A suitable conclusion to this chapter, and also an opportunity to cast further light upon some of the points we have been discussing, is suggested by the objection that the close connection between this world and the next, between nature and grace, destroys all natural spontaneity, and deprives art, politics, and economic industry of their independent form and value, so that they can no longer be governed by their own internal laws; that they are thus reduced to a state of mere dependence upon religion, Christianity, and the Catholic Church. We are told that a pious Catholic is not allowed to have any sense of "independence" of conscience with regard to the laws of God and the Church, nor of the value of things temporal as compared with things eternal, nor of the secular as compared with the religious life, nor of the "autonomy" of economic life and the independence of science and art. Isolated charges of this kind are found continually in the works of Protestants and freethinkers, although they often contradict one another, and occasionally they are collected so as to give a more or less unpleasant picture of Catholicism.{1}
On the other hand, many people profess to discover in Catholicism a mistaken tendency to represent as independent some things that have only a relative and derived value. Thus the followers of Kant criticize the "independence" of our form of worship as opposed to general morality. Protestant theologians complain that we set an "independent value" upon asceticism and mortification, as being practices holy in themselves, and not merely means to an end; and both alike blame the "independent emphasis" that we lay upon good works as objective duties, necessary even apart from the intention with which they are performed.
The word "independent" is used with many different meanings, and not infrequently quite wrongly, and this gives rise sometimes to misunderstandings and fears, even amongst Catholics, although a more careful investigation would remove them. This is true in cases where theologians speak of the "independence" of what is natural as contrasted with the life of grace; of the "independence" of lay action within the ranks of the Church, and of Church history as an "independent" branch of knowledge, as contrasted with history of dogma, etc.{2}
We must begin by distinguishing absolute from relative independence. God alone is absolutely independent; "I am who am. God alone exists of Himself (a se) by an inward, essential necessity. He alone exists so completely in Himself (in se), with such infinite fulness of being, that no other being can increase or add to it; He alone exists completely by and for Himself (per se and propter se) as the supreme, perfect, and personal God, whose rights, worth, and dignity depend on Himself alone; He thinks and wills with that supreme independence which knows no rules and laws apart from its own being; He alone commands and rules with that sovereign power which is dependent upon no one, and is limited and influenced by no other force. In this way, in comparison with God, the Creator, all that is created and outside of God is absolutely dependent; it originates in the thoughts and will of God, it is called into existence from nothingness by His free decision, it remains in existence and action by His power, it is subject in every respect to His physical guidance and moral laws, and in every moment and aspect of its being it is directed towards God as its highest aim.
Nevertheless there is such a thing in creation as a real, though relative, independence. And as God's words: "I am who am" conveyed to the Israelites a sense of His fidelity to His promises, and of the abiding character of His covenant with them, in the same way, from the philosophical point of view, the absolute fulness and majesty of God's being is the surest guarantee of the independent existence of things in this world and especially of spiritual beings. The work of the infinite, almighty God cannot be merely a dream or a phantom; it is reality, though a finite reality, far inferior to God. There are in the world substances, i.e., beings that exist in themselves (in se), and possess a uniform, permanent sort of being, each according to the ideas implanted in them by the Creator. We may and must call them independent, if we contrast them with the properties, faculties, and processes that belong to them and do not exist alone (accidentia). There is in the world a causality, i.e., an activity and productiveness, originating in the substances, but expressing and realizing its own being; the first Cause called into existence a wonderful variety and order of secondary causes. When such a cause produces a result, we may say that it is independent, that it has reached its goal independently, which we could not say of a mere instrument employed by the cause.
There are spiritual beings in the world, persons, who in a more perfect sense exist independently and have a more definite individuality, than the lower substances. Christian philosophy regards increased independence and individuality (per se esse) as their most conspicuous characteristic. In virtue of his spiritual nature and personal dignity, man is God's likeness, and is at once the centre and climax of creation. He is the ruler, and external nature is destined to serve him. His personal individuality justifies us, moreover, in saying of man that he exists for his own sake (propter se), not in the sense that he is his own aim, but that he is no mere instrument for realizing the aim of creation as a whole, being himself a microcosmos, a being resembling God, and destined to belong directly to God.{3}
This fact expresses most plainly the independent dignity of each individual human being, and the difference between man and the brute creation. In consequence of man's interior independence, he is capable of the more perfect action that belongs to spiritual beings. In his self-consciousness and in the exercise of his free will man acts according to his own perceptions, he chooses his own aims, and is his own master (dominus sui). It is difficult for us to understand how God can unite, in the human will, both freedom and dependence upon His power; and it is equally difficult to fathom His reason for allowing man to abuse his liberty and do evil; but every thoughtful person must acknowledge that on this point the Church ascribes to man a high degree of independence. In consequence of man's power to govern his inner life, he has a right to personal liberty, and to claim certain external possessions; every man is to some extent independent in the eyes of the law (sui iuris) -- and this is another principle which the Christian view of man, as opposed to pagan ideas regarding slavery, and total dependence, introduced into the conscience of the people.
