling of attraction, an intense affection, generally influence a man who is making up his mind to marry; and even in the case of a priest, an effort, for instance, to secure a better appointment is not invariably the result of striving after higher moral perfection. Can we say that matters of this sort are influenced by love of God, and that actions, performed for a man's own advantage, are directed towards the final aim of charity? The worldly motives that I have mentioned origmate all alike in natural self-love, in a man's desire for happiness. St. Thomas remarks: "Self-love may stand in a threefold relation to charity, In the first place, it is contrary to love of God when a man makes love of his own welfare his final aim. In the second place, it is included in love of God, when a man loves himself for God's sake and in God. In the third place, it is different from love of God, but not opposed to it, when a man loves himself from the point of view of desiring his own welfare, but does not make this welfare his final aim. In the same way there is also a kind of love towards one's neighbour besides that which is based upon God, such as exists when a man loves his neighbour because of his attractiveness or on the ground of kinship, or for some other reason referable (referibilis) to charity."{11}
The virtual influence of love of God, as St. Thomas conceives it, is undoubtedly great in comparison with these natural inclinations and motives, although it can more easily be overlooked. It does not in this case produce actions that would otherwise not have been performed at all; but it checks natural impulses, and limits and restrains the force of worldly motives, so that they cease to be contrary to love of God, and are ordered with reference to the highest end. This influence may rightly be described as negative, since its immediate result is to restrict natural tendencies. A mother controls her children not only when she is telling them what to do, encouraging or admonishing them, but also when she lets them work and play according to their own inclination. By her presence and glance she keeps them within bounds, and silently checks all that is unseemly. In the same way the reign of the love of God becomes universal, including not only the positive good, but also all lawful actions.{12}
St. Augustine was doubtful whether sensual pleasure was a permissible motive of action. St. Thomas admits that the moral worth of an action is diminished by the influence of sensual emotions, but considers that the action remains morally good, as long as it proceeds from moral perception as well, and not exclusively from motives of pleasure and inclination. The same opinion was held by later theologians. Natural pleasures and also "the advantages of education and social life affect men so directly that, considering the way in which interior and exterior things act and react upon one another, it is impossible to love them only from the moral and religious point of view. Most men learn to appreciate their meaning and connection better from their lower side, by means of experience and practice; and of course a natural inclination accompanies these. It requires deep insight or great sanctity to direct from love of God the stream of living interest in a right and effectual manner, so that it affects all the lower part of our life. . . . The splendour attaching to God, our highest Good, constrains us to dedicate to Him our love and adoration, and to testify the firm direction of our will to Him by means of special actions, modes of life, and sacrifices; in this way we shall work and bring forth fruit in the spirit of charity. But the higher love asserts its supremacy even then when it assigns limits to the rest of our other and well-directed activity, and when all natural love is ready at any moment to submit to its paramount decision, although to do so may involve its own death sentence. The moral and religious life as a rule receives its vigour from above and from below at the same time."
A young man must above all things be trained in faith and love of God, but this alone will not enable him to discover his duties to his family and to society, and the path to follow in his future career in God's service. Natural love of father, mother, family, and home, and an innate pleasure in and capacity for certain arts and occupations, are all good as motives. But these natural motives must be ennobled and directed towards the superior impulse given by love of God; and in this way the Christian character gradually matures, and the divine and human, the natural and supernatural, become more and more interwoven in it, until it is possible to say with St. Paul: "Whether we live, we live unto the Lord, and whether we die, we die unto the Lord."
The inner life receives a higher moral character through the fact that beside the three theological virtues, and the religio which aims at honouring God by acts of piety, it is affected also by a number of "moral virtues," resident in the faculties of the soul, giving a moral form and strength to a man's will and feelings, analogous to his various duties in life. Scholastic writers discuss particularly the cardinal virtues -- prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, -- deriving from them a great number of other virtues which ought to impart moral security and ease to our secular activity in civil life, In the natural man these virtues are subject to moral prudence, in the supernatural life they are under the higher guidance of charity.