If we look more closely at the activity of the mind and will itself, at their nature, rules, aims, and productions, we shall see quite plainly that from one point of view, God, the Creator of the universe, is the Alpha and Omega of all intellectual life and progress; but from another point of view it is obvious that man must use his own resources, his own consciousness, and its immediate objects, in order to lay hold of God in thought, arriving thus at knowledge and, as it were, self-evident truths. God, the first and highest Truth, is not the truth first recognized by us. His existence, per se notum, is discovered by us through the instrumentality of creatures, which are for us magis nota, and from the first principles of our reason, which are per se nota.{4}
Hence we collect information regarding things internal and external, and by means of methodical and systematic work we build up sciences, that control our thought by the evidence of those principles and facts, which have for us an independent validity, not dependent in the first place upon our knowledge of God. The same impartial view of the universe, and the same laws of thought, carry us beyond the single sciences to philosophy; and they constrain a philosopher, like any man with sound common sense, to acknowledge that this finite and limited universe and the order and wisdom displayed in its government must be referred to God, as the Creator and first Cause. This natural recognition of God is progressive, and rises from the effects to the Cause by way of natural knowledge. Scholasticism does not appeal to any innate conception of God, nor even, as Descartes does, to God's real existence, in order to arrive at a trustworthy knowledge of the universe. The natural tendency of our own minds compels us to use and study the materials supplied by our sense perception, if we desire to make the universe our own and to rise up to God, and thus we employ what lies close at hand, and belongs to us, as a foundation for further progress to what is higher. Hence it follows that all practical control of nature, and technical work in the widest sense (trades, agriculture, manufactures, etc.), are closely connected with the actuality of the universe and with the laws of nature revealed to us by science, and consequently they must avail themselves of the forces of nature with logical consideration and appreciation of the same.
Men have observed the properties of fire, water,, steam, etc.; and have found out how to employ them for definite purposes. In course of time the methods of employing them have become more refined, more complicated, and more successful, but it is perfectly clear that all this technical work cannot deviate from the laws of nature without incurring the penalty imposed by nature, and that thus technical knowledge, like science, is independent in its own department, and rests on foundations of its own.
Art, although it very often serves moral and religious purposes, has its own particular formal object, viz., beauty; and wherever we encounter this in nature or in the works of men's ingenuity, it has a direct influence on our feelings. Whoever wishes to reproduce this beauty artistically, must study the hidden relations of forms, grouping, and rhythm, and must master the technical rules of art; in other words, he must know and apply the inner laws of aesthetics. Art, too, has its independent sphere and interior standard of merit; not everything practically advantageous or morally good is artistically beautiful.
The economic activity of individuals and of society in general has, as a rule, another tendency, and aims at solid advantage, and at the multiplying and ordering of material possessions. But still more is it dependent on the natural wealth and energies of the earth, and still more does it seek to satisfy most elementary needs; it forms the material foundation for higher intellectual culture. Moreover, the whole great system of industry, trade, and commerce, however much it may be raised by the intelligence and free activity of men, displays an inward necessity and conformity to law. There is an economic calculation of what is attractive and profitable, and any one attempting to dispense with it would soon pay the penalty.
The same remarks apply in a wider sense to the social field. "Social politics undoubtedly make for an aim peculiar to itself alone and limited to its sphere. To this extent it must be admitted that it is independent, and competent to deal with matters belonging to this department."{5}
With regard to the society of the State, we have already seen that, being the highest organization in secular life, it possesses independence in its legal authority and self-sufficiency in its means of existence, in virtue of which we are bound to impute sovereignty to it, and describe it as the societas perfecta, "in suo genere suprema."
As compared with the substance, the accidental is really, inwardly dependent; so an irrational being in comparison with the human being, an instrument in comparison with the determining cause, means that are only "used" in comparison with an end that is "attained," a slave in comparison with one legally free. In the same way, in the sphere of intellectual and social activity, the mere collecting of materials and all subordinate work connected with science, all that is purely external and technical in art, the necessary, but in itself unproductive, labour of economic life, -- these are all dependent occupations. It is clear, however, that in these matters, the aims and limits of which are so dependent upon the intentions and opinions of men, the idea of "independence" can only be relative, according as the standpoint is raised or lowered. Thus an auxiliary science like palaeography is dependent when compared with the science of history, but as a science it is independent. Money-making is an aim in itself, from the point of view of a financier, but it is only a means to an end from that of an economist. In the same way within the State a province or a city may be self-governing, and yet subject to the control of the State.
In the sphere of our efforts and desires St. Thomas distinguishes the bonum honestum, utile, delectabile, In the narrowest sense what is useful is that "which in itself contains no reason why it should be sought and is sought only in as far as it tends to something else, as, e.g., taking unpleasant medicine." On the other hand, that which is honourable and morally good (honestum) is sought for its own sake (propter se), because it is in harmony with the mind and reason. What is pleasant (delectabile) is, like what is honourable, an end (terminus) for our efforts, not merely a point of transition like that which is useful. It is sought, however, for the subjective pleasure that it affords, and not for its objective beauty. Above all other good things, virtue is an independent aim for our efforts, and on this point, too, the circles intersect. If we think of the supreme aim of all our efforts, virtue appears as a means to that aim (bonum utile), without, however, losing its character of being in itself good.{6}
St. Augustine, who influenced St. Thomas in drawing this distinction,{7} considers more particularly the difference between frui and uti, and says that frui means: amore alicui rei inhaerere propter se ipsam. As he frequently employs frui in the absolute sense, in speaking of the highest aim, he has to face the question whether we may not love earthly things, especially our friends, for their own sake. He answers it in the affirmative, pointing out that we may love them both for their worthiness as human beings and with reference to the highest Good, loving them in God.{8}
Morality is superior to every other department of life and existence, since it aims at leading back to God the being that proceeded from God. It makes God's honour, which is the final end of creation, the highest aim of human activity, and thus guides man to his true perfection. Owing to this relation to the absolute, morality is essentially different from an activity that affects only a proximate and finite end. Everything strives to attain the infinite good, and all aims are subordinate to the absolute aim, so that the moral law is superior to all individual laws.