It is not necessary that the acts of these virtues should always be referred to the aim of love; to make them meritorious it is enough that they should be referred to the aims of other virtues. For instance, one who is striving to preserve chastity, being in the state of grace, obtains merit even though he does not think at all about love of God. Every act, aimed at something good, provided it is not performed in impropriety, has as its object the good of some virtue.{13}
Eating and drinking in moderation, playing games for recreation, within the limits of that decorum which assigns a proper measure to such things, are meritorious in the case of one who possesses charity, and who, by means of it, has made God the supreme aim of his life.{14}
The reason why this indirect influence and fruitfulness of love suffices is that all affirmative and positive commandments are "always" but not perpetually binding. At every moment of our life we are under obligation to obey the negative commandments: not to blaspheme, not to steal, etc.; but it is possible for us only occasionally to actually obey the positive commandments: to love God, to pray, to give alms, etc., because even in matters of morals the temporary, partial, and uneven nature of our life on earth makes some alternation and some kind, of division of labour even in moral effort absolutely necessary.
St. Thomas applies the same principle to the faith of a Christian, and he draws from it conclusions in favour of the possibility of doing good works even in a state of unbelief. "We are not bound actually to refer every action to the aim to which faith alone can guide us, for the affirmative commandments are not binding for all times although they are always binding. Hence the actions of an unbeliever, not directed to that aim are not necessarily always sinful, but are so only when he is bound to direct his actions to the highest end."{15}
Another factor contributes to the same conclusion, viz., the conviction that a natural moral disposition exists even in sinners and unbelievers, and may reveal itself in good works, in spite of his error.{16} It might be supposed that the whole life of an unbeliever was sinful, since the whole life of a believer, in as far as it tends to the glory of God, is meritorious.{17} "As a matter of fact, however, the attitude of the believer towards what is good differs from that of the unbeliever towards what is evil, In the man who professes faith animated by love there is no condemnation,"{18} in an unbeliever however there is natural goodness together with his unbelief. Hence an unbeliever does not sin when, in compliance with the dictates of reason, he does something good, provided that he does not do it for a bad end; his work is not, however, meritorious because it is not possessed by grace."{19}
St. Thomas establishes his theory very beautifully by pointing out how the various values of human action are graduated, and by comparing them with the various stages of things in nature. Thus each act is to some extent good as an act, as being the result of a natural force. Besides this goodness there is a relative goodness, which grows out of the correct relation of the act to its object, and there is yet another, due to the relation to the aim and to the circumstances. The highest and crowning goodness, however, is derived from supernatural grace and love. "Now even if the latter be withdrawn, the former will remain. Therefore, although the actions of unbelievers lose that excellence which renders an act meritorious, they retain another kind of goodness, either of civic virtue or that derived from circumstances or from the class to which they belong. Hence it does not follow that their actions are bad, but only that they are defective in goodness."{20}
Even the desire for virtue (habitus) cannot in the case of an unbeliever be called "true" virtue in the sense of being genuine, embracing the whole of a man's life, and ordering it to its end. However, as a single virtue, as an effort to attain a definite moral aim, such as the safety of one's country, it is a "true" virtue.{21} With St. Paul, St. Augustine, and all the mystics, the Catholic Church has invariably represented love of God as the fundamental duty and essential perfection of man; and in opposition to Bajus, Jansenius, Quesnel, and others, she has steadily denied that all the virtues of pagans are sins, that all love of creatures is either caritas or evil cupiditas, and that all morality and obedience to law must necessarily proceed from faith and charity.{22}
By clearly distinguishing natural and supernatural spheres of action, the Church facilitates an appreciation of the general work of civilization, and the possibility of the Christian to coöperate with unbelievers or with men of other creeds in certain departments of life. A well-meant assertion, but one liable to be misunderstood, is made by an author who writes that "profane civilization in its specific form has as its root the religious view of the world, and is permeated by it"; and he proceeds to derive thence the "Catholic unity of Church and world."{23}