The value of moral virtue is, indeed, incomparable and infinite, and cannot have its ultimate basis in the personality of creatures. The moral obligation is absolute and unlimited; whether the action belongs to the sphere of politics, industry or art, the obligation cannot be derived from any of these things. Their claims are relative and conditional, and whenever they come into conflict with the law of morality they must give way, as the accidental invariably must give way to the essential. This dependence may be traced ultimately to the most universal conception of good. We cannot absolutely assert a thing to be good, unless we know the object for which it is good, and have traced it up to the highest aim, i.e., to an aim that from every point of view is worthy to be loved and sought for its own sake. It is only possible to state, with complete and permanent assurance, what is good for man and for his conduct, if we regard him not as a philosopher, artist, citizen or contractor, but as man, a human being, having in his innermost nature a soul related to infinite truth and goodness. Thus the isolated departments of human activity lose their independence in the presence of the force and obligation of morality, and yet it is no loss, because from the very outset they could not regard their special aims as absolute, but must look, for their crown and completion, to life as a whole, in the light of true wisdom.
This is the distinction between truth and goodness, -- even before we have a knowledge of God, even before recognition of the divine truth, there is absolutely valid truth, such as that of the principles of thought; but there is no absolutely binding goodness until we have grasped what is absolutely good and valuable. The foundation of our knowledge lies in the actuality of the created world, but the ultimate ground of our volition is in our final aim. The truth of the statment 2 X 2 = 4 is not increased for us when there is added to it a knowledge of the source of truth and being; but in the sentence "A child must obey his parents," the "must" receives a fresh and intensified meaning, if we first derive its meaning from the ideas of "child" and "parents," without reference to a higher aim and Lawgiver, and then, as our natural conscience does, bring the idea "must" into relation with a higher, absolute aim and law.{9}
The Commandment: "Thou shalt honour thy father and thy mother" appears at first sight to be sufficiently justified by the natural relation of a child to its parents and by the value of family life; but what are we to say when people of the modern type regard the family in its present form as a hindrance to genuine development? We may refer them to a higher aim, to the welfare and life of society, the foundation of which is the family, but this reference will have no effect, if the absolute value of this aim is called in question. Not every kind of society deserves respect, indiscriminately, and so we are forced to seek a higher standard of genuine goodness. Even life and the preservation of the human race do not seem to a philosopher such absolute advantages as to a sociologist, as pessimism looks at it. If all created being and life did not, in its order and direction to an aim, reveal God to us, -- God, who desires the life, order, and perfection of humanity as the true good, as His own aim, -- then we might well raise the question whether human life, the alleged "highest good," is really a good thing in all cases, and whether the elimination of this highest point in the series of our aims does not destroy the whole purpose of morality. The justifiable independence of human action gains rather than loses by its subordination to morality. Not only are due limits assigned to the various departments of life and law, but any encroachment of one upon the other is averted. Their interior laws and postulates, too, are confirmed and established by morals, as are also parental authority, fidelity to the marriage bond, commercial honesty, civil liberty, the dignity of art, and in fact all rules and methods upon which work in the various departments must depend, if it is to be productive of good results. The highest aim, as we have seen, works through all the lower aims, not destroying, but maintaining and raising them. The practical relations, arising out of the nature and position of man in the world, remain authoritative in morality also. These foundations, based on natural law, the Catholic teaching on ethics defends against the doctrines of a radical evolution of morals as well as against those theorists who represent the whole moral law as the outcome of a free, arbitrary determination on part of the Creator.{10}
The system of morality that builds up so as to preserve the right relation of things to one another, whilst ordering all to the highest end, appears again as important. We see how the department of morality is higher than other departments of civilized life, but is still akin to them; it is superior to them, but does not crush nor confuse them; and thus they remain truly independent, -- not independent of morality, but within the limits of morality.
The whole consideration assumes another aspect, if morality be separated in some way from its natural foundation, if the principle of good and evil be relegated to the subjective consciousness or habits of mankind, or made dependent upon some arbitrary action on the part of God. When this is done, it destroys the inner teleological connection between the advantages of civilization and the excellence of morality, and as nevertheless the moral law is the highest positive command, it must in that case almost inevitably imperil true independence in all other matters.
The empiricists, in writing on ethics, try to show that ordering life to God neutralizes all earthly and temporal interests, and that the divine law deprives all independent effort of its value, and actually destroys it. But as things in this world owe their natural being and energy to the fact that they were created by God, so it is impossible for them to lose their natural significance and expediency by being destined and used for God. I have repeatedly pointed out that Catholic morals represent certain actions as necessary and good in themselves, whilst others are condemned as bad because they are opposed to the nature of man, and frustrate the object for which things are created. For instance, a lie frustrates the object of speech, impurity that of marriage, and deeds of violence that of liberty. Thus out of the very nature of things proceeds a law, and from existence an obligation; God Himself cannot reverse the law, -- not that He is dependent upon the things, but because He has created them according to His own ideas, and cannot contradict Himself. Our reason recognizes such a law out of our concepts of things, before it thinks of any special commandment given by God. It sees that family love and the virtues of justice and truthfulness are in necessary agreement with the will and glory of God. Thus these moral obligations possess a certain independence, not because they have produced an absolute obligation irrespective of the highest end, but because in their very nature they are included in the order making for the highest end. In this way we arrive at a sort of natural ethics, the simplest rules of which may be traced in all philosophies and in every nation, even amongst pagans.
Not only are the laws of action in harmony with the nature of things, but Catholic moralists recognize that there is a natural value attached to the corresponding actions. There is only one summum bonum, and only one fundamental morality, that subjects everything to this supreme good. But there are many bona honesta, which, though inferior to it, must to some extent be valued for their own sake, and there are many virtues, which, as virtutes politicae, possess a moral value, although perfection is not brought about until all are ordered to God. Thus as Christians we may still speak of asceticism as having an independent value, meaning that mortification is not only a means for the preservation of other virtues, but is estimable in itself, through its peculiar moral beauty (honestas), In the same way, whilst acknowledging that the life of a Christian must be directed to God alone, we may speak of the independent value of public worship, of family affection, of patriotism, etc., provided we remember that the independence in these cases is only relative.
Owing to the greatness and universality of the moral aim, there is an essential difference between morals and secular civilization. In secular occupations much exclusiveness and specialization are permissible and even beneficial, but in matters of morality the part seeks the whole, and each single virtue with its finis particularis makes for the highest end of life. There are no limitations, no specialists and amateurs. A poet or artist may select for himself an "independent" sphere in poetry or painting; a merchant may take one thing or another as the object of his industry; and both may occasionally suspend their activities and take a holiday. But the moral law is always binding, and it pledges us always to what is highest, i.e., to become like God. Although for hours at a time we may not think of Him, and devote our days to secular occupations, anxieties, and pleasures, still, to some extent, all that we do must be done in His light. Parents may bring up their children in accordance with the rules of hygiene, train them according to the laws of psychology, and instruct them according to the best didactic methods, without reference to religion; but they cannot educate them, i.e., make them moral beings, without God and the fear of God; not even by teaching them to practise civic virtues.
When once the moral consciousness is awakened, it cannot be isolated and lulled to rest; it tolerates no self-sufficiency on the part of single moral tendencies; these are virtues only in the sense that they are the beginnings (inchoatio) of the perfect virtue of charity, and they have a moral value only as offshoots and partial manifestations (participatio) of the effort made by the soul to apply itself, whole and undivided, to the highest Good.{11}
We also maintain that law and politics, industry, science, and art, are all governed by their own laws, but we assert at the same time that they all have to wait for religion to give them their true and higher principles.{12}
There is in human nature a true independence, that submits to higher laws -- God loves willing service, rendered by independent beings, not by slaves. As to Schiele's further remark: "We are convinced that the world has its own order, independently of Christianity; a Catholic seeks to bring order into the world by means of Christianity," we must make a distinction: Christianity is a supernatural religion; the world of nature received its order at the Creation, and preserves it quite apart from Christianity. This is true of conformity to the physical laws of the universe and also of the natural law of morality, and of the aims assigned by God to govern the natural life of man. If we speak of "the world," in the sense in which the word is used in the New Testament, as meaning men who have departed from the moral order, of course we can assert that Christianity ought to bring order into the world, for as the world has been false to its moral aim, it needs the restoration and renewed health that revealed religion can supply. Does any student of ethics doubt that the world as it now exists, with its modern revival of paganism, requires improvement, purification, and rearrangement?
Moreover, Christianity gives back to us the supernatural life of grace that was lost by sin; and it is probably chiefly to this point that reference is made, when fears are expressed lest the security and well-being of civilized society would suffer, should we apply the phrase "to renew all things in Christ"{13} to the world. The same fear seems to give rise to the assertion that "revelation has an interior mission only to the individual soul," and not "a public mission to all universally." The origin and history of Christianity do not afford the slightest justification for this distinction. The Gospel was to be preached to all nations, not only to individuals; and the words quoted from the epistle to the Ephesians refer to all things "that are in heaven and on earth," and in the same epistle St. Paul goes on to apply them to marriage, slavery, and other social questions. The distinction between the interior and the public mission of Revelation is in itself unnatural, for the life of the individual is organically connected with that of society, and the former cannot be developed fully without the latter, which embodies it. In the course of history, whenever any great upward tendency has affected the souls of men, the outward results have invariably been manifest. If it were true that Revelation was a danger to exterior civilization, security, and order, it would have to imperil the inner life in a similar fashion. But as a matter of fact, the case is quite different; the new and incomprehensible qualities with which grace endows us and by which it makes us resemble God, are not a sign of danger and a hindrance, but a completion and perfection of nature.