Of course, all civilization, including the worldly, ought to be "permeated" by religion, but if it were really its peculiarity to spring from religion as its root, it certainly ought not to be called "profane" or even worldly. Faith is the root of justification and of every action tending to salvation; and in the same way love of God is the principle of the supernatural life, and consequently the completion and soul of all virtues. But as we have seen, there is a kind of moral thought and activity, there is a sphere of secular education, technical knowledge, and science that is not rooted in faith and charity. Leo XIII says that the political order requires the moral support which religion gives, for "religion . . . is the queen of virtues, because in binding these to God it completes them all and perfects them" (revocando ad Deum explet et cumulat universas).{24}
The same writer is opposed to any joint work with Protestants even in political matters, maintaining that as the art of halving a man has not yet been discovered, it is not right for a man to act in private life in accordance with his Catholic view of the world, but in politics to put this view on the shelf as readily as he would his hat. Every Catholic must endorse the latter remark: we are never permitted to abandon our faith and our religious view of life; or even to deny them in our life in the world (negligere bona supernaturalia); in fact, we have acknowledged it to be our duty to act in all things under the virtual guidance of love of God.{25} But it is not possible, nor does duty require, that we should continually be actually referring all our actions to God. An uninterrupted positive assertion and profession of our faith is not demanded by Catholic morals. As long as we are in this world, subject to various obligations, and able to attend at any given moment to only one of them, we are often forced and in duty bound to "halve" ourselves, and even for a considerable time to put aside the things that we value most highly. The "art" that we have to study is how, amidst the distracting changes of duties and occupations, we may, in the depths of our souls, preserve our disposition to God so as never to devote immoderate anxiety to worldly aims. Catholic philosophers, historians, politicians, and business men must often for hours at a time turn their thoughts away from the highest ideas and aims and devote them intently to worldly objects; in fact, they must sometimes even adopt methodically a hostile standpoint; but by this division of labour they serve the cause of a Catholic view of the world better than they could do were they never to turn their attention from things above this world. They do not, indeed, divide themselves in acting thus, for their habitual faith and love sanctions and demands this concentration of mind upon worldly concerns, and guides them during it so that they tolerate nothing opposed to faith or morals. Thus a Catholic diplomatist at a political Congress, a Catholic partner in a modern corporation, a Catholic workman in a mixed association of workingmen, can act with others not sharing his faith on the ground of possessing just and moral standards in common. A man joins any society as a Catholic, if he does so recto consilio, and if, after joining it, he examines and decides secundum doctrinae catholicae principia how far he can coöperate in its work. In matters affecting the interests of religion, he allows faith and obedience to the Church to be a positive rule, guiding him in public as well as in private life.
But in order to do this a Christian must often collect his thoughts in religious consciousness and desire, and by means of faith and charity rise above the world and its aims, so as to think with undivided attention of the things of God. In the life of a Christian it is necessary to stir up actually the theological virtues and a good intention, and to do so frequently, that the habitual direction of his thoughts to God may not be destroyed by grievous sin. The more intimately a man comes in contact with worldly affairs, and the more he is brought under influences hostile to faith and morals, the more does he need supernatural motives to counteract their effect. This lively turning of the soul to God is important, also, because it submits the individual actions to a strict scrutiny, and purifies them from even those slight irregularities which are capable of preventing them from being directed towards God. Finally, this good intention is generally valuable and advisable, because of every form of activity the supernatural virtues form the highest sphere, and because it indicates a higher degree of perfection when a man in his secular occupation is animated with thoughts of eternity. The blessing of Christianity is more perfectly realized when thinkers and artists, men in social work and labourers, all have recourse to the truth and strength of the ideals of faith, and with the fulness of this inner life engage in the distracting and often conspicuous tasks of modern civilization.
Hence, as the working classes are involved in the struggle for worldly advantage, and are at the same time exposed to the storm threatening the moral foundations of individual and family life, they need especially to be reminded of that supernatural final end whence life derives its value and hope its assurance, In the Pastoral issued by the Bishop of Fulda in 1900, we are told that religion "ought to penetrate a man's whole being; it is not enough for him to remember it occasionally, and obey its precepts and comply with its principles now and then; it ought to influence his whole nature, his thoughts and feelings, his endeavours and forbearances, his actions and non-actions; they ought to be his guide and his angel, warning him when he is going astray and encouraging him when he is exhausted with work, struggles, and sufferings."