The words so often quoted: Gratia non destruit, sed supponit et perficit naturam, imply that our natural faculties and powers presuppose, as a permanent foundation, the life of grace. The supernatural light and life of grace can be communicated only to a spiritual being, and it affects the reason and free will of man. What is natural, being the suppositum of grace, must be preserved in its security and order, in its independence as designed by God, if the Catholic idea of the supernatural life is to be fully realized.{14}
Faith is reached by way of the so-called praeambula fidei, the natural knowledge of certain philosophical and historical truths; the supernatural desire contained in hope and charity are connected with our innate longing for happiness and perfection; and in both the natural conscience must coöperate in the process of justification by means of admonitions and demands. Charity, the most perfect expression of the life of grace, includes the "whole law" of the decalogue; it is the finis praecepti, the end in the sense of completion, not in that of destroying and rendering void the moral law.{15}
The Vatican Council emphatically insists upon both, the difference and the connection between the natural and the supernatural order, and incidentally refers to the independent character of the natural arts and sciences. Faith and reason mutually support each other, "since true reason authenticates the foundations of faitb, and, by the light of faith, perfects our knowledge of divine things, whilst faith delivers and preserves reason from error, and equips it with many kinds of perception. The Church, far from opposing the practice of human arts and sciences, encourages and promotes them in various ways, for she is well aware of, and far from despising, the advantages accruing therefrom to human life; in fact, she confesses that all knowledge proceeds from God, the Lord of knowledge, and that when its pursuit is carried on by the aid of His grace, it leads men to God. The Church does not forbid any branch of learning to employ its own principles and methods, but whilst recognizing this independence (libertas), she is careful to prevent the sciences from suffering any contamination by error through denying her divine teaching, and from overstepping their own limits so as to encroach upon the sphere of faith."{16}
The Church has always warned her children against false wisdom and civilization; even in the earliest ages of Christianity she made it her task to discover and appropriate whatever was true and trustworthy in pagan philosophy and learning, the gold and silver that the heathen nations "had dug, as it were, out of the mines of divine Providence, that diffused itself in all directions."{17}
Even with regard to ethics, some of the doctors of the Church, such as St. Clement of Alexandria and St. Ambrose, often adhered to ancient models on points of method and of natural morality. The Stoic philosophers investigated the natural law and their research found a place in Christian science, and the study of the Classics was after due consideration introduced into the instruction of the young, who were taught to imitate their style. Scholasticism showed a generous appreciation of the connection between natural and supernatural wisdom by assigning to the works of Plato and Aristotle so high a value and position in education. The very name of the Renaissance indicates a revival of other important elements in the old learning, viz., the sense of artistic form and a closer adherence to nature. From that period dates the rise of secular knowledge, which does not indeed deny its connection with the Christian form of intellectual development that preceded it, but owes its marvellous results primarily to the most exact study of nature and to mathematical methods. Of such scientific research it is even more true than of philosophy, that it must proceed according to its own methods and on its own lines, and in so doing cannot employ principles of supernatural thought. Speaking in general terms, Cardinal Mercier remarks: "We ought not to approach the problems of physics, chemistry, biology, history or political economy with a preconceived intention of deriving from them a confirmation of our religious convictions. When we speak of treating anything from the scientific point of view, we mean that we isolate it, in order to look at it by itself." Therefore, in granting that each natural science, each art and each branch of technical knowledge, has a formal object, we tacitly acknowledge that it possesses interior independence.{18}
Scientific thought is, however, not the only means of arriving at a knowledge of truth; hence the "isolation" must not lead to a denial of other sources of information, and least of all to a denial of faith in Revelation. Scientific thought, like everything human, is fallible, and history records many cases where it has given rise to errors on most important subjects; hence faith, being based upon the infallible teaching of God, ought to have precedence whenever alleged results of scientific research are opposed to it.
The distinction between the natural and the supernatural becomes confused by an attempt to determine the "sole validity of the Catholic ideal" and "the Catholic unity of the Church and the world," by means of such a statement as the following: "All that is truly natural is truly good, and all that is truly good is Catholic. This is the universality and breadth of the Catholic, i.e., universal idea. If this Catholic element occurs even amongst Protestants or atheists, we accept it as being inwardly Catholic. If Protestants or atheists offer to coöperate with us, we welcome them, provided that they work in a Catholic spirit. But we reject everything in literature, society, politics, and education that in this wide sense lacks the inwardly Catholic character, since not being Catholic it is therefore worthless and must inevitably be harmful, not only to religion, but also to industry, art, political life, and education."{19}
According to this sort of argument, Alexander's military genius and Homer's poetry, Greek architecture and Roman law, the invention of steam engines and of flying machines, are all inwardly Catholic; but they would have to be absolutely condemned if they lacked "this inwardly Catholic character!" The correct view is that the universality of the Church consists in her being able in a unique manner to incorporate with herself all that is naturally good and beautiful, thus preserving it and raising it to a higher level. What is naturally good may become Catholic, but it is not Catholic until it has received a Catholic character through faith and the Church, -- just as a natural man with the best dispositions and noblest intentions only becomes a Catholic when he is baptized. The Church recognizes as good and valuable many things that are not Catholic, for instance, valid marriage among pagans, although it is plainly different from Catholic marriage, and the authority of a heathen government, although it is by no means on a level with what is Christian and Catholic. She recognizes also the substance of the natural law, and teaches that it is good, not because she enforces it, but she enforces it because it is good. She approves of civic virtues originating in the natural moral disposition and freedom of mankind, though not bearing any inwardly Catholic character. How can it be possible for atheists to "work in a Catholic spirit," especially when we are told elsewhere that all progress springs from a religious theory of life?{20}
God designed the natural to be the basis of the supernatural life and activity, and thus the degree and durability of human progress depend not only on the amount of graces bestowed by God, but also on the solidity of their natural foundation; in other words, upon the coöperation and loyalty of mankind. If we survey certain periods in the history of the Church, we shall find that this fact often accounts for the vigorous life displayed in some, and the stagnation and inactivity prevailing in others. As we have seen, the natural departments of labour have each their own laws, given them at their creation, and it often requires persevering research and toil to appreciate these laws. Hence for Christians to spend their energies profitably, they must not begin at the highest point only, relying solely on the beauty and truth of the Catholic ideals, but they must at the same time work upwards from below, striving with patience and by means adapted to each individual task to bring reality into harmony with their ideals. They must not be afraid to learn from their opponents, for it cannot be denied that men and periods of time alien to Christianity and the supernatural have concentrated their forces exclusively upon nature, and just on account of this concentration have in some respects attained to remarkable acumen and exactness in their knowledge, and to wonderful mastery over their intellectual and practical powers.
In this connection I remind my readers once more of the perfect style and model language of the old classical writers, so highly appreciated by our Catholic educators, and of the marvellous progress made by science in the last few years, and of the increased power of expression possessed by modern art. It involves no denial of Catholic principles to recommend Catholics to acquire such mastery over natural forces and modes of thought even though it grew upon a strange soil, and even to set the example in these matters. But on the other hand, it is a higher duty to be faithful to the supernatural aim indicated by faith, hope, and charity, and gladly to acknowledge the advantages that we derive from these virtues, and their assistance in solving the most fundamental problems of natural knowledge and life. The assurance and light that they impart to our theories of life and of the universe far outweigh any "inferiority" in isolated branches of science.
Faith supplies and maintains the one thing needful, the highest truth and supreme obligation amidst the diversity of secular occupations, and it must inevitably restrict the independence of the various departments of natural knowledge to the extent that they may not oppose the supernatural direction of thought and life. This surveillance promotes the real interests of natural truth and morality, and protects important principles of the natural law and of the true ideal of civilization, for in spite of their appealing to human reason, these principles are often obscured, doubted, and even attacked by men who claim to think deeply. If religious and moral thought is not to be left isolated, powerless, and remote from all the extravagances of the natural mind of man, the Church, as guardian of the faith, must be able to condemn philosophical and social errors. Her interference with secular work and knowledge is of a negative character, indicating restrictions and safeguards, and it is not a substitute for natural, positive work.{21} Together with this corrective and negative action, there proceeds from the supernatural principle, as I have already said, also a positive action promoting civilization and progress by supplying a more perfect harmony and a higher vigour, fulness, and power of doing good to all important branches of learning.{22}
On this subject H. Holzamer writes as follows: "The activities which aim primarily at the attainment of natural ends, such as our political, social, scientific, and artistic work, receive their inner order and guidance from natural reason, and not from supernatural faith. Faith makes not the slightest attempt to give a man any instructions on the subject of his worldly occupations; it does not tell him which form of government he ought to select, which scientific methods he ought to apply, nor which rules of architecture and painting he ought to observe. In all his secular occupation man is referred to the positive guidance of reason. It is only negatively, as an exterior standard, that faith claims respect here. It requires man in his daily work not to violate the divine law. It sets up a barrier which secular existence must respect, so as not to encroach upon the supernatural and spiritual life."{23}
Science is, in Holzamer's opinion, autonomous and supreme within itself (p. 167), faith affects political life only negatively (p. 196), and religion is only an external, negative rule with reference to secular art (p. 234). This is, he thinks, the definite formula, which if rightly understood, will prove a means of removing the differences and effecting the union among Catholics of various opinions.
It is quite true that the sphere of secular occupation is not subject to faith as an interior rule, if the word "rule" means a law, constraining and forbidding. Holzamer states that he uses the word in this sense. But a wider meaning may be assigned to it, and it may include regulations and measures adapted to what is better or more expedient; and in this sense faith and the supernatural view of life do exercise a positive, interior influence upon ordinary occupations. Incidentally Holzamer also uses instead of the word "rule" other words such as "guidance," "suggestion," "standards," which have this wider meaning.{24}
A scientist, artist or author is not bound to choose his subjects and carry out his work with any positive reference to faith, but it is often imprudent for him to restrict himself to purely secular matters, because faith may suggest to him fresh points of view, fill up lacunae in his line of thought and answer disturbing questions. Holzamer speaks of this influence as furthering and enlightening philosophical thought, which has benefited, moreover, by dogmatic teaching on the subjects of personality, substance, etc. In the same way he points out that social politics, if not enlightened by Christian principles, are very apt to run counter to reason, and frequently arrive at nothing beyond untrustworthy hypotheses, or mere criticism, and therefore they would do well to let the "standard wisdom" of Christianity be their positive guide (pp. 215, 218). In both cases of course it is taken for granted that science as such does not teach dogmatically, but expounds and explains in conformity with reason. The same remarks apply to other departments of secular knowledge, and more particularly to those that are closely connected with morals.{25}
Full light is thrown upon the whole question, if Holzamer's distinction "supernatural life -- natural life" is more consistently kept in view, and if natural morality (ethics and the natural law) is included under "natural life as a whole." Under the one head Holzamer discusses only the supernatural = spiritual = ecclesiastical life, and under the other the secular or "profane" activity, including the scientific, political, industrial, and artistic life.
The extension of the quotation as indicated, leads to a solution less attractive but more complete and far-reaching. As soon as we touch on the sphere of morality, or on that of the civic virtues, which are indispensable even to the ethics of modern free thought and social praxis, the "isolation" of the various departments to some extent ceases, and so does all limitation to the concrete formal object of each, since each special "good" necessarily tends to the universal and supreme good. Although on this point the distinction between the positive and negative influence of faith and charity is justifiable, still the connection between the natural and the supernatural is undoubtedly closer and the positive influence of the supernatural greater and more evident.{26}
A true consideration of the world and of life shows us that nowhere is there any absolute autonomy for a creature, either in his existence or his actions, and that we cannot grant any complete self-mastery to the various departments of intellectual and social life without at the same time destroying civilization as a whole, which underlies them all and is their very soul.
Pantheism aims at giving to human life and activity absolute independence and value, but unless it abandons its fundamental dogma of the unity of substance, it is forced to deny the actual diversity existing in nature and civilized life, and the peculiarities and independence of the various departments of knowledge and work. At the same time it takes away all the value of personality, all liberty of action, all possibility of real causation, -- in fact it destroys all the essential constituents of subjective independence.