We often hear complaints that, in spite of many legal enactments and social efforts, the spirit of discontent and the estrangement between different classes of society are as strong as ever. But all external and social remedies for the betterment of social conditions are sure to fail unless men possess the inner calm and conciliatory spirit which adherence to God and peace with Him alone can supply. A great void, a silent despair is felt by the masses. . . . Their natural, worldly selfishness is not broken down by any considerations for law and society; only love of God and of their crucified Redeemer can soften and remove it. The rough, envious struggle for earthly possessions will not end in a harmonious union of forces, unless the minds of men are first lifted above their natural prejudices, their hearts inspired, and their whole intentions and hopes centred upon God in such a way that in spite of social inequality, their inner liberty and security is preserved. The inevitable dependence of the economic weak is apt to lead to unwilling servitude or violent rebellion where the religious justification for, and disposition to, obedience is lacking. "Whatsoever you do, do it from the heart as to the Lord, and not to men."{26}
{1} 1 Cor. x. 31.
{2} Cf. supra, pp. 134, seq.
{3} Rom. i. 17.
{4} Cf. supra, pp. 182, seq.
{5} In III sent. dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4.
{6} Ibid., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5 ad 7.
{7} De malo, q. 2, a. 5, obi. 11. De cant., a. 11 ad 2.
{8} De malo, q. 2, a. 5, obi. 11. A collection of other quotations from St. Thomas having a practical application may be found in Gury-Ballerini, Comp. theol., mor. I, 25, etc.
{9} Cf. e.g., Laymann, op. cit., 1. 2, tr. 3, c. 1, n. 5, where he refers to St. Bonaventure. See also Scheeben-Atzberger, Dogmatik, IV, 129, etc.
{10} Rom. xiv. 7, 8.
{11} S. theol., II, II, q. 19, a. 6; cf. De cant., a. 7: Considerandum est, quod sic se babent dilectiones ad invicem, sicut et bona, quae sunt earum objecta. Unde, cum omnia bona humane ordinentur in beatitudinem aeternam sicut in ultimum finem, dilectio caritatis sub se comprehendit omnes dilectiones humanas nisi tantum has, quae fundantur super peccatum, quod non est ordinabile in beatitudinem.
{12} Cf. infra, pp. 487 seq. The question suggested above: "Is it not a fact that I should do this work even if I did not love God as my supreme good?" is less conclusive than: "Should I not at once relinquish this work if love of God forbade me to perform it?" Those who put the stricter interpretation upon "virtual influence" are of course inclined to exclude from the sphere of what is morally good a great many actions contributing to natural and lawful gratification, and to describe them as indifferent. In this way they reduce St. Paul's injunction to do all for the glory of God to the rank of a counsel of perfection; it loses the character of a universal command, at least on the positive side. Cf. St. Bonaventure, In sent. 1.2 dist. 41, a. 1, q. 3. A. Schmid, Adiaphora (Kirchenlexikon I, 229).
{12} Mausbach, Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus. I, 255.
{13} Thom., In II sent. dist. 40, q. 1, a. 6 ad 3.
{14} Thom., In II sent. dist. 40, c. art. St. Thomas makes the same remark (in cap. 3 Isaiae ad fin.) about sumptuous clothing and ornaments worn by women. It can be meritorious to take pains about such things if women restrict themselves to what is customary and in keeping with their rank, and avoid all that may give occasion to sin.
{15} In II sent. dist. 41, q. 1, a. 2 ad 4.
{16} 1 Cor. x. 31.
{17} Cf. supra, pp. 152 seq.
{18} Rom, viii. 1.
{19} In Epist. ad Rom., c. xiv., lect. 3. Cf. De Vent., q. 23, a. 7 ad 8: We must distinguish between obligation in the "literal sense," in which it is contrasted with sin and its punishment, and the obligation to perform supernatural and meritorious works, In the former sense: "non tenemur ad faciendum aliquid ex caritate sed ad faciendum aliquid ex dilectione naturali, sine qua ad minus, quidquid fit, male fit. Et dico dilectionem naturalem nom (solum) illam, quae est nobis naturaliter indita et est omnibus communis, ut quod omnes beatitudinem appetunt, sed illam, ad quam aliquis per principia naturalia pervenire potest, quae invenitur in bonis ex genere et in virtutibus politicis."
{20} In II sent. dist. 41, q. 1, a. 2.
{21} S. theol., II, II, q. 23, a. 7; cf. Müller, Theol. mon., I, 408, etc.
{22} Denz. Enchir., 1025, 1038, 1377, 1397.
{23} Köln, Eine innere Gefahn für den Katholizismus, 1910, p. 48.
{24} Sapientiae christ., p. 166 C.T.S.
{25} See supra, pp. 443, seq.
{26} Co. iii. 23.