The Christian theory grants to what is finite in nature and civilized life the full reality and peculiar beauty that it possesses in the sight of natural knowledge, and admits its peculiar value and influence upon human volition and action; the Christian theory adds depth and dignity to man, since he is the subject of knowledge and action. All that an empiricist or secular thinker possesses and boasts of, is equally the property of a Christian, who is not disposed either to treat it superficially, like the idealist, or to regard it with suspicion, like the pessimist. Over and above the order of good things on earth he recognizes one supreme Good, to which all personal and human life is subservient; but this is a gain, an increment added to the possession that the Christian enjoys in common with others, and it has a most beneficial influence both upon the inner life of the individual and the outer life of mankind collectively.
There are at the present time teachers of social science, such as Sombart, Menger, and others, who do not simply idolize earthly progress and do not regard industrial productiveness as the highest aim and purpose of life, but would prefer to uphold the validity of the moral law in all the various spheres of human activity. Yet at the same time they agree with earlier national economists in teaching that the "social and political ideal" is perfectly autonomous, and they deny that there is any moral limitation to economic progress. This seems to be an incomprehensible contradiction; we may comprehend it to some degree, perhaps, if we remember that some modern principles of morals are too one-sided, or too much a matter of sentiment, or too much savouring of formalism, ever to be capable of regulating life as a whole, although the principles themselves may be universally valid. The case is different when morals, in spite of their subjectivity, stand in an essential relation to the objective world around us, and when, according to the theory of St. Thomas, they are always in touch with the order of ideas and aims. Even in the case of philosophers who to some extent recognize this teleological principle, we can perhaps understand the contradiction when we are told that Sombart, for instance, considers the aim of economics to be only a "particular ideal," and with reference to the moral aim assumes it to be the final and highest aim, yet at the same time he denies that all "particular ideals" with their spheres of influence must be dominated by the highest aim. St. Thomas having proved that there is one and only one final aim for man, raises the further question whether all other aims must be desired for the sake of this final aim.{27} His answer is in the affirmative, for two reasons, first, because the will fundamentally keeps in view the most perfect conception of what is good, and all that is good only in a partial and incomplete way must be referred to, and judged by, the standard of what is perfectly and completely good. Secondly, because in the movement towards an end, the final aim occupies the same position as that which the first cause occupies in movements from causes, and thus all proximate ends receive from the final end their power to affect us. I cannot here discuss further the truth of this argument, or its application to the case that we are considering. It is clear, however, that if some final end, recognized or assumed by students of ethics, proves not to possess this universal value and moving force, they will be tempted to look upon the "particular ideals" as subject to no control, and to suppose that the attitude of these ideals to the highest aim ought perhaps to be one of respect, but not of subordination to it.{28}
The aim of Christian morality is so exalted, and yet so intimately related with all natural goods and human endeavours, that it affects every department of civilized life, directing, moderating, and checking it, but also adding life, depth, and harmony to it. We honour God when we offer Him our heart's devotion in religious worship, but we also honour Him when we marvel at His great works in nature; we can serve Him in quiet domestic work, but also in the arena of military and political warfare; we can further His designs for mankind by means of apostolic work in the Church, but also by the acquisition and use of earthly possessions. Economic life shows by the very fact that it serves the aims of sustenance that it has no right to claim to be a wholly independent aim. Its close connection with law, and its place in social science, which puts a higher and more general interpretation upon the idea of welfare, reveal to us the links connecting economic life and morals. The extreme ardour to make worldly aims independent makes it easy to understand why, in worldly matters, people want to do everything with the help of religion, but nothing from motives of religion, whilst to a Catholic his religion is the strongest motive for all that he accomplishes.{29}
Religion means referring all one's life to God, and uniting the soul with Him, and it can no more be something running parallel to and yet unconnected with worldly affairs, than God can be imagined as existing alongside of the world but unconnected with it.
The genuinely Catholic maxim, Ora et labora, shows that we too connect religion, the special service of God, with work in the world, and whilst esteeming most highly all that is religious, we acknowledge that fidelity to one's secular calling has a moral beauty of its own, and we recognize it at its natural worth in those also who do not work in the spirit of Christianity. Thus, on the one hand, we preserve the unity of life indispensable for our mind and disposition, the unity of the inner soul life with the public life in society, a unity which inevitably implies dependence upon its central point; but on the other hand, we give to the special energies and forces which work according to God's will within that unity all the scope that they need in order to develop freely and independently in conformity with their nature.
{1} Cf. supra, p. 427. In a criticism of a speech against Modernism that I delivered at the Catholic congress at Dusseldorf, Fr. Schiele, speaking as one of the Protestant Modernists, says that my words revealed to him plainly the difference between his attitude and that of the Catholic Church towards progress. "We are convinced that the 'world' has its own order, independently of Christianity; a Catholic seeks to bring order into the world by means of Christianity. Politics, law, industry, science, and art all are, in our opinion, governed by their own laws; to a Catholic they all have to wait for religion to give them their true and higher principles. We fear for the purity of our faith as well as for the safety and order of civilized life, if Christianity should encroach upon these subjects; but a Catholic welcomes such encroachment as tending omnia instaurare in Christo. We distinguish religion and theology, faith and knowledge, morality and politics, Christianity and art; but a Catholic cannot unite all these too closely. We know that Revelation has an interior mission only for the individual soul; a Catholic believes it to have a public mission to all universally. We desire as individuals to do everything in the world with the aid of religion, but nothing for the sake of religion; a Catholic looks upon religion as his strongest motive of action, and does everything for the sake of his religion" (Christl. Welt, 1908, p. 905).
{2} One aspect of independence, viz., the relation between subjective liberty of action and ecclesiastical authority, was discussed in Chapter IX. I am restricting myself here to the objective independence of the value of actions and of the interior rules for action. The misunderstandings to which I have just referred are partly due to the fact that the Latin languages possess no word exactly equivalent to the German selbstständig, which does not mean exactly "independent," but rather "self-dependent."
{3} Thom., S. c. Gentil., III, c. 112: Sola igitur intellectualis natura est propter se quaesita in universo, alia autem omnia propter ipsam.
{4} S. theol., 1, q. 2, a. 1.
{5} Fr. Walter, Socialpolitik und Moral, 1899, p. 24.
{6} S. theol., I, q. 5, a. 6; II, II, q. 145, a. 3.
{7} De div., 83 quaest., q. 30.
{8} Cf. Mausbach, Die Etbik des hI. Augustinus, I, 223.
{9} Cf. Philos. Jahrbuch, 1899, p. 420. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, I, 394, etc.
{10} Cf. supra, pp. 134, seq.
{11} S. theol., II, II, q. 23, a. 7: Si accipiatur virtus, secundum quod est in ordine ad finem aliquem particularem, sic potest aliqua virtus dici sine caritate. Erit quidem vera virtus sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et perfectum bonum. Ibid., ad 2 and 3; I, II, q. 57, a. 4 ad 3: Prudentia est bene consiliativa de his, quae pertinent ad totam vitam hominis et ad ultimum finem vitae humanae. Sed in artibus aliquibus est consilium de his qui pertinent ad fines proprios illarum artium. Unde aliqui, inquantum sunt bene consiliativi in rebus bellicis vel nauticis, dicunter prudentes duces vel gubernatores, non autem prudentes simpliciter; sed illi solum, qui bene consiliantur de his, qui conferunt ad totam vitam. I, II, q. 65, a. 2: Ad rectam autem rationem prudentiae multo magis requiritur, quod homo bene se habeat circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem, quam circa alios fines, quod fit per virtutes morales. I, II, q. 1, a. 6: Quidquid homo appetit, appetit sub ratione boni; quod quidem, si non appetitur ut bonum perfectum, quod est ultimus finis, necesse est ut appetatur ut tendens in bonum perfectum; quia semper inchoatia alicujus ordinatur ad consummationem ipsius, sicut patet tam in his, quae fiunt a natura, quam in his, quae fiunt ab arte; et ita omnis inchoatio perfectionis ordinatur in perfectionem consummatum, quae est per ultimum finem.
{12} Cf. supra, p. 474, note 1.
{13} Eph. i. 10.
{14} Cf. supra, pp. 313, seq.; St. Thomas's statement: "Fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem sicut gratia naturam" is supplemented by the Vatican Council in the words "recta ratio fidei fundamenta demonstrat." Cf. A. Weiss, op. cit., I, 700: "First the foundation, then the structure built upon it. The foundation is nature, the structure is grace. Grace presupposes nature. Not as if it grew out of nature, for it is a new and higher creation from above. But grace builds on nature, and cannot thrive where nature is unhealthy. In order to thrive, grace perfects nature." Cf. Meyenberg, supra, p. 466, note 1.
{15} Augustin, En. 2, in ps. 31, 5; Non ergo hic finem praecepti dixit, quo quasi pereant praecepta, sed quo perficiantur et consummentur, non consumantur.
{16} Sess. 3, c. 4 (Dens. 10th ed., p. 1799). Granderath (Gesch. des Vatik. Konsils, II, 1903, 453) remarks that all who have discussed the passage quoted above have come to the following conclusion: "Science has its own rules and methods, by means of which it can, within its own domain, carry on investigations, free and unimpeded. It is under no external obligation, hence is not constrained by revelation and the Church to accept anything at which it would not have arrived by following its own rules, or to carry on its investigations according to the orders of others. Its dependence is negative, not positive; it may not assert and maintain anything contradictory to one of the truths of faith . . . for truth cannot be opposed to truth."
{17} St. Augustine, De doctr. christ., II, n. 60.
{18} Mercier, La Modernisme.
{19} Köln., Eine innere Gefahr, p. 59.
{20} Köln, Eine innere Gefahr, p. 48; cf. supra, p. 450.
{21} Cf. supra, p. 488, note 1.
{22} Cf. supra, pp. 294, seq.
{23} Turm und Block, p. 154.
{24} Cf. e.g., p. 166.
{25} Cf. H. Pesch, Nationalökonomie, I (1905), 420, etc.; III (1913), 754, etc.
{26} Cf. supra, pp. 488, seq. We see how the results agree with one another and turn out to be analogous. In speaking of secular associations we noted that their necessary basis must be an aim objectively permissible and in accordance with reason and the natural law, and the elevating force furthering this aim must be their Christian and Catholic character (p. 471); in the same way secular knowledge is truly independent in the sense that it is inwardly and positively obliged to follow only its own principles and methods, but it can be assisted and perfected by a suitable adherence to Christianity.
{27} S. theol., I, II, q. 1, a. 6.
{28} Cf. on this subject Fr. Walter, Sozialpolitik und Moral, 1899, pp. 22, etc., 257, etc.; H. Pesch, Nationalökonomie, I, 264, etc., 420, etc.; J. Beck, Volkswirtschaft und Sittengesetz, 1908. In answer to Dürkheim and LevyBrühl, French sociologists, who assert that the morals of the present day at any rate are incompatible with economics, S. Duploige shows (Le conflit de la morale et de la sociologie, 1912) that St. Thomas's moral teaching forms an excellent and trustworthy basis for economic activity, especially because it has a firm hold upon the natural law whilst at the same time it interprets that law with great elasticity, and also because it connects morality very closely with the order of aims.
{29} Cf. supra, p. 474, note 1